Search results for 'premise conditionals' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals. In K. P. Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic (CRiSPI, Vol. 24). Emerald.score: 96.0
    It is generally agreed that constructions of the form “if P, Q” are capable of conveying a number of different relations between antecedent and consequent, with pragmatics playing a central role in determining these relations. Controversy concerns what the conventional contribution of the if-clause is, how it constrains the pragmatic processes, and what those processes are. In this essay, I begin to argue that the conventional contribution of if-clauses to semantics is exhausted by the fact that these clauses introduce a (...)
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  2. Katrin Schulz (2011). “If You'd Wiggled A, Then B Would've Changed”. Synthese 179 (2):239-251.score: 72.0
    This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl (2000) to formalize a causal (...)
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  3. E. P. Brandon (1992). Supposition, Conditionals and Unstated Premises. Informal Logic 14 (2).score: 72.0
    Informal logicians recognise the frequent use of unstated assumptions; some (e.g. Fisher) also recognise entertained arguments and recommend a suppositional approach (such as Mackie's) to conditional statements. It is here argued that these two be put together to make argument diagrams more accurate and subtle. Philosophical benefits also accrue: insights into Jackson's apparent violations of modus tollens and contraposition and McGee's counterexamples to the validity of modus ponens.
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  4. Sara Verbrugge & Hans Smessaert (2010). On the Argumentative Strength of Indirect Inferential Conditionals. Argumentation 24 (3):337-362.score: 66.0
    Inferential or epistemic conditional sentences represent a blueprint of someone’s reasoning process from premise to conclusion. Declerck and Reed (2001) make a distinction between a direct and an indirect type. In the latter type the direction of reasoning goes backwards, from the blatant falsehood of the consequent to the falsehood of the antecedent. We first present a modal reinterpretation in terms of Argumentation Schemes of indirect inferential conditionals (IIC’s) in Declerck and Reed (2001). We furthermore argue for a (...)
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  5. Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.score: 66.0
    The rise of causality and the attendant graph-theoretic modeling tools in the study of counterfactual reasoning has had resounding effects in many areas of cognitive science, but it has thus far not permeated the mainstream in linguistic theory to a comparable degree. In this study I show that a version of the predominant framework for the formal semantic analysis of conditionals, Kratzer-style premise semantics, allows for a straightforward implementation of the crucial ideas and insights of Pearl-style causal networks. (...)
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  6. Henry Markovits (2000). A Mental Model Analysis of Young Children's Conditional Reasoning with Meaningful Premises. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):335 – 347.score: 64.0
    Mental model theory has been used to explain many differing phenomena in adult reasoning, including the extensively studied case of conditional reasoning. However, the current theory makes predictions about the development of conditional reasoning that are not consistent with data. In this article, young children's performance on conditional reasoning problems and the justifications given are analysed. A mental model account of conditional reasoning is proposed that assumes that (1) young children can reason with two models and (2) the fleshing out (...)
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  7. Wayne Wobcke (2000). An Information-Based Theory of Conditionals. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (2):95-141.score: 58.0
    We present an approach to combining three areas of research which we claim are all based on information theory: knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science using prototypes, plans, or schemata; formal semantics in natural language, especially the semantics of the `if-then' conditional construct; and the logic of subjunctive conditionals first developed using a possible worlds semantics by Stalnaker and Lewis. The basic premise of the paper is that both schema-based inference and the semantics of conditionals (...)
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  8. Nicholas Allott & Hiroyuki Uchida (2009). Classical Logic, Conditionals and “Nonmonotonic” Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):85-85.score: 54.0
    Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.
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  9. Peter Milne (2012). Indicative Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and the “Defective Truth-Table”: A Request for More Experiments. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196 - 224.score: 54.0
    While there is now considerable experimental evidence that, on the one hand, participants assign to the indicative conditional as probability the conditional probability of consequent given antecedent and, on the other, they assign to the indicative conditional the ?defective truth-table? in which a conditional with false antecedent is deemed neither true nor false, these findings do not in themselves establish which multi-premise inferences involving conditionals participants endorse. A natural extension of the truth-table semantics pronounces as valid numerous inference (...)
