Search results for 'promising' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  8
    Jason D’Cruz & Justin Kalef (2015). Promising to Try. Ethics 125 (3):797-806.
    We maintain that in many contexts promising to try is expressive of responsibility as a promiser. This morally significant application of promising to try speaks in favor of the view that responsible promisers favor evidentialism about promises. Contra Berislav Marušić, we contend that responsible promisers typically withdraw from promising to act and instead promise to try, in circumstances in which they recognize that there is a significant chance that they will not succeed.
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  2. David Owens (2006). A Simple Theory of Promising. Philosophical Review 115 (1):51-77.
    Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is (...)
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  3. Jason Kawall (2006). On Promising to Supererogate: A Response to Heyd. Philosophia 34 (2):153-156.
    In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I (...)
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  4.  35
    Jorah Dannenberg (2015). Promising Ourselves, Promising Others. Journal of Ethics 19 (2):159-183.
    Promising ourselves is familiar, yet some find it philosophically troubling. Though most of us take the promises we make ourselves seriously, it can seem mysterious how a promise made only to oneself could genuinely bind. Moreover, the desire to be bound by a promise to oneself may seem to expose an unflattering lack of trust in oneself. In this paper I aim to vindicate self-promising from these broadly skeptical concerns. Borrowing Nietzsche’s idea of a memory of the will, (...)
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  5.  38
    Kenneth Shockley (2008). On That Peculiar Practice of Promising. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):385 - 399.
    T. M. Scanlon has alleged that the social practice of promising fails to capture the sense in which when I break my promise I have wronged the promisee in particular. I suggest the practice of promising requires the promisee to have a normatively significant status, a status with interpersonal authority with respect to the promisor, and so be at risk of a particular harm made possible by the social practice of promising. This formulation of the social practice (...)
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  6.  14
    Jason D’Cruz and Justin Kalef (2015). Promising to Try. Ethics 125 (3):797-806,.
    We maintain that in many contexts promising to try is expressive of responsibility as a promiser. This morally significant application of promising to try speaks in favor of the view that responsible promisers favor evidentialism about promises. Contra Marušić, we contend that responsible promisers typically withdraw from promising to act, and instead promise to try, in circumstances where they recognize that there is a significant chance that they will not succeed.
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  7.  49
    Michael Cholbi (2002). A Contractualist Account of Promising. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):475-91.
    T.M. Scanlon (1998) proposes that promise breaking is wrong because it shows manipulative disregard for the expectations for future behavior created by promising. I argue that this account of promissory obligation is mistaken in it own right, as well as being at odds with Scanlon's contractualism. I begin by placing Scanlon's account of promising within a tradition that treats the creation of expectations in promise recipients as central to promissory obligation. However, a counterexample to Scanlon's account, his case (...)
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  8. Marguerite La Caze (2014). Promising and Forgiveness. In Patrick Hayden (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Key Concepts. Acumen 209-21.
    My paper explores the power that forgiveness and the promise, as potentialities of action, have to counter the two difficulties that follow from the possibility of being able to begin something new or what Arendt calls the ‘frailty of human affairs’: irreversibility and unpredictability. Acts of forgiving and promising are expressions of freedom and natality, as they begin human relations anew: forgiveness creates a fresh beginning after wrong-doing, and the promise initiates new political agreements. Arendt argues that forgiveness and (...)
     
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  9. Jason Kawall (2005). Promising and Supererogation. Philosophia 32 (1-4):389-398.
    A paradox involving promises to perform supererogatory actions is developed. Several attempts to resolve the problem, focusing in particular on changing our understanding of supererogatory actions, are explored. It is concluded that none of the proposed solutions are viable; the problem lies in promises with certain contents, not in our understanding of supererogation.
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  10.  27
    Mark van Roojen (2013). Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Righ Kind of Reasons to Believe. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. 59-78.
    T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to expect (...)
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  11.  8
    D. S. Horner (2007). Digital Futures: Promising Ethics and the Ethics of Promising. Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 37 (2):64-77.
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  12. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2011). Consciousness Modeled: Reification and Promising Pluralism. Pensamiento 67 (254):617-630.
    Paradoxically, explorers of the territory of consciousness seem to be studying consciousness out of existence, from inside the field of "consciousness studies". How? Through their love of the phenomenon/process, they have developed powerful single models or lenses through which to understand consciousness. But in doing so, they also seek to destroy the other /equally useful/ lenses. Our opportunity lies in halting the vendettas and cross-speakings/cross-fire. The imploration is to stop the dichotomous thinking and pernicious reification of single models, and instead (...)
