In her introduction to this collection, Tymieniecka presents her phenomenology of life - the leitmotif of the three-volume anniversary publication of Analecta Husserliana - as something that stands out from preceding historical attempts to investigate life in an 'integral' or 'scientific' way. After an incubation lasting throughout the 2000 years of Occidental philosophy, this scientific phenomenology/philosophy of life at last uncovers the entire area of the 'inner workings of Nature', exposing the way in which the 'sufficient reason' and (...) the 'ground' of beingness as such crystallise out of the 'onto poietic' process. This onto-poietic process, continuing as it does in the human creative condition, also reveals the authentic genius of the works of the human spirit. This new and original philosophy, free of fallacious simplifications, speculations and reductionism, opens up a basic starting point for all philosophy. Life, 'the theme of our times', at last receives a profound philosophical treatment. (shrink)

Philosophy has been dominated by the view that emotions do a perfect job in producing knowledge about the inner and the outer world. Until recently this was the mark of standard naturalism but with the early Sartre and Merleau-Ponty it became central to contemporary phenomenology. In part because there is a persistent difficulty in understanding the relation between reasoning and feeling. In part because there is no scientific evidence for the ability to reason. There are many accounts of emotion (...) but few attempts to understand reasoning. My assumption is that emotions assist only with collecting data while reasoning is responsible for generating meaning about the inner and outer world. In order to understand that, we must approach reasoning without mixing ontology with metaphysics. Second, we must provide a compelling realistic model of reasoning. In this paper I sketch out a version of it. Overall, I argue that that we must find a way to re-integrate reasoning within the contemporary philosophical and scientific vocabulary if we wish to understand the conscious mind. (shrink)

Taking as a starting point Taylor's concept about man as a being of meanings, this article examines, in particular, the way that Taylor elaborates his conception of the practical use of reason, recovering some fundamental notions of the phenomenological tradition and hermeneutics, relating to language, such as, the idea of the background, and the incarnated situation of man. Considering that, ultimately, the background is a horizon of previous reference, from the ontological point of view, to the subjective domain of reason (...) in the human agent, the analysis of Taylor ends up favoring certain approaches of contemporary philosophy such as, Heidegger’s existential analytic that aims at leaving aside, paradoxically, the premise of the subject. If we consider this indication, a challenge that remains, then, to the future development of the ways of understanding moral philosophy and philosophical anthropology, is how to link the analysis of the moral problem, in a subject of senses, with the ontological theory of the background that is, however, a-subjective. Tomando como punto de partida el concepto que tiene Taylor acerca del ser humano como un ser de significados, este artículo estudia el modo como Taylor elabora su concepción del uso práctico de la razón, recuperando ciertas nociones fundamentales de la tradición fenomenológica y hermenéutica relativas al lenguaje, como lo son la idea del trasfondo y la situación encarnada del hombre. Puesto que, en definitiva, el trasfondo constituye un horizonte de referencia anterior, desde el punto de vista ontológico, al dominio subjetivo de la razón en el agente humano, el análisis de Taylor termina por favorecer ciertos enfoques de la filosofía contemporánea como, por ejemplo, la analítica existenciaria de Heidegger, que buscan prescindir, paradójicamente, de la premisa del sujeto. Si atendemos a esta indicación, un desafío que resta, pues, al desarrollo futuro de los modos de comprensión de la filosofía moral, y de la antropología filosófica, es el de cómo vincular el análisis del problema moral, de un sujeto de sentidos, con una teoría ontológica del trasfondo que es, en cambio, a-subjetiva. (shrink)

There are three steps in my description of the ground-problem of value: First, Husserl’s analysis of the crisis of reason is based on the systematic loss and phenomenological recovery of the intuitive evidence of the lifeworld. But if letter symbols are essential to formalizing abstraction, as Klein’s de-sedimentation of Vieta’s institution of modern algebra shows, then the ultimate substrates upon which formalization rests cannot be “individuals” in Husserl’s sense. The consequence of the essentiality of the letter symbols to formalization is (...) that no direct reference to intuitive evidence of individuals is possible from formal structures. Second, the crisis of reason in Marx’s Capital on commodities contains a parallel analysis of the contradictory relation between formalism and evidence. The value-structure of capitalist society expels qualitative value to subjective use and imposes a homogeneous standard on social representation of value such that quantitative values are not grounded in the experience of use which entails that the system of general value becomes a mere aggregate. Third, the problem of value, or formal axiology, is the core of a teleological convergence between phenomenology and Marxism. A short phenomenological description of the experience of value shows that practical activities generate valuations that are experienced with an intensity through which they aim toward social representation. The conclusion is that the social representation of value in capitalist society intervenes into the constitution of the community by the intensity of individuals’ value-experience to reduce its system of value to an unthematized simple aggregate of value-quantities. (shrink)

