A metric approach to Popper's verisimilitude question is proposed which is related to point-free geometry. Indeed, we define the theory of approximate metric spaces whose primitive notions are regions, inclusion relation, minimum distance, and maximum distance between regions. Then, we show that the class of possible scientific theories has the structure of an approximate metric space. So, we can define the verisimilitude of a theory as a function of its (approximate) distance from the truth. This avoids some (...) of the difficulties arising from the known definitions of verisimilitude. (shrink)

In the first section we briefly describe methodological assumptions of point-free geometry and topology. We also outline history of geometrical theories based on the notion of emph{region}. The second section is devoted to concise presentation of the content of the LLP special issue on point-free theories of space.

We face with the question of a suitable measure theory in Euclidean point-free geometry and we sketch out some possible solutions. The proposed measures, which are positive and invariant with respect to movements, are based on the notion of infinitesimal masses, i.e. masses whose associated supports form a sequence of finer and finer partitions.

Whitehead, in two basic books, considers two different approaches to point-free geometry: the inclusion-based approach , whose primitive notions are regions and inclusion relation between regions, and the connection-based approach , where the connection relation is considered instead of the inclusion. We show that the latter cannot be reduced to the first one, although this can be done in the framework of multivalued logics.

The paper presents the main idea of point-free theories of space based on Tarski's system of point-free geometry. First, the general idea of the so-called point-free ontology was discussed, as well as the epistemological and methodological reasons for its adoption. Next, Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction, which is the methodological basis for the construction of point-free theories of space, is presented, and the fundamental concepts of mereology are discussed. The main part (...) of the paper is a discussion of Tarski’s geometry of solids, its postulates and metatheoretical properties. The paper ends with a short description of the contribution of Polish researchers to the development of research on point-free theories of space. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the problem of ontological foundations of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Starting from Bertrand Russell’s intuitions concerning the sensual world we try to show that it is possible to build a foundation for pure geometry by means of the so called regions of space. It is not our intention to present mathematically developed theory, but rather demonstrate basic assumptions, tools and techniques that are used in construction of systems of point-free geometry and (...) topology by means of mereology and Whitehead-like connection structures. We list and briefly analyze axioms for mereological structures, as well as those for connection structures. We argue that mereology is a good tool to model so called spatial relations. We also try to justify our choice of axioms for connection relation. Finally, we briefly discuss two theories: Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology and Tarski’s geometry of solids. (shrink)

Euclid’s definition of a point as “that which has no part” has been a major source of controversy in relation to the epistemological and ontological presuppositions of classical geometry, from the medieval and modern disputes on indivisibilism to the full development of point-free geometries in the 20th century. Such theories stem from the general idea that all talk of points as putative lower-dimensional entities must and can be recovered in terms of suitable higher-order constructs involving only (...) extended regions (or bodies). Here I focus on what is arguably the first thorough proposal of this sort, Whitehead’s theory of “extensive abstraction”, offering a critical reconstruction of the theory through its successive installments: from the purely mereological version of ‘La théorie relationniste de l’espace’ (1916) to the refined versions presented in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919) and in The Concept of Nature (1920) to the last, mereotopological version of Process and Reality (1929). (shrink)

This note is motivated by Whitehead’s researches in inclusion-based point-free geometry as exposed in An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge and in The concept of Nature. More precisely, we observe that Whitehead’s definition of point, based on the notions of abstractive class and covering, is not adequate. Indeed, if we admit such a definition it is also questionable that a point exists. On the contrary our approach, in which the diameter is a further (...) primitive, enables us to avoid such a drawback. Moreover, since such a notion enables us to define a metric in the set of points, our proposal looks to be a good starting point for a foundation of the geometry metrical in nature (as proposed, for example, by L.M. Blumenthal). (shrink)

Let n be a positive integer and FAℓ be the free abelian lattice-ordered group on n generators. We prove that FAℓ and FAℓ do not satisfy the same first-order sentences in the language if m≠n. We also show that is decidable iff n{1,2}. Finally, we apply a similar analysis and get analogous results for the free finitely generated vector lattices.

