Search results for 'promissory obligation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  62
    Margaret P. Gilbert (2004). Scanlon on Promissory Obligation. Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):83-109.
    This article offers a critique of Thomas Scanlon's well-known account of promissory obligation by reference to the rights of promisees. Scanlon's account invokes a moral principle, the "principle of fidelity". Now, corresponding to a promisor's obligation to perform is a promisee's right to performance. It is argued that one cannot account for this right in terms of Scanlon's principle. This is so in spite of a clause in the principle relating to the promisee's "consent", which might have (...)
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  2.  38
    Neal A. Tognazzini (2007). The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (3):203–232.
    How do promissory obligations get created? Some have thought that the answer to this question must make reference to our social practice of promising. Recently, however, T.M. Scanlon has argued (in his book What We Owe to Each Other) for a pure ‘expectation view’ of promising, according to which promissory obligations arise as a result of our producing certain expectations in others. He formulates a principle of fidelity (Principle F) that tells us when one has gained an (...) due to producing expectations in another, and he maintains that breaking one's promise is merely a special instance of violation against Principle F. Though initially compelling, Scanlon’s account is ultimately unsatisfactory because it is subject to a vicious circularity. In order to get out of the circle, we are forced to resort back to elements of a social practice view of promising. Thus we arrive at a hybrid view of promissory obligation, which weds parts of Scanlon’s expectation view with parts of a social practice view. After briefly examining and rejecting Scanlon’s pure expectation view, I consider the hybrid view of Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace. I present a serious objection to the hybrid view as they formulate it and go on to construct a modified hybrid view. Finally, I defend my modified hybrid view from certain pressing objections. (shrink)
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  3.  40
    Margaret Gilbert (2004). Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees' Rights. Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):83 - 109.
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  4.  22
    Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2007). Searle's Derivation of Promissory Obligation. In Intentional Acts and Insitutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology. Springer
  5.  10
    Joe D. van Zandt (2001). Comments Concerning Spinoza and the Antimony of Promissory Obligation. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (2):159-162.
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  6.  8
    Kevin Zanelotti (2000). Spinoza and the Antimony of Promissory Obligation. Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):69-76.
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  7. Nicholas Southwood & Daniel Friedrich (2009). Promises Beyond Assurance. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):261 - 280.
    Breaking a promise is generally taken to involve committing a certain kind of moral wrong, but what (if anything) explains this wrong? According to one influential theory that has been championed most recently by T.M. Scanlon, the wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating an obligation that one incurs to a promisee in virtue of giving her assurance that one will perform or refrain from performing certain acts. In this paper, we argue that the “Assurance (...)
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  8. Daniel Friedrich & Nicholas Southwood (2011). Promises and Trust. In Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreement: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press
    In this article we develop and defend what we call the “Trust View” of promissory obligation, according to which making a promise involves inviting another individual to trust one to do something. In inviting her trust, and having the invitation accepted (or at least not rejected), one incurs an obligation to her not to betray the trust that one has invited. The distinctive wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating this obligation. We (...)
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  9.  31
    Nikil Mukerji (2014). Consequentialism, Deontology and the Morality of Promising. In Johanna Jauernig & Christoph Lütge (eds.), Business Ethics and Risk Management. Springer 111-126.
    In normative ethics there has been a long-standing debate between consequentialists and deontologists. To settle this dispute moral theorists have often used a selective approach. They have focused on particular aspects of our moral practice and have teased out what consequentialists and deontologists have to say about it. One of the focal points of this debate has been the morality of promising. In this paper I review arguments on both sides and examine whether consequentialists or deontologists offer us a more (...)
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  10.  22
    Ashley Dressel (2015). Directed Obligations and the Trouble with Deathbed Promises. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):323-335.
