Search results for 'platitude' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. A. Ahmed (2009). Review: David Pears: Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (469):200-203.score: 15.0
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  2. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2008). Review of David Pears, Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).score: 15.0
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  3. David Pears (2006). Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 15.0
    This is a concise and readable study of five intertwined themes at the heart of Wittgenstein's thought, written by one of his most eminent interpreters. David Pears offers penetrating investigations and lucid explications of some of the most influential and yet puzzling writings of twentieth-century philosophy. He focuses on the idea of language as a picture of the world; the phenomenon of linguistic regularity; the famous "private language argument"; logical necessity; and ego and the self.
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  4. Natan Berber (2009). Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy by David Pears. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):608-610.score: 15.0
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  5. Avishai Margalit (1978). The “Platitude” Principle of Semantics. Erkenntnis 13 (1):377 - 395.score: 15.0
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  6. R. M. White (2010). David Pears, Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Philosophical Review 119 (3):381-384.score: 15.0
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  7. Michael Loughlin (2006). A Platitude Too Far: 'Evidence‐Based Ethics'. Commentary on Borry (2006), Evidence‐Based Medicine and its Role in Ethical Decision‐Making. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 12 (3):312-318.score: 15.0
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  8. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.score: 9.0
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
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  9. Daniel Nolan (2009). Platitudes and Metaphysics. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press.score: 6.0
    One increasingly popular technique in philosophy might be called the "platitudes analysis": a set of widely accepted claims about a given subject matter are collected, adjustments are made to the body of claims, and this is taken to specify a “role” for the phenomenon in question. (Perhaps the best-known example is analytic functionalism about mental states, where platitudes about belief, desire, intention etc. are together taken to give us a "role" for states to fill if they are to count as (...)
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  10. Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi (2006). Platitudes Against Paradox. Erkenntnis 65 (3):319 - 341.score: 6.0
    We present a strategy to dissolve semantic paradoxes which proceeds from an explanation of why paradoxical sentences or their definitions are semantically defective. This explanation is compatible with the acceptability of impredicative definitions, self-referential sentences and semantically closed languages and leaves the status of the so-called truth-teller sentence unaffected. It is based on platitudes which encode innocuous constraints on successful definition and successful expression of propositional content. We show that the construction of liar paradoxes and of certain versions of Curry’s (...)
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  11. Kenneth Baynes (2007). ‘Gadamerian Platitudes’ and Rational Interpretations. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):67-82.score: 6.0
    The article considers some of the methodological commitments - specifically, what Brandom calls ‘Gadamerian platitudes’ - defended in Tales of the Mighty Dead . I argue that, given his commitment to Gadamer’s model of dialogue and Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit (‘anticipation of completeness’), Brandom should also accept Habermas’ position on the ineliminability of the second-person or performative perspective concerning our interpretive claims. Key Words: first person • Hans Georg Gadamer • Jürgen Habermas • hermeneutics • inferential semantics • performative • pragmatics (...)
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  12. Jesús Ruiz Fernández (2010). La idea de filosofía en Ortega y Gasset. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 35 (1):111-132.score: 6.0
    This article does a research into a theme that has not been studied specifically. This is curious, as the idea of philosophy is the most important one in Ortega y Gasset’s system. Here, it is considered concerning its specifity: the principles of pantonomy and autonomy his platitudinous nature and its integrating and critical functions. As it can be seen, Philosophy’s traditional characteristics. Ortega sets them out in a masterly way, reaching its hight literary brilliance when he praises Philosophy.
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  13. Michael Loughlin (2009). The Basis of Medical Knowledge: Judgement, Objectivity and the History of Ideas. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15 (6):935-940.score: 6.0
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  14. Cara Spencer (2007). Unconscious Vision and the Platitudes of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):309 – 327.score: 5.0
    Since we explain behavior by ascribing intentional states to the agent, many philosophers have assumed that some guiding principle of folk psychology like [Intentional States and Actions] must be true. [Intentional States and Actions]: If A and B are different actions, then the agents performing them must differ in their intentional states at the time they are performed. Recent results in the physiology of vision present a prima facie problem for this principle. These results show that some visual information that (...)
