Search results for 'possible world semantics' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Lee Walters (2015). Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter (...)
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  2. Christopher Menzel (1990). Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics. Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.
    Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it (...)
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  3. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris (2010). The Epistemic Inadequacy of Ersatzer Possible World Semantics. Logique Et Analyse 53:61-76.
    In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of linguistic ersatzism, the ontologically deflationary view that possible worlds are maximal and consistent sets of sentences, and possible world semantics, the view that the meaning of a sentence is the set of possible worlds at which it is true, implies that no actual speaker can effectively use virtually any language to successfully communicate information. This result is based on complexity issues that relate to our finite (...)
     
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  4. R. Bradley (2012). Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false (...)
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  5. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris (2006). A Paradox for Possible World Semantics. Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):307-317.
    The development of possible worlds semantics for modal claims has led to a more general application of that theory as a complete semantics for various formal and natural languages, and this view is widely held to be an adequate (philosophical) interpretation of the model theory for such languages. We argue here that this view generates a self-referential inconsistency that indicates either the falsity or the incompleteness of PWS.
     
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  6. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Does Possible World Semantics Turn All Propositions Into Necessary Ones? Journal of Pragmatics 39 (5):972-916.
    "Jim would still be alive if he hadn't jumped" means that Jim's death was a consequence of his jumping. "x wouldn't be a triangle if it didn't have three sides" means that x's having a three sides is a consequence its being a triangle. Lewis takes the first sentence to mean that Jim is still alive in some alternative universe where he didn't jump, and he takes the second to mean that x is a non-triangle in every alternative universe where (...)
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  7. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics. Erkenntnis 72 (3):295 - 314.
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the (...)
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  8.  25
    Cheng-Chih Tsai (2012). The Genesis of Hi-Worlds: Towards a Principle-Based Possible World Semantics. Erkenntnis 76 (1):101-114.
    A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland’s paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002 ), with a remark that “neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker’s work”. In light of Frege’s celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker’s semantics, rather than Kripke’s semantics, that has captured the (...)
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  9.  12
    Melvin Fitting (2014). Possible World Semantics for First-Order Logic of Proofs. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):225-240.
    In the tech report Artemov and Yavorskaya [4] an elegant formulation of the first-order logic of proofs was given, FOLP. This logic plays a fundamental role in providing an arithmetic semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic, as was shown. In particular, the tech report proved an arithmetic completeness theorem, and a realization theorem for FOLP. In this paper we provide a possible-world semantics for FOLP, based on the propositional semantics of Fitting [5]. We also give an (...)
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  10.  23
    Nobu-Yuki Suzuki (1997). Kripke Frame with Graded Accessibility and Fuzzy Possible World Semantics. Studia Logica 59 (2):249-269.
    A possible world structure consist of a set W of possible worlds and an accessibility relation R. We take a partial function r(·,·) to the unit interval [0, 1] instead of R and obtain a Kripke frame with graded accessibility r Intuitively, r(x, y) can be regarded as the reliability factor of y from x We deal with multimodal logics corresponding to Kripke frames with graded accessibility in a fairly general setting. This setting provides us with a (...)
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  11.  9
    Robert Brandom & N. Rescher (1979). The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Nonstandard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly, Library of Philosophy 5 (1):233-236.
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  12.  5
    Lee Walters (2015). Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter (...)
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  13.  3
    Lee Walters (forthcoming). Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:n/a-n/a.
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  14. David Lewis (1977). Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):359-363.
  15.  33
    C. Anthony Anderson (2009). The Lesson of Kaplan's Paradox About Possible World Semantics. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 85.
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  16.  71
    Brian Ellis, Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1977). An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):355 - 357.
  17.  51
    Melvin Fitting, Possible World Semantics for First Order Lp.
    First we have individual variables, as usual in first-order logics. (We do not have individual constants, but this is a minor point.) The propositional logic LP has justification constants, but in FOLP these are generalized to allow individual variables as arguments. Thus we have as justification constants c, c(x), c(x, y), . . . . Similarly LP has justification variables, but in FOLP these can be parametrized with individual variables p, p(x), p(x, y), . . . . To keep terminology (...)
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  18. Jaakko Hintikka (1981). Phenomenology Vs. Possible-World Semantics: Apparent and Real Differences. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 35 (1):113.
     
