Search results for 'proper function' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  46
    Daniel M. Johnson (2011). Proper Function and Defeating Experiences. Synthese 182 (3):433-447.
    Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification, though the argument applies also to Alvin Plantinga’s proper function account of warrant. (...)
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  2.  42
    Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that (...)
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  3.  33
    Tyler Wunder (2008). Anti-Naturalism and Proper Function. Religious Studies 44 (2):209-224.
    The penultimate chapter of Alvin Plantinga's "Warrant and Proper Function" attacks metaphysical naturalism through an argument which concludes that only a supernaturalistic worldview can accommodate the indispensable concept of proper function. I make the case that this argument, which I dub 'the argument from proper function', suffers from two major flaws. First, it underestimates the naturalist's ability to ground natural proper function ascriptions in the concept of health. Second, it relies upon an (...)
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  4. Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
    In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.
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  5.  15
    Sergio E. Chaigneau & Guillermo Puebla (2013). The Proper Function of Artifacts: Intentions, Conventions and Causal Inferences. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):391-406.
    Designers’ intentions are important for determining an artifact’s proper function (i.e., its perceived real function). However, there are disagreements regarding why. In one view, people reason causally about artifacts’ functional outcomes, and designers’ intended functions become important to the extent that they allow inferring outcomes. In another view, people use knowledge of designers’ intentions to determine proper functions, but this is unrelated to causal reasoning, having perhaps to do with intentional or social forms of reasoning (e.g., (...)
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  6.  12
    Colin Ruloff (2010). Some Remarks on Bonjour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility. Principia 4 (2):215-228.
    A number of counterexamples have recently been leveled against Alvin Plantinga's Proper Functionalism, counterexamples aimed at showing that Plantinga's theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for warrant — that elusive epistemic property which together with true belief yields knowledge. Among these counterexamples, Laurence Bonjour's is perhaps the most formidable and, if successful, shows that Proper Functionalism is simply too weak to serve as an acceptable theory of warrant. In this paper, I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, BonJour's (...)
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  7.  33
    Peter H. Schwartz (1999). Proper Function and Recent Selection. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):222.
    "Modern History" versions of the etiological theory claim that in order for a trait X to have the proper function F, individuals with X must have been recently favored by natural selection for doing F (Godfrey-Smith 1994; Griffiths 1992, 1993). For many traits with prototypical proper functions, however, such recent selection may not have occurred: traits may have been maintained due to lack of variation or due to selection for other effects. I examine this flaw in Modern (...)
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  8.  12
    L. A. W. Brakel (2002). Phantasy and Wish: A Proper Function Account for Human a-Rational Primary Process Mediated Mentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):1 – 16.
    (2002). Phantasy and Wish: A Proper Function Account for Human A-Rational Primary Process Mediated Mentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
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  9.  23
    Michael Czapkay Sudduth (1999). Can Religious Unbelief Be Proper Function Rational? Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):297-314.
    This paper presents a critical analysis of Alvin Plantinga’s recent contention, developed in Warranted Christian Belief (forthcoming), that if theism is true, then it is unlikely that religious unbelief is the product of properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive faculties. More specifically, Plantinga argues that, given his own model of properly basic theistic belief, religious unbelief would always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere in a person’s noetic establishment. I argue that this claim is highly questionable and has adverse consequences for Plantinga’s epistemology (...)
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  10. Michael Bertrand (2013). Proper Environment and the SEP Account of Biological Function. Synthese 190 (9):1503-1517.
    The survival enhancing propensity (SEP) account has a crucial role to play in the analysis of proper function. However, a central feature of the account, its specification of the proper environment to which functions are relativized, is seriously underdeveloped. In this paper, I argue that existent accounts of proper environment fail because they either allow too many or too few characters to count as proper functions. While SEP accounts retain their promise, they are unworkable because (...)
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  11. Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.
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  12. Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.
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  13.  16
    Inna Semetsky (2005). From Design to Self-Organization, Or: A Proper Structure for a Proper Function. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 15 (4):575-597.
    It is suggested that Charles Sanders Peirce's triadic semiotics provides a framework for a diagrammatic representation of a sign's proper structure. The action of signs is described at the logical and psychological levels. The role of (unconscious) abductive inference is analyzed, and a diagram of reasoning is offered. A series of interpretants transform brute facts into interpretable signs thereby providing human experience with value or meaning. The triadic structure helps in de-mystifying the relations between Penrose's three worlds when the (...)
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  14. Alvin Plantinga (1988). Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function. Philosophical Perspectives 2:1-50.
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  15.  11
    Alvin Plantinga (1993). Review: Why We Need Proper Function. [REVIEW] Noûs 27 (1):66 - 82.
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  16.  30
    Charles Starkey (2007). Manipulating Emotion: The Best Evidence for Non-Cognitivism in the Light of Proper Function. Analysis 67 (295):230–237.
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  17. Peter H. Schwartz (2002). The Continuing Usefulness Account of Proper Function. In Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Clarendon Press
     
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  18.  25
    Todd R. Long (2010). Proper Function Justification and Epistemic Rationality. Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):189-195.
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  19.  31
    Gloria Origgi & Dan Sperber (2000). Evolution, Communication and the Proper Function of Language. In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Cambridge University Press 140--169.
    Language is both a biological and a cultural phenomenon. Our aim here is to discuss, in an evolutionary perspective, the articulation of these two aspects of language. For this, we draw on the general conceptual framework developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) while at the same time dissociating ourselves from her view of language.
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  20. M. T. Turvey, Kevin Shockley & Claudia Carello (1999). Affordance, Proper Function, and the Physical Basis of Perceived Heaviness. Cognition 73 (2):B17-B26.
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  21.  40
    Adrian Bardon (2007). Reliabilism, Proper Function, and Serendipitous Malfunction. Philosophical Investigations 30 (1):45–64.
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  22. Ernest Sosa (1996). ``Postscript to Proper Function and Virtue Epistemology". In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contempoary Epistemology. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 271-280.
     