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  10. Guy Politzer & Jean-françois Bonnefon (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484–503.score: 54.0
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between 'rebutting' and 'undercutting' defeaters. 'Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
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  11. Politzer Guy & Bonnefon Jean-Francois (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.score: 54.0
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock’s (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting’ and ‘undercutting’ defeaters. ‘Inferential’ conditionals are shown to come in two varieties, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
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  12. Sara Verbrugge, Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Hans Smessaert & William Van Belle (2007). Pronounced Inferences: A Study on Inferential Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):105 – 133.score: 54.0
    An experimental study is reported which investigates the differences in interpretation between content conditionals (of various pragmatic types) and inferential conditionals. In a content conditional, the antecedent represents a requirement for the consequent to become true. In an inferential conditional, the antecedent functions as a premise and the consequent as the inferred conclusion from that premise. The linguistic difference between content and inferential conditionals is often neglected in reasoning experiments. This turns out to be unjustified, (...)
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  13. Guy Politzer & J.-F. Bonnefon (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484-503.score: 54.0
    Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting' and ‘undercutting' defeaters. ‘Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two types, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as (...)
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  14. Katrin Schulz (2011). "If You'd Wiggled A, Then B Would've Changed" Causality and Counterfactual Conditionals. Synthese 179 (2):239 - 251.score: 54.0
    This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl (2000) to formalize a causal (...)
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  15. Ernest W. Adams (1981). Transmissible Improbabilities and Marginal Essentialness of Premises in Inferences Involving Indicative Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):149 - 177.score: 50.0
  16. Vittorio Girotto, Alberto Mazzocco & Alessandra Tasso (1997). The Effect of Premise Order in Conditional Reasoning: A Test of the Mental Model Theory. Cognition 63 (1):1-28.score: 50.0
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  17. Claude Gratton (2002). Premise, Conclusion and Conditional Indicators. Informal Logic 22 (2).score: 50.0
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  18. Eric Swanson (2011). On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):693-713.score: 48.0
    In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate (...)
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  19. Stephane Quinn & Henry Markovits (2002). Conditional Reasoning with Causal Premises: Evidence for a Retrieval Model. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (3):179 – 191.score: 48.0
    This study examined the hypothesis that a key process in conditional reasoning with concrete premises involves on-line retrieval of information about potential alternate antecedents. Participants were asked to solve reasoning problems with causal conditional premises (If cause P then effect Q). These premises were inserted into short contexts. The availability of potential alternatives was varied from one context to another by adding statements that explicitly invalidated one or more of these alternatives (i.e., other causes that lead to the effect Q). (...)
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  20. Isabelle Vadeboncoeur & Henry Markovits (1999). The Effect of Instructions and Information Retrieval on Accepting the Premises in a Conditional Reasoning Task. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (2):97 – 113.score: 48.0
    Some studies have reported that, under some circumstances, participants sometimes reject the truth of conditional premises and give incorrect uncertain conclusions to MP and MT, despite the standard instructions to assume the truth of the premises. Instructions that emphasise the logical nature of the task, on the other hand, increase the number of valid conclusions to these two inferences. In this paper, we examine two possible explanations for the influence of instructions on the production of valid conclusions: (1) instructions trigger (...)
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  21. Donald Bamber (2000). Entailment with Near Surety of Scaled Assertions of High Conditional Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):1-74.score: 46.0
    An assertion of high conditional probability or, more briefly, an HCP assertion is a statement of the type: The conditional probability of B given A is close to one. The goal of this paper is to construct logics of HCP assertions whose conclusions are highly likely to be correct rather than certain to be correct. Such logics would allow useful conclusions to be drawn when the premises are not strong enough to allow conclusions to be reached with certainty. This goal (...)
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  22. Gilbert Plumer (2000). The Paradoxical Associated Conditional of Enthymemes. In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.score: 40.0
    Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...)
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  23. Mauricio Ayala-Rincon (2000). Church-Rosser Property for Conditional Rewriting Systems with Built-in Predicates as Premises. In Dov M. Gabbay & Maarten de Rijke (eds.), Frontiers of Combining Systems. Research Studies Press. 2--17.score: 40.0
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  24. Christopher Gauker (2005). Conditionals in Context. MIT.score: 38.0
    "If you turn left at the next corner, you will see a blue house at the end of the street." That sentence -- a conditional -- might be true even though it is possible that you will not see a blue house at the end of the street when you turn left at the next corner. A moving van may block your view; the house may have been painted pink; a crow might swoop down and peck out your eyes. Still, (...)
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  25. James B. Freeman (1996). Consider the Source: One Step in Assessing Premise Acceptability. [REVIEW] Argumentation 10 (4):453-460.score: 38.0
    Premise acceptability is conceptually connected to presumption. To say that a premise is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor is to give a first approximation to this connection. A number of popular principles of presumption suggest that whether there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim depends on the sources which vouch for it. Sources consist of internal belief-generating mechanisms and external testimony. Alvin Plantinga's notion of warrant lays down four conditions (...)
