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  1. Peter Langland-Hassan (2012). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.score: 18.0
    A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are “belief-like” in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a “DCA”) called “imagination” that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating (...)
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  2. Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Szabó Gendler (2011). Pretense and Imagination. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 2 (1):79-94.score: 18.0
    Issues of pretense and imagination are of central interest to philosophers, psychologists, and researchers in allied fields. In this entry, we provide a roadmap of some of the central themes around which discussion has been focused. We begin with an overview of pretense, imagination, and the relationship between them. We then shift our attention to the four specific topics where the disciplines' research programs have intersected or where additional interactions could prove mutually beneficial: the psychological underpinnings of performing (...)
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  3. Michael Hicks (2010). A Note on Pretense and Co-Reference. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400.score: 18.0
    Anna Pautz has recently argued that the pretense theory of thought about fiction cannot explain how two people can count as thinking about the same fictional character. This is based on conflating pretending and the serious thought that can be based on pretend. With this distinction in place, her objections are groundless.
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  4. Anna Bjurman Pautz (2008). Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.score: 18.0
    There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
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  5. James A. Woodbridge (2005). Truth as a Pretense. In Mark Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 134.score: 18.0
    Truth-talk exhibits certain features that render it philosophically suspect and motivate a deflationary account. I offer a new formulation of deflationism that explains truth-talk in terms of semantic pretense. This amounts to a fictionalist account of truth-talk but avoids an error-theoretic interpretation and its resulting incoherence. The pretense analysis fits especially well with deflationism’s central commitment, and it handles truth-talk’s unusual features effectively. In particular, this approach suggests an interesting strategy for dealing with the Liar paradox. This version (...)
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  6. James A. Woodbridge (2006). Propositions as Semantic Pretense. Language and Communication 26 (3-4):343-355.score: 18.0
    Our linguistic and inferential practices are said to implicate a kind of abstract object playing various roles traditionally attributed to propositions, and our predictive and explanatory success with this ‘‘proposition-talk’’ is held to underwrite a realistic interpretation of it. However, these very same practices pull us in different directions regarding the nature of propositions, frustrating the development of an adequate unified theory of them. I explain how one could retain proposition-talk, and the advantages of interpreting it as being purportedly about (...)
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  7. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2010). Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are). In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we clarify the notion of deflationism, with special attention to deflationary accounts of truth. Seocnd, we argue that one who endorses a deflationary account of truth (or of semantic notions, generally) should be, or perhaps already is, a pretense theorist regarding truth-talk. In §1 we discuss mathematical fictionalism, where we focus on Yablo’s pretense account of mathematical discourse. §2 briefly introduces the key elements of deflationism and explains deflationism about truth (...)
     
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  8. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.score: 12.0
    I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. (...)
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  9. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2003). On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge. 125--141.score: 12.0
    By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken (...)
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  10. Catherine Wearing (2012). Metaphor, Idiom, and Pretense. Noûs 46 (3):499-524.score: 12.0
    Imaginative and creative capacities seem to be at the heart of both games of make-believe and figurative uses of language. But how exactly might cases of metaphor or idiom involve make-believe? In this paper, I argue against the pretense-based accounts of Walton (1990, 1993), Hills (1997), and Egan (this journal, 2008) that pretense plays no role in the interpretation of metaphor or idiom; instead, more general capacities for manipulating concepts (which are also called on within the use of (...)
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  11. Edward N. Zalta (2000). The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object Theory. In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications.score: 12.0
    In its approach to fiction and fictional discourse, pretense theory focuses on the behaviors that we engage in once we pretend that something is true. These may include pretending to name, pretending to refer, pretending to admire, and various other kinds of make-believe. Ordinary discourse about fictions is analyzed as a kind of institutionalized manner of speaking. Pretense, make-believe, and manners of speaking are all accepted as complex patterns of behavior that prove to be systematic in various ways. (...)
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  12. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (2000). A Cognitive Theory of Pretense. Cognition 74 (2):115-147.score: 12.0
    Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by describing a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained (...)
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  13. Jonathan Tallant (2013). Pretense, Mathematics, and Cognitive Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs013.score: 12.0
    A pretense theory of a given discourse is a theory that claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we token (speak, write, and so on) when taking part in that discourse. Instead, according to pretense theory, we are speaking from within a pretense. According to pretense theories of mathematics, we engage with mathematics as we do a pretense. We do not use mathematical language to make claims that express (...)