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  13. Seana Valentine Shiffrin (2008). Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism. Philosophical Review 117 (4):481-524.
    The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create commitments. What is really at issue between conventionalists and nonconventionalists is whether the basic moral relation of promissory commitment derives from the moral principles that govern our use of social conventions. Other nonconventionalist accounts make problematic concessions to the conventionalist's (...)
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  14.  5
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  15.  20
    Claire Benn (2014). What is Wrong with Promising to Supererogate. Philosophia 42 (1):55-61.
    There has been some debate as to whether or not it is possible to keep a promise, and thus fulfil a duty, to supererogate. In this paper, I argue, in agreement with Jason Kawall, that such promises cannot be kept. However, I disagree with Kawall’s diagnosis of the problem and provide an alternative account. In the first section, I examine the debate between Kawall and David Heyd, who rejects Kawall’s claim that promises to supererogate cannot be kept. I disagree with (...)
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  16. Mark Schroeder (2006). Not so Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):348–356.
    Douglas Portmore has recently argued in this journal for a "promising result" – that combining teleological ethics with "evaluator relativism" about the good allows an ethical theory to account for deontological intuitions while "accommodat[ing] the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs." I show that this result is false. It follows from the indexical semantics of evaluator relativism that Portmore's compelling idea is false. I also try to explain what might (...)
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  17.  68
    Douglas W. Portmore (2005). Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):95–113.
    Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two—namely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE)—is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and like deontology, NATE (...)
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  18.  15
    Clare Shelley-Egan (2010). The Ambivalence of Promising Technology. NanoEthics 4 (2):183-189.
    Issues of responsibility in the world of nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible development’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of nanotechnology and of promising technology in general. Actors must find means of dealing with these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses to ambivalence are shaped by their position and context, along with strategic games they are involved in, together with other actors. A number of interviews were conducted (...)
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  19.  2
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  20.  2
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  21.  2
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  22. Julia Driver, Promising Too Much.
    This paper begins with the idea that we can learn a good deal about promising by examining the conditions and norms that govern promise- breaking. Sometimes promises are broken as a deliberate plan, other times they are broken because they are simply incompatible with other, more signifi cant moral norms, or because it becomes clear that they are impossible to keep. There are cases where people make promises that are actually incompatible with each other. Politicians, for example, often give (...)
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  23.  29
    Michael H. Robins (1984). Promising, Intending, and Moral Autonomy. Cambridge University Press.
    Introduction Promising seems to be an act of intentionally creating an obligation where none existed before, but how is such a thing accomplished? ...
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  24.  31
    Nikil Mukerji (2014). Consequentialism, Deontology and the Morality of Promising. In Johanna Jauernig & Christoph Lütge (eds.), Business Ethics and Risk Management. Springer 111-126.
    In normative ethics there has been a long-standing debate between consequentialists and deontologists. To settle this dispute moral theorists have often used a selective approach. They have focused on particular aspects of our moral practice and have teased out what consequentialists and deontologists have to say about it. One of the focal points of this debate has been the morality of promising. In this paper I review arguments on both sides and examine whether consequentialists or deontologists offer us a (...)
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  25.  1
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  26.  1
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  27.  1
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  28.  1
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  29.  1
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  30.  1
    Berislav Marušić (2016). What's Wrong with Promising to Try? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    There is often something wrong with merely promising to try to φ. In this article I explain what is wrong with such promises. I argue that a promise to try to φ, when it is entirely up to us to φ, is always wrong because it hides a possible choice under the veil of our susceptibility to circumstances beyond our control. I furthermore argue that this is often also the case when matters are not entirely up to us. Finally, (...)
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  31.  57
    David Owens, The Problem with Promising.
    Why have philosophers since Hume regarded promising as problematic? I distinguish two problems raised by Hume. The problem of the bare wrong is the problem of how it can make sense to avoid a wrong when the wrong does not affect any intelligible human interest. The problem of normative power is the problem of how something can be a wrong simply because it has been declared to be a wrong. I argue that the problem of the bare wrong is (...)
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  32.  20
    Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising-Part 1. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account and the (...)
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  33. Peter Vallentyne (2006). “Natural Rights and Two Conceptions of Promising”. Chicago-Kent Law Review 81 (9):9-19.
