Search results for 'pragmatist theory of truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  72
    Brian Ribeiro (2011). A Really Short Refutation of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:31-34.
    The pragmatic theory of truth (PTT) seeks to illuminate the concept of truth by focusing on concepts like usefulness or adaptivity. However, contrary to common opinion, PTT does not merely face a narrow band of (perhaps) rather artificial counterexamples (as in a case of empirically unfounded but life-extending optimism in a cancer patient); instead, PTT is faced with a fast psychological research literature which suggests that inaccurate beliefs are both (1) pervasive in human beings and, nonetheless, (2) (...)
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  2. Samuel S. S. Browne (1930). A Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Reality. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
     
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  3. Susan Haack (1976). The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):231-249.
  4.  2
    Max Black (1944). Review: Virgil G. Hinshaw, The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (3):67-68.
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  5.  17
    Virgil G. Hinshaw Jr (1944). The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Philosophy of Science 11 (2):82-92.
  6.  5
    Allan Törnudd (1915). Types of Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (18):491-500.
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  7.  5
    R. Anschutz (1924). The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):174 – 182.
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  8. R. Anschutz (1924). The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 2 (3):174-182.
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  9.  3
    F. C. S. Schiller (1931). A Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Reality. By Samuel S. S. Browne B.Litt., (U.S.A.: Princeton University Press. 1930. Pp. 93. Price 9s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 6 (21):120-.
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  10.  3
    Gary E. Dann (1999). Letson, Ben H. Davidson's Theory of Truth and Its Implications for Rorty's Pragmatism. Review of Metaphysics 53 (2):458-460.
  11.  14
    Ulrich Majer (1991). Ramsey's Theory of Truth and the Truth of Theories: A Synthesis of Pragmatism and Intuitionism in Ramsey's Last Philosophy. Theoria 57 (3):162-195.
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  12.  12
    Panayot Butchvarov (2003). Davidson's Theory of Truth and Its Implications for Rorty's Pragmatism. International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):339-340.
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  13.  25
    Karl-Otto Apel (2001). Pragmatism as Sense-Critical Realism Based on a Regulative Idea of Truth: In Defense of a Peircean Theory of Reality and Truth. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (4):443 - 474.
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  14.  4
    Dan Nesher (2002). On Truth and the Representation of Reality: A Collection of Inquiries From a Pragmatist Point of View. Upa.
    In On Truth and the Representation of Reality, Dan Nesher develops a new theory of truth in the framework of pragmatist theory of representation. Using the pragmatist theory of perception for the basis of his epistemological explanation of our confrontation with external Reality and how it's represented, Nesher shows that in our perceptual operations we quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments.
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  15. Bella K. Milmed (1956). Lewis and the Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 53 (19):569-583.
    C i lewis, regarding himself as a pragmatist, repeatedly attempts to identify truth with verification. it is here argued, however, that a correspondence or semantic theory is required by (1) lewis's interpretation of objective judgments in terms of "possible experience" and of possible experience in terms of counterfactual conditions; (2) his distinction between the justification of knowledge and the truth of knowledge; and (3) his logical analysis of truth in terms of the extension (known or (...)
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  16.  43
    Ian Rumfitt (forthcoming). Tempered Pragmatism. In Cheryl Misak & Huw Price (eds.), Pragmatism in the Long Twentieth Century: Proceedings of the 2014 Dawes Hicks Symposium. British Academy
    This paper assesses the prospects of a pragmatist theory of content. I begin by criticising the theory presented in D.H. Mellors essaySuccessful Semantics’. I (...) then identify problems and lacunae in the pragmatist theory of meaning sketched in Chapter 13 of Dummetts The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. The prospects are brighter, I contend, for a tempered pragmatism, in which the theory of content is permitted to draw upon irreducible notions of truth and falsity. I sketch the shape of such a theory and illustrate the role of its pragmatist elements by showing how they point towards a promising account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals. A feature of the account is that it validates Modus Ponens whilst invalidating Modus Tollens. (shrink)
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  17.  24
    Kathleen Wider (1995). Truth and Existence: The Idealism in Sartre's Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):91 – 109.
    Although Sartre rejects a certain kind of idealism in "Truth and Existence", I argue that a commitment to a kind of transcendental idealism remains. I explore the expression of this idealism in "Truth and Existence" and how it enhances an idealist tradition which begins with Kant. More importantly, I examine Sartre's divergence from Kantian idealism and his blending of pragmatism with idealism, in a way most similar to Wittgenstein's. Unlike Wittgenstein's idealism, however, Sartre's idealism, I argue, brings him (...)
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  18.  33
    Gurpreet S. Rattan (2004). The Theory of Truth in the Theory of Meaning. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):214–243.
    The connection between theories of truth and meaning is explored. Theories of truth and meaning are connected in a way such that differences in the conception of what it is for a sentence to be true are engendered by differences in the conception of how meanings depend on each other, and on a base of underlying facts. It is argued that this view is common ground between Davidson and Dummett, and that their dispute over realism is really a (...)
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  19.  7
    Warren Schmaus (2010). Durkheim, Jamesian Pragmatism and the Normativity of Truth. History of the Human Sciences 23 (5):1-16.
    In his lectures on pragmatism presented in the academic year 1913—14 at the Sorbonne, Durkheim argued that James’s pragmatist theory of truth, due to its emphasis on individual satisfaction, was unable to account for the obligatory, necessary and impersonal character of truth. But for Durkheim to make this charge is only to raise the question whether he himself could account for the morally obligatory or normative character of truth. Although rejecting individualism may be necessary for (...)
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  20. David Lamberth (2009). What to Make of James's Genetic Theory of Truth? William James Studies 4:1-20.
    This Presidential Address to the 2008 Annual Meeting of the William James Society pursues an overlooked avenue to understanding what James might have intended by his claim in Pragmatism to offer a “genetic theory of what is meant by truth.” The author argues that we can plausibly interpret this specific claim of James by appealing to Hermann Lotze’s conception of “genetic definition,” explicated in his 1874 Logik, which James read and annotated closely. The essay concludes by pursuing the (...)
     
