Search results for 'privileged access' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.score: 90.0
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jordi Fernandez (2003). Privileged Access Naturalized. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.score: 90.0
    The purpose of this essay is to account for privileged access or, more precisely, the special kind of epistemic right that we have to some beliefs about our own mental states. My account will have the following two main virtues. First of all, it will only appeal to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in order to account for perceptual knowledge. Secondly, it will constitute a naturalizing account of privileged access in that it does (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2006). Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue. Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.score: 90.0
    I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey argues (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access. Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.score: 90.0
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Andrew Cullison (2007). Privileged Access, Externalism, and Ways of Believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.score: 90.0
    By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Finn Spicer (2004). On the Identity of Concepts, and the Compatibility of Externalism and Privileged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):155-168.score: 90.0
    ism is compatible with privileged access. it is in some sense direct, or that it is non-.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ernest Sosa (2003). Privileged Access. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 238-251.score: 75.0
    In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael McKinsey (1991). Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 51 (January):9-16.score: 75.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Brie Gertler (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.score: 75.0
    When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):199-224.score: 75.0
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jordi Fernández (2005). Privileged Access Revisited. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102 - 105.score: 75.0
    Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Arnold B. Levison (1987). Rorty, Materialism, and Privileged Access. Noûs 21 (September):381-393.score: 75.0
  13. Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). The Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error Through Misidentification, and Privileged Access. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.score: 60.0
  14. J. Brown (1995). The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.score: 60.0
    In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jessica Brown (1999). Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.score: 60.0
    Boghossian has argued that Putnam's externalism is incompatible with privileged access, i.e., the claim that a subject can have nonempirical knowledge of her thought contents ('What the externalist can know a priori', PAS 1997). Boghossian's argument assumes that Oscar can know a priori that (1) 'water' aims to name a natural kind; and (2) 'water' expresses an atomic concept. However, I show that if Burge's externalism is correct, then these assumptions may well be false. This leaves Boghossian with (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ram Neta (2008). The Nature and Reach of Privileged Access. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    Many philosophers accept a “privileged access” thesis concerning our own present mental states and mental events. According to these philosophers, if I am in mental state (or undergoing mental event) M, then – at least in many cases – I have privileged access to the fact that I am in (or undergoing) M. For instance, if I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap, then (in normal circumstances) I have privileged access (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Joseph Agassi (1969). Privileged Access. Inquiry 12 (1-4):420 – 426.score: 60.0
    That everyone has some privileged access to some information is trivially true. The doctrine of privileged access is that I am the authority on all of my own experiences. Possibly this thesis was attacked by Wittgenstein (the thesis on the non?existence of private languages). The thesis was refuted by Freud (I know your dreams better than you), Duhem (I know your methods of scientific discovery better than you), Malinowski (I know your customs and habits better than (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Kourken Michaelian (2009). Reliabilism and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.score: 60.0
    Reliabilism is invoked by a standard causal response to the slow switching argument for incompatibilism about mental content externalism and privileged access. Though the response in question is negative, in that it only establishes that, given such an epistemology, externalism does not rule privileged access out, the appeal to reliabilism involves an assumption about the reliability of introspection, an assumption that in turn grounds a simple argument for the positive conclusion that reliabilism itself implies privileged (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Brie Gertler (2003). Introduction to Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. In , Privileged Access: Philosophical Theories of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.score: 60.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.score: 51.0
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Keya Maitra (2005). Self-Knowledge: Privileged in Access or Privileged in Authority? Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):101-114.score: 48.0
  22. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.score: 45.0
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and (...) access. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Ted A. Warfield (2005). Tyler Burge's Self-Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):169-178.score: 45.0
    The question of whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access is a question of ongoing concern within philosophy of mind. Some philosophers think that Tyler Burge's early work on what he calls "basic self-knowledge" shows that externalism and privileged access are compatible. I critically assess this claim, arguing that Burge's work does not establish the compatbility thesis.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. John Heil (1988). Privileged Access. Mind 98 (April):238-51.score: 45.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.score: 45.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged Access to the World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.score: 45.0
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Sarah Sawyer, Semantic Externalism and Self Knowledge: Privileged Access to the World.score: 45.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2008). Why the Externalist is Better Off Without Free Logic: A Reply to McKinsey. Dialectica 62 (4):535-540.score: 45.0
    McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments attempt to show that the thesis that subjects have privileged, a priori access to the contents of their thoughts is incompatible with semantic externalism. This incompatibility follows – it is urged – from the fact that these theses jointly entail an absurd conclusion, namely, the possibility of a priori knowledge of the world. In a recent paper I argued that a large and important class of such arguments exemplifies a dialectical failure: if they are valid, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Paul Noordhof (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument? Analysis 64 (1):48-56.score: 45.0
    Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Christoph Jäger (2009). Affective Ignorance. Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.score: 45.0
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. N. Georgalis (1990). No Access for the Externalist: Discussion of Heil's 'Privileged Access'. Mind 100 (393):101-8.score: 45.0
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Joseph Margolis (1970). Indubitability, Self-Intimating States, and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):918-31.score: 45.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Richard Rorty (1970). Wittgenstein, Privileged Access, and Incommunicability. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (3):192 - 205.score: 45.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. William S. Larkin, Burge on Our Privileged Access to the External World.score: 45.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. A. R. Louch (1965). Privileged Access. Mind 74 (April):155-173.score: 45.0
  36. William P. Alston (1976). Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):257 - 272.score: 45.0
    This paper defends the view that a belief to the effect that the believer is currently in some conscious state is "self-Warranted," in the sense that what warrants it is simply its being a belief of that sort. This position is compared with other views as to the epistemic status of such beliefs--That they are warranted by their truth and that they are warranted by an immediate awareness of their object. In the course of the discussion, Various modes of immediate (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. George N. Schlesinger (1985). Inaccessible Routes to the Problem of Privileged Access. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):84 – 87.score: 45.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Robert Alun Jones (1985). Second Thoughts on Privileged Access. Sociological Theory 3 (1):16-19.score: 45.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Joseph Margolis (1970). Indubitability, Self-Intimating States, and Logically Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):918 - 931.score: 45.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Michael McKinsey (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.score: 45.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jay David Atlas (2007). What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us About Belief : A New Moore's Paradox de Se, Rationality, and Privileged Access. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.score: 45.0
  42. Anthony L. Brueckner (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.score: 45.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. M. Eagle (1982). Privileged Access and the Status of Self-Knowledge in Cartesian and Freudian Conceptions of the Mental. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (4):349-373.score: 45.0
  44. J. J. MacIntosh (1983). The Logic of Privileged Access. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):142 – 151.score: 45.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael McKinsey (2003). Anti-Individualism and the Privileged Access. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.score: 45.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. B. P. McLaughlin & M. Tye (1998). Is Privileged Access Incompatible with Content-Externalism? Philosophical Review 107:349-380.score: 45.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Natika Newton (2002). Privileged Access and Merleau-Ponty. In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay Between Philosophy, Literature, and Reality. Kluwer. 71--78.score: 45.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Michael Pauen (2010). How Privileged is First-Person Privileged Access? American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):1-15.score: 45.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Joseph Quitterer (1999). Introspection and Privileged Access in Folk-Psychological Explanations. Disputatio Philosophica 1 (1):79-89.score: 45.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Sydney Shoemaker (1991). B. Privileged Access. In David M. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press. 116.score: 45.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000