    Does one have an obligation to keep one’s promises? I answer this question by distinguishing between two broad conceptions of promising. On the normativized conception of promising, a promise is made when an agent validly offers to undertake an obligation to the promisee to perform some act (i.e., give up a liberty-right in relation to her) and the promisee validly accepts the offer. Keeping such promises is morally obligatory by definition. On the non- normativized conception, the nature of (...)
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  34.  18
    Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising - Part 2. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining (...)
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  35. William Vitek (1993). Promising. Temple University Press.
    William Vitek enlarges our understanding by treating the act of promising as a social practice and complex human experience. Citing engaging examples of promises made in everyday life, in extraordinary circumstances, and in literary works, Vitek grapples with the central paradox of promising: that human beings can intend a future to which they are largely blind. _Promising_ evaluates contemporary approaches to the topic by such philosophers as John Rawls, John Searle, Henry Sidgwick, P.S. Atiyah, and Michael Robbins but (...)
     
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  36.  13
    R. I. Sikora (1975). Facts, Promising and Obligation. Philosophy 50 (193):352 - 355.
    John Searle attempts to show through a consideration of promising that at least some ‘ought’ statements can be derived from ‘is’ statements. He thinks that you can determine on purely factual grounds that a person has made a promise, and that it follows logically from the statement that a person has made a promise that he has at least a prima facie obligation to do the thing he promised to do. I agree with but not with.
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  37.  1
    Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer (eds.) (2010). Economics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field. The MIT Press.
    The integration of economics and psychology has created a vibrant and fruitful emerging field of study. The essays in Economics and Psychology take a broad view of the interface between these two disciplines, going beyond the usual focus on "behavioral economics." As documented in this volume, the influence of psychology on economics has been responsible for a view of human behavior that calls into question the assumption of complete rationality, the acceptance of experiments as a valid method of economic research, (...)
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  38. Adele Lozano (ed.) (2015). Latina/o College Student Leadership: Emerging Theory, Promising Practice. Lexington Books.
    This book examines Latina/o college student leadership and leadership development in higher education. Lozano analyzes emerging frameworks, empirical research, leadership models, essays, and promising practices to provide insight into how Latina/o students experience and promote leadership in higher education.
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  39. Herbert J. Schlesinger (2008). Promises, Oaths, and Vows: On the Psychology of Promising. Routledge.
    Considering that getting along in civil society is based on the expectation that people will do what they say they will do, i.e., essentially live up to their explicit or implicit promises, it is amazing that so little scientific attention has been given to the act of promising. A great deal of research has been done on the moral development of children, for example, but not on the child’s ability to make and keep a promise, one of the highest (...)
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  40. Ming Kuo (2015). How Might Contact with Nature Promote Human Health? Promising Mechanisms and a Possible Central Pathway. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  41.  46
    Berislav Marušić (2013). Promising Against the Evidence. Ethics 123 (2):292-317.
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  42.  46
    Jack Woods (forthcoming). The Normative Force of Promising. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 6.
  43. Ibon Manterola (2014). Bilingual Education Searching for Promising Didactic Proposals. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  44.  97
    Gary Watson (2004). Asserting and Promising. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):57-77.
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  45. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Left-Libertarianism as a Promising Form of Liberal Egalitarianism. Philosophical Exchange:56-71.
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  46. Ned Hall (2006). Philosophy of Causation: Blind Alleys Exposed; Promising Directions Highlighted. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):86–94.
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  47.  66
    W. R. Carter (1969). Grice on Promising on Condition. Analysis 30 (1):31 - 32.
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  48.  3
    Vladimir Espinosa Angarica & Antonio del Sol (forthcoming). Modeling Heterogeneity in the Pluripotent State: A Promising Strategy for Improving the Efficiency and Fidelity of Stem Cell Differentiation. Bioessays.
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  49.  4
    C. O. Carter (1961). Promising Families: Some Conclusions. The Eugenics Review 52 (4):197.
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  50. David Owens (2008). Promising Without Intending. Journal of Philosophy 105 (12):737-755.
    It is widely held that one who sincerely promises to do something must at least intend to do that thing: a promise communicates the intention to perform. In this paper, I argue that a promise need only communicate the intention to undertake an obligation to perform. I consider examples of sincere promisors who have no intention of performing. I argue that this fits well with what we want to say about other performatives - giving, commanding etc. Furthermore, it supports a (...)
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