...In what follows I lay out Husserl's theory of epistemic justification as he sketches it in Part IV of 'Ideas 1', especially in the section he appropriately titles the "Phenomenology of Reason," understood here to present a phenomenological analysis of how reason is given, namely, how reason manifests itself in conscious life. My claim is that Husserl's "phenomenology of reason," by clarifying the ways in which the "legitimizations of reason" take place can be ultimately understood as a theory (...) of epistemic justification. The theory of epistemic justification discused here is a phenomenological account of the process whereby the thinking subject comes to regards particular beliefs as true and can give reasons to support this claim. (shrink)

Phenomenology of Civilization explores the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and R.G. Collingwood, two of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Husserl founded phenomenology, which has had a direct effect on contemporary philosophy, and Collingwood, though less formally known, is still one of the most commonly read twentieth century philosophers. Maurice Eisenstein examines their work in relation to recent philosophy, particularly focusing on existentialism, Heideggerian phenomenology, and postmodernism. He brings these two philosophers together because they were (...) contemporaries of each other, addressed the same audience, and, therefore, had similar issues to influence them. This discussion of Husserl and Collingwood's work moves beyond Husserl's phenomenology, and Collingwood's typical association with Hegel or Kant, to a new understanding of their ideas through an association with each other in regard to contemporary philosophy and political theory. Eisenstein's discoveries place Husserl and Collingwood into the main Western liberal political tradition with Dewey and James, rather than the more radical critique of that tradition with Sartre and Heidegger. (shrink)

I offer a phenomenological description of undocumented immigrant reason, provisionally understood as a sort of historical reason grounded on undocumented immigrant life. That is, the categories of undocumented immigrant reason are resources for undocumented immigrant existence and are inscribed in the historical memory of immigration (they are shared and communal), accessed by immigrants in stories, anecdotes, and interpersonal trauma. Abstracting from personal experience, testimony, popular culture, and elsewhere, I propose a fragmentary list of these categories of undocumented immigrant reason, a (...) list that includes journeying, crossing/nepantla, uncertainty/zozobra, nostalgia, and return. These categories, which structure undocumented immigrant reason, are reflected in beliefs and attitudes about migration, belonging, the contingency of life, the centrality of memory, and the meaning of death. Constitutive of immigrant rationality are beliefs and ways of being that lend meaning to immigrant life, including those beliefs and ways of being that place immigrants in closer proximity to fundamental human truths. (shrink)

Bringing together Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Jan Patocka, this book provides a comprehensive examination of the central role that questioning plays in phenomenology. Joel Hubick not only offers a phenomenological analysis of the activity of asking questions, but further traces the development of this form of questioning in the early stages of the phenomenology movement. Starting with Husserl's motto 'to the matters themselves', Hubick examines how the phenomenological method utilizes questioning as a means to both return to (...) and to preserve the phenomena in order to re-experience them anew. He then demonstrates how Heidegger takes up Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and, in doing so, develops phenomenology into a philosophy of possibility, one that seeks in equal measure to preserve questions while also answering them. Continuing this questioning philosophy, this volume showcases how Patocka explicitly advances what had remained implicit in both Husserl and Heidegger's works; namely, phenomenology understood as a set of questions - from 'what is history?' to 'who am I?' - all of which elicit original experiences for future generations of thinkers. With a close focus on the primary material of these three fundamental figures, The Phenomenology of Questioning affords a crucial insight into the history of phenomenological reasoning, as well as a reminder to today's phenomenologists to continue asking questions. (shrink)