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  15. Stephen K. White (2002). Introduction: Pluralism, Platitudes, and Paradoxes: Fifty Years of Western Political Thought. Political Theory 30 (4):472-481.score: 5.0
  16. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1995). Platitudes and Attitudes: A Minimalist Conception of Belief. Analysis 55 (1):37 - 44.score: 5.0
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  17. Richard Marens (2010). Speaking Platitudes to Power: Observing American Business Ethics in an Age of Declining Hegemony. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 94 (2):239 - 253.score: 5.0
    Over the last generation, American Business Ethics has focused excessively on the process of managerial decision-making while ignoring the collective impact of these decisions and avoiding other approaches that might earn the disapproval of corporate executives. This narrowness helped the field establish itself during the 1980s, when American management, under pressure from finance and heightened competition, was unreceptive to any limitations on its autonomy. Relying, however, on top-down approaches inspired by Aristotle, Locke, and Kant, while ignoring the consequentialism of Mill (...)
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  18. Baynes Kenneth (2007). Gadamerian Platitudes'and Rational Interpretations. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1).score: 5.0
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  19. Walter Lapini (2008). Spinoza and Childish Platitudes. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 63 (2):289-300.score: 5.0
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  20. Peter Menzies (2009). Platitudes and Counterexamples. In Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press. 341--367.score: 5.0
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  21. Michael H. Robinson (1987). Pets, People, and Platitudes. BioScience 37 (11):811-812.score: 5.0
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  22. Stephen K. White (2003). Pluralism, Platitudes, and Paradoxes : Western Political Thought at the Beginning of a New Century. In Stephen K. White & J. Donald Moon (eds.), What is Political Theory? Sage Publications.score: 5.0
  23. Jacob Stegenga (forthcoming). Theory Choice and Social Choice: Okasha Versus Sen. Mind.score: 3.0
    A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the Arrow analogue for theory choice by employing a (...)
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  24. Rachael Briggs (2010). Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes. Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.score: 3.0
    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to (...)
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  25. David O. Brink, Handout #2: Moral Motivation and Rationalism.score: 3.0
    We have looked at worries about expressivism and other forms of noncognitivism. The externalist solution may also seem to be a solution of last resort, because it may seem to deny the platitude that moral judgments are motivationally efficacious. For this reason, we might look seriously at rationalist theories of moral motivation, because they promise to represent moral judgments as intrinsically motivational without giving up cognitivism.
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  26. Antony Eagle (2011). Deterministic Chance. Noûs 45 (2):269 - 299.score: 3.0
    I sketch a new constraint on chance, which connects chance ascriptions closely with ascriptions of ability, and more specifically with 'CAN'-claims. This connection between chance and ability has some claim to be a platitude; moreover, it exposes the debate over deterministic chance to the extensive literature on (in)compatibilism about free will. The upshot is that a prima facie case for the tenability of deterministic chance can be made. But the main thrust of the paper is to draw attention to (...)
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  27. Antony Eagle (2008). Mathematics and Conceptual Analysis. Synthese 161 (1):67–88.score: 3.0
    Gödel argued that intuition has an important role to play in mathematical epistemology, and despite the infamy of his own position, this opinion still has much to recommend it. Intuitions and folk platitudes play a central role in philosophical enquiry too, and have recently been elevated to a central position in one project for understanding philosophical methodology: the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’. This philosophical role for intuitions suggests an analogous epistemology for some fundamental parts of mathematics, which casts a number of (...)
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  28. Patricia Marino (2008). The Ethics of Sexual Objectification: Autonomy and Consent. Inquiry 51 (4):345 – 364.score: 3.0
    It is now a platitude that sexual objectification is wrong. As is often pointed out, however, some objectification seems morally permissible and even quite appealing—as when lovers are so inflamed by passion that they temporarily fail to attend to the complexity and humanity of their partners. Some, such as Nussbaum, have argued that what renders objectification benign is the right sort of relationship between the participants; symmetry, mutuality, and intimacy render objectification less troubling. On this line of thought, pornography, (...)
