Search results for 'personhood account' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Robert Lane (2009). Persons, Signs, Animals: A Peircean Account of Personhood. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):pp. 1-26.score: 156.0
    In this essay I describe two of the accounts that Peirce provides of personhood: the semiotic account, on which a person is a sequence of thought-signs, and the naturalistic account, on which a person is an animal. I then argue that these disparate accounts can be reconciled into a plausible view on which persons are numerically distinct entities that are nevertheless continuous with each other in an important way. This view would be agreeable to Peirce in some (...)
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  2. Moral Personhood (2010). 3 Developmental Perspective on the Emergence of Moral Personhood James C. Harris. In Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. 55.score: 120.0
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  3. Christian Barry & Nicholas Southwood (2011). What Is Special About Human Rights? Ethics and International Affairs 25 (3):369-83.score: 90.0
    Despite the prevalence of human rights discourse, the very idea or concept of a human right remains obscure. In particular, it is unclear what is supposed to be special or distinctive about human rights. In this paper, we consider two recent attempts to answer this challenge, James Griffin’s “personhood account” and Charles Beitz’s “practice-based account”, and argue that neither is entirely satisfactory. We then conclude with a suggestion for what a more adequate account might look like (...)
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  4. Luke Russell (2010). Dispositional Accounts of Evil Personhood. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):231 - 250.score: 84.0
    It is intuitively plausible that not every evildoer is an evil person. In order to make sense of this intuition we need to construct an account of evil personhood in addition to an account of evil action. Some philosophers have offered aggregative accounts of evil personhood, but these do not fit well with common intuitions about the explanatory power of evil personhood, the possibility of moral reform, and the relationship between evil and luck. In contrast, (...)
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  5. Kristin Borgwald (2012). Women's Anger, Epistemic Personhood, and Self-Respect: An Application of Lehrer's Work on Self-Trust. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):69-76.score: 66.0
    I argue in this paper that the work of Keith Lehrer, especially in his book Self-Trust has applications to feminist ethics; specifically care ethics, which has become the leading form of normative sentimentalist ethics. I extend Lehrer's ideas concerning reason and justification of belief beyond what he says by applying the notion of evaluation central to his account of acceptance to the need for evaluation of emotions. The inability to evaluate and attain justification of one's emotions is an epistemic (...)
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  6. Sirkku Kristiina Hellsten (2000). Towards an Alternative Approach to Personhood in the End of Life Questions. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (6):515-536.score: 66.0
    Within the Western bioethical framework, we make adistinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: thenaturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim topromote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normativeviews on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every daylife. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general thearguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist (...)
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  7. Mahon O'Brien (2011). The Future of Humanity: Heidegger, Personhood and Technology. Comparative Philosophy 2 (2).score: 66.0
    This paper argues that a number of entrenched posthumanist positions are seriously flawed as a result of their dependence on a technical interpretive approach that creates more problems than it solves. During the course of our discussion we consider in particular the question of personhood. After all, until we can determine what it means to be a person we cannot really discuss what it means to improve a person. What kinds of enhancements would even constitute improvements? This in turn (...)
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  8. Richard Cross (2011). Disability, Impairment, and Some Medieval Accounts of the Incarnation: Suggestions for a Theology of Personhood. Modern Theology 27 (4):639 - 658.score: 60.0
    Drawing on insights from the medieval theologians Duns Scotus and Hervaeus Natalis, I argue that medieval views of the Incarnation require that there is a sense in which the divine person depends on his human nature for his human personhood, and thus that the paradigmatic pattern of human personhood is in some way dependent existence. I relate this to a modern distinction between impairment and disability to show that impairment -- understood as dependence -- is normative for human (...)
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  9. Ruth Boeker (2014). The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity. History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (3):229-247.score: 58.0
    I offer an interpretation of John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke’s claim that “person” is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke’s characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke’s claim that sameness of consciousness is (...)
     
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  10. Steve Matthews (1998). Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.score: 54.0
    Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may (...)
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  11. Catriona Mackenzie (2007). Bare Personhood? Velleman on Selfhood. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):263 – 282.score: 54.0
    In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that 'the word "self" does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind' (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these (...)