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  19.  15
    G. W. R. (1982). The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):627-629.
  20.  6
    Jean-Pascal Alcantara (2012). Leibniz, Modal Logic and Possible World Semantics: The Apulean Square as a Procrustean Bed for His Modal Metaphysics. In J.-Y. Beziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Birkhäuser 53--71.
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  21.  5
    Wlodek Rabinowicz, Analyticity: An Unfinished Business in Possible-World Semantics.
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  22.  3
    Rabinowicz Wlodek (2006). Analyticity-An Unfinished Business in Possible World Semantics. In Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53 345--358.
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  23.  1
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics. Erkenntnis 72 (3):295-314.
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  24.  13
    L. Wiesenthal (1985). Visual Space From the Perspective of Possible World Semantics II. Synthese 64 (2):241 - 270.
  25. David Makinson (1982). Review: Nicholas Rescher, Robert Brandom, The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1):233-236.
     
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  26. Sven Danielsson (2006). Moorean Possible World Semantics for Supervenience. In Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53 53--117.
     
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  27. David Makinson (1982). Rescher Nicholas and Brandom Robert. The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. APQ Library of Philosophy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, and Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., © 1979, Pub. 1980, X + 174 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1):233-236.
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  28. Javier Vilanova (1995). A Possible World Semantics for Conditional Logic Based in Similarity Relations. Bulletin of the Section of Logic 3:132-139.
     