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  21. Sami Pihlstrom (2005). Truthmaking And Pragmatist Conceptions Of Truth And Reality. Minerva 9:105-133.
    This paper argues for a rearticulation of the theory of truthmaking within pragmatism. The concept of truthmaking hasusually been employed by metaphysical realists , but it can be reinterpreted in a pragmatistmanner, following both classical and more recent pragmatists’ ideas on the“making of truth” as a process within human experience and world-categorization. Thus, a pragmatist criticism of metaphysical realism can be extended to the core areas of realist metaphysics, including the truthmaking theory.
     
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  22.  21
    C. J. Misak (2000). Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation. Routledge.
    Can we criticize those who hold beliefs which are likely to be wrong? Or must we abandon notions of truth and objectivity and claim that certain beliefs are best for us while incompatible beliefs are best for others? Truth, Politics, Morality addresses this crucial issue and its implications for democracy by arguing that the notion of truth ought to be returned to the center of moral and political philosophy. Cheryl Misak persuasively makes a case for a certain (...)
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  23. Harvey Cormier (2000). The Truth is What Works: William James, Pragmatism, and the Seed of Death. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Charles Sanders Peirce complained that James allowed pragmatism to become "infected" with "seeds of death" like the idea that truth is mutable. The Truth is What Works is an attempt to defend James's pragmatic theory of truth from a wide range of critics including Peirce, Betrand Russell, Hilary Putnam, and Cornel West. Cormier runs the gauntlet of historical and contemporary criticism in an attempt to show, not that Jamesian pragmatism does in fact contain a perfectly good (...)
     
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  24.  28
    Catherine Legg (2014). Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth. Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.
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  25.  14
    Rinat M. Nugayev (2014). Coherent Theory of Truth and Its Forerunners. In Vladimir G. Kuznetzov & Alexandre A. Pechenkin (eds.), Science,Philosophy and Humanities. Moscow State University 44-66.
    Arguments pro and contra convergent realism - underdetermination of theory by observational evidence and pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity- are considered. It is argued that, to meet the counter-arguments challenge, convergent realism should be considerably changed with a help of modification of the propositions from this meta-programme’s “hard core” and “protecting belt”. Maybe one of the ways out is to turn to the coherent theory of truth. Some of the works of Hegel (as interpreted by Merab Mamardashvili (...)
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  26.  60
    Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to (...)
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  27.  38
    Colin Johnston (2013). Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):381-397.
    The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.
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  28.  40
    Kalle Puolakka (2008). Literature, Ethics, and Richard Rorty's Pragmatist Theory of Interpretation. Philosophia 36 (1):29-41.
    This article considers the validity and strength of Richard Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation in the light of two ethical issues related to literature and interpretation. Rorty’s theory is rejected on two grounds. First, it is argued that his unrestrained account of interpretation is incompatible with the distinctive moral concerns that have been seen to restrict the scope and nature of valid approaches to artworks. The second part of the paper claims that there is no indispensable (...)
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  29.  31
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1993). The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False. Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  30.  20
    Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch (2001). Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth. Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.
    We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.
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  31.  18
    Axel Seemann (2004). Lifeworld, Discourse, and Realism: On Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Truth. Philosophy and Social Criticism 30 (4):503-514.
    In this paper, I give a systematic account of the core features of Jürgen Habermas’s revised approach to truth that comprises both realist and epistemic components. While agents in the lifeworld are pragmatic realists and work on the basic assumption that their beliefs about the world are true, beliefs that have become problematic can be scrutinized only in the form of validity-claims in rational discourses. Thus Habermas introduces a discursive truth predicate that involves a procedural idealization of the (...)
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  32.  1
    Brendan Hogan (2007). Guest Editor Introduction to a Symposium on Robert Westbrook's Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth. Contemporary Pragmatism 4 (2):1.
    This symposium on Robert Westbrook's John Dewey and American Democracy explores the continuing relevance of pragmatism for democratic political theory.
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  33.  10
    Ron Bombardi (2013). On the Neurobiology of Truth. Biosemiotics 6 (3):537-546.
    The concept of truth arises from puzzling over distinctions between the real and the apparent, while the origin of these distinctions lies in the neurobiology of mammalian cerebral lateralization, that is, in the evolution of brains that can address the world both indicatively and subjunctively; brains that represent the world both categorically and hypothetically. After some 2,500 years of thinking about it, the Western philosophical tradition has come up with three major theories of truth: correspondence, coherence, and (...). Traditional philosophy has nevertheless failed to arbitrate much among these views; certainly no clear winner has emerged. I argue, however, that contemporary neuroscience provides adequate theoretical grounds for a unified theory of truth. More specifically, I contend that the correspondence, the coherence, and the pragmatic utility of symbols are each biological features of our neurophysiological information processing systems—that is to say, our brains. On my view, the traditional trifurcation of philosophical accounts of the predicate, “is true”, stems from a trifurcation of focus on the information latent in sensory, motor, and somatosensory cortices of the human brain. (shrink)
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  34. Dhirendra Nath Roy (1930). Pragmetic [!] Theory of Truth. [Manila.
     