    On some popular accounts of promissory obligation, a promise creates an obligation to the person to whom the promise is made . On such accounts, the wrong involved in breaking a promise is a wrong committed against a promisee. I will call such accounts ‘directed obligation’ accounts of promissory obligation. While I concede that directed obligation accounts make good sense of many of our promissory obligations, I aim to show that directed (...) accounts, at least in their current forms, cannot accommodate an obligation to keep deathbed promises. While the term 'deathbed promise' refers to any promise made to a person who is dying, I focus specifically on deathbed promises which will not, or even cannot, be fulfilled until after the promisee's death. In what follows, I examine two prominent types of directed obligation account: rights-based accounts, which argue that a promissory obligation is a directed obligation because a promise gives the promisee certain rights, and harm accounts, which argue that a promissory obligation is a directed obligation because a promise puts the promisee in a special position to be harmed. I argue that neither version can accommodate an obligation to keep deathbed promises. (shrink)
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  11.  50
    Hanoch Sheinman (2008). Promise as Practice Reason. Acta Analytica 23 (4):287-318.
    To promise someone to do something is to commit oneself to that person to do that thing, but what does that commitment consist of? Some think a promissory commitment is an obligation to do what’s promised, and that while promising practices facilitate the creation of promissory obligations, they are not essential to them. I favor the broadly Humean view in which, when it comes to promises (and so promissory obligations), practices are of the essence. I propose (...)
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  12. Stephen Kershnar (2014). A Promissory Theory of the Duty to Tip. Business and Society Review 119 (2):247-276.
    In this article, I argued that in contexts in which tipping is customary, there is a moral duty to tip or to explicitly tell the server that you will not be tipping. The evidence for this rests on anecdotes about people's mental states, and customers and server's intuitions about duties that would arise were a customer unable to tip his server. The promise is a speech act that is implicit in ordering food. The speech act must be matched by the (...)
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  13. David Owens (2006). A Simple Theory of Promising. Philosophical Review 115 (1):51-77.
    Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is taken (...)
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  14.  30
    Margaret Gilbert (2013). Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. OUP Usa.
    This new essay collection by distinguished philosopher Margaret Gilbert provides a richly textured argument for the importance of joint commitment in our personal and public lives. Topics covered by this diverse range of essays range from marital love to patriotism, from promissory obligation to the unity of the European Union.
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  15. David Owens (2008). Promising Without Intending. Journal of Philosophy 105 (12):737-755.
    It is widely held that one who sincerely promises to do something must at least intend to do that thing: a promise communicates the intention to perform. In this paper, I argue that a promise need only communicate the intention to undertake an obligation to perform. I consider examples of sincere promisors who have no intention of performing. I argue that this fits well with what we want to say about other performatives - giving, commanding etc. Furthermore, it supports (...)
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  16. Margaret Gilbert (2013). Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In this wide-ranging collection of essays, distinguished philosopher Margaret Gilbert investigates the structure of our social world. People often speak of what we do, think, and feel, and of our values, conventions, and laws. Asking what we mean by such talk, Gilbert invokes the foundational idea of joint commitment. She applies this idea to topics ranging from the mutual recognition of two people to the unity of the European Union, from marital love to patriotism, from promissory obligation to (...)
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  17.  58
    David Owens (2007). Duress, Deception, and the Validity of a Promise. Mind 116 (462):293-315.
    An invalid promise is one whose breach does not wrong the promisee. I describe two different accounts of why duress and deception invalidate promises. According to the fault account duress and deception invalidate a promise just when it was wrong for the promisee to induce the promisor to promise in that way. According to the injury account, duress and deception invalidate a promise just when by inducing the promise in that way the promisee wrongs the promisor. I demonstrate that the (...)
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  18.  18
    Michael G. Pratt (2003). Promises and Perlocutions. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. Frank Cass 93-119.
    This is a critical analysis of T.M. Scanlon's contractualist account of promising and promissory obligation. After situating Scanlon's account within one of two broad schools of thought on promising (the 'perlocutionary' school) I argue that his account fails to overcome a fatal circularity that plagues all such theories of promise. I go on to argue that Scanlon's contractualist moral theory will support an alternative, non-perlocutionary theory of promise that is not susceptible to this logical difficulty.
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  19.  49
    Michael Cholbi (2002). A Contractualist Account of Promising. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):475-91.
