Search results for 'philpapers: relativism about truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Isidora Stojanovic (2007). Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706.score: 756.0
    In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643–686, 2005), according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter (in addition to a possible world parameter) rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much (...)
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  2. Crispin Wright (2007). New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.score: 576.0
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in (...)
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  3. Andy Egan (2007). Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.score: 576.0
    I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree'', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would (...)
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  4. Michael Glanzberg (2007). Context, Content, and Relativism. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.score: 576.0
    This paper argues against relativism, focusing on relativism based on the semantics of predicates of personal taste. It presents and defends a contextualist semantics for these predicates, derived from current work on gradable adjectives. It then considers metasemantic questions about the kinds of contextual parameters this semantics requires. It argues they are not metasemantically different from those in other gradable adjectives, and that contextual parameters of this sort are widespread in natural language. Furthermore, this paper shows that (...)
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  5. Ragnar Francén (2010). No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.score: 536.0
    Recently a number of writers have argued that a new form of relativism involves a form of semantic context-dependence which helps it escape the perhaps most common objection to ordinary contextualism; that it cannot accommodate our intuitions about disagreement. I argue: (i) In order to evaluate this claim we have to pay closer attention to the nature of our intuitions about disagreement. (ii) We have different such intuitions concerning different questions: we have more stable disagreement intuitions (...) moral disputes than about, say, disputes about matters of taste. (iii) The new form of relativism does not vindicate the stable intuitions about disagreement. (iv) It does a better job explaining the unstable intuitions than contextualism. But, pace some relativists, it is not clear that assertion-truth rather than just proposition-truth has to be relativized to accomplish this. (shrink)
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  6. Mark Richard (2011). Relativistic Content and Disagreement. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 156 (3):421-431.score: 536.0
    Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth presses a number of worries about relativistic content. It forces one to think carefully about what a relativist should mean by saying that speakers disagree or contradict one another in asserting such content. My focus is on this question, though at points (in particular in Sect. 4) I touch on other issues Cappelen and Hawthorne (CH) raise.
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  7. Sebastiano Moruzzi & Crispin Wright (2009). Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future. Synthese 166 (2):309 - 331.score: 522.0
    In the paper we argue that truth-relativism is potentially hostage to a problem of exhibiting witnesses of its own truth. The problem for the relativist stems from acceptance of a trumping principle according to which there is a dependency between ascriptions of truth of an utterance and ascriptions of truth to other ascriptions of truth of that utterance. We argue that such a dependency indeed holds in the case of future contingents and the case (...)
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  8. Stefano Predelli (2012). Indexicality, Intensionality, and Relativist Post-Semantics. Synthese 184 (2):121-136.score: 516.0
    This essay argues that relativist semantics provide fruitful frameworks for the study of the relationships between meaning and truth-conditions, and consequently for the analysis of the logical properties of expressions. After a discussion of the role of intensionality and indexicality within classic double-indexed semantics, I explain that the non-relativistic identification of the parameters needed for the definition of truth and for the interpretation of indexicals is grounded on considerations that are irrelevant for the assessment of the relationships between (...)
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  9. Scott Soames (2011). True At. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):124 - 133.score: 516.0
    Cappelen and Hawthorne tell us that the most basic, explanatory notion of truth is a monadic property of propositions. Other notions of truth, including those applying to sentences, are to be explained in terms of it. Among them are those found in Kripkean, Montagovian, and Kaplanean semantic theories, and their descendants – to wit truth at a context, at a circumstance, and at a context-plus-circumstance. If these are to make sense, the authors correctly maintain, they must be (...)
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  10. John MacFarlane (forthcoming). Epistemic Modalities and Relative Truth. Drafts.score: 516.0
    I want to discuss a puzzle about the semantics of epistemic modals, like “It might be the case that” as it occurs in “It might be the case that Goldbach’s conjecture is false.”1 I’ll argue that the puzzle cannot be adequately explained on standard accounts of the semantics of epistemic modals, and that a proper solution requires relativizing utterance truth to a context of assessment, a semantic device whose utility and coherence I have defended elsewhere for future contingents (...)
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  11. Mikhail Kissine (2012). From Contexts to Circumstances of Evaluation: Is the Trade-Off Always Innocuous? Synthese 184 (2):199-216.score: 516.0
    Both context relativists and circumstance-of-evaluation relativists agree that the traditional semantic interpretation of some sentence-types fails to deliver the adequate truth-conditions for the corresponding tokens. But while the context relativists argue that the truth-conditions of each token depend on its context of utterance—each token being thus associated with a distinct intension—circumstance-of-evaluation relativists preserve a unique intension for all the tokens by placing circumstances of evaluations under the influence of a certain ‘point of view’. The main difference between the (...)