Any acceptable quantum gravity theory must allow us to recover the classical spacetime in the appropriate limit. Moreover, the spacetime geometrical notions should be intrinsically tied to the behavior of the matter that probes them. We consider some difficulties that would be confronted in attempting such an enterprise. The problems we uncover seem to go beyond the technical level to the point of questioning the overall feasibility of the project. The main issue is related to the fact that, in (...) the quantum theory, it is impossible to assign a trajectory to a physical object, and, on the other hand, according to the basic tenets of the geometrization of gravity, it is precisely the trajectories of free localized objects that define the spacetime geometry. The insights gained in this analysis should be relevant to those interested in the quest for a quantum theory of gravity and might help refocus some of its goals. (shrink)

In this paper we construct a non-CM-trivial stable theory in which no infinite field is interpretable. In fact our theory will also be trivial and ω-stable, but of infinite Morley rank. A long term aim would be to find a nonCM-trivial theory which has finite Morley rank (or is even strongly minimal) and does not interpret a field. The construction in this paper is direct, and is a “3-dimensional” version of the free pseudoplane. In a sense we are cheating: (...) the original point of the notion ofCM-triviality was to describe the geometry of a strongly minimal set, or even of a regular type. In our example, non-CM-triviality will come from the behaviour of three orthogonal regular types.A stable theory is said to beCM-trivial if wheneverA⊆Band acl(Ac) ∩ acl(B) = acl(A) inTeq, then Cb(stp(c/A)) ⊆ Cb(stp(c/B)). ( An infinite stable field will not beCM-trivial.) The notion is due to Hrushovski [3], where he gave several equivalent definitions, as well as showing that his new strongly minimal sets constructed “ab ovo” wereCM-trivial. The notion was studied further in [6] where it was shown thatCM-trivial groups of finite Morley rank are nilpotent-by-finite. These results were generalized in various ways to the superstable case in [8]. (shrink)

This paper continues the investigations begun in [6] and continued in [7] about quantifier-free axiomatizations of plane Euclidean geometry using ternary operations. We show that plane Euclidean geometry over Archimedean ordered Euclidean fields can be axiomatized using only two ternary operations if one allows axioms that are not first-order but universal Lw1,w sentences. The operations are: the transport of a segment on a halfline that starts at one of the endpoints of the given segment, and the operation (...) which produces one of the intersection points of a perpendicular on a diameter of a circle with that circle. MSC: 03F65, 51M05, 51M15. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a point-free approach to the study of topological spaces and functions on them, establish platforms for both and present some findings on recursive points. In the first sections of the paper, we obtain conditions under which our approach leads to the generation of ideal objects with which mathematicians work. Next, we apply the effective version of our approach to the real numbers, and make exact connections to the classical approach to recursive reals. In (...) the succeeding sections of the paper, we introduce machinery to produce functions on topological spaces and find succinct conditions which will be effectivized in our sequel. (shrink)

De Cock and Kerre, in considering Poincaré paradox, observed that the intuitive notion of "approximate similarity" cannot be adequately represented by the fuzzy equivalence relations. In this note we argue that the deduction apparatus of fuzzy logic gives adequate tools with which to face the question. Indeed, a first-order theory is proposed whose fuzzy models are plausible candidates for the notion of approximate similarity. A connection between these structures and the point-free metric spaces is also established.