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  35.  22
    Nicholas Unwin (2013). Deflationist Truth is Substantial. Acta Analytica 28 (3):257-266.
    Deflationism is usually thought to differ from the correspondence theory over whether truth is a substantial property. However, I argue that this notion of a ‘substantial property’ is tendentious. I further argue that the Equivalence Schema alone is sufficient to lead to idealism when combined with a pragmatist theory of truth. Deflationism thus has more powerful metaphysical implications than is generally thought and itself amounts to a kind of correspondence theory.
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  36.  32
    P. Schlenker (2007). The Elimination of Self-Reference: Generalized Yablo-Series and the Theory of Truth. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):251 - 307.
    Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken together, are paradoxical. Yablo's paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k > i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k > i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo's (...)
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  37. Gábor Forrai (2001). Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes a Defense of Internal Realism. Kluwer.
    This systematic development of the internal realist approach, first developed by Hilary Putnam, tries to steer a middle course between metaphysical realism and relativism. It argues against metaphysical realism that it is open to global skepticism and cannot cope with conceptual pluralism. Against relativism it is claimed that there are mind-independent constraints on the validity of our claims to knowledge. The book provides a moderately verificationist account of semantics and novel explanation of the idea of conceptual schemes. It is (...)
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  38.  56
    C. J. Misak (2004). Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements of a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth (...)
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  39.  83
    Jennifer Bleazby (2011). Overcoming Relativism and Absolutism: Dewey's Ideals of Truth and Meaning in Philosophy for Children. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (5):453-466.
    Different notions of truth imply and encourage different ideals of thinking, knowledge, meaning, and learning. Thus, these concepts have fundamental importance for educational theory and practice. In this paper, I intend to draw out and clarify the notions of truth, knowledge and meaning that are implied by P4C's pedagogical ideals. There is some disagreement amongst P4C theorists and practitioners about whether the community of inquiry implies either relativism or absolutism. I will argue that both relativism and absolutism (...)
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  40.  52
    Julian Dodd (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.
    This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory, while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
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  41.  24
    Nicholas Rescher (1977). Methodological Pragmatism: A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Blackwell.
  42. Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  43.  73
    Andrew Newman (2002). The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. Cambridge University Press.
    This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not (...)
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  44. Ricardo Roque Pascual (1940). Logical Analysis of Fictionalism with Respect to the Theory of Truth. [Manila, P.I..
     
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  45.  25
    Ernesto Perini-Santos (2011). John Buridan's Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar. Vivarium 49 (1-3):184-213.
    The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera (...)
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  46. James O. Young (2002). The Slingshot Argument and the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 17 (2):121-132.
    The correspondence theory of truth holds that each true sentence corresponds to a discrete fact. Donald Davidson and others have argued (using an argument that has come to be known as the slingshot) that this theory is mistaken, since all true sentences correspond to the same “Great Fact.” The argument is designed to show that by substituting logically equivalent sentences and coreferring terms for each other in the context of sentences of the form ‘P corresponds to the (...)
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  47.  15
    Reinoud Bosch (2007). Pragmatism and the Practical Relevance of Truth. Foundations of Science 12 (3):189-201.
    In this article, I argue that pragmatism has something to gain from returning once more to the question of truth, and acknowledging the truth of the existence of Being and its elements. The practical relevance of this insight is shown by my proposition for a practical hermeneutic social scientific method which logically follows from the truth of Being. The method is compatible with the inevitability of subjective judgments in any kind of scientific research, as well as with (...)
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  48.  74
    Tristan Haze (forthcoming). Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
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  49.  29
    Aaron Cooley (2007). Review: Of Westbrook, Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth. [REVIEW] Education and Culture 23 (2):pp. 76-79.
    The dormancy of American pragmatism is over. At least, this is what numerous articles and books have unequivocally stated in the decades since Richard Rorty gave up his belief in orthodox analytical epistemology and settled into his own brand of John Dewey's antifoundational epistemology. Even though Rorty's interpretation and manipulation of Dewey have been controversial, we are all the better for the revival of discourse around what pragmatism was, is, and will be. Robert Westbrook's Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics (...)
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  50. Brian Loar (1980). Ramsey's Theory of Belief and Truth. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press 49--69.
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