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  26. Joe Salerno, How to Embed Epistemic Modals Without Violating Modus Tollens.score: 36.0
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions of fa- miliar truth conditional theories of modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, these explana- tions go too far. For they foster other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are no equivocations. It is argued here that the key to the solution is to drop the assumption (...)
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  27. Guy Politzer (2007). Reasoning with Conditionals. Topoi 26 (1):79-95.score: 34.0
    This paper reviews the psychological investigation of reasoning with conditionals, putting an emphasis on recent work. In the first part, a few methodological remarks are presented. In the second part, the main theories of deductive reasoning (mental rules, mental models, and the probabilistic approach) are considered in turn; their content is summarised and the semantics they assume for if and the way they explain formal conditional reasoning are discussed, in particular in the light of experimental work on the probability (...)
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  28. Walter Schroyens, Niki Verschueren, Walter Schaeken & Gery D'Ydewalle (2000). Conditional Reasoning with Negations: Implicit and Explicit Affirmation or Denial and the Role of Contrast Classes. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (3):221 – 251.score: 34.0
    We report two studies on the effect of implicitly versus explicitly conveying affirmation and denial problems about conditionals. Recently Evans and Handley (1999) and Schroyens et al. (1999b, 2000b) showed that implicit referencing elicits matching bias: Fewer determinate inferences are made, when the categorical premise (e.g., B) mismatches the conditional's referred clause (e.g., A). Also, the effect of implicit affirmation (B affirms not-A) is larger than the effect of implicit denial (B denies A). Schroyens et al. hypothesised that (...)
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  29. Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Walter Schroyens & Gery D'Ydewalle (2000). Strategies During Complex Conditional Inferences. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (2):125 – 160.score: 34.0
    In certain contexts reasoners reject instances of the valid Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inference form in conditional arguments. Byrne (1989) observed this suppression effect when a conditional premise is accompanied by a conditional containing an additional requirement. In an earlier study, Rumain, Connell, and Braine (1983) observed suppression of the invalid inferences "the denial of the antecedent" and "the affirmation of the consequent" when a conditional premise is accompanied by a conditional containing an alternative requirement. Here we (...)
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  30. Ernest Adams (1965). The Logic of Conditionals. Inquiry 8 (1-4):166 – 197.score: 30.0
    The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.?) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ?safely? used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the (...)
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  31. David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2003). The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence. Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.score: 30.0
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe (...)
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  32. Carlos Santamaria Juan A. Garcia-Madruga Philip & N. Johnson-Laird (1998). Reasoning From Double Conditionals: The Effects of Logical Structure and Believability. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):97 – 122.score: 30.0
    We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form: If A then B. If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or ''figures" of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C , or If C (...)
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  33. Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2006). Is Human Reasoning About Nonmonotonic Conditionals Probabilistically Coherent? In Proceedings of the 7 T H Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. 138--150.score: 30.0
    Nonmonotonic conditionals (A |∼ B) are formalizations of common sense expressions of the form “if A, normally B”. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted by a “high” coherent conditional probability, P(B|A) > .5. Two important properties are closely related to the nonmonotonic conditional: First, A |∼ B allows for exceptions. Second, the rules of the nonmonotonic system p guiding A |∼ B allow for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new premises. This study reports a series of three experiments on (...)
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  34. James B. Freeman (1995). Premise Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification. Informal Logic 17 (2).score: 30.0
    Acceptability is a thoroughly normative epistemic notion. If a statement is acceptable, i.e. it is proper to take it as a premise, then one is justified in accepting it. We also hold that a statement is acceptable just in case there is a presumption of warrant in its favor. We thus see acceptability connected to epistemic normativity on the one hand and to warrant on the other. But there is a distinct tension in this dual connection. The dominant tradition (...)
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  35. James Hawthorne (1988). A Semantic Approach to Non-Monotonic Conditionals. In J. F. Lemmer & L. N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2. Elsevier.score: 28.0
    Any inferential system in which the addition of new premises can lead to the retraction of previous conclusions is a non-monotonic logic. Classical conditional probability provides the oldest and most widely respected example of non-monotonic inference. This paper presents a semantic theory for a unified approach to qualitative and quantitative non-monotonic logic. The qualitative logic is unlike most other non- monotonic logics developed for AI systems. It is closely related to classical (i.e., Bayesian) probability theory. The semantic theory for qualitative (...)
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  36. Paolo Cherubini, Alberto Mazzocco, Simona Gardini & Aurore Russo (2001). A Re-Examination of Illusory Inferences Based on Factual Conditional Sentences. Mind and Society 2 (2):9-25.score: 28.0
    According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment (...)
