Search results for 'privileged access' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jordi Fernandez (2003). Privileged Access Naturalized. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.
    The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does (...)
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  2. Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of (...)
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  3. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2006). Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue. Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.
    I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey argues (...)
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  4.  79
    Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access. Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
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  5.  35
    Finn Spicer (2004). On the Identity of Concepts, and the Compatibility of Externalism and Privileged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):155-168.
    ism is compatible with privileged access. it is in some sense direct, or that it is non-.
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  6.  23
    Kourken Michaelian (2009). Reliabilism and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.
    Reliabilism is invoked by a standard causal response to the slow switching argument for incompatibilism about mental content externalism and privileged access. Though the response in question is negative, in that it only establishes that, given such an epistemology, externalism does not rule privileged access out, the appeal to reliabilism involves an assumption about the reliability of introspection, an assumption that in turn grounds a simple argument for the positive conclusion that reliabilism itself implies privileged (...)
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  7.  86
    Andrew Cullison (2007). Privileged Access, Externalism, and Ways of Believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.
    By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
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  8. Michael McKinsey (1991). Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 51 (January):9-16.
  9. Ernest Sosa (2003). Privileged Access. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 238-251.
    In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002).
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  10.  73
    Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):199-224.
  11.  55
    Jordi Fernández (2005). Privileged Access Revisited. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102 - 105.
    Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.
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  12. Brie Gertler (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic (...)
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  13.  12
    Arnold B. Levison (1987). Rorty, Materialism, and Privileged Access. Noûs 21 (September):381-393.
  14.  77
    Timothy Allen & Joshua May (2014). Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):617-629.
    Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people's minds. This seems incompatible with "privileged access"---the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for (...)
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  15. J. Brown (1995). The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.
    In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. (...)
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  16. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). The Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error Through Misidentification, and Privileged Access. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate
  17.  78
    Jessica Brown (1999). Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.
    Boghossian has argued that Putnam's externalism is incompatible with privileged access, i.e., the claim that a subject can have nonempirical knowledge of her thought contents ('What the externalist can know a priori', PAS 1997). Boghossian's argument assumes that Oscar can know a priori that (1) 'water' aims to name a natural kind; and (2) 'water' expresses an atomic concept. However, I show that if Burge's externalism is correct, then these assumptions may well be false. This leaves Boghossian with (...)
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  18. Ram Neta (2008). The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press
    Many philosophers accept a “privileged access” thesis concerning our own present mental states and mental events. According to these philosophers, if I am in mental state (or undergoing mental event) M, then – at least in many cases – I have privileged access to the fact that I am in (or undergoing) M. For instance, if I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap, then (in normal circumstances) I have privileged access (...)
     
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  19.  11
    Joseph Agassi (1969). Privileged Access. Inquiry 12 (1-4):420 – 426.
    That everyone has some privileged access to some information is trivially true. The doctrine of privileged access is that I am the authority on all of my own experiences. Possibly this thesis was attacked by Wittgenstein (the thesis on the non?existence of private languages). The thesis was refuted by Freud (I know your dreams better than you), Duhem (I know your methods of scientific discovery better than you), Malinowski (I know your customs and habits better than (...)
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  20. Brie Gertler (2003). Introduction to Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. In Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate
     
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  21. Michael Pauen (2010). How Privileged is First-Person Privileged Access? American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):1-15.
    Many philosophers agree that mental states are subject to privileged first-person access. Exactly what privileged, first-person access means is controversial, but it seems that, while our third-person access to mental states is only indirect because it depends on behavioral observation, first-person access seems to be direct because it depends on no such mediation.
     
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  22.  74
    Kevin Falvey (2000). The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.
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  23. John Heil (1988). Privileged Access. Mind 98 (April):238-51.
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  24.  56
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
  25.  64
    Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged Access to the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.
  26. Robert Alun Jones (1985). Second Thoughts on Privileged Access. Sociological Theory 3 (1):16-19.
  27. Allan Snyder (2010). Explaining and Inducing Savant Skills: Privileged Access to Lower Level, Less Processed Information. In Francesca Happé & Uta Frith (eds.), Autism and Talent. OUP/the Royal Society
     
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  28.  71
    N. Georgalis (1990). No Access for the Externalist: Discussion of Heil's 'Privileged Access'. Mind 100 (393):101-8.
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  29. Jay David Atlas (2007). What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us About Belief : A New Moore's Paradox de Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press
  30. Anthony L. Brueckner (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
     
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  31. B. P. McLaughlin & M. Tye (1998). Is Privileged Access Incompatible with Content-Externalism? Philosophical Review 107:349-380.
  32. Anne Bartsch & Christoph Jäger (2002). Privileged Access and Repression. In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle. De Gruyter 59-80.
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  33.  5
    Michael McKinsey (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
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  34.  38
    Sarah Sawyer, Semantic Externalism and Self Knowledge: Privileged Access to the World.
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  35.  1
    Michael McKinsey (2003). Anti-Individualism and the Privileged Access. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. OUP Oxford
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  36.  16
    William P. Alston (1976). Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):257 - 272.
    This paper defends the view that a belief to the effect that the believer is currently in some conscious state is "self-Warranted," in the sense that what warrants it is simply its being a belief of that sort. This position is compared with other views as to the epistemic status of such beliefs--That they are warranted by their truth and that they are warranted by an immediate awareness of their object. In the course of the discussion, Various modes of immediate (...)
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  37. K. Falvey (2000). The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.
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  38.  15
    Richard Rorty (1970). Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Incommunicability. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):192 - 205.
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  39.  21
    Joseph Margolis (1970). Indubitability, Self-Intimating States, and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):918-31.
  40.  8
    Joseph Margolis (1970). Indubitability, Self-Intimating States, and Logically Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):918 - 931.
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  41.  2
    Natika Newton (2002). Privileged Access and Merleau-Ponty. In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay Between Philosophy, Literature, and Reality. Kluwer 71--78.
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  42.  14
    A. R. Louch (1965). Privileged Access. Mind 74 (April):155-173.
  43.  13
    William S. Larkin, Burge on Our Privileged Access to the External World.
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  44.  1
    Jordi Fernandez (2005). Privileged Access Revisited. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102-105.
    Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.
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  45.  5
    George N. Schlesinger (1985). Inaccessible Routes to the Problem of Privileged Access. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):84 – 87.
  46.  1
    J. J. MacIntosh (1983). The Logic of Privileged Access. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):142 – 151.
  47.  1
    Joseph Quitterer (1999). Introspection and Privileged Access in Folk-Psychological Explanations. Disputatio Philosophica 1 (1):79-89.
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  48.  1
    M. Eagle (1982). Privileged Access and the Status of Self-Knowledge in Cartesian and Freudian Conceptions of the Mental. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (4):349-373.
  49. J. Brown (1999). Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.
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  50. Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms Of Externalism And Privileged Access. Noûs 36 (s16):199-224.
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