Search results for 'premise conditionals' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals. In K. P. Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic (CRiSPI, Vol. 24). Emerald
    It is generally agreed that constructions of the form “if P, Q” are capable of conveying a number of different relations between antecedent and consequent, with pragmatics playing a central role in determining these relations. Controversy concerns what the conventional contribution of the if-clause is, how it constrains the pragmatic processes, and what those processes are. In this essay, I begin to argue that the conventional contribution of if-clauses to semantics is exhausted by the fact that these clauses introduce a (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  69
    Katrin Schulz (2011). “If You'd Wiggled A, Then B Would've Changed”. Synthese 179 (2):239-251.
    This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl (2000) to formalize a causal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  27
    Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.
    The rise of causality and the attendant graph-theoretic modeling tools in the study of counterfactual reasoning has had resounding effects in many areas of cognitive science, but it has thus far not permeated the mainstream in linguistic theory to a comparable degree. In this study I show that a version of the predominant framework for the formal semantic analysis of conditionals, Kratzer-style premise semantics, allows for a straightforward implementation of the crucial ideas and insights of Pearl-style causal networks. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  21
    Sara Verbrugge & Hans Smessaert (2010). On the Argumentative Strength of Indirect Inferential Conditionals. Argumentation 24 (3):337-362.
    Inferential or epistemic conditional sentences represent a blueprint of someone’s reasoning process from premise to conclusion. Declerck and Reed (2001) make a distinction between a direct and an indirect type. In the latter type the direction of reasoning goes backwards, from the blatant falsehood of the consequent to the falsehood of the antecedent. We first present a modal reinterpretation in terms of Argumentation Schemes of indirect inferential conditionals (IIC’s) in Declerck and Reed (2001). We furthermore argue for a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  56
    Peter Milne (2012). Indicative Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and the “Defective Truth-Table”: A Request for More Experiments. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196 - 224.
    While there is now considerable experimental evidence that, on the one hand, participants assign to the indicative conditional as probability the conditional probability of consequent given antecedent and, on the other, they assign to the indicative conditional the ?defective truth-table? in which a conditional with false antecedent is deemed neither true nor false, these findings do not in themselves establish which multi-premise inferences involving conditionals participants endorse. A natural extension of the truth-table semantics pronounces as valid numerous inference (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6.  20
    Guy Politzer & Jean-françois Bonnefon (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484–503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between 'rebutting' and 'undercutting' defeaters. 'Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  7.  5
    Guy Politzer & J.-F. Bonnefon (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting' and ‘undercutting' defeaters. ‘Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two types, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8.  18
    Sara Verbrugge, Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Hans Smessaert & William Van Belle (2007). Pronounced Inferences: A Study on Inferential Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):105 – 133.
    An experimental study is reported which investigates the differences in interpretation between content conditionals (of various pragmatic types) and inferential conditionals. In a content conditional, the antecedent represents a requirement for the consequent to become true. In an inferential conditional, the antecedent functions as a premise and the consequent as the inferred conclusion from that premise. The linguistic difference between content and inferential conditionals is often neglected in reasoning experiments. This turns out to be unjustified, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9.  11
    Katrin Schulz (2011). "If You'd Wiggled A, Then B Would've Changed" Causality and Counterfactual Conditionals. Synthese 179 (2):239-251.
    This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl to formalize a causal notion (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  24
    Wayne Wobcke (2000). An Information-Based Theory of Conditionals. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (2):95-141.
    We present an approach to combining three areas of research which we claim are all based on information theory: knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science using prototypes, plans, or schemata; formal semantics in natural language, especially the semantics of the `if-then' conditional construct; and the logic of subjunctive conditionals first developed using a possible worlds semantics by Stalnaker and Lewis. The basic premise of the paper is that both schema-based inference and the semantics of conditionals (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  57
    Nicholas Allott & Hiroyuki Uchida (2009). Classical Logic, Conditionals and “Nonmonotonic” Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):85-85.
    Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  16
    Politzer Guy & Bonnefon Jean-Francois (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock’s (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting’ and ‘undercutting’ defeaters. ‘Inferential’ conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Guy Politzer & Jean-François Bonnefon ( 2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's distinction between ‘rebutting' and ‘undercutting' defeaters. ‘Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two types, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  55
    Eric Swanson (2011). On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):693-713.
    In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. Fabrizio Cariani & Lance J. Rips (2016). Conditionals, Context, and the Suppression Effect. Cognitive Science 40 (5):n/a-n/a.
    Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B. Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Fabrizio Cariani (forthcoming). Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All? In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press
    This paper motivates and develops a novel semantic framework for deontic modals. The framework is designed to shed light on two things: the relationship between deontic modals and substantive theories of practical rationality and the interaction of deontic modals with conditionals, epistemic modals and probability operators. I argue that, in order to model inferential connections between deontic modals and probability operators, we need more structure than is provided by classical intensional theories. In particular, we need probabilistic structure that interacts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  9
    Ruth M. J. Byrne (1989). Suppressing Valid Inferences with Conditionals. Cognition 31 (1):61-83.