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  12. Shiloh Y. Whitney (2011). Dependency Relations: Corporeal Vulnerability and Norms of Personhood in Hobbes and Kittay. Hypatia 26 (3):554-574.score: 54.0
    Theories of the liberal tradition have relied on independence as a norm of personhood. Feminist theorists such as Eva Kittay in Love's Labor have been instrumental in critiquing normative independence. I explore the role of corporeal vulnerability in Kittay's account of personhood, developing a comparison to the role it plays in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan. Kittay's crucial contribution in Love's Labor is that once we acknowledge the facts of corporeal vulnerability, we must not only acknowledge but also affirm (...)
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  13. S. K. Wertz (2012). Persons and Collingwoods Account. Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 17 (2):189-202.score: 54.0
    In his critique of aesthetic individualism, R.G. Collingwood provides an account of persons that anticipates the post-Wittgensteinians; notably, Peter Strawson, Daniel Dennett, and Annette Baier. According to this view, persons emerge in the midst of other persons. This process is always unfinished and ongoing throughout one's life. One difficulty with this perspective is the problem of firstness: if persons are essentially second persons or one's personhood is contingent upon other persons, how could there be a first person or (...)
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  14. Brenda Appleby & Nuala P. Kenny (2010). Relational Personhood, Social Justice and the Common Good: Catholic Contributions Toward a Public Health Ethics. Christian Bioethics 16 (3):296-313.score: 54.0
    Worldwide, there is renewed public and political attention focused on public health fueled by the globally explosive H1N1 pandemic. Pandemic planning emerged as a major area for public action in the absence of an overarching ethics framework appropriate for the community and population focus of public health. Baylis, Sherwin, and Kenny propose relational personhood and relational solidarity as core values for a public health ethics. The Catholic faith tradition makes three useful contributions in support of a relational ethic: first, (...)
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  15. Maykel Verkuyten (1998). Personhood and Accounting for Racism in Conversation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28 (2):147–167.score: 50.0
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  16. S. Matthew Liao (2012). The Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):265-277.score: 48.0
    Christopher Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is problematic because it fails to grant all human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are inclined to hold that all human (...)
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  17. L. K. Radha Krishna (forthcoming). Accounting for Personhood in Palliative Sedation: The Ring Theory of Personhood. Medical Humanities.score: 40.0
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  18. Lalit Kumar Radha Krishna (forthcoming). Accounting for Personhood in Palliative Sedation: The Ring Theory of Personhood. Medical Humanities.score: 40.0
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  19. John D. Greenwood (1993). Split Brains and Singular Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.score: 38.0
    In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.
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  20. Marcus Arvan (2014). A Better, Dual Theory of Human Rights. Philosophical Forum 45 (1):17-47.score: 36.0
    Human rights theory and practice have long been stuck in a rut. Although disagreement is the norm in philosophy and social-political practice, the sheer depth and breadth of disagreement about human rights is truly unusual. Human rights theorists and practitioners disagree – wildly in many cases – over just about every issue: what human rights are, what they are for, how many of them there are, how they are justified, what human interests or capacities they are supposed to protect, what (...)
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  21. Omar Sultan Haque (2008). Brain Death and its Entanglements. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (1):13-36.score: 36.0
    The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub-traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and (...)
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  22. Françoise Baylis, Nuala P. Kenny & Susan Sherwin (2008). A Relational Account of Public Health Ethics. Public Health Ethics 1 (3):196-209.score: 36.0
    oise Baylis, 1234 Le Marchant Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 3P7. Tel.: (902)-494–2873; Fax: (902)-494-2924; Email: francoise.baylis{at}dal.ca ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> . Abstract Recently, there has been a growing interest in public health and public health ethics. Much of this interest has been tied to efforts to draw up national and international plans to deal with a global pandemic. It is common for these plans to state the importance of drawing upon a well-developed (...)
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  23. Pak-Hang Wong (2012). Dao, Harmony and Personhood: Towards a Confucian Ethics of Technology. Philosophy and Technology 25 (1):67-86.score: 36.0
    A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...)
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  24. Rita C. Manning (1988). Dismemberment, Divorce and Hostile Takeovers: A Comment on Corporate Moral Personhood. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 7 (8):639 - 643.score: 36.0
    We can explain our intuitions about corporate takeover cases by appeal to Peter French's picture of the corporation as a moral person. He argues that corporations are persons in much the same sense as you and I, and are entitled to the same rights as humans. On this analysis, takeovers are murders, attempted murders, attempts to enslave, etc. I want to explore the consequences of this view for corporate takeovers. I shall argue that, though French can explain why our moral (...)
