Search results for 'phenomenal experience' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.score: 180.0
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be (...)
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  2. Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.score: 180.0
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...)
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  3. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.score: 180.0
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be (...)
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  4. Talis Bachmann (2011). Attention as a Process of Selection, Perception as a Process of Representation, and Phenomenal Experience as the Resulting Process of Perception Being Modulated by a Dedicated Consciousness Mechanism. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 156.0
    Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained controversial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially useful for moving forward. Specifically, we should differentiate between processes and the results of the processes, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention on the modality-specific and feature-specific perception to studying attentional effects (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.score: 132.0
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection (...)
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  6. Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.) (2012). Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co..score: 132.0
    The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration.
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  7. Neil Mehta (forthcoming). The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience. Journal of Philosophy.score: 126.0
    By considering imaginative experiences, radically different experiences of a single object, and other data, I argue that external particulars are sometimes parts of experience but are never parts of phenomenal character.
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  8. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.score: 120.0
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of (...)
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  9. Mark Pharoah, 'Thing-in-Itself' - Exploring the Relationship Between Phenomenal Experience and the Phenomenon of Consciousness.score: 120.0
    If one were to provide a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience one would explain why there could be a phenomenal experience that identifies itself as an individual that possesses ‘consciousness’. Although not a requirement of reduction, such an explanation would be consistent with our understanding of evolution and, consequently, explain the physical origins and purpose of phenomenal experience. However, this explanation would not explain why a particular conscious individual identifies itself as itself rather than (...)
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  10. Mark Pharoah, Looking to Systems Theory for a Reductive Explanation of Phenomenal Experience and Evolutionary Foundations for H.O.T.score: 120.0
    This paper details an evolving dynamic systems hierarchy and explores its relationship with conceptual, evolutionary, physiological, and behavioural characteristics that include phenomenal experience. In doing this, the paper demonstrates an example of a type-C physicalist's reductive explanation of phenomenal experience that is coherent with stipulated philosophical criteria and theories. By providing a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, the paper provides insights toward explaining many unique human characteristics. These include, creativity, the origins of language as (...)
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  11. Craig DeLancey (2007). Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information. Erkenntnis 66 (3):329 - 352.score: 120.0
    This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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  12. Victor A. F. Lamme & Rogier Landman (2001). Attention Sheds No Light on the Origin of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-993.score: 120.0
    In O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) account for the phenomenal experience of seeing, awareness is equated to what is within the current focus of attention. They find no place for a distinction between phenomenal and access awareness. In doing so, they essentially present a dualistic solution to the mind-brain problem, and ignore that we do have phenomenal experience of what is outside the focus of attention.
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  13. Thomas C. Dalton (1998). The Developmental Gap in Phenomenal Experience: A Comment on J. G. Taylor's "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap''. J:Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.score: 120.0
    J. G. Taylor advances an empirically testable local neural network model to understand the neural correlates of phenomenal experience. Taylor's model is better able to explain the presence (i.e., persistence, latency, and seamlessness) and unity of phenomenal consciousness which support the idea that consciousness is coherent, undivided, and centered. However, Taylor fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the nonlinear relationship between local and global neural systems. In addition, the ontological assumptions that PE is immediate, intrinsic, and (...)
     