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  14. Peter Gärdenfors (1997). The Role of Memory in Planning and Pretense. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):24-25.score: 12.0
    Corresponding to Glenberg's distinction between the automatic and effortful modes of memory, I propose a distinction between cued and detached mental representations. A cued representation stands for something that is present in the external situation of the representing organism, while a detached representation stands for objects or events that are not present in the current situation. This distinction is important for understanding the role of memory in different cognitive functions like planning and pretense.
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  15. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Noûs 41 (1):231 - 258.score: 12.0
    I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. (...)
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  16. Abraham Stefanidis & Moshe Banai (2014). Ethno‐Cultural Considerations in Negotiation: Pretense, Deception and Lies in the Greek Workplace. Business Ethics: A European Review 23 (2):197-217.score: 12.0
    A retrospect into ethos, this study examines the impact of individualism, collectivism, ethical idealism and interpersonal trust on negotiators' attitudes toward questionable negotiation tactics in Greece. A thousand survey questionnaires were administered to Greek employees, of which 327 usable responses were collected. Our findings empirically corroborated a classification of three groups of negotiation tactics, namely, pretense, deception and lies. Individualism–collectivism and ethical idealism were found to be related, and interpersonal trust was found to be unrelated, to attitudes toward questionable (...)
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  17. Jeffrey Goodman (2011). Pretense Theory and the Imported Background. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):22.score: 12.0
    Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.
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  18. James R. Hamilton (2009). Pretense and Display Theories of Theatrical Performance. Organon F (4):632-654.score: 12.0
    A survey of and a comparison of the relative strengths of two favored views of what theatrical performers do: pretend or engage in a variety of self-display. The behavioral version of the pretense theory is shown to be relatively weak as an instrument for understanding the variety of performance styles available in world theater. Whether pretense works as a theory of the mental capacities that underly theatrical performance is a separate question.
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  19. Franck Lihoreau (ed.) (2011). Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag.score: 9.0
    The essays collected in this volume are all concerned with the connection between fiction and truth. This question is of utmost importance to metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic and epistemology, raising in each of these areas and at their intersections a large number of issues related to creation, existence, reference, identity, modality, belief, assertion, imagination, pretense, etc. All these topics and many more are addressed in this collection, which brings together original essays written from various points of view (...)
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  20. Stacie Friend (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.score: 9.0
    If there are no fictional characters, how do we explain thought and discourse apparently about them? If there are, what are they like? A growing number of philosophers claim that fictional characters are abstract objects akin to novels or plots. They argue that postulating characters provides the most straightforward explanation of our literary practices as well as a uniform account of discourse and thought about fiction. Anti-realists counter that postulation is neither necessary nor straightforward, and that the invocation of (...) provides a better account of the same phenomena. I outline and assess these competing theories. (shrink)
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  21. Mark Collier (2010). Hume's Theory of Moral Imagination. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):255-273.score: 9.0
    David Hume endorses three claims that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce compassion towards their plight, (2) adopting the general point of view often requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strangers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two types of sympathy. We feel compassion towards those around us because associative sympathy (...)
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  22. Amy Kind (2013). The Heterogeneity of the Imagination. Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.score: 9.0
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
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  23. Anthony Everett (2007). Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.score: 9.0
    There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then note that some of (...)
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  24. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). The Story About Propositions. Noûs 46 (4):635-674.score: 9.0
    It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent linguistic commitment evident in our use of 'that'-clauses (in offering explanations and making (...)
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  25. Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). What It Is to Pretend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1).score: 9.0
    Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, (...)
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  26. Peter Ludlow (2006). From Sherlock and Buffy to Klingon and Norrathian Platinum Pieces: Pretense, Contextalism, and the Myth of Fiction. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):162–183.score: 9.0
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  27. Mark Crimmins (1998). Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference. Philosophical Review 107 (1):1-47.score: 9.0
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  28. Elisabeth Camp (2012). Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Noûs 46 (4):587 - 634.score: 9.0
    Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes (...)
