Search results for 'problem of the many' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dan López de Sa (2014). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.score: 306.0
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly (...)
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  2. Dan López de Sa (2008). Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics? Noûs 42 (4):746-752.score: 306.0
    Kilimanjaro is a paradigmatic mountain, if any is. Consider atom Sparky, which is neither determinately part of Kilimanjaro nor determinately not part of it. Let Kilimanjaro(+) be the body of land constituted, in the way mountains are constituted by their constituent atoms, by the atoms that make up Kilimanjaro together with Sparky, and Kilimanjaro(–) the one constituted by those other than Sparky. On the one hand, there seems to be just one mountain in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro. On the other (...)
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  3. Thomas Sattig (2013). Vague Objects and the Problem of the Many. Metaphysica 14 (2):211-223.score: 306.0
    The problem of the many poses the task of explaining mereological indeterminacy of ordinary objects in a way that sustains our familiar practice of counting these objects. The aim of this essay is to develop a solution to the problem of the many that is based on an account of mereological indeterminacy as having its source in how ordinary objects are, independently of how we represent them. At the center of the account stands a quasi-hylomorphic ontology (...)
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  4. Dan López de Sa (2013). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1-13.score: 306.0
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly (...)
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  5. Ibo van de Poel, Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist, Neelke Doorn, Sjoerd Zwart & Lambèr Royakkers (2012). The Problem of Many Hands: Climate Change as an Example. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):49-67.score: 255.0
    In some situations in which undesirable collective effects occur, it is very hard, if not impossible, to hold any individual reasonably responsible. Such a situation may be referred to as the problem of many hands. In this paper we investigate how the problem of many hands can best be understood and why, and when, it exactly constitutes a problem. After analyzing climate change as an example, we propose to define the problem of many (...)
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  6. Michael E. Cuffaro (2012). Many Worlds, the Cluster-State Quantum Computer, and the Problem of the Preferred Basis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (1):35-42.score: 206.3
    I argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum computation is not licensed by, and in fact is conceptually inferior to, the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics from which it is derived. I argue that the many worlds explanation of quantum computation is incompatible with the recently developed cluster state model of quantum computation. Based on these considerations I conclude that we should reject the many worlds explanation of quantum computation.
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  7. David H. Sanford (1993). The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology. Noûs 27 (2):219-228.score: 204.0
    Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to (...)
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  8. David Hershenov (2001). The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many. Philosophical Papers 30 (1):57-67.score: 204.0
    Although the predominant view is that vagueness is due to our language being imprecise, the alternative idea that objects themselves do not have determinate borders has received an occasional hearing. But what has failed to be appreciated is how this idea can avoid a puzzle Peter Unger named “The Problem of the Many.”[i].
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  9. Neil McKinnon (2008). A New Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):80-97.score: 204.0
    Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here I present a new problem of the many. This new problem, I claim, is resistant to the solutions cunently on offer for Unger's problem.
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  10. By Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242–253.score: 204.0
    A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism – which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition – meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace (...)
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  11. Neil McKinnon (2002). Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):320-339.score: 204.0
    Supervaluational treatments of vagueness are currently quite popular among those who regard vagueness as a thoroughly semantic phenomenon. Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' may be regarded as arising from the vagueness of our ordinary physical-object terms, so it is not surprising that supervaluational solutions to Unger's problem have been offered. I argue that supervaluations do not afford an adequate solution to the problem of the many. Moreover, the considerations I raise against the supervaluational solution (...)
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  12. Patrick Toner (2012). St. Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers. The Modern Schoolman 89 (3-4):209-222.score: 204.0
    It has been argued that St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological views fall prey to the problem of “Too Many Thinkers.” The worry, roughly, is that his views entail that I—a human person—am able to think, but that my soul—which is not a human person—is also able to think. Hence, too many thinkers: there are too many ofus having my thoughts. In this paper, I show why this is not a problem for St. Thomas. Along the way, (...)
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  13. Brian Weatherson, The Problem of the Many.score: 202.5
    As anyone who has flown out of a cloud knows, the boundaries of a cloud are a lot less sharp up close than they can appear on the ground. Even when it seems clearly true that there is one, sharply bounded, cloud up there, really there are thousands of water droplets that are neither determinately part of the cloud, nor determinately outside it. Consider any object that consists of the core of the cloud, plus an arbitrary selection of these droplets. (...)
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  14. Matthew C. Haug (2010). The Exclusion Problem Meets the Problem of Many Causes. Erkenntnis 73 (1):55-65.score: 198.0
    In this paper I develop a novel response to the exclusion problem. I argue that the nature of the events in the causally complete physical domain raises the “problem of many causes”: there will typically be countless simultaneous low-level physical events in that domain that are causally sufficient for any given high-level physical event (like a window breaking or an arm raising). This shows that even reductive physicalists must admit that the version of the exclusion principle used (...)