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  14. Diana I. Pérez (2011). Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle. Teorema (3):113-133.score: 114.0
    The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a (...) concept is, and I show the difficulties each of them have. Finally, I develop my own account of phenomenal concepts. My thesis claims that phenomenal concepts are complex concepts whose possession conditions depend upon the mastery of many other concepts, in fact, quite complex concepts such as the distinction between appearance and reality (which belongs to our theory of mind system), and color concepts (at least in the case of the phenomenal concepts needed in order to account for Mary's case). And these later concepts are concepts that have special possession conditions: they include the deployment of nonconceptual recognitional capacities. (shrink)
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  15. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.score: 108.0
    We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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  16. Robert Schroer (2009). Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism? Philosophical Papers 39 (1):93-110.score: 108.0
    : Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: (...)
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  17. Riccardo Manzotti & Giulio Sandini (2001). Does Functionalism Really Deal with the Phenomenal Side of Experience? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):993-994.score: 102.0
    Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
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  18. Allen Lane, Review of Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe “Does Functionalism Really Deal with the Phenomenal Side of Experience?”. [REVIEW]score: 102.0
    Sensory Motor Contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not give any explanation about why and how objective functional relations should produce phenomenal experience. O’Regan and Noe as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
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  19. Vittorio Gallese (2005). Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.score: 96.0
    The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly (...)
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  20. Terry Horgan (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455.score: 96.0
    Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  21. Julian Kiverstein (2010). Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):155-181.score: 96.0
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience (...)
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  22. Garry Young (2011). Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.score: 96.0
    This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying (...) experience in accounting for the specificity of the delusional content. The role played by patient phenomenology is examined in light of Ratcliffe’s recent phenomenological account. Similarities and differences are discussed. The paper concludes that a purely phenomenological account is unable to differentiate between non-delusional patient groups, who have what appear to be equivalent phenomenal experiences to patients suffering from delusional misidentification but without the delusional belief, and delusional groups, something the interactionist model is able to do. (shrink)
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  23. Michael Pauen (1999). Phenomenal Experience and Science: Separated by a “Brick Wall”? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):968-968.score: 96.0
    Palmer's principled distinction between first-person experience and scientific access is called into question. First, complete color transformations of experience and memory may be undetectable even from the first-person perspective. Second, transformations of (say) pain experiences seem to be intrinsically connected to certain effects, thus giving science access to these experiences, in principle. Evidence from pain research and emotional psychology indicates that further progress can be made.
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  24. Philip Goff (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):617 - 620.score: 96.0
    (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 617-620. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.788529.
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  25. Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.score: 90.0
    According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles (...)
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  26. Joseph Levine (2010). Phenomenal Experience: A Cartesian Theater Revival. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.score: 90.0
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  27. Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2010). Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.score: 90.0
    Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. (...)
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  28. Anthony J. Marcel (1983). Conscious and Unconscious Perception: An Approach to the Relations Between Phenomenal Experience and Perceptual Processes. Cognitive Psychology 15:238-300.score: 90.0
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  29. Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 90.0
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with (...)
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  30. Craig DeLancey (2012). Consciousness and the Superfunctionality Claim. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.score: 90.0
    The superfunctionality claim is that phenomenal experiences are more than functional (objective, causal) relations. This is one of the most widely used but least attacked claims in the anti-physicalist literature on consciousness. Coupled with one form of structuralism, the view that science only explains functional relations, the superfunctionality claim entails that science will not explain phenomenal experience. The claim is therefore essential to many anti-physicalist arguments. I identify an open question argument for the superfunctionality claim that expresses (...)
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  31. Gary Bartlett (2014). Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.score: 90.0
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  32. Thomas C. Dalton (1998). The Developmental Gap in Phenomenal Experience: A Comment on J. G. Taylor's “Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap”. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):159-164.score: 90.0
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  33. Marzia Michelizza (2012). Carnap e Vasubandhu: esperienza e coscienza. Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 18 (1):175-195.score: 90.0
    In philosophy of mind, the arguments about phenomenal experience are related to ontological points of view in which the alternatives are physicalist monism and dualism. Both involve problems and the choice is difficult in order to describe the experience into scientific knowledge. I accost Carnap and Vasubandhu philosophies to show an epistemic position, that involves an ontological deconstruction, from the phenomenal experience starting point. In this view, the way to address the psico-physical problem changes: it (...)
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  34. William F. Brewer (1992). Phenomenal Experience in Laboratory and Autobiographical Memory. In Martin A. Conway, David C. Rubin, H. Spinnler & W. Wagenaar (eds.), Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory. Kluwer. 31--51.score: 90.0
  35. Max Kistler, Powers and Phenomenal Experience.score: 90.0
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  36. Anthony J. Marcel (1988). Phenomenal Experience and Functionalism. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.score: 90.0
     
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  37. Thomas Natsoulas (1992). Are All Instances of Phenomenal Experience Conscious in the Sense of Their Being Objects of Inner (Second-Order) Consciousness? American Journal of Psychology 105:605-12.score: 90.0
     
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  38. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience -- Self Knowledge and Inner Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.score: 84.0
  39. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2013). Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.score: 78.0
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the (...)
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  40. René Jagnow (2009). How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.score: 78.0
    In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three (...)
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  41. Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols (2013). Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 126–50.score: 78.0
    Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in (...)
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  42. Torin Alter (2008). Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 247.score: 72.0
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  43. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.score: 72.0
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  44. Sydney Shoemaker, Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.score: 72.0
    These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object perceptual model -- it takes (...)
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  45. Torin Alter (2008). 13 Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In Edmond L. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press. 247.score: 72.0
  46. Peter Carruthers (2003). Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.score: 72.0
    Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state-consciousness, which contrasts with creature-consciousness, or perceptual-consciousness. The different forms of state-consciousness include various kinds of access-consciousness, both first-order and higher-order--see Rosenthal, 1986; Block, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when they (...)
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  47. Elizabeth Schechter (2013). The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.score: 72.0
    This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship between the subjective and the objective structure of consciousness. A critique of Tim Bayne’s recent book indicates certain crucial choices that works on the unity of consciousness must make. If one identifies the subject of experience with something whose consciousness is necessarily unified, then one cannot offer an account of the objective structure of consciousness. Alternatively, identifying the (...)
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  48. Dimitris Platchias (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding The Relation Between Neural Processes And Experience. Acumen.score: 72.0
  49. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.score: 72.0
  50. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Phenomenal Character of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2).score: 72.0
    These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense- perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object-perceptual model -- it takes perception (...)
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