This is the first, out of two papers, devoted to Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free system of topology from Grzegorczyk :228–235, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485101). His system was one of the very first fully fledged axiomatizations of topology based on the notions of region, parthood and separation. Its peculiar and interesting feature is the definition of point, whose intention is to grasp our geometrical intuitions of points as systems of shrinking regions of space. In this part we analyze separation structures and (...) Grzegorczyk structures, and establish their properties which will be useful in the sequel. We prove that in the class of Urysohn spaces with countable chain condition, to every topologically interpreted representative of a point in the sense of Grzegorczyk’s corresponds exactly one point of a space. We also demonstrate that Tychonoff first-countable spaces give rise to complete Grzegorczyk structures. The results established below will be used in the second part devoted to points and topological spaces. (shrink)

This volume is the first systematic and thorough attempt to investigate the relation and the possible applications of mereology to contemporary science. It gathers contributions from leading scholars in the field and covers a wide range of scientific theories and practices such as physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, computer science and engineering. Throughout the volume, a variety of foundational issues are investigated both from the formal and the empirical point of view. The first section looks at the topic as it (...) applies to physics. The section addresses questions of persistence and composition within quantum and relativistic physics and concludes by scrutinizing the possibility to capture continuity of motion as described by our best physical theories within gunky space times. The second part tackles mathematics and shows how to provide a foundation for point-free geometry of space switching to fuzzy-logic. The relation between mereological sums and set-theoretic suprema is investigated and issues about different mereological perspectives such as classical and natural Mereology are thoroughly discussed. The third section in the volume looks at natural science. Several questions from biology, medicine and chemistry are investigated. From the perspective of biology, there is an attempt to provide axioms for inferring statements about part hood between two biological entities from statements about their spatial relation. From the perspective of chemistry, it is argued that classical mereological frameworks are not adequate to capture the practices of chemistry in that they consider neither temporal nor modal parameters. The final part introduces computer science and engineering. A new formal mereological framework in which an indeterminate relation of part hood is taken as a primitive notion is constructed and then applied to a wide variety of disciplines from robotics to knowledge engineering. A formal framework for discrete mereotopology and its applications is developed and finally, the importance of mereology for the relatively new science of domain engineering is also discussed. (shrink)

In the second installment to Gruszczyński and Pietruszczak we carry out an analysis of spaces of points of Grzegorczyk structures. At the outset we introduce notions of a concentric and \-concentric topological space and we recollect some facts proven in the first part which are important for the sequel. Theorem 2.9 is a strengthening of Theorem 5.13, as we obtain stronger conclusion weakening Tychonoff separation axiom to mere regularity. This leads to a stronger version of Theorem 6.10. Further, we show (...) that Grzegorczyk points are maximal contracting filters in the sense of De Vries, but the converse inclusion is not necessarily true. We also compare the notions of a Grzegorczyk point and an ultrafilter, and establish several properties of topological spaces based on Grzegorczyk structures. The main results of the paper are representation and completion theorems for G-structures. We prove both set-theoretical and topological representation theorems for various classes of G-structures. We also present topological object duality theorem for the class of complete G-structures and the class of concentric spaces, both restricted to structures which satisfy countable chain condition. We conclude the paper with proving equivalence of the original Grzegorczyk axiom with the one accepted by us as axiom. (shrink)

We study some connections between two kinds of emph{overlap} relations: that of point-free geometries in the sense of Grzegorczyk, Whitehead and Clarke, and that recently introduced by Sambin within his constructive approach to topology. The main thesis of this paper is that the overlap relation in the latter sense is a necessary tool for a constructive and intuitionistic development of point-free geometry.

This is a spin-off paper to [3, 4] in which we carried out an extensive analysis of Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology from [5]. In [1] Loredana Biacino and Giangiacomo Gerla presented an axiomatization which was inspired by the Grzegorczyk’s system, and which is its variation. Our aim is to compare the two approaches and show that they are slightly different. Except for pointing to dissimilarities, we also demonstrate that the theories coincide in presence of axiom stipulating non-existence of (...) atoms. (shrink)