    T.M. Scanlon (1998) proposes that promise breaking is wrong because it shows manipulative disregard for the expectations for future behavior created by promising. I argue that this account of promissory obligation is mistaken in it own right, as well as being at odds with Scanlon's contractualism. I begin by placing Scanlon's account of promising within a tradition that treats the creation of expectations in promise recipients as central to promissory obligation. However, a counterexample to Scanlon's account, (...)
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  20.  20
    Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising-Part 1. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account (...)
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  21.  18
    Ulrike Heuer (2012). Promising - Part 2. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining (...)
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  22. William Vitek (1993). Promising. Temple University Press.
    William Vitek enlarges our understanding by treating the act of promising as a social practice and complex human experience. Citing engaging examples of promises made in everyday life, in extraordinary circumstances, and in literary works, Vitek grapples with the central paradox of promising: that human beings can intend a future to which they are largely blind. _Promising_ evaluates contemporary approaches to the topic by such philosophers as John Rawls, John Searle, Henry Sidgwick, P.S. Atiyah, and Michael Robbins but transcend their (...)
     
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  23.  4
    P. Nash (1995). Doctors and Nurses Once More--An Alternative to May. Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (2):82-83.
    It is argued that promissory obligation arising from the contract of employment offers a simpler and less contentious explanation and justification of the doctor-nurse relationship at work, than does May's proposal of second-order reasons. The second-order reason position is rejected as the norm for that relationship, and in the exceptional case, where it is admitted, shared employee status is identified as primary validator of a doctor as locus of rational authority. Finally, a brief case is made for a (...)
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  24. Azam Golam (2008). Moral Obligation of Pharmaceutical Companies Towards HIV Victims in Developing Countries. The Dhaka University Studies 64 (1):197-212.
    The objective of the paper is to analyze whether that the pharmaceutical companies producing HIV drugs have moral obligation(s) towards the HIV victims in developing countries who don‟t have access to get drug to reduce their risks. The primary assessment is that the pharmaceutical companies have minimum moral obligation(s) to the HIV patients especially in developing countries. It is because they are human beings and hence they are the subject of moral considerations. The paper argues that from the (...)
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  25. Thomas M. Hughes (2012). Is Political Obligation Necessary for Obedience? Hobbes on Hostility, War and Obligation. Teoria Politica 2:77-99.
    Contemporary debates on obedience and consent, such as those between Thomas Senor and A. John Simmons, suggest that either political obligation must exist as a concept or there must be natural duty of justice accessible to us through reason. Without one or the other, de facto political institutions would lack the requisite moral framework to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay suggests that both are unnecessary in order to provide a conceptual framework in which obedience to coercive political institutions (...)
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  26. Thomas Fossen (2013). The Grammar of Political Obligation. Politics, Philosophy and Economics (3):1470594-13496072.
    This essay presents a new way of conceptualizing the problem of political obligation. On the traditional ‘normativist’ framing of the issue, the primary task for theory is to secure the content and justification of political obligations, providing practically applicable moral knowledge. This paper develops an alternative, ‘pragmatist’ framing of the issue, by rehabilitating a frequently misunderstood essay by Hanna Pitkin and by recasting her argument in terms of the ‘pragmatic turn’ in recent philosophy, as articulated by Robert Brandom. From (...)
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  27.  65
    Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (2015). Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. PLoS ONE 10 (8).
    It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1–3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral (...)
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  28.  53
    Sean Aas (2015). Distributing Collective Obligation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (3).
    In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the (...)
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  29.  41
    Russell Haines, Marc D. Street & Douglas Haines (2008). The Influence of Perceived Importance of an Ethical Issue on Moral Judgment, Moral Obligation, and Moral Intent. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):387 - 399.
    The study extends and tests the issue contingent four-component model of ethical decision-making to include moral obligation. A web-based questionnaire was used to gauge the influence of perceived importance of an ethical issue on moral judgment and moral intent. Perceived importance of an ethical issue was found to be a predictor of moral judgment but not of moral intent as predicted. Moral obligation is suggested to be a process that occurs after a moral judgment is made and explained (...)