    Three experiments are reported which show that in certain contexts subjects reject instances of the valid modus ponens and modus tollens inference form in conditional arguments. For example, when a conditional premise, such as: If she meets her friend then she will go to a play, is accompanied by a conditional containing an additional requirement: If she has enough money then she will go to a play, subjects reject the inference from the categorical premise: She meets her friend, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   77 citations  
  18. Joe Salerno, How to Embed Epistemic Modals Without Violating Modus Tollens.
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions of fa- miliar truth conditional theories of modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, these explana- tions go too far. For they foster other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are no equivocations. It is argued here that the key to the solution is to drop the assumption (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  52
    Donald Bamber (2000). Entailment with Near Surety of Scaled Assertions of High Conditional Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):1-74.
    An assertion of high conditional probability or, more briefly, an HCP assertion is a statement of the type: The conditional probability of B given A is close to one. The goal of this paper is to construct logics of HCP assertions whose conclusions are highly likely to be correct rather than certain to be correct. Such logics would allow useful conclusions to be drawn when the premises are not strong enough to allow conclusions to be reached with certainty. This goal (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20.  11
    Roderic A. Girle (2016). Proof and Dialogue in Aristotle. Argumentation 30 (3):289-316.
    Jan Łukasiewicz’s analysis of Aristotle’s syllogism drew attention to the nature of syllogisms as conditionals rather than premise-conclusion arguments. His further idea that syllogisms should be understood as theorems of an axiom system seems a step too far for many logicians. But there is evidence to suggest that Aristotle’s syllogism was to regularise some of the steps made in ‘dialogue games.’ This way of seeing the syllogism is explored in the framework of modern formal dialogue systems. A modern (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Jonathan Bennett (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
    Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject. An ideal introduction for undergraduates with a philosophical grounding, it also offers a rich source of illumination and stimulation for graduate (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   111 citations  
  22. Nate Charlow (2016). Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals. Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  69
    Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge (2013). The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited. Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
    According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  24. Daniel Rothschild (2013). Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions? Noûs 47 (1):49-68.
    Discusses how to capture the link between the probability of indicative conditionals and conditional probability using a classical semantics for conditionals.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  25. Lee Walters (2014). Conditionals, Modals, and Hypothetical Syllogism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):90-97.
    Moti Mizrahi (2013) presents some novel counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) for indicative conditionals. I show that they are not compelling as they neglect the complicated ways in which conditionals and modals interact. I then briefly outline why HS should nevertheless be rejected.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  26.  67
    Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   43 citations  
  27.  76
    Justin Khoo (2016). Probabilities of Conditionals in Context. Linguistics and Philosophy (1):1-43.
    The Ramseyan thesis that the probability of an indicative conditional is equal to the corresponding conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent is both widely confirmed and subject to attested counterexamples (e.g., McGee 2000, Kaufmann 2004). This raises several puzzling questions. For instance, why are there interpretations of conditionals that violate this Ramseyan thesis in certain contexts, and why are they otherwise very rare? In this paper, I raise some challenges to Stefan Kaufmann's account of why the Ramseyan (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer (forthcoming). Conditionals in Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-37.
    We argue that distinct conditionalsconditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  31
    Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre (2016). A Puzzle About Knowing Conditionals. Noûs.
    We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Frank Veltman (2005). Making Counterfactual Assumptions. Journal of Semantics 22 (2):159-180.
    This paper provides an update semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It does so by giving a dynamic twist to the ‘Premise Semantics’ for counterfactuals developed in Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1981). It also offers an alternative solution to the problems with naive Premise Semantics discussed by Angelika Kratzer in ‘Lumps of Thought’ (Kratzer, 1989). Such an alternative is called for given the triviality results presented in Kanazawa et al. (2005, this issue).
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  31.  27
    Wolfgang Spohn (2013). A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
    Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32.  24
    Matthias Unterhuber (2013). Possible Worlds Semantics for Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals? A Formal Philosophical Inquiry Into Chellas-Segerberg Semantics. Ontos (Now de Gruyter).
    Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative (...). (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. Kenneth L. Pearce (2016). Counteressential Conditionals. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):73-81.
    Making sense of our reasoning in disputes about necessary truths requires admitting nonvacuous counterpossibles. One class of these is the counteressentials, which ask us to make contrary to fact suppositions about essences. A popular strategy in accounting for nonvacuous counterpossibles is to extend the standard possible worlds semantics for subjunctive conditionals by the addition of impossible worlds. A conditional A □-> C is then taken to be true if all of the nearest A worlds are C worlds. I argue (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Niki Pfeifer (2013). Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals. Studia Logica (4):1-18.