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  29.  3
    Dale Jacquette (2005). Nonstandard Semantics for Modal Logic and the Concept of a Logically Possible World. Philosophia Scientiae 9 (2):239-258.
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  30. Dale Jacquette (2005). Nonstandard Semantics for Modal Logic and the Concept of a Logically Possible World. Philosophia Scientae 9:239-258.
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  31.  61
    L. Wiesenthal (1983). Visual Space From the Perspective of Possible-Worlds Semantics, I. Synthese 56 (August):199-238.
  32. Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu & Tuomo Aho (2009). Modal Logic From Kant to Possible Worlds Semantics. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press
    This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach to modal logic, possible (...)
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  33.  33
    Charles B. Cross (2016). Embedded Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds Semantics. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):665-673.
    Stephen Barker argues that a possible worlds semantics for the counterfactual conditional of the sort proposed by Stalnaker and Lewis cannot accommodate certain examples in which determinism is true and a counterfactual Q > R is false, but where, for some P, the compound counterfactual P > is true. I argue that the completeness theorem for Lewis’s system VC of counterfactual logic shows that Stalnaker–Lewis semantics does accommodate Barker’s example, and I argue that its doing so should (...)
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  34.  77
    Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch (2003). Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for (...)
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  35. John Divers (2006). Possible-Worlds Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach. Mind 115 (458):187-226.
    If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring commitment to the existence (...)
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  36.  18
    Javier Vilanova (1999). Un Análisis Dei Concepto de Cognoscibilidad Desde la Semántica de Mundos Posibles (an Analysis of the Notion of Knowability in the F Ield of Possible Worlds Semantics). Theoria 14 (3):413-429.
    Las nociones epistémicas modales se definen como aquellos conceptos epistémicos que, como el de cognoscibilidad o el de indudabilidad, incluyen una nota modal. Segun se defiende en este trabajo, la semántica de mundos posibles y algunas de sus extensiones (especialmente las llevadas a cabo para logica temporal, logica epistemica y logica condicional) son instrumentos adecuados para deshacer el nudo de las intensionalidades superpuestas en estas nociones especialmente esquivas al análisis. Para mostrarlo, se proporcionan una serie de análisis sucesivos de la (...)
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  37.  31
    Dale Jacquette (2014). Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence. Metaphysica 15 (1).
    The thesis that entities exist in, at, or in relation to logically possible worlds is criticized. The suggestion that actually nonexistent fictional characters might nevertheless exist in nonactual merely logically possible worlds runs afoul of the most general transworld identity requirements. An influential philosophical argument for the concept of world-relativized existence is examined in Alvin Plantinga’s formal development and explanation of modal semantic relations. Despite proposing an attractive unified semantics of alethic modality, Plantinga’s argument is rejected (...)
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  38. Martin Smith (2007). Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97 - 121.
    Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals - that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or 'other things being equal' clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus (...)
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  39.  95
    Alessandro Torza (2013). How to Lewis a Kripke-Hintikka. Synthese 190 (4):743-779.
    It has been argued that a combination of game-theoretic semantics and independence-friendly (IF) languages can provide a novel approach to the conceptual foundations of mathematics and the sciences. I introduce and motivate an IF first-order modal language endowed with a game-theoretic semantics of perfect information. The resulting interpretive independence-friendly logic (IIF) allows to formulate some basic model-theoretic notions that are inexpressible in the ordinary quantified modal logic. Moreover, I argue that some key concepts of Kripke’s new theory of (...)
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  40.  81
    Roberta Ballarin (2005). Validity and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):275 - 303.
    In this paper I argue against the commonly received view that Kripke's formal Possible World Semantics (PWS) reflects the adoption of a metaphysical interpretation of the modal operators. I consider in detail Kripke's three main innovations vis-à-vis Carnap's PWS: a new view of the worlds, variable domains of quantification, and the adoption of a notion of universal validity. I argue that all these changes are driven by the natural technical development of the model theory and its related (...)
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  41.  31
    Alberto Zanardo (2006). Quantification Over Sets of Possible Worlds in Branching-Time Semantics. Studia Logica 82 (3):379 - 400.
    Temporal logic is one of the many areas in which a possible world semantics is adopted. Prior's Ockhamist and Peircean semantics for branching-time, though, depart from the genuine Kripke semantics in that they involve a quantification over histories, which is a second-order quantification over sets of possible worlds. In the paper, variants of the original Prior's semantics will be considered and it will be shown that all of them can be viewed as first-order (...)
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  42.  8
    Aneta Markoska-Cubrinovska (forthcoming). Possible Worlds in “The Craft of Formal Logic”. Synthese:1-13.
    “The Craft of Formal Logic” is Arthur Prior’s unpublished textbook, written in 1950–51, in which he developed a theory of modality as quantification over possible worlds-like objects. This theory predates most of the prominent pioneering texts in possible worlds semantics and anticipates the significance of its basic concept in modal logic. Prior explicitly defines modal operators as quantifiers of ‘entities’ with modal character. Although he talks about these ‘entities’ only informally, and hesitates how to name them, using (...)
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  43. John Perry, U039 Semantics, Possible-Worlds.
    Possible worlds semantics (PWS) is a family of methods that have been used to analyze a wide variety of intensional phenomena, including modality, conditionals, tense and temporal adverbs, obligation, and reports of informational and cognitive content. PWS spurred the development of philosophical logic and led to new applications of logic in computer science and artificial intelligence. It revolutionized the study of the semantics of natural languages. PWS has inspired analyses of many concepts of philosophical importance, and the (...)
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  44.  95
    Michael Glanzberg (2009). Semantics and Truth Relative to a World. Synthese 166 (2):281 - 307.
    This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation (...)
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  45.  40
    Greg Ray (1996). Ontology-Free Modal Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):333 - 361.
    The problem with model-theoretic modal semantics is that it provides only the formal beginnings of an account of the semantics of modal languages. In the case of non-modal language, we bridge the gap between semantics and mere model theory, by claiming that a sentence is true just in case it is true in an intended model. Truth in a model is given by the model theory, and an intended model is a model which has as domain the (...)
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  46. M. J. Cresswell (1973). Physical theories and possible worlds. Logique Et Analyse 16 (63):495.
    Formalized physical theories are not, as a rule, stated in intensional languages. Yet in talking about them we often treat them as if they were. We say for instance: 'Consider what would happen if instead of p's being true q were. In such a case r would be likely.' If we say this sort of thing, p, q and r appear to stand for the meanings of sentences of the theory, but meanings in some intensional sense. Now it is very (...)
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  47. J. Y. Béziau (2010). What is a Possible World. In Guido Imaguire & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Possible Worlds: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. Philosophia 25--37.
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  48. B. Jack Copeland (2002). The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):99-137.
    This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913-1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945-1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947-1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953-1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955-1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958-1959; Drake, 1959-1961; Kripke, 1958-1965.
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  49.  46
    Gerhard Schurz & Paul Weingartner (2010). Zwart and Franssen's Impossibility Theorem Holds for Possible-World-Accounts but Not for Consequence-Accounts to Verisimilitude. Synthese 172 (3):415 - 436.
    Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not (...)
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  50. Robert Stalnaker (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (75):141-156.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of (...)
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