In this note a T1 formal space is a formal space whose points are closed as subspaces. Any regular formal space is T1. We introduce the more general notion of a formal space, and prove that the class of points of a weakly set-presentable formal space is a set in the constructive set theory CZF. The same also holds in constructive type theory. We then formulate separation properties for constructive topological spaces , strengthening separation properties discussed elsewhere. Finally we relate (...) the properties for ct-spaces with corresponding properties of formal spaces. (shrink)

In this book I investigate the necessary structure of the aether the stuff that fills the whole universe. Some of my conclusions are. 1. There is an enormous variety of structures that the aether might, for all we know, have. 2. Probably the aether is point-free. 3. In that case, it should be distinguished from Space-time, which is either a fiction or a construct. 4. Even if the aether has points, we should reject the orthodoxy that all regions (...) are grounded in points by summation. 5. If the aether is point-free but not continuous, its most likely structure has extended atoms that are not simples. 6. Space-time is symmetric if and only if the aether is continuous. 7. If the aether is continuous, we should reject the standard interpretation of General Relativity, in which geometry determines gravity. 8. Contemporary physics undermines an objection to discrete aether based on scale invariance, but does not offer much positive support.". (shrink)

This paper presents several independence results concerning the topos-valid and the intuitionistic predicative theory of locales. In particular, certain consequences of the consistency of a general form of Troelstra's uniformity principle with constructive set theory and type theory are examined.

Edmund Husserl has argued that we can intuit essences and, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a method for intuiting essences. Husserl calls this method 'ideation'. In this paper I bring a fresh perspective to bear on these claims by illustrating them in connection with some examples from modern pure geometry. I follow Husserl in describing geometric essences as invariants through different types of free variations and I then link this to the mapping out of geometric invariants (...) in modern mathematics. This view leads naturally to different types of spatial ontologies and it can be used to shed light on Husserl's general claim that there are different ontologies in the eidetic sciences that can be systematically related to one another. The paper is rounded out with a consideration of the role of ideation in the origins of modern geometry, and with a brief discussion of the use of ideation outside of pure geometry. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl has argued that we can intuit essences and, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a method for intuiting essences. Husserl calls this method ‘ideation’. In this paper I bring a fresh perspective to bear on these claims by illustrating them in connection with some examples from modern pure geometry. I follow Husserl in describing geometric essences as invariants through different types of free variations and I then link this to the mapping out of geometric invariants (...) in modern mathematics. This view leads naturally to different types of spatial ontologies and it can be used to shed light on Husserl's general claim that there are different ontologies in the eidetic sciences that can be systematically related to one another. The paper is rounded out with a consideration of the role of ideation in the origins of modern geometry, and with a brief discussion of the use of ideation outside of pure geometry. What would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being?… Geometry and arithmetic would be among the studies we are seeking … a philosopher must learn them because he must arise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner … they facilitate the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth… they are knowledge of that which always is and not of something which at some time comes into being and passes away. (shrink)

Noncommutative geometries generalize standard smooth geometries, parametrizing the noncommutativity of dimensions with a fundamental quantity with the dimensions of area. The question arises then of whether the concept of a region smaller than the scale—and ultimately the concept of a point—makes sense in such a theory. We argue that it does not, in two interrelated ways. In the context of Connes’ spectral triple approach, we show that arbitrarily small regions are not definable in the formal sense. While in the (...) scalar field Moyal–Weyl approach, we show that they cannot be given an operational definition. We conclude that points do not exist in such geometries. We therefore investigate (a) the metaphysics of such a geometry, and (b) how the appearance of smooth manifold might be recovered as an approximation to a fundamental noncommutative geometry. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:La question de la relation entre le point et l'étendue en géométrie résonne, dans la pensée de Leibniz, avec celle du lien entre la substance simple avec le corps matériel dont elle est l'élément constitutif d'un point de vue métaphysique. En effet, comment ce qui est indivisible et sans dimension pourrait-il être le principe de ce qui se présente, au contraire, comme toujours divisé et étendu? Si la philosophie tardive de l'auteur, une fois devenue monadologie après 1700, rencontre (...) en cela un problème presque insurmontable, il ne semble pas en être de même dans les années 1690. Cet article propose de montrer comment, vers 1695, une solution originale en est fournie qui renvoie aux innovations mathématiques de cette période, au sujet du point, de l'étendue et, de façon centrale, de la continuité, étoffant ainsi la toile qui unit les mathématiques de Leibniz avec sa philosophie. (shrink)