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  12. Brian Weatherson (2008). Attitudes and Relativism. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):527-544.score: 516.0
    Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a more plausible story to tell than contextualists about the division (...)
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  13. John MacFarlane (2008). Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths. In Max K”Obel & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 81--102.score: 492.0
    From García-Carpintero and Kölbel, eds, Relative Truth.
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  14. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Against Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.score: 480.0
    Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.
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  15. John MacFarlane (2012). Richard on Truth and Commitment. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 160 (3):445 - 453.score: 480.0
    Richard on truth and commitment Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9795-1 Authors John MacFarlane, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  16. Brian Weatherson (2009). Conditionals and Indexical Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):333-357.score: 480.0
    I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.
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  17. Stefano Predelli & Isidora Stojanovic (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 63--90.score: 480.0
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  18. John MacFarlane (2011). Relativism and Knowledge Attributions. In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. 536--544.score: 468.0
  19. Richard Heck (2006). MacFarlane on Relative Truth. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):88–100.score: 468.0
  20. Peter Lasersohn (2011). Context, Relevant Parts and (Lack of) Disagreement Over Taste. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 156 (3):433-439.score: 456.0
    Responds to an argument against relativist semantics advanced in Cappelen and Hawthorne’s Relativism and Monadic Truth.
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  21. Karl Schafer (2011). Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):265-286.score: 456.0
    It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present (...)
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  22. Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2008). CIA Leaks. Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.score: 456.0
    Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, CIA). Here we argue against such "relativist" semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then (...)
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  23. Isidora Stojanovic (2012). Domain-Sensitivity. Synthese 184 (2):137-155.score: 456.0
    In this paper, I argue that there are good motivations for a relativist account of the domain-sensitivity of quantifier phrases. I will frame the problem as a puzzle involving what looks like a logically valid inference, yet one whose premises are true while the conclusion is false. After discussing some existing accounts, literalist and contextualist, I will present and argue for an account that may be said to be relativist in the following sense: (i) a domain of quantification is required (...)
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  24. Michael Rieppel (2011). Stoic Disagreement and Belief Retention. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):243-262.score: 420.0
    Propositions are generally thought to have a truth-value only relative to some parameter or sequence of parameters. Many apparently straightforward notions, like what it is to disagree or retain a belief, become harder to explain once propositional truth is thus relativized. An account of disagreement within a framework involving such ‘stoic’ propositions is here presented. Some resources developed in that account are then used to respond to the eternalist charge that temporalist propositions can't function as belief contents because (...)
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  25. John MacFarlane (2009). Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 412.0
    By “epistemic modals,” I mean epistemic uses of modal words: adverbs like “necessarily,” “possibly,” and “probably,” adjectives like “necessary,” “possible,” and “probable,” and auxiliaries like “might,” “may,” “must,” and “could.” It is hard to say exactly what makes a word modal, or what makes a use of a modal epistemic, without begging the questions that will be our concern below, but some examples should get the idea across. If I say “Goldbach’s conjecture might be true, and it might be false,” (...)
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  26. M. F. Burnyeat (1976). Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's Theaetetus. Philosophical Review 85 (2):172-195.score: 408.0
  27. Michael Glanzberg, Not All Contextual Parameters Are Alike.score: 408.0
    A great deal of discussion in recent philosophy of language has centered on the idea that there might be hidden contextual parameters in our sentences. But relatively little attention has been paid to what those parameters themselves are like, beyond the assumption that they behave more or less like variables do in logic. My goal in this paper is to show this has been a mistake. I shall argue there are at least two very different sorts of contextual parameters. One (...)
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  28. Tamina Stephenson (2007). Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (4):487--525.score: 408.0
    Predicates of personal taste (fun, tasty) and epistemic modals (might, must) share a similar analytical difficulty in determining whose taste or knowledge is being expressed. Accordingly, they have parallel behavior in attitude reports and in a certain kind of disagreement. On the other hand, they differ in how freely they can be linked to a contextually salient individual, with epistemic modals being much more restricted in this respect. I propose an account of both classes using Lasersohn’s (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: (...)