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  29. Jan Westerhoff (2011). The Merely Conventional Existence of the World. In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    A platitude questioned by many Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet is the existence of the world. We might be tempted to insert some modifier here, such as “substantial,” “self-existent,” or “intrinsically existent,” for, one might argue, these thinkers did not want to question the existence of the world tout court but only that of a substantial, self-existent, or otherwise suitably qualified world. But perhaps these modifiers are not as important as is generally thought, for the understanding of the (...)
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  30. B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.score: 3.0
    One thing nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the 'anti-luck platitude'. <br (...)
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  31. Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 231--250.score: 3.0
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences (...)
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  32. Daniel Whiting (2013). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the (...)
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  33. Susan Oyama (2000). Causal Democracy and Causal Contributions in Developmental Systems Theory. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):347.score: 3.0
    In reworking a variety of biological concepts, Developmental Systems Theory (DST) has made frequent use of parity of reasoning. We have done this to show, for instance, that factors that have similar sorts of impact on a developing organism tend nevertheless to be invested with quite different causal importance. We have made similar arguments about evolutionary processes. Together, these analyses have allowed DST not only to cut through some age-old muddles about the nature of development, but also to effect a (...)
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  34. Ben Blumson (2009). Defining Depiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (2):143-157.score: 3.0
    It is a platitude that whereas language is mediated by convention, depiction is mediated by resemblance. But this platitude may be attacked on the grounds that resemblance is either insufficient for or incidental to depictive representation. I defend common sense from this attack by using Grice's analysis of meaning to specify the non-incidental role of resemblance in depictive representation.
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  35. Scott Hill (2010). Richard Joyce's New Objections to the Divine Command Theory. Journal of Religious Ethics 38 (1):189-196.score: 3.0
    In a 2002 paper for this journal, Richard Joyce presents three new arguments against the Divine Command Theory. In this comment, I attempt to show that each of these arguments is either unpersuasive or uninteresting. Two of Joyce’s arguments are unpersuasive because they rely on an implausible principle or an implausible claim about what counts as a platitude governing use of the term “wrong.” Joyce’s other argument is uninteresting because it is persuasive only if Joyce’s formulation of the Euthyphro (...)
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  36. Daniel Whiting (2009). Is Meaning Fraught with Ought? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (4):535-555.score: 3.0
    According to Normativism, linguistic meaning is intrinsically normative (I shall explore what this amounts to below). One, though not the only, reason for Normativism’s importance is that it bears on the prospects of providing an account of meaning in the terms available to the natural sciences. In turn, since linguistic behaviour is inextricably bound up with both non linguistic behaviour and the psychological attitudes informing it, Normativism might (if true) pose a serious challenge to the project of accommodating creatures such (...)
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  37. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 3.0
    It is a platitude in epistemology to say that knowledge excludes luck. Indeed, if one can show that an epistemological theory allows ‘lucky’ knowledge, then that usually suffices to warrant one in straightforwardly rejecting the view. Even despite the prevalence of this intuition, however, very few commentators have explored what it means to say that knowledge is incompatible with luck. In particular, no commentator, so far as I am aware, has offered an account of what luck is and on (...)
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  38. Ben Blumson (2010). Pictures, Perspective and Possibility. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):135 - 151.score: 3.0
    This paper argues for a possible worlds theory of the content of pictures, with three complications: depictive content is centred, two-dimensional and structured. The paper argues that this theory supports a strong analogy between depictive and other kinds of representation and the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance.
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  39. Ben Blumson (2009). Images, Intentionality and Inexistence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):522-538.score: 3.0
    The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.