Why concern oneself with Otto Neurath’s economic thought in its historical context? Could anything be more out of fashion than a theory proposing a centrally managed planned economy? Than the views of a theorist whose ideas on in-kind economic planning drove the notion of economic planning to its utmost extreme ? Indeed, Neurath’s ideas appeared too radical and utopian even for the social democrats of the 1920s. So why give even a second thought to them today? Would it not be (...) better to follow the advice a colleague gave me in the 1980s and to pass over Neurath’s “youthful sins” silently so as not to tarnish the reputation that – finally, after a lengthy delay – has been accredited to Neurath for his impressive philosophical achievements within the framework of logical empiricism?In the years since the 1980s, however, Neurath’s economic writings have attracted much more interest than anyone would previously have suspected. Today we are aware of the fact that Neurath formulated ideas at an unexpectedly early stage that are currently relevant in ecological economy, social choice theory and developmental economy. And that his reflections vis-à-vis “associational socialism” could provide interesting impulses for a new theory of socialism. Viewed from this perspective, Neurath’s status is secure as a precursor of theoretical developments and debates that are in full swing today. But is that enough? After all, if the role of the precursor is an endearing one, isn’t it also quite thankless? For even in the areas in which Neurath can be regarded as a precursor, the relevant questions are posed today with far greater precision and with reference to current facts – so why should anyone concern oneself with a precursor whose fundamental assumptions differ so greatly from those of the overwhelming majority of economists working today? (shrink)

The consequences for the theory of sets of points of the assumption of sets of sets of points, sets of sets of sets of points, and so on, are surveyed, as more generally are the differences among the geometric theories of points, of finite point-sets, of point-sets, of point-set-sets, and of sets of all ranks.

In this paper, we try to build a semiotics of stereotypes through the key idea of enunciation. We investigate stereotypes of Persons with Disabilities in the context of social media networks (e.g., Facebook, Instagram) by adopting a semiotic perspective. The mainstream idea about stereotypes is that they are necessarily something negative, that must be avoided to maximize inclusivity and fairness. However, in our view, stereotypes are the background of our perception of the world, and we cannot escape from them, because (...) when we leave behind a stereotype, it is only for adopting a new one built on a different basis. Therefore, it is crucial to understand stereotypes and the way they are expressed, since they are one of the enunciating instances that circulate in the space of the Encyclopedia. Through a semiotic point of view, we will follow how stereotypes transform, showing the way they change the modes of existence of meanings, shifting between the virtualized, the potentialized, the actualized, and the realized. Analyzing a huge corpus of social network messages built by the partners of the European project MeMe (Me & the Media: Fostering Social Media Literacy competences through Interactive Learning Settings for Adults with Disabilities), we will show how the advent of social media affected the research field of disability studies. Later, we will point out the variations of the classic stereotypes that have been addressed in the new participatory context of social media through the semiotic theory of enunciation. (shrink)

