Search results for 'phenomenal temporality' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Michael Pelczar (2010). Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
    It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2. Benjamin L. Curtis (2015). Material Constitution, the Neuroscience of Consciousness, and the Temporality of Experience. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory. 433-444.
    In this paper I argue that if a completed neuroscience of consciousness is to be attained, we must give the synchronic and diachronic application conditions for brain states and phenomenal states. I argue that, due to the temporal nature of our experiences, such states must be viewed as being temporally extended events, and illustrate how to give such application conditions using examples of other temporally extended events. However, I also raise some difficulties for the project of giving application conditions (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  4.  62
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons. In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  70
    David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  7. Luca Moretti (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Chad Kidd (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  10. David Bourget (2015). Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
    This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Thomas Fuchs (2013). Temporality and Psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):75-104.
    The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  12.  77
    Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Declan Smithies (2014). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan 98-124.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  14. Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1271-1290.
    In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  15. Gary Hatfield (2014). Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy. Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  17. Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
    According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  19. Neil Mehta (2014). The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience. Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
    Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of (...) character. -/- Here I show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20.  49
    Walter Ott (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
    According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.
    Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  22. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  23. Bryce Huebner (2010). Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.
    It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the interesting connection between (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  24. Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (2015). Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond. Philosophy Compass 10 (10):672-684.
    In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time. Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world is ‘opened (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  67
    Kati Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  26.  62
    Thomas Metzinger (2013). Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research. Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27. Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou (2016). Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded. Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr (2015). The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument. Kemanusiaan 22 (1).
    The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is widely regarded as the most promising physicalist defence against the so-called epistemic arguments—the anti-physicalist arguments that establish an ontological gap between physical and phenomenal facts on the basis of the occurrence of epistemic gaps in our descriptions of these facts. The PCS tries to undercut the force of the epistemic arguments by attributing the occurrence of the epistemic gaps to the special character of phenomenal concepts—the concepts by means of which we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  30. Chris Tucker (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology. In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press 52--73.
    Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  31. Preston J. Werner (2015). Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):261-272.
    Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering a few objections (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
    This is an introduction to a special issue on the history of phenomenal intentionality.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Jonathan Matheson (2014). Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism. In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. 3-20.
    Recently there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between common sense epistemology and Skeptical Theism. Much of the debate has focused on Phenomenal Conservatism and any tension that there might be between it and Skeptical Theism. In this paper I further defend the claim that there is no tension between Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism. I show the compatibility of these two views by coupling them with an account of defeat – one that is (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Stan Klein & Chloe Steindam (2016). The Role of Subjective Temporality in Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. In Kirk Michaelian, Stan Klein & Karl Szpunar (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press 135-152.
    In this chapter we examine the tendency to view future-oriented mental time travel as a unitary faculty that, despite task-driven surface variation, ultimately reduces to a common phenomenological state. We review evidence that FMTT is neither unitary nor beholden to episodic memory: Rather, it is varied both in its memorial underpinnings and experiential realization. We conclude that the phenomenological diversity characterizing FMTT is dependent not on the type of memory activated during task performance, but on the kind of subjective (...) associated with the memory in play. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Moti Mizrahi (2014). Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat. Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110.
    In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Luca Moretti (2013). Mizrahi’s Argument Against Phenomenal Conservatism. The Reasoner 7 (12):137-139.
    I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37.  32
    Gary Hatfield (2015). Objectifying the Phenomenal in Experimental Psychology: Titchener and Beyond. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (3):73-94.
    This paper examines the origins and legacy of Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in the experimental study of sensory experience. It places Titchener’s introspective methods into the intellectual world of early experimental psychology. It follows the subsequent development of perceptual experimentation primarily in the American literature, with notice to British and German studies as needed. Subsequent investigators transformed the specific notion of a “stimulus error” into experimental questions in which subjects’ attitudes toward their perceptual tasks became independent variables to be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38.  78
    David Morris (2008). Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic Temporality. Human Studies 31 (4):399-421.
    This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  13
    Xiaoxing Zhang (forthcoming). Phenomenal Concepts and the Speckled Hen. Analysis:anw059.
    Feldman proposed a solution to the speckled hen problem via ‘phenomenal concepts’, a solution which Fumerton accepted with reservation. Notwithstanding the existing criticisms of Feldman as being over-intellectualist, I argue that his approach fails for other reasons.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Andreas Elpidorou (2015). Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  20
    François Kammerer (2016). Conscious Experiences as Ultimate Seemings: Renewing the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Argumenta 1 (2):233-243.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a popular strategy used to support physicalism in the realm of conscious experience. This Strategy accounts for dualist intuitions but uses the ways in which we think about our experiences to explain these intuitions in a physicalist framework, without any appeal to ontological dualism. In this paper, I will raise two issues related to the currently available versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. First, most of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal Concept (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  75
    Bénédicte Veillet (2015). The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.
    Knowledge of what it’s like to have perceptual experiences, e.g. of what it’s like to see red or taste Turkish coffee, is phenomenal knowledge; and it is knowledge the substantial or significant nature of which is widely assumed to pose a challenge for physicalism. Call this the New Challenge to physicalism. The goal of this paper is to take a closer look at the New Challenge. I show, first, that it is surprisingly difficult to spell out clearly and neutrally (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Robert Schroer (2010). Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
    One popular materialist response to the explanatory gap identifies phenomenal concepts with type-demonstrative concepts. This kind of response, however, faces a serious challenge: that our phenomenal concepts seem to provide a richer characterization of their referents than just the demonstrative characterization of 'that quality'. In this paper, I develop a materialist account that beefs up the contents of phenomenal concepts while retaining the idea that these contents contain demonstrative elements. I illustrate this account by focusing on our (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  44.  25
    Timothy L. Hubbard (2013). Phenomenal Causality I: Varieties and Variables. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 23 (1):1-42.
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (i.e., the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. In Part I of this two-part series, different potential types of phenomenal causality (launching, triggering, reaction, tool, entraining, traction, braking, enforced disintegration and bursting, coordinated movement, penetration, expulsion) are described. Stimulus variables (temporal gap, spatial gap, spatial overlap, direction, absolute velocity, velocity ratio, trajectory length, radius of action, size, motion type, modality, animacy) and observer variables (attention, eye movements and fixation, prior experience, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47.  75
    Kevin McCain (2012). Against Hanna on Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 27 (1):45-54.
    Against Hanna on Phenomenal Conservatism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0148-2 Authors Kevin McCain, Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Box 270078, Rochester, NY 14627-0078, USA Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  48. Brad J. Thompson (2007). Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.
    In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content. It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum - inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  49. Dan Lloyd (2002). Functional MRI and the Study of Human Consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):818-831.
    & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  50.  32
    Kevin McCain (forthcoming). Explanationist Aid for Phenomenal Conservatism. Synthese:1-16.
    Phenomenal conservatism is a popular theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity and the fact that some think that phenomenal conservatism can provide a complete account of justification, it faces several challenges. Among these challenges are the need to provide accounts of defeaters and inferential justification. Fortunately, there is hope for phenomenal conservatism. Explanationism, the view on which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations, can help phenomenal conservatism with both of these challenges. The resulting view (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000