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  23.  14
    John C. Wingard Jr (2000). Is Proper Function Necessary for Epistemic Warrant? Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):133-141.
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  24.  28
    Hilary Kornblith (2004). Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual Reason. Episteme 1 (3):169-176.
    Human beings form beliefs by way of a variety of psychological processes. Some of these processes of belief acquisition are innate; others are acquired. A good deal of interesting work has been done in assessing the reliability of these processes. Any such assessment must examine not only features intrinsic to the psychological processes themselves, but also features of the environments in which those processes are exercised; a mechanism which is reliable in one sort of environment may be quite unreliable in (...)
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  25.  19
    Alvin Plantinga (1995). Review: Précis of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):393 - 396.
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  26.  16
    W. Jay Wood (2004). Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect. Faith and Philosophy 21 (1):3-24.
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  27.  12
    William Alston (1995). Epistemic Warrant as Proper Function. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):397-402.
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  28.  11
    Peter Markie (1999). Plantinga, Metaphysical Naturalism and Proper Function. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):65-72.
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  29.  12
    William Alston (1995). Review: Epistemic Warrant as Proper Function. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):397 - 402.
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  30.  10
    Manuel García-Carpintero (2000). Fregean Sense and the Proper Function of Assertion. Theoria 15 (2):303-316.
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  31.  4
    Christopher Hookway & Alvin Plantinga (1995). Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):122.
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  32.  2
    Jerry Steinhofer (2010). Comments on Long's “Proper Function Justification and Epistemic Rationality”. Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):61-63.
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  33.  5
    Jamie L. Phillips (1997). The Untimely Deaths of Ms. Prejudice and Proper Function. Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):129-140.
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  34.  2
    Paul Helm (1995). Alvin Plantinga. Warrant: The Current Debate. Pp. Xii+228. . Alvin Plantinga. Warrant and Proper Function. Pp. Xii+243. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 31 (1):129.
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  35.  5
    Waddah N. Nasr (1992). On the Proper Function of the Moral Philosopher: Kant and Rawls on Theory and Practice. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):172-179.
  36. Bruce Hunter (1994). Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (2):121-127.
     
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  37. Kelly James Clark (2007). Pluralism and Proper Function. In Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga. Cambridge University Press
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  38. Manuel García-Carpintero (2000). Fregean Sense and the Proper Function of Assertion: Comments on Textor: Philosophy of Language. Theoria 15 (38):303-316.
     
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  39. John Greco (1995). Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):109-112.
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  40. Bruce Hunter (1994). Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 14:121-127.
     
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  41. Peter D. Klein (1996). Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility. In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield
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  42. Jonathan Kvanvig (1996). Plantinga's Proper Function Account of Warrant. In J. J. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland
    Plantinga thus offers an approach that begins by assessing the faculties or abilities of a cognitive system or agent. Once such an assessment is complete, the epistemologist is in a position to infer the epistemic status of the doxastic products of those faculties or abilities.
     
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  43. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1996). ``Plantinga's Proper Function Theory of Warrant&Quot. In Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 281-306.
     
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  44. Keith Lehrer (1996). ``Proper Function Versus Systematic Coherence&Quot. In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 27-47.
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  45. Thomas D. Senor (1995). Review of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics:925-26.
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  46. Charles Starkey (2007). Manipulating Emotion: The Best Evidence for Non-Cognitivism in the Light of Proper Function. Analysis 67 (295):230-237.
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  47. N. Vassallo (1995). Warrant e Proper Function: alcune osservazioni sulla teoria di Plantinga. Epistemologia 18 (2):341-352.
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  48.  89
    Beth Preston (1998). Why is a Wing Like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of Function. Journal of Philosophy 95 (5):215-254.
    Function theorists routinely speculate that a viable function theory will be equally applicable to biological traits and artifacts. However, artifact function has received only the most cursory scrutiny in its own right. Closer scrutiny reveals that only a pluralist theory comprising two distinct notions of function--proper function and system function--will serve as an adequate general theory. The first section describes these two notions of (...). The second section shows why both notions are necessary, by showing that attempts to do away with one of them fail. This demonstration draws on examples from the artifactual realm to motivate major points of the argument. The third section is an outline of artifact function. It confirms the conclusions of the second section, and also begins the task of describing some of the special features of artifact function needing accommodation within the general theory. (shrink)
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  49. John T. Mullen (2005). Spontaneous Generation: Design Beliefs and Proper Cognitive Function. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):345 - 367.
    It is commonly assumed that there is some sort of tacit ’inference’ involved when we form the belief that intentional activity on the part of some (perhaps unidentified) person is causally relevant to the occurrence of some event. Against this "inferential model" of design belief formation I argue that in many ordinary cases we do not ’infer’ design beliefs at all, but that they form spontaneously and ’properly’ whenever certain conditions are met. This alternative model has a respectable historical precedent, (...)
     
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  50. Beth Preston (2009). Biological and Cultural Proper Functions in Comparative Perspective. In Ulrich Krohs & Peter Kroes (eds.), Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press
    Both biological traits and artifacts have proper functions. But accounts of proper function are typically based on the biological case. So adapting these accounts to the artifact case requires finding cultural analogues of biological concepts. This can go wrong in two ways. The biological concepts may not pick out either biological or cultural proper functions correctly; or they may have no cultural analogues. I argue that things have gone wrong in the first way with regard to (...)
     
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