Search results for 'physical realization' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  78
    Andrew Melnyk (2010). Comments on Sydney Shoemaker's 'Physical Realization'. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):113 - 123.
    This paper concerns Sydney Shoemaker's view, presented in his book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), of how mental properties are realized by physical properties. That view aims to avoid the "too many minds" problem to which he seems to be led by his further view that human persons are not token-identical with their bodies. The paper interprets and criticizes Shoemaker's view.
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  2. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be ...
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  3. Jaegwon Kim (2010). Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker's Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112.
    This paper discusses in broad terms the metaphysical projects of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization . Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of Shoemaker’s novel “subset” account of realization for defusing the problem of mental causation, and compare the “subset” account with the standard “second-order” account. Finally, I discuss the physicalist status of the metaphysical worldview presented in Shoemaker’s important new contribution to philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
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  4. Robert Francescotti (2002). Understanding Physical Realization (and What It Does Not Entail). Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):279-292.
    The notion of realization is defined so that we can better understand what it means to say that mentality is physically realized. It is generally thought that physical properties realize mental properties (thesis PR). The definitions provided here support this belief, but they also reveal that mental properties can be viewed as realizing physical properties. This consequence questions the value of PR in helping us capture the idea that mental phenomena are dependent upon (i.e., obtain by virtue (...)
     
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  5. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both (...)
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  6.  67
    Stephen Pink & Stanley Martens, Schroedinger's Register: Foundational Issues and Physical Realization.
    This work-in-progress paper consists of four points which relate to the foundations and physical realization of quantum computing. The first point is that the qubit cannot be taken as the basic unit for quantum computing, because not every superposition of bit-strings of length n can be factored into a string of n-qubits. The second point is that the “No-cloning” theorem does not apply to the copying of one quantum register into another register, because the mathematical representation of this (...)
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  7.  41
    Robert Kirk (2009). Physical Realization. Analysis 69 (1):148-156.
    Sydney Shoemaker thinks the ‘most revealing characterization of physicalism’ is in terms of realization . He offers a meticulously worked out account of physical realization and goes on to apply it to a range of major topics: mental causation, personal identity, emergence, three-dimensional versus four-dimensional accounts of temporal persistence, qualia. 1 He also discusses constitution by micro-entities, functional properties, causation by ‘second-order’ properties, ‘phony’ and ‘genuine’ properties, and whether mental properties strongly supervene on physical ones. Several (...)
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  8.  23
    Wim de Muijnck (2003). Wide Physical Realization. Inquiry 46 (1):97 – 111.
    In this paper I develop a theory of the physical realization of higher-level properties. I argue that physical realization is in an important sense indirect, and that at each level causal relations are crucial to realizing next-level phenomena. My account makes it intelligible how higher-level properties can be realized by wide stretches of physical reality without the inter-level dependence becoming weak, or global; it also explains how both physicalism and non-reductivism can be true.
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  9. Wilson Cooper (2009). Review of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization. [REVIEW] Psyche 15 (2).
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker argues that all properties, including phenomenally conscious properties that feature in our cognitive activities are realized in microphysical states of affairs or properties. It is the purpose of Physical Realization to provide an account of realization ‘and to discuss [its] bearing on a number of central topics in metaphysics and philosophy of mind’ . This book consolidates many of the themes found in Sydney Shoemaker’s work over the past quarter of (...)
     
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  10. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press Uk.
    How can physicalism be true? How can all facts about the world, including facts about our mental states, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Sydney Shoemaker's answer to this question involves showing how the mental properties of a person can be 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and how all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects can be realized in microphysical states of affairs. Physical Realization will be (...)
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  11. Ronald P. Endicott (1989). On Physical Multiple Realization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):212-24.
     