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  25. Francis Dunlop (1981). Moral Personhood: A Tentative Analysis. Journal of Moral Education 11 (1):3-17.score: 36.0
    Abstract The paper is an attempt to provide a brief analysis of moral experience and moral agency set firmly within an experiential analysis of the human person. The approach yields a set of ?moral components? that the moral educator should take into account, but also enables him to understand their significance in human life. The analysis stresses the importance of ?moral character?, which is seen partly in terms of the blind development of innate psychic capacities or powers in response (...)
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  26. Ursula Naue (2008). 'Self-Care Without a Self': Alzheimer's Disease and the Concept of Personal Responsibility for Health. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11 (3):315-324.score: 36.0
    The article focuses on the impact of the concept of self-care on persons who are understood as incapable of self-care due to their physical and/or mental ‘incapacity’. The article challenges the idea of this health care concept as empowerment and highlights the difficulties for persons who do not fit into this concept. To exemplify this, the self-care concept is discussed with regard to persons with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). In the case of persons with AD, self-care is interpreted in many different (...)
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  27. Mary I. Bockover (2010). Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition II: A Comparative Analysis of Personhood. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):317-325.score: 30.0
    This Philosophy Compass article continues the comparison between Confucian and mainstream Western views of personhood and their connection with ethics begun in Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition I: Fundamental Concepts , by focusing on the Western self conceived as an independent agent with moral and political rights. More specifically, the present article briefly accounts for how the more strictly and explicitly individualistic notion of self dominating Western philosophy has developed, leading up to a recent debate in (...)
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  28. John D. Greenwood (1993). Split-Brains and Singular Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.score: 30.0
    In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.
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  29. Donald Wilson (2007). Abortion, Persons, and Futures of Value. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (2):86-97.score: 26.0
    Don Marquis argues that his “future of value” account of the ethics of killing affords us a persuasive argument against abortion that avoids difficult questions about the moral status of the fetus. I argue that Marquis’ account is missing essential detail required for the claimed plausibility of the argument and that any attempt to provide this needed detail can be expected to undercut the claim of plausibility. I argue that this is the case because attempts to provide the (...)
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  30. Peter Brian Barry (2010). Extremity of Vice and the Character of Evil. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:25-42.score: 24.0
    It is plausible that being an evil person is a matter of having a particularly morally depraved character. I argue that suffering from extreme moral vices—and not consistently lacking moral vices, for example—suffices for being evil. Alternatively, I defend an extremity account concerning evil personhood against consistency accounts of evil personhood. After clarifying what it is for vices to be extreme, I note that the extremity thesis I defend allows that a person could suffer from both extremely (...)
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  31. S. Kay Toombs (1988). Illness and the Paradigm of Lived Body. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 9 (2).score: 24.0
    This paper suggests that the paradigm of lived body (as it is developed in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Zaner) provides important insights into the experience of illness. In particular it is noted that, as embodied persons, we experience illness primarily as a disruption of lived body rather than as a dysfunction of biological body. An account is given of the manner in which such fundamental features of embodiment as bodily intentionality, primary meaning, contextural organization, body image, gestural (...)
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  32. Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein (2007). Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):37-48.score: 24.0
    Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the (...)
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  33. Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.score: 24.0
    In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be (...)
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  34. Frans Svensson (2010). Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):255 - 271.score: 24.0
    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting (...)
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  35. Andy Clark (2002). That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press. 187--205.score: 24.0
    Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly continuous with, the minds of other animals and simple agents. His treatments of mind, consciousness, free will and human agency all reflect this distinctive dual perspective. There is, on the one hand, the (in)famous Intentional Stance, relative to which humans, dogs, insects and even the lowly thermostat (e.g. Dennett (1998) p.327) are all pronounced capable of believing and desiring in essentially the same theoretical sense. And there is, on the (...)
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  36. Manfred Frank (2007). Non-Objectal Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.score: 24.0
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of (...)
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  37. Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.score: 24.0
    According to the increasingly popular knowledge account, assertion is governed by the rule that speech acts of that kind require knowledge of their content. Timothy Williamson has argued that this knowledge rule is the constitutive rule of assertion. It is argued here that it is not the constitutive rule of assertion in any sense of the term, as it governs only some assertions rather than all of them. A (qualified) knowledge rule can in fact be derived from the traditional (...)
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  38. Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.score: 24.0
    Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding (...)
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  39. S. Matthew Liao (2010). The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.score: 24.0
    T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned (...)