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  40. Kent Bach (2012). Context Dependence. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub..score: 3.0
    All sorts of things are context-dependent in one way or another. What it is appropriate to wear, to give, or to reveal depends on the context. Whether or not it is all right to lie, harm, or even kill depends on the context. If you google the phrase ‘depends on the context’, you’ll get several hundred million results. This chapter aims to narrow that down. In this context the topic is context dependence in language and its use. It is commonly (...)
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  41. Jacob Stegenga (2009). Robustness, Discordance, and Relevance. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):650-661.score: 3.0
    Robustness is a common platitude: hypotheses are better supported with evidence generated by multiple techniques that rely on different background assumptions. Robustness has been put to numerous epistemic tasks, including the demarcation of artifacts from real entities, countering the “experimenter’s regress,” and resolving evidential discordance. Despite the frequency of appeals to robustness, the notion itself has received scant critique. Arguments based on robustness can give incorrect conclusions. More worrying is that although robustness may be valuable in ideal evidential circumstances (...)
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  42. Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss, The Normativity of Meaning and Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 3.0
    There is a long tradition of thinking of language as conventional in its nature, dating back at least to Aristotle De Interpretatione ). By appealing to the role of conventions, it is thought, we can distinguish linguistic signs, the meaningful use of words, from mere natural ‘signs’. During the last century the thesis that language is essentially conventional has played a central role within philosophy of language, and has even been called a platitude (Lewis 1969). More recently, the focus (...)
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  43. Ben Blumson (2008). Depiction and Convention. Dialectica 62 (3):335-348.score: 3.0
    By defining both depictive and linguistic representation as kinds of symbol system, Nelson Goodman attempts to undermine the platitude that, whereas linguistic representation is mediated by convention, depiction is mediated by resemblance. I argue that Goodman is right to draw a strong analogy between the two kinds of representation, but wrong to draw the counterintuitive conclusion that depiction is not mediated by resemblance.
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  44. Kent Bach (2005). Context Ex Machina. In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. 15--44.score: 3.0
    Once upon a time it was assumed that speaking literally and directly is the norm and that speaking nonliterally or indirectly is the exception. The assumption was that normally what a speaker means can be read off of the meaning of the sentence he utters, and that departures from this, if not uncommon, are at least easily distinguished from normal utterances and explainable along Gricean lines. The departures were thought to be limited to obvious cases like figurative speech and conversational (...)
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  45. Joseph Adam Carter (2009). Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety's (Recent) Discontents. Philosophia 38 (3):517-532.score: 3.0
    Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in (...)
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  46. Matti Eklund (2007). The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) (...)
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  47. Patrick Allo & Edwin Mares (2012). Informational Semantics as a Third Alternative? Erkenntnis 77 (2):167-185.score: 3.0
    Informational semantics were first developed as an interpretation of the model-theory of substructural (and especially relevant) logics. In this paper we argue that such a semantics is of independent value and that it should be considered as a genuine alternative explication of the notion of logical consequence alongside the traditional model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical accounts. Our starting point is the content-nonexpansion platitude which stipulates that an argument is valid iff the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined (...)
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  48. David Shoemaker (2012). Responsibility Without Identity. Harvard Revieiw of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.score: 3.0
    It is taken to be platitude that I can be responsible only for my own actions. Many have taken this to entail the slogan that responsibility presupposes personal identity. In this paper, I show that even if we grant the platitude, the slogan is not entailed and is at any rate false. I then suggest what the relevant non-identity relation grounding the ownership of actions consists in instead.
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  49. Ruth Garrett Millikan (1998). Language Conventions Made Simple. Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):161-180.score: 3.0
    At the start of Convention (1969) Lewis says that it is "a platitude that language is ruled by convention" and that he proposes to give us "an analysis of convention in its full generality, including tacit convention not created by agreement." Almost no clause, however, of Lewis's analysis has withstood the barrage of counter examples over the years,1 and a glance at the big dictionary suggests why, for there are a dozen different senses listed there. Left unfettered, convention wanders (...)
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