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  30. Simon Cushing (1999). Rawls and "Duty-Based" Accounts of Political Obligation. APA Newsletter on Law and Philosophy 99 (1):67-71.
    Rawls's theory of political obligation attempts to avoid the obvious flaws of a Lockean consent model. Rawls rejects a requirement of consent for two reasons: First, the consent requirement of Locke’s theory was intended to ensure that the liberty and equality of the contractors was respected, but this end is better achieved by the principles chosen in the original position, which order the basic structure of a society into which citizens are born. Second, "basing our political ties upon a (...)
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  31. Jiafeng Zhu (2014). Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap. Journal of Moral Philosophy (4):1-23.
    The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen‟s (...)
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  32.  73
    Jiafeng Zhu (2015). Farewell to Political Obligation: In Defense of a Permissive Conception of Legitimacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    In the recent debate on political legitimacy, we have seen the emergence of a revisionist camp, advocating the idea of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ as opposed to the traditional view that political obligation is necessary for state legitimacy. The revisionist idea of legitimacy is appealing because if it stands, the widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligation will not lead us to conclude that the state is illegitimate. Unfortunately, existing conceptions of ‘legitimacy without political obligation (...)
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  33.  38
    Philip J. Nickel (2007). Trust and Obligation-Ascription. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):309 - 319.
    This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that (...)
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  34. Matthias Kiesselbach (2010). Hobbes's Struggle with Contractual Obligation. On the Status of the Laws of Nature in Hobbes's Work. Hobbes Studies 23 (2):105-123.
    This paper argues that throughout his intellectual career, Hobbes remains unsatisfied with his own attempts at proving the invariant advisability of contract-keeping. Not only does he see himself forced to abandon his early idea that contractual obligation is a matter of physical laws. He also develops and retains doubts concerning its theoretical successor, the doctrine that the obligatoriness characteristic of contracts is the interest in self-preservation in alliance with instrumental reason - i.e. prudence. In fact, it is during his (...)
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  35. Piotr Kulicki & Robert Trypuz (2013). Two Faces of Obligation. In Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki & Berislav Žarnić (eds.), Theory of Imperatives from Different Points of View (2). Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper
    In the paper we discuss different intuitions about the properties of obligatory actions in the framework of deontic action logic based on boolean algebra. Two notions of obligation are distinguished–abstract and processed obligation. We introduce them formally into the system of deontic logic of actions and investigate their properties and mutual relations.
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  36.  72
    Paul McNamara (2004). Agential Obligation as Non-Agential Personal Obligation Plus Agency. Journal of Applied Logic 2 (1):117-152.
    I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in[P.McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2)(2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However,the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements. Instead, I take the basic form to be an agent’s (...)
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  37.  26
    Amir Saemi (2014). On John Laird’s “Value and Obligation”. Ethics 125 (1):235-237,.
    Unjustly forgotten, Laird’s “value and obligation”, I shall argue, is of great relevance to contemporary moral philosophy. To this aim, I will explore three main theses of Laird’s paper which are as follows: (T1) We can’t understand judgments of value and obligation in terms of mere feelings and desires. (T2) Desire must be guided by cognition of some value. (T3) Judgments of rightness and obligation must be grounded in judgments of value.
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  38. Mark Tunick (2002). The Moral Obligation to Obey Law. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3):464–482.
    Is it always morally wrong to violate a law and in doing so does one necessarily act badly? I argue that whether in breaking a law one acts badly depends on considerations unique to the particular act of lawbreaking. The moral judgment in question is deeply contextual and cannot be settled by appeal to blanket moral rules such as that it is wrong to break (any) law. The argument is made by focusing on the example of a runner having to (...)
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  39.  12
    Peter Øhrstrøm, Jörg Zeller & Ulrik Sandborg-Petersen (2012). Prior's Defence of Hintikka's Theorem. A Discussion of Prior's 'The Logic of Obligation and the Obligations of the Logician'. Synthese 188 (3):449-454.