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  40. Bennett W. Helm (2009). The Import of Human Action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action. Automatic Press/Vip. 89--100.score: 24.0
    My central philosophical concern for many years has been with what it is to be a person. Of course, we persons are agents, indeed agents of a special sort, so understanding personhood has of course led me to think about that special sort of agency. Yet my background in the philosophy of mind leads me to think that any account of this special sort of agency must appeal to psychological capacities that are themselves grounded in an account (...)
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  41. Eva Feder Kittay (2005). At the Margins of Moral Personhood. Ethics 116 (1):100-131.score: 24.0
    In this article I examine the proposition that severe cognitive disability is an impediment to moral personhood. Moral personhood, as I understand it here, is articulated in the work of Jeff McMahan as that which confers a special moral status on a person. I rehearse the metaphysical arguments about the nature of personhood that ground McMahan’s claims regarding the moral status of the “congenitally severely mentally retarded” (CSMR for short). These claims, I argue, rest on the view (...)
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  42. Benjamin Vilhauer (2009). Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.score: 24.0
    In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that (...)
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  43. Arto Laitinen (2010). Seen to Be Done: The Roots and Fruits of Public Equality. [REVIEW] Res Publica 16 (1):83-88.score: 24.0
    What is the ethical basis for democracy? What reasons do we have to go along with democratic decisions even when we disagree with them? When can we justly ignore democratic decisions? These three questions are intimately connected: understanding what is ultimately important about democracy helps us to understand the authority of democratic decisions over our personal views, and the limits of such authority. Thomas Christiano’s ambitious new book, The Constitution of Equality, aims to provide such an understanding through a discussion (...)
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  44. Nils Holtug (2011). Killing and the Time-Relative Interest Account. Journal of Ethics 15 (3):169-189.score: 24.0
    Jeff McMahan appeals to what he calls the “Time-relative Interest Account of the Wrongness of Killing” to explain the wrongness of killing individuals who are conscious but not autonomous. On this account, the wrongness of such killing depends on the victim’s interest in his or her future, and this interest, in turn, depends on two things: the goods that would have accrued to the victim in the future; and the strength of the prudential relations obtaining between the victim (...)
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  45. Arto Laitinen (2007). Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood:Capacities, Normativity and Recognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):248-270.score: 24.0
    This paper examines how three central aspects of personhood -- the capacities of individuals, their normative status, and the social aspect of being recognized -- are related, and how personhood depends on them. The paper defends first of all a 'basic view' that while actual recognition is among the constitutive elements of full personhood, it is the individual capacities (and not full personhood) which ground the basic moral and normative demands concerning treatment of persons. Actual recognition (...)
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  46. Thane Plantikow (2008). Surviving Personal Identity Theory: Recovering Interpretability. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109.score: 24.0
    Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.
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  47. David W. Shoemaker (1999). Utilitarianism and Personal Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):183-199.score: 24.0
    Ethical theories must include an account of the concept of a person. They also need a criterion of personal identity over time. This requirement is most needed in theories involving distributions of resources or questions of moral responsibility. For instance, in using ethical theories involving compensations of burdens, we must be able to keep track of the identities of persons earlier burdened in order to ensure that they are the same people who now are to receive the compensatory benefits. (...)
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  48. Joshua Preiss (2011). Multiculturalism and Equal Human Dignity: An Essay on Bhikhu Parekh. Res Publica 17 (2):141-156.score: 24.0
    Bhikhu Parekh is an internationally renowned political theorist. His work on identity and multiculturalism is unquestionably thoughtful and nuanced, benefiting from a tremendous depth of knowledge of particular cases. Despite his work’s many virtues, however, the normative justification for Parekh’s recommendations is at times vague or ambiguous. In this essay, I argue that a close reading of his work, in particular his magnum opus Rethinking Multiculturalism and the selfproclaimed sequel A New Politics of Identity, reveals that his claims frequently rely (...)
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  49. Lawrence B. Solum (1992). Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences. North Carolina Law Review 70:1231.score: 24.0
    Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program currently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonetheless of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer. Artificial intelligence (...)
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  50. Luciano Floridi (2012). Semantic Information and the Network Theory of Account. Synthese 184 (3):431-454.score: 24.0
    The article addresses the problem of how semantic information can be upgraded to knowledge. The introductory section explains the technical terminology and the relevant background. Section 2 argues that, for semantic information to be upgraded to knowledge, it is necessary and sufficient to be embedded in a network of questions and answers that correctly accounts for it. Section 3 shows that an information flow network of type A fulfils such a requirement, by warranting that the erotetic deficit, characterising the target (...)
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