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  15. Ibo van de Poel, Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist, Neelke Doorn, Sjoerd Zwart & Lambèr Royakkers (2012). The Problem of Many Hands: Climate Change as an Example. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):49-67.score: 198.0
    In some situations in which undesirable collective effects occur, it is very hard, if not impossible, to hold any individual reasonably responsible. Such a situation may be referred to as the problem of many hands. In this paper we investigate how the problem of many hands can best be understood and why, and when, it exactly constitutes a problem. After analyzing climate change as an example, we propose to define the problem of many (...)
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  16. Berry Groisman, Na'ama Hallakoun & Lev Vaidman (2013). The Measure of Existence of a Quantum World and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 73 (4):695-706.score: 185.3
    Next SectionAn attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the solution of the Sleeping Beauty Problem in the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation led to a new controversy regarding the Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem. We apply the concept of a measure of existence of a world and reach the solution known as ‘thirder’ solution which differs from Peter Lewis’s ‘halfer’ assertion. We argue that this method provides a simple and powerful tool for analysing rational decision theory problems.
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  17. Joel Smith (2010). The Conceptual Problem of Other Bodies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):201-217.score: 184.5
    The, so called, ‘conceptual problem of other minds’ has been articulated in a number of different ways. I discuss two, drawing out some constraints on an adequate account of the grasp of concepts of mental states. Distinguishing between behaviour-based and identity-based approaches to the problem, I argue that the former, exemplified by Brewer and Pickard, are incomplete as they presuppose, but do not provide an answer to, what I shall call the conceptual problem of other bodies. I (...)
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  18. Bradley Monton & Sanford Goldberg (2006). The Problem of the Many Minds. Minds and Machines 16 (4):463-470.score: 181.5
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particlestuff persist through time.
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  19. Neil McKinnon, Persistence and a New Problem of the Many.score: 180.0
    One winter’s Saturday Clarence wakes up. He realises he has left his umbrella at work. The office is locked, and he can’t get in. Being one of those people who punish themselves for their mistakes, he can’t bring himself to buy a replacement. He has an engagement six kilometres down the road and starts wondering whether it will rain. Normally, this would not be a problem, but his motor vehicle has broken down because he forgot to have it serviced. (...)
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  20. Howard Sankey (2011). Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.score: 178.5
    This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of (...)
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  21. Andrew D. Cling (2014). The Epistemic Regress Problem, the Problem of the Criterion, and the Value of Reasons. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):161-171.score: 175.5
    There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need (...)
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  22. David F. Wolf Ii (1998). How Many Spaces Does It Take to Get to the Center of a Theory of Human Problem Solving? Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (4):49-55.score: 175.5
    The diverse number of N-space theories and the unrestrained growth of the number of spaces within the multiple space models has incurred general skepticism about the new search space variants within the search space paradigm of psychology. I argue that any N-space theory is computationally equivalent to a single space model. Nevertheless, the N-space theories may explain the systematic behavior of human problem solving better than the original one search space theory by identifying relationships between the tasks that occur (...)
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  23. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Frances Howard-Snyder (1996). The Real Problem of No Best World. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):422-425.score: 172.5
    This is a reply to William Rowe, "The Problem of No Best World," Faith and Philosophy (1994).
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  24. David Kyle Johnson (forthcoming). The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World. Sophia:1-19.score: 171.0
    The multiverse hypothesis is growing in popularity among theistic philosophers because some view it as the preferable way to solve certain difficulties presented by theistic belief. In this paper, I am concerned specifically with its application to Rowe’s problem of no best world, which suggests that God’s existence is impossible given the fact that the world God actualizes must be unsurpassable, yet for any given possible world, there is one greater. I will argue that, as a solution to the (...)
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  25. Hon-Lam Li (1997). &Quot;abortion and Degrees of Personhood: Understanding the Impasse of the Abortion Problem (and the Animal Rights Problem)&Quot;. Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (1):1-19.score: 171.0
    I argue that the personhood of a fetus is analogous to the the heap. If this is correct, then the moral status or intrinsic value of a fetus would be supervenient upon the fetus's biological development. Yet to compare its claim vis-a-vis its mother's, we need to consider not only their moral status, but also the type of claim they each have. Thus we have to give weight to the two factors or variables of the mother's moral status and her (...)
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  26. C. K. Raju (2004). The Electrodynamic 2-Body Problem and the Origin of Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Physics 34 (6):937-962.score: 171.0
    We numerically solve the functional differential equations (FDEs) of 2-particle electrodynamics, using the full electrodynamic force obtained from the retarded Lienard–Wiechert potentials and the Lorentz force law. In contrast, the usual formulation uses only the Coulomb force (scalar potential), reducing the electrodynamic 2-body problem to a system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The ODE formulation is mathematically suspect since FDEs and ODEs are known to be incompatible; however, the Coulomb approximation to the full electrodynamic force has been believed to (...)