    In his paper, The logic of obligation and the obligations of the logician, A.N. Prior considers Hintikka's theorem, according to which a statement cannot be both impossible and permissible. This theorem has been seen as problematic for the very idea of a logic of obligation. However, Prior rejects the view that the logic of obligation cannot be formalised. He sees this resistance against such a view as an important part of what could be called the obligation (...)
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  40. Jacob Ross (2010). The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323.
    It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form "s ought to 0") cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form "it ought to be the case that p"). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.
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  41.  52
    Uwe Steinhoff, Political Obligation and the Particularity Problem: A Note on Markie.
    P.J. Markie tries to solve the so-called particularity problem of natural duty accounts of political obligation, a problem which seems to make natural duty accounts implausible. I argue that Markie at best “dissolves” the problem: while his own natural duty account of political obligation still does not succeed in ensuring particularity, this is not an implausible but an entirely plausible implication of his account, thanks to the weakness of his concept of political obligation. The price for this, (...)
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  42.  82
    Massimo Renzo (2008). Duties of Samaritanism and Political Obligation. Legal Theory 14 (3):193–217.
    In this article I criticize a theory of political obligation recently put forward by Christopher Wellman. Wellman's “samaritan theory” grounds both state legitimacy and political obligation in a natural duty to help people in need when this can be done at no unreasonable cost. I argue that this view is not able to account for some important features of the relation between state and citizens that Wellman himself seems to value. My conclusion is that the samaritan theory can (...)
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  43.  48
    Simon Cushing (1998). Representation and Obligation in Rawls' Social Contract Theory. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):47-54.
    The two justificatory roles of the social contract are establishing whether or not a state is legitimate simpliciter and establishing whether any particular individual is politically obligated to obey the dictates of its governing institutions. Rawls's theory is obviously designed to address the first role but less obviously the other. Rawls does offer a duty-based theory of political obligation that has been criticized by neo-Lockean A. John Simmons. I assess Simmons's criticisms and the possible responses that could be made (...)
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  44.  5
    Rosemarie Dlc Bernabe, Ghislaine Jmw van Thiel, Jan Am Raaijmakers & Johannes Jm van Delden (2014). The Fiduciary Obligation of the Physician-Researcher in Phase IV Trials. BMC Medical Ethics 15 (1):11.
    BackgroundIn this manuscript, we argue that within the context of phase IV, physician-researchers retain their fiduciary obligation to treat the patient-participants.DiscussionWe first clarify why the perspective that research ethics ought to be differentiated from clinical ethics is not applicable in phase IV, and therefore, why therapeutic orientation is most convivial in this phase. Next, assuming that ethics guidelines may be representative of common morality, we show that ethics guidelines see physician-researchers primarily as physicians and only secondarily as researchers. We (...)
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  45.  4
    Xiaoying Qi (2015). Filial Obligation in Contemporary China: Evolution of the Culture‐System. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 45 (1):141-161.
    Family obligation, which has an exceptionally high salience in traditional Chinese society, continues to be significant in contemporary China. In family relations in particular sentiments and practices morphologically similar to those associated with xiao remains intact in so far as an enduring set of expectations concerning age-based obligation continues to structure behavior toward others. Researchers pursuing the theme of “individualization” in Chinese society, on the other hand, argue that family obligations and filial sentiments have substantially weakened. The present (...)
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  46.  29
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):255 - 281.
    I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral (...)
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  47. Michael J. Zimmerman (2006). On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577-597.
    This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is (...)
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  48.  25
    Ivan Hu (2015). Epistemicism, Paradox, and Conditional Obligation. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2123-2139.
    Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.
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  49.  18
    Bridget G. Haire (2011). Because We Can: Clashes of Perspective Over Researcher Obligation in the Failed Prep Trials. Developing World Bioethics 11 (2):63-74.
    This article examines the relationship between bioethics and the therapeutic standards in HIV prevention research in the developing world, focusing on the closure of the pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) trials in the early 2000s. I situate the PrEP trials in the historical context of the vertical transmission debates of the 1990s, where there was protracted debate over the use of placebos despite the existence of a proven intervention. I then discuss the dramatic improvement in the clinical management of HIV and the (...)
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  50.  36
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):239 - 261.
    What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in (...)
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