The notion of linguistic geometry is defined in this book. It is pertinent to keep in the record that linguistic geometry differs from classical geometry. Many basic or fundamental concepts and notions of classical geometry are not true or extendable in the case of linguistic geometry. Hence, for simple illustration, facts like two distinct points in classical geometry always define a line passing through them; this is generally not true in linguistic geometry. Suppose (...) we have two linguistic points as tall and light we cannot connect them, or technically, there is no line between them. However, let's take, for instance, two linguistic points, tall and very short, associated with the linguistic variable height of a person. We have a directed line joining from the linguistic point very short to the linguistic point tall. In this case, it is important to note that the direction is essential when the linguistic variable is a person's height. The other way line, from tall to very short, has no meaning. So in linguistic geometry, in general, we may not have a linguistic line; granted, we have a line, but we may not have it in both directions; the line may be directed. The linguistic distance is very far. So, the linguistic line directed or otherwise exists if and only if they are comparable. Hence the very concept of extending the line infinitely does not exist. Likewise, we cannot say as in classical geometry; three noncollinear points determine the plane in linguistic geometry. Further, we do not have the notion of the linguistic area of well-defined figures like a triangle, quadrilateral or any polygon as in the case of classical geometry. The best part of linguistic geometry is that we can define the new notion of linguistic social information geometric networks analogous to social information networks. This will be a boon to non-mathematics researchers in socio-sciences in other fields where natural languages can replace mathematics. (shrink)

This book reconstructs, both from the historical and theoretical points of view, Leibniz's geometrical studies, focusing in particular on the research Leibniz ...

According to Kepler and Descartes, the geometry of the triangle formed by the two eyes when focused on a single point affords perception of the distance to that point. Kepler characterized the processes involved as associative learning. Descartes described the processes as a “ natural geometry.” Many interpreters have Descartes holding that perceivers calculate the distance to the focal point using angle-side-angle, calculations that are reduced to unnoticed mental habits in adult vision. This article offers (...) a purely psychophysiological interpretation of Descartes’s natural geometry. In his account of perceived limb position from the Treatise on Man, he envisioned a central brain state that controls ocular convergence and thereby co-varies with the distance from observer to object. A psychophysiological law relates the visual perception of distance to this brain state. Descartes also invokes more traditional theories of distance and size perception based on unnoticed judgments, yielding a hybrid account. (shrink)

It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of determinism is not really a problem. Compatibilists, in (...) turn, tend to proceed as if showing that determinism is not a problem thereby shows that we have free will, as if determinism is the only thing that might threaten free will. In this chapter, I reject both of these elements of the traditional debate; the question of whether we have free will should neither begin nor end with the so-called problem of determinism. I present and discuss evidence from a variety of studies that suggests that incompatibilism is not particularly intuitive. Most people do not have to be talked out of incompatibilism but rather talked into it. This provides some reasons—though certainly not decisive reasons—to think that compatibilism is true. I conclude by pointing out that, even if compatibilism were true, it would not dissolve the problem of free will, because there are problems other than determinism that need to be confronted—namely, challenges to free will suggested by current and “future science,” including neuroscience and psychology. The threats to free will suggested by these sciences are distinct from the traditional threat of determinism, and they are the ones that “ordinary persons” find intuitively threatening to free will. In fact, I will argue that the reason incompatibilism about free will and determinism appears to be intuitive is that determinism is often and easily misunderstood to involve these distinct threats to free will—threats that suggest that our rational, conscious mental activity is bypassed in the process of our making decisions and coming to act. (shrink)

This book is a collection of edited interviews from The Free Will Show-a podcast that provides a beginner-friendly introduction to free will while also highlighting recent developments on the topic. The book includes original material as well, including an introduction to the interviews and an afterward with reflections on the podcast by the authors (who are cohosts of The Free Will Show). The book also includes a bibliography and suggestions for further reading after each interview and a (...) glossary of terms at the end of the book. The book will serve well either as a textbook or as an accessible entry-point to the free will debate, whether for an interested non-specialist or a philosopher who works in another area. The first half of this book introduces the main issues and arguments in philosophical debates about free will, including various apparent threats to free will (fatalism, foreknowledge, and determinism), the Consequence Argument, and the problem of luck, among others. The second half of this book introduces the main positions in the debate about free will and determinism, including several varieties of libertarianism and compatibilism, a version of free will skepticism, and some other positions that do not fit neatly into these categories. (shrink)