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  37. Dale Jacquette (1996). Charity and the Reiteration Problem for Enthymemes. Informal Logic 18 (1).score: 28.0
    Any enthymeme can be made logically valid by adding as a suppressed premise a conditional that reiterates the argument's stated content and inferential structure in if-then form, We cannot blanketly prohibit reiteration to avoid this sort of trivialization, because some enthymemes legitimately require completion by reiterative conditionals, The solution proposed here is to allow reiterative expansions, but to rank them, other things being equal, as less charitable than nonreiterative expansions. Reiterative expansions can then be chosen as the most (...)
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  38. Katrin Schulz (2014). Minimal Models Vs. Logic Programming: The Case of Counterfactual Conditionals. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):153-168.score: 28.0
    This article aims to propagate Logic Programming as a formal tool to deal with non-monotonic reasoning. In philosophy and linguistics non-monotonic reasoning is modelled using Minimal Models as standard, i.e., by imposing an order (or selection function) on the class of all models and then by defining entailment as only caring about the minimal models of the premises with respect to the order. In this article we investigate the question whether instead of minimal models we should use logic programming to (...)
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  39. William B. Starr (2014). A Uniform Theory of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.score: 24.0
    A uniform theory of conditionals is one which compositionally captures the behavior of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals without positing ambiguities. This paper raises new problems for the closest thing to a uniform analysis in the literature (Stalnaker, Philosophia, 5, 269–286 (1975)) and develops a new theory which solves them. I also show that this new analysis provides an improved treatment of three phenomena (the import-export equivalence, reverse Sobel-sequences and disjunctive antecedents). While these results concern central issues in (...)
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  40. Daan Evers (2011). Two Objections to Wide-Scoping. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (13):251-255.score: 24.0
    Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.
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  41. Daniel Dohrn, DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation.score: 24.0
    I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features (...)
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  42. Daniel Rothschild (2013). Do Indicative Conditionals Express Propositions? Noûs 47 (1):49-68.score: 24.0
    Discusses how to capture the link between the probability of indicative conditionals and conditional probability using a classical semantics for conditionals.
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  43. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.score: 24.0
    In this paper I will be concerned with the question as to whether expressivist theories of meaning can coherently be combined with deflationist theories of truth. After outlining what I take expressivism to be and what I take deflationism about truth to be, I’ll explain why I don’t take the general version of this question to be very hard, and why the answer is ‘yes’. Having settled that, I’ll move on to what I take to be a more pressing and (...)
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  44. Jonathan Bennett (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject. An ideal introduction for undergraduates with a philosophical grounding, it also offers a rich source of illumination and stimulation for graduate (...)
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  45. Rani Lill Anjum, Conditionals and Truth Functionality.score: 24.0
    The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘if p then q’. This inadequacy also affects the ability of the overall formal system to establish whether or (...)
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  46. Rani Lill Anjum, Paul Grice on Indicative Conditionals.score: 24.0
    Grice argues that indicative conditionals ‘if p then q’ have conventional, truth conditional meaning according to the material conditional ‘p  q’. In order to explain away the known paradoxes with this interpretation, he distinguishes between truth conditions and assertion conditions, attempting to demonstrate that the assumed connection between ‘p’ and ‘q’ (the Indirectness Condition) is a conversational implicature; hence a matter only relevant for the assertion conditions of a conditional. This paper argues that Grice fails to demonstrate i) (...)
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  47. Adam Rieger (2013). Conditionals Are Material: The Positive Arguments. Synthese 190 (15):3161-3174.score: 24.0
    A number of papers have argued in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals, but typically they either concentrate on defending the account from the charge that it has counterintuitive consequences, or else focus on some particular positive argument in favour of the theory. In this paper, I survey the various positive arguments that can be given, presenting simple versions where possible and showing the connections between them. I conclude with some methodological considerations.
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  48. Daniel Rothschild, A Note on Conditionals and Restrictors.score: 24.0
    This note relates the Lewis/Kratzer view of conditionals as restrictors to the philosophical debate over the meaning of conditionals.
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  49. J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Conversation and Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.score: 24.0
    I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the (...)
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  50. D. Manley & R. Wasserman (2012). Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples. Mind 120 (480):1191-1227.score: 24.0
    In an earlier paper in these pages (2008), we explored the puzzling link between dispositions and conditionals. First, we rehearsed the standard counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis and the refined conditional analysis defended by David Lewis. Second, we attacked a tempting response to these counterexamples: what we called the ‘getting specific strategy’. Third, we presented a series of structural considerations that pose problems for many attempts to understand the link between dispositions and conditionals. Finally, we developed our (...)
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