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  12. Willem M. de Muynck (2003). Wide Physical Realization. Inquiry 46 (1):97-111.
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  13.  60
    Kevin Morris (2011). Subset Realization and Physical Identification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):317-335.
    According to a prominent line of thought, we can be physicalists, but not reductive physicalists, by holding that mental and other ‘higher-level’ or ‘nonbasic’ properties — properties that are not obviously physical properties — are all physically realized. Spelling this out requires an account of realization, an account of what it is for one property to realize another. And while several accounts of realization have been advanced in recent years,1 my interest here is in the ‘subset view,’ (...)
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  14. Sydney Shoemaker (2013). Physical Realization Without Preemption. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press
  15.  30
    Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Review of Sydney Shoemaker, Physical Realization. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
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  16. E. Hiddleston (2012). Physical Realization. Philosophical Review 121 (3):467-471.
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  17.  63
    S. C. Gibb (2009). Review: Sydney Shoemaker: Physical Realization. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (469):207-211.
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  18. Louise Antony (2010). Realization Theory and the Philosophy of Mind: Comments on Sydney Shoemaker's Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):89 - 99.
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  19. David Papineau (1995). Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press
     
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  20.  1
    Jaegwon Kim (2010). Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101-112.
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  21.  1
    Louise Antony (2010). Realization Theory and the Philosophy of Mind: Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):89-99.
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  22.  1
    Robert M. Harrish (1983). Computational Commitment and Physical Realization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):408.
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  23.  1
    Arthur W. Burks, Carl H. Pollmar, Don W. Warren & Jesse B. Wright, Language Conversion for Digital Computers. Vol. 2 : The Physical Realization of Code and Format Conversion.
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  24. Andrew Melnyk (2010). Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):113-123.
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  25. Matthew Tugby (2009). Physical Realization. [REVIEW] Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 12.
     