Jean Dieudonné, the spokesman of the group of French mathematicians named Bourbaki, called mathematics the music of reason. This metaphor invites a phenomenological account of the affective, in contrast to the epistemic and discursive, nature of mathematics: What constitutes its charm? Mathematical reasoning is described as a perceptual experience, which in Husserl’s late philosophy would be a case of passive synthesis. Like a melody, a mathematical proof is manifest in an affective identity of a temporal object. Rather than an exercise (...) for its own sake, this account sheds a different light on both the epistemic limitation of mathematical science, and the discursive problem of social responsibility in mathematics – two issues at the heart of Husserl’s critique of science as well as of mid-20th century mathematics, for which Nicolas Bourbaki stands as a monument of rigor. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of Spirit, first published in 1807, is G. W. F. Hegel's remarkable philosophical text that examines the dynamics of human experience from its simplest beginnings in consciousness through its development into ever more complex and self-conscious forms. The work explores the inner discovery of reason and its progressive expansion into spirit, a world of intercommunicating and interacting minds reconceiving and re-creating themselves and their reality. The Phenomenology of Spirit is a notoriously challenging and arduous text that (...) students and scholars have been studying ever since its publication. In this long-awaited translation, Peter Fuss and John Dobbins provide a succinct, highly informative, and readily comprehensible introduction to several key concepts in Hegel's thinking. This edition includes an extensive conceptual index, which offers easy reference to specific discussions in the text and elucidates the more subtle nuances of Hegel's concepts and word usage. This modern American English translation employs natural idioms that accurately convey what Hegel means. Throughout the book, the translators adhered to the maxim: if you want to understand Hegel, read him in the English. This book is intended for intellectuals with a vested interest in modern philosophy and history, as well as students of all levels, seeking to access or further engage with this seminal text. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of Spirit is both one of Hegel's most widely read books and one of his most obscure. The book is the most detailed commentary on Hegel's work available. It develops an independent philosophical account of the general theory of knowledge, culture, and history presented in the Phenomenology. In a clear and straightforward style, Terry Pinkard reconstructs Hegel's theoretical philosophy and shows its connection to ethical and political theory. He sets the work in a historical context and (...) shows the contemporary relevance of Hegel's thought for European and Anglo-American philosophers. The principal audience for the book is teachers and students of philosophy, but the great interest in Hegel's work and the clarity of Pinkard's exposition ensure that historians of ideas, political scientists, and literary theorists will also read it. (shrink)

In this book, Robert Sokolowski argues that being a person means to be involved with truth. He shows that human reason is established by syntactic composition in language, pictures, and actions and that we understand things when they are presented to us through syntax. Sokolowski highlights the role of the spoken word in human reason and examines the bodily and neurological basis for human experience. Drawing on Husserl and Aristotle, as well as Aquinas and Henry James, Sokolowski here employs (...) class='Hi'>phenomenology in a highly original way in order to clarify what we are as human agents. (shrink)

The struggle for self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit is fraught with false achievements. In sense-certainty, consciousness is aware of itself as consciousness of an object, but this awareness of self is thoroughly mediated by the object, which remains the essential element in the relation until this view collapses with the untenability of the theory of force. As self-certainty, consciousness then becomes immediately aware of itself, and so seems to have achieved real self-consciousness. But such is not the case, (...) since self-consciousness requires the recognition of others; certainty of self must be raised to the level of truth. This is easier said than done. The ensuing dialectical passage from the life-and-death struggle through the unhappy consciousness seems to end in failure - at least up until the very end, when, out of despair, the individuals sacrifice their sense of self only to regain it through the action of the mediating counselor. In renouncing their one-sided claims to self-consciousness, the alienated consciousnesses who confess their misery gain precisely what had seemed irredeemably lost just a moment before. It is a dialectical irony that, though the struggle for recognition began with the individuals’ willingness to risk everything for the sake of self, they achieve genuine self-recognition only when they are willing to risk their sense of self for the sake of everything else. (shrink)