    There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants’ responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed. I argue why neither logic nor standard probability (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35.  48
    Frank Jackson (1998). Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays. Routledge.
    This collection brings together some of Frank Jackson's most influential essays on mind, action, conditionals, method in metaphysics, and ethics. These have each been revised for this edition, and are presented along with his challenge to orthodoxy on the new riddle of induction.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  36.  84
    D. Manley & R. Wasserman (2012). Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples. Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.
    In an earlier paper in these pages (2008), we explored the puzzling link between dispositions and conditionals. First, we rehearsed the standard counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis and the refined conditional analysis defended by David Lewis. Second, we attacked a tempting response to these counterexamples: what we called the ‘getting specific strategy’. Third, we presented a series of structural considerations that pose problems for many attempts to understand the link between dispositions and conditionals. Finally, we developed our (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  37.  70
    Michael Zhao (2015). Intervention and the Probabilities of Indicative Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):477-503.
    A few purported counterexamples to the Adams thesis have cropped up in the literature in the last few decades. I propose a theory that accounts for them, in a way that makes the connections between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals clearer.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  60
    Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng (2007). Conditionals and Consequences. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
    We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  39. William B. Starr (2014). A Uniform Theory of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.
    A uniform theory of conditionals is one which compositionally captures the behavior of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals without positing ambiguities. This paper raises new problems for the closest thing to a uniform analysis in the literature (Stalnaker, Philosophia, 5, 269–286 (1975)) and develops a new theory which solves them. I also show that this new analysis provides an improved treatment of three phenomena (the import-export equivalence, reverse Sobel-sequences and disjunctive antecedents). While these results concern central issues in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Nate Charlow (2013). Conditional Preferences and Practical Conditionals. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.
    I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the proper analysis of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41.  81
    Justin Khoo (2015). On Indicative And Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (32).
    At the center of the literature on conditionals lies the division between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, and Ernest Adams’ famous minimal pair: If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did. If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have. While a lot of attention is paid to figuring out what these different kinds of conditionals mean, significantly less attention has been paid to the question of why their grammatical differences give rise to their semantic differences. In this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  28
    Michael Woods (1997). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
    Conditionals has at its center an extended essay on this problematic and much-debated subject in the philosophy of language and logic, which the widely respected Oxford philosopher Michael Woods had been preparing for publication at the time of his death in 1993. It appears here edited by his eminent colleague David Wiggins, and is accompanied by a commentary specially written by a leading expert on the topic, Dorothy Edgington. This masterly and original treatment of conditionals will demand the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  43.  81
    Igor Douven (2008). The Evidential Support Theory of Conditionals. Synthese 164 (1):19-44.
    According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional’s antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  44. Niki Pfeifer (2012). Experiments on Aristotle's Thesis: Towards an Experimental Philosophy of Conditionals. The Monist 95 (2):223-240.
    Two experiments (N1 = 141, N2 = 40) investigate two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis for the first time. Aristotle’s Thesis is a negated conditional, which consists of one propositional variable with a negation either in the antecedent (version 1) or in the consequent (version 2). This task allows to infer if people interpret indicative conditionals as material conditionals or as conditional events. In the first experiment I investigate between-participants the two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis crossed with abstract versus (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45.  18
    Ana Arregui (2007). When Aspect Matters: The Case of Would-Conditionals. [REVIEW] Natural Language Semantics 15 (3):221-264.
    Differences in the interpretation of would-conditionals with simple (perfective) and perfect antecedent clauses are marked enough to discourage a unified view. However, this paper presents a unified, Lewis–Stalnaker style semantics for the modal in such constructions. Differences in the interpretation of the conditionals are derived from the interaction between the interpretation of different types of aspect and the modal. The paper makes a distinction between perfective and perfect aspect in terms of whether they make reference to or quantify (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  46.  86
    Ernest W. Adams (1975). The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   176 citations  
  47.  72
    J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Conversation and Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.
    I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker's framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle -- concerning so-called 'reverse Sobel sequences' -- can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theoryneutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  48.  36
    Isabel Orenes & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2012). Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences. Mind and Language 27 (4):357-377.
    People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  64
    Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  50.  33
    Igor Douven (forthcoming). How to Account for the Oddness of Missing-Link Conditionals. Synthese:1-14.
    Conditionals whose antecedent and consequent are not somehow internally connected tend to strike us as odd. The received doctrine is that this felt oddness is to be explained pragmatically. Exactly how the pragmatic explanation is supposed to go has remained elusive, however. This paper discusses recent philosophical and psychological work that attempts to account semantically for the apparent oddness of conditionals lacking an internal connection between their parts.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000