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  27. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga. In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. 19-33.score: 169.5
    J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence (...)
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  28. Fuxiang Yu (2007). On the Complexity of the Pancake Problem. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 53 (4):532-546.score: 168.0
    We study the computational complexity of finding a line that bisects simultaneously two sets in the two-dimensional plane, called the pancake problem, using the oracle Turing machine model of Ko. We also study the basic problem of bisecting a set at a given direction. Our main results are: (1) The complexity of bisecting a nice (thick) polynomial-time approximable set at a given direction can be characterized by the counting class #P. (2) The complexity of bisecting simultaneously two linearly (...)
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  29. Brian Weatherson, Vague Composition and the Problem of the Many.score: 165.0
    Assume also that it is vague, in some sense, which hairs are hairs of that cat. Then one might think that it is indeterminate in some sense which thing is the cat on the mat.
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  30. Paul Weiss (1980). Games: A Solution to the Problem of the One and the Many. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 7 (1):7-14.score: 164.3
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  31. Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). Reasoning Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge.score: 163.5
    According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will (...)
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  32. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):39-47.score: 162.0
    In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve (...)
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  33. Donald Turner (2003). The Many-Universes Solution to the Problem of Evil. In Richard M. Gale & Alexander R. Pruss (eds.), The Existence of God.score: 160.5
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  34. A. W. Moore (1989). A Problem for Intuitionism: The Apparent Possibility of Performing Infinitely Many Tasks in a Finite Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:17 - 34.score: 157.5
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  35. Jonathan A. Simon (2014). Indeterminate Comprehension. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4).score: 156.0
    Can we solve the Problem of the Many, and give a general account of the indeterminacy in definite descriptions that give rise to it, by appealing to metaphysically indeterminate entities? I argue that we cannot. I identify a feature common to the relevant class of definite descriptions, and derive a contradiction from the claim that each such description is satisfied by a metaphysically indeterminate entity.
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  36. Anne Newstead & Franklin James, The Epistemology of Geometry I: The Problem of Exactness. ASCS 2009 Proceedings of the 9th Australasian Society for Cognitive Science Conference.score: 154.5
    We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the (...)
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  37. Francisco L. Peccorini (1972). Suarez's Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many. The Thomist 36:433-471.score: 153.8
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  38. Peter Unger (1980). The Problem of the Many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.score: 153.0
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  39. Sean Walsh (2012). Modal Mereology and Modal Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):1-20.score: 153.0
    David Lewis insists that restrictivist composition must be motivated by and occur due to some intuitive desiderata for a relation R among parts that compose wholes, and insists that a restrictivist’s relation R must be vague. Peter van Inwagen agrees. In this paper, I argue that restrictivists need not use such examples of relation R as a criterion for composition, and any restrictivist should reject a number of related mereological theses. This paper critiques Lewis and van Inwagen (and others) on (...)
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  40. E. J. Lowe (1995). The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution. Analysis 55 (3):179 - 182.score: 153.0
  41. Michael Tye (1996). Fuzzy Realism and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):215 - 225.score: 153.0
  42. Terry Horgan (1997). Deep Ignorance, Brute Supervenience, and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Issues 8:229-236.score: 153.0
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  43. Geert Keil (2013). Introduction: Vagueness and Ontology. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (2):149-164.score: 153.0
    The article introduces a special issue of the journal Metaphysica on vagueness and ontology. The conventional view has it that all vagueness is semantic or representational. Russell, Dummett, Evans and Lewis, inter alia, have argued that the notion of “ontic” or “metaphysical” vagueness is not even intelligible. In recent years, a growing minority of philosophers have tried to make sense of the notion and have spelled it out in various ways. The article gives an overview and relates the idea of (...)
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  44. Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242-253.score: 153.0
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  45. Terry Horgan (1997). Brute Supervenience, Deep Ignorance, and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Issues 8:229-236.score: 153.0
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  46. Thomas Sattig (2010). 1. The Problem of the Many. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:145.score: 153.0
     
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  47. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.score: 151.5
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s (...)
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  48. Tobias Hansson (2007). The Problem(s) of Change Revisited. Dialectica 61 (2):265–274.score: 151.5
    Two recurrent arguments levelled against the view that enduring objects survive change are examined within the framework of the B-theory of time: the argument from Leibniz's Law and the argument from Instantiation of Incompatible Properties. Both arguments are shown to be question-begging and hence unsuccessful.
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  49. David B. Hershenov (2006). Shoemaker's Problem of Too Many Thinkers. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:225-236.score: 151.5
    Shoemaker maintains that when a functionalist theory of mind is combined with his belief about individuating properties and the well-known cerebrumtransplant thought experiment, the resulting position will be a version of the psychological approach to personal identity that can avoid The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. I maintain that the costs of his solution—that the human animal is incapable of thought—are too high. Shoemaker also has not provided an argumentagainst there existing a merely conscious being that is not (...)
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