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  29. Frederick Kroon (2004). Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems. Philosophical Review 113 (1):1-30.score: 9.0
    Contrary to frequent declarations that descriptivism as a theory of how names refer is dead and gone, such a descriptivism is, to all appear- ances, alive and well. Or rather, a descendent of that doctrine is alive and well. This new version—neo- descriptivism , for short—is suppos- ..
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  30. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Imaginative Contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.score: 9.0
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, (...)
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  31. Andy Egan (2008). Pretense for the Complete Idiom. Noûs 42 (3):381 - 409.score: 9.0
  32. Krista Lawlor (2005). Enough is Enough: Pretense and Invariance in the Semantics of "Knows That". Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):211–236.score: 9.0
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  33. Frédérique de Vignemont (2009). Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.score: 9.0
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds , Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s (...)
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  34. Martijn Blaauw (2006). Belief and Pretense: A Reply to Gendler. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):204-209.score: 9.0
    In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic-like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief-forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion (...)
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  35. Brendan Jackson (2007). Truth Vs. Pretense in Discourse About Motion (or, Why the Sun Really Does Rise). Noûs 41 (2):298–317.score: 9.0
    These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full (...)
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  36. Eric Schwitzgebel, A Difficulty for Simulation Theory Due to the Close Connection of Pretense and Action in Early Childhood. Available on Author's Homepage.score: 9.0
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  37. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'" (with a Detour Through Meaning Attribution). Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):33-63.score: 9.0
    In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk (including meaning-attribution) that we have developed elsewhere.
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  38. Frederick W. Kroon (2001). Parts and Pretense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):543-560.score: 9.0
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  39. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I. Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.score: 9.0
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
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  40. David L. Prychitko (1993). Formalism in Austrian‐School Welfare Economics: Another Pretense of Knowledge? Critical Review 7 (4):567-592.score: 9.0
    Contemporary Austrian?school economists reject neoclassical welfare theory for being founded on the benchmark of a perfectly competitive general equilibrium, and instead favor a formal theory deemed consistent with the notions of radical subjectivism and disequilibrium analysis. Roy Cordato advances a bold free?market benchmark by which to formally assess social welfare, economic efficiency, and externalities issues. Like all formalist, a priori theory, however, Cordato's reformulation cannot meet its own standards, being theoretically and empirically flawed, and perhaps ideologically suspect.
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  41. Deena S. Weisberg & Alison Gopnik (2013). Pretense, Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters. Cognitive Science 37 (7):1368-1381.score: 9.0
    Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non-real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn (...)
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  42. Claire Horisk (2003). Pretense and Abstract Objects. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):85-88.score: 9.0
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  43. Gaetano Albergo (2013). L'impegno ontologico del pretense. Rivista di Estetica 53 (53):155-177.score: 9.0
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  44. Sachi Kumon-Nakamura, Sam Glucksberg & Mary Brown (1995). How About Another Piece of Pie: The Allusional Pretense Theory of Discourse Irony. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 124 (1):3.score: 9.0
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  45. Ori Friedman, Karen R. Neary, Corinna L. Burnstein & Alan M. Leslie (2010). Is Young Children's Recognition of Pretense Metarepresentational or Merely Behavioral? Evidence From 2- and 3-Year-Olds' Understanding of Pretend Sounds and Speech. [REVIEW] Cognition 115 (2):314-319.score: 9.0
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  46. Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie (2007). The Conceptual Underpinnings of Pretense: Pretending is Not 'Behaving-as-If'. Cognition 105 (1):103-124.score: 9.0
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  47. Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (1999). Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds. In. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. 199--216.score: 9.0
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  48. R. Stith (1975). The World as Reality, as Resource, and as Pretense. American Journal of Jurisprudence 20 (1):141-153.score: 9.0
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  49. David M. Sobel (2009). Enabling Conditions and Children's Understanding of Pretense. Cognition 113 (2):177-188.score: 9.0
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  50. Uku Tooming (2013). Without Pretense: A Critique of Goldman's Model of Simulation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 9.0
    In this paper I criticize Alvin Goldman's simulation theory of mindreading which involves the claim that the basic method of folk psychologically predicting behaviour is to form pretend beliefs and desires that reproduce the transitions between the mental states of others, in that way enabling to predict what the others are going to do. I argue that when it comes to simulating propositional attitudes it isn't clear whether pretend beliefs need to be invoked in order to explain relevant experimental results, (...)
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