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  26. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, 'determination') (...)
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  27. Sydney Shoemaker (2011). Realization, Powers and Property Identity. The Monist 94 (1):3-18.
    This paper is about the relation between two metaphysical topics: the nature of properties, and way the instantiation of a property is sometimes “realized in” something more fundamental. It is partly an attempt to develop further, but also to correct, my earlier treatments of these topics. In my published work on realization, including my book Physical Realization, I was at pains to insist that acceptance of my view about this does not commit one to the causal theory (...)
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  28.  44
    Kevin Morris (2010). Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
    Realization can be roughly understood as a kind of role-playing, a relationship between a property that plays a role and a property characterized by that role. This rough sketch previously received only moderate elaboration; recently, however, several substantive theories of realization have been proposed. But are there any general constraints on a theory of realization? What is a theory of realization supposed to accomplish? I first argue that a view of realization is viable, in part, (...)
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  29.  3
    Andrew Melnyk (forthcoming). In Defense of a Realization Formulation of Physicalism. Topoi:1-11.
    In earlier work, I proposed and defended a formulation of physicalism that was distinctive in appealing to a carefully-defined relation of physical realization. Various philosophers have since presented challenges to this formulation. In the present paper, I aim to show that these challenges can be overcome.
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  30.  29
    Andrew Melnyk (2009). Realization Realized. Philosophical Books 50 (3):185-195.
    This is a critical study of Sydney Shoemaker's, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007). It focuses on (i) the relationship between his subset theory of realization and the higher-order property theory of realization, and (ii) his attempt to solve the problem of mental causation.
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  31. David Pineda & Agustín Vicente (2015). Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).
    Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: how the physical grounds the mental; and why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of (...)
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  32. Jessica M. Wilson (2011). Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy. The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
    I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that (...)
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  33.  63
    Umut Baysan (2015). Realization Relations in Metaphysics. Minds and Machines (3):1-14.
    Realization” is a technical term that is used by metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of science to denote some dependence relation that is thought to obtain between higher-level properties and lower-level properties. It is said that mental properties are realized by physical properties; functional and computational properties are realized by first-order properties that occupy certain causal/functional roles; dispositional properties are realized by categorical properties; so on and so forth. Given this wide usage of the term “realization”, (...)
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  34.  97
    Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23.
    Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in (...)
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  35. Andrew Melnyk (2006). Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):127-55.
    Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. (...)
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  36.  76
    Matthias Scheutz (1999). When Physical Systems Realize Functions. Minds and Machines 9 (2):161-196.
    After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions computation and implementation for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a state-to-state correspondence view of implementation cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion realization of a function, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced (...)
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  37.  80
    Thomas W. Polger (2009). Evaluating the Evidence for Multiple Realization. Synthese 167 (3):457 - 472.
    Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses (...)
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  38.  71
    Sven Walter (2010). Taking Realization Seriously: No Cure for Epiphobia. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 151 (2):207 - 226.
    The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called non-reductive physicalism because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and, despite their irreducibility, their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of realization has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind until a couple of years ago authors (...)
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  39.  24
    Carl Gillett (2010). Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization: The Problem of Qualitative Distinctness in the Metaphysics of Science. Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
    Understanding the 'making-up' relations, to put things neutrally, posited in mechanistic explanations the sciences is finally an explicit topic of debate amongst philosophers of science. In particular, there is now lively debate over the nature of the so-called 'realization' relations between properties posited in such explanations. Despite criticism (Gillett, Analysis 62: 316-323, 2002a), the most common approach continues to be that of applying machinery developed in the philosophy of mind to scientific concepts in what is known as the 'Flat' (...)
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  40.  59
    Kevin Morris (2011). Subset Realization, Parthood, and Causal Overdetermination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):363-379.
    Defenders of the subset view of realization have claimed that we can resolve well-known worries about mental-physical causal overdetermination by holding that mental properties are subset realized by physical properties, that instances of subset realized properties are parts of physical realizers, and that part-whole overdetermination is unproblematic. I challenge the claim that the overdetermination generated by the subset view can be legitimated by appealing to more mundane part-whole overdetermination. I conclude that the subset view does not (...)
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  41.  49
    Oron Shagrir (1998). Multiple Realization, Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States. Synthese 114 (3):445-461.
    The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.
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  42.  91
    Matthew C. Haug (2010). Realization, Determination, and Mechanisms. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330.
    Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996 ); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006 ); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007 ) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009 ). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates why these (...)
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  43.  45
    Kenneth Aizawa (2013). Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
    One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw (...)
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  44.  36
    Michael Rescorla (2014). A Theory of Computational Implementation. Synthese 191 (6):1277-1307.
    I articulate and defend a new theory of what it is for a physical system to implement an abstract computational model. According to my descriptivist theory, a physical system implements a computational model just in case the model accurately describes the system. Specifically, the system must reliably transit between computational states in accord with mechanical instructions encoded by the model. I contrast my theory with an influential approach to computational implementation espoused by Chalmers, Putnam, and others. I deploy (...)
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  45.  62
    Robert Francescotti (2010). Realization and Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):601-616.
    Melnyk provides a rigorous analysis of the notion of realization with the aim of defining Physicalism. It is argued here that contrary to Melnyk's Realization Physicalism, the idea that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena fails to capture the physicalist belief that the former obtain in virtue of the latter. The conclusion is not that Physicalism is false, but that its truth is best explained with some notion other than realization in Melnyk's sense. I also (...)
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  46.  71
    David Joslin (2006). Real Realization: Dennett's Real Patterns Versus Putnam's Ubiquitous Automata. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 16 (1):29-41.
    Both Putnam and Searle have argued that that every abstract automaton is realized by every physical system, a claim that leads to a reductio argument against Cognitivism or Strong AI: if it is possible for a computer to be conscious by virtue of realizing some abstract automaton, then by Putnam’s theorem every physical system also realizes that automaton, and so every physical system is conscious—a conclusion few supporters of Strong AI would be willing to accept. Dennett has (...)
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  47.  15
    Giovanna Hendel (2001). Realization. Critica 33 (98):41-70.
    So far no clear explication of the notion of realization has been offered, in spite of the frequent uses of the notion in the literature to discharge important jobs, such as that of accounting for the causal efficacy of the mental in a physical world, and that of providing a viable characterization of physicalism, and/or psychophysical reduction. I put forward an account of realization as an identity-like relation. I argue that such account has the following advantages: (a) (...)
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  48. Jeffrey A. Barrett & Wayne Aitken, On the Physical Possibility of Ordinal Computation (Draft).
    α-recursion lifts classical recursion theory from the first transfinite ordinal ω to an arbitrary admissible ordinal α [10]. Idealized computational models for α-recursion analogous to Turing machine models for classical recursion have been proposed and studied [4] and [5] and are applicable in computational approaches to the foundations of logic and mathematics [8]. They also provide a natural setting for modeling extensions of the algorithmic logic described in [1] and [2]. On such models, an α-Turing machine can complete a θ-step (...)
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  49. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization. Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
    Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other (...)
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  50.  5
    David Pineda & Agustín Vicente (2015). Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: how the physical grounds the mental; and why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of (...)
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