“A Phenomenology of Seeing and Affect in a Polarized Climate,” focuses on the polarized political climate that reflects racial and class differences in the wake of the Trump election. She explores how to see differently about those with whom one disagrees—that is in this specific scenario for Lee, the Trump supporters, including Asian American members of her own family. Understanding Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s exploration of the interstice between the visible and the invisible, if human beings are to see otherwise, we (...) need to disrupt the ready association between the visible and the invisible. Here, she explores the function of affect for the possibility of this break. The phenomenological understanding of emotion does not necessarily empower emotion with any sort of superlative force, especially over reason. But a subject’s emotion chiasmatically reflects the world and vice versa. The caustic and strong emotions felt by people about this presidency reflects the entrenched political climate in our society and chiasmatically the entrenched political climate embroils people in strong emotions that make it difficult to see those with whom we disagree as people we can trust and consider reasonable. To break out of this standoff, to see differently about Trump supporters, one needs to feel differently about them as well. (shrink)

The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with (...) experiences, namely the rational role that they play in our mental lives and their determination by factors external to them, such as external objects or reasons. In particular, I aim to defend Phenomenal Rationalism about judgemental thoughts and perceptual experiences: the view that their phenomenal character reflects their rational role, that is, their capacity to provide and/or respond to reasons. I conclude with some remarks about how this view may be extended to other kinds of th... (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American Scientist, Mathematician, and Logician, developed much of the logic widely used today. Using copies of his unpublished manuscripts, this book provides a comprehensive collection of Peirce’s writings on Phaneroscopy and the outlines of his project to develop a Science of Reasoning. The collection is focused on three main fields: Phaneroscopy, the science of observation, Semeiotic, the science of sign relations, and Logic, the science of inferences. Peirce understands all thought to be mediated in and through (...) signs and its essence to be diagrammatic. The book serves as a timely contribution for the introduction of Peirce’s Phaneroscopy to the emerging research field of Image Sciences. (shrink)

Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent (...) like Huck can implicitly appreciate a consideration as a moral reason to φ by presenting it under the light of a particular phenomenologically-mediated mode of presentation: one that presents that consideration via the light of a felt directive force “pointing” towards φ-ing—lending weight to it, or soliciting it—in a particular authoritative way. Thus, I suggest, Huck may be understood on analogy with a young jazz piano virtuoso. As she may appreciate that the G-seventh chord having been played just so constitutes an aesthetic reason for her to ease into the C-major-seventh chord just so by virtue of experiencing the former as pointing or directing her to the latter, so also, I propose, Huck may appreciate the considerations speaking in favor of helping Jim as moral reasons to help Jim by virtue of experiencing them as pointing or directing him to help Jim. The chapter also examines and rejects four alternative proposals for how to account for implicit reasons-appreciation: first, a de re account of appreciation and then three additional accounts of appreciation derived from major theories of mental representation (inferentialist, causal tracking, and functionalist theories). (shrink)

In At the Heart of Reason, Claude Romano boldly calls for a reformulation of the phenomenological project. He contends that the main concern of phenomenology, and its originality with respect to other philosophical movements of the last century, such as logical empiricism, the grammatical philosophy of Wittgenstein, and varieties of neo-Kantianism, was to provide a "new image of Reason." Against the common view, which restricts the range of reason to logic and truth-theory alone, Romano advocates "big-hearted rationality," including in (...) it what is only ostensibly its opposite, that is, sensibility, and locating in sensibility itself the roots of the categorical forms of thought. Contrary to what was claimed by the "linguistic turn," language is not a self-enclosed domain; it cannot be conceived in its specificity unless it is led back to its origin in the pre-predicative or pre-linguistic structures of experience itself. (shrink)

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the "paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology," and for this reason, she concludes, "We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must (...) be identified with openness to unpredictability." The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the “paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology,” and for this reason, she concludes, “We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must (...) be identified with openness to unpredictability.” The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Hegel's Project of Phenomenology Kant and the Infinite Within‐and‐Without Experience The Phenomenology of Infinite Conflict Hegel and Witnessing to the Traces of Unacknowledged Absolutes Conclusion.

Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, (...) just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent. (shrink)

The Environmental Uncanny argues that the increasing destitution of our world is the result of a certain forgetfulness: we have forgotten that the basis of our knowledge is not calculative reason, but our participation in the natural world. Offering a unique interdisciplinary perspective on the global environmental crisis - ranging from traditional phenomenology, including substantial discussion of both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, to philosophy of biology, to architectural and urban design theory, to landscape photography, this book makes illuminating connections to (...) paint a multifaceted picture. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a psychologically-informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favour of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as (...) an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. (shrink)