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  29. Dan López de Sa (2012). What Does It Take to Enter Into the Circumstance? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):147-153.score: 408.0
  30. Lynsey Wolter (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):108-111.score: 81.0
    Demonstrative noun phrases (e.g. this; that guy over there ) are intimately connected to the context of use in that their reference is determined by demonstrations and/or the speaker's intentions. The semantics of demonstratives therefore has important implications not only for theories of reference, but for questions about how information from the context interacts with formal semantics. First treated by Kaplan as directly referential , demonstratives have recently been analyzed as quantifiers by King, and the choice between these two (...)
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  31. Shoshana Smith (2005). Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes's Philosophy. Dissertation, University of California Berkeleyscore: 49.0
    (Shoshana Smith now goes by her married name, Shoshana Brassfield: http://philpapers.org/profile/37640) Descartes famously claims that everything we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Although this rule is fundamental to Descartes’s theory of knowledge, readers from Gassendi and Leibniz onward have complained that unless Descartes can say explicitly what clear and distinct perception is, how we know when we have it, and why it cannot be wrong, then the rule is empty. I offer a detailed analysis of clear and distinct perception, (...)
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  32. C. Travis (1996). Meaning's Role in Truth. Mind 105 (419):451-466.score: 48.0
    What words mean plays a role in determining when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. For that role leaves room for variation in truth conditions, with meanings fixed, from one speaking of words to another. What role meaning plays depends on what truth is; on what words, by virtue of meaning what they do are requied to have done (as spoken) in order to have said what is true. There is a deflationist position on what (...)
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  33. David Bourget & David J. Chalmers (2013). What Do Philosophers Believe? Philosophical Studies (3):1-36.score: 18.0
    What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual’s views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey (...)
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  34. R. M. Sainsbury (2001). Two Ways to Smoke a Cigarette. Ratio 14 (4):386–406.score: 18.0
    In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist (...)
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  35. Daniel Rothschild & Gabriel Segal (2009). Indexical Predicates. Mind and Language 24 (4):467--493.score: 18.0
    We discuss the challenge to truth-conditional semantics presented by apparent shifts in extension of predicates such as 'red'. We propose an explicit indexical semantics for 'red' and argue that our account is preferable to the alternatives on conceptual and empirical grounds.
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  36. F. Recanati (2007). It is Raining (Somewhere). Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):123--146.score: 18.0
    The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain’ is that they carry an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain’, in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article in this journal, I provided a counter-example, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining’ receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I argued that when there is (...)
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  37. Christopher Kennedy & Louise McNally (2010). Color, Context, and Compositionality. Synthese 174 (1):79--98.score: 18.0
    Color adjectives have played a central role in work on language typology and variation, but there has been relatively little investigation of their meanings by researchers in formal semantics. This is surprising given the fact that color terms have been at the center of debates in the philosophy of language over foundational questions, in particular whether the idea of a compositional, truth-conditional theory of natural language semantics is even coherent. The challenge presented by color terms is articulated in detail (...)
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  38. Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne (2007). Locations and Binding. Analysis 67 (294):95–105.score: 18.0
    It is natural to think that the relationship between ‘rain’ and the location of rain is different from the relationship between ‘dance’ and the location of dancing. Utterances of (1) are typically interpreted as, in some sense, being about a location in which it rains. (2) is, typically, not interpreted as being about a location in which the dancing takes place.
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  39. Stefano Predelli (2005). Painted Leaves, Context, and Semantic Analysis. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):351 - 374.score: 18.0
    This essay aims at neutralizing the contextualist challenge against traditional semantics. According to contextualism, utterances of non-elliptical, non-ambiguous, and non-indexical sentences may be associated with contrasting truth-conditions. In this essay, I grant the contextualist analysis of the sentences in question, and the contextualist assessment of the truth-conditions for the corresponding utterances. I then argue that the resulting situation is by no means incompatible with the traditional approach to semantics, and that the evidence put forth by the contextualists may (...)
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  40. Timothy Williamson (1998). Indefinite Extensibility. Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:1-24.score: 18.0
    Of all the cases made against classical logic, Michael Dummett's is the most deeply considered. Issuing from a systematic and original conception of the discipline, it constitutes one of the most distinctive achievements of twentieth century British philosophy. Although Dummett builds on the work of Brouwer and Heyting, he provides the case against classical logic with a new, explicit and general foundation in the philosophy of language. Dummett's central arguments, widely celebrated if not widely endorsed, concern the implications of the (...)
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  41. Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2010). Adjectives in Context. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 119--146.score: 18.0
     
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