Search results for 'propositional identity' (try it on Scholar)

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1. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1976). Prior on Propositional Identity. Analysis 36 (4):182-184.score: 90.0
Let A, B, C stand for sentences expressing propositions; let A be a component of C; let C A/B be just like C except for replacing some occurrence of A in C by an occurrence of B; let = be a binary connective for propositional identity read as ‘the proposition that __ is the very same proposition as …’. Then authors defend adding ‘from C = C A/B infer A = B’ to Prior’s rules for propositional (...), appearing in OBJECTS OF THOUGHT. (shrink)

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2. Charles Sayward & Philip Hugly (1979). More on Propositional Identity. Analysis 39:129-132.score: 90.0
We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) (...)

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3. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1979). More on Propositional Identity. Analysis 39 (3):129-132.score: 90.0
We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) (...)

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4. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1981). Completeness Theorems for Two Propositional Logics in Which Identity Diverges From Mutual Entailment. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (3):269-282.score: 81.0
Anderson and Belnap devise a model theory for entailment on which propositional identity equals proposional coentailment. This feature can be reasonably questioned. The authors devise two extensions of Anderson and Belnap’s model theory. Both systems preserve Anderson and Belnap’s results for entailment, but distinguish coentailment from identity.

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5. Charles Sayward (2006). What is the Logic of Propositional Identity? Logic and Logical Philosophy 15:3-15.score: 74.0
Propositional identity is not expressed by a predicate. So its logic is not given by the ordinary first order axioms for identity. What are the logical axioms governing this concept, then? Some axioms in addition to those proposed by Arthur Prior are proposed.

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6. score: 48.0
We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used (...)

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7. David Landy (2005). Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.score: 45.0
Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a (...)

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8. A. N. Prior (1969). Extensionality and Propositional Identity. Crítica 3 (7/8):35 - 60.score: 45.0
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9. James B. Freeman (1977). A Caution on Propositional Identity. Analysis 37 (4):149 - 151.score: 45.0
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10. C. Lewy (1964). Entailment And Propositional Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:107-122.score: 45.0
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11. Edgar Page (1970). Reference and Propositional Identity. Philosophical Review 79 (1):43-62.score: 45.0
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12. Rod Bertolet (1984). Ackerman on Propositional Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):499-504.score: 45.0
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13. Esa Saarinen (1978). Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations Among Quantifiers, Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):151 - 223.score: 36.0

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14. John Wallace (1969). Propositional Attitudes and Identity. Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):145-152.score: 36.0
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15. score: 30.0
Machine generated contents note: Introduction and overview; 1. Logics with actualist quantifiers; 2. The Barcan formulas; 3. The existence predicate; 4. Propositional functions and predicate substitution; 5. Identity; 6. Cover semantics for relevant logic; References; Index.

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16. Jean-Yves Béziau (2007). Sentence, Proposition and Identity. Synthese 154 (3):371 - 382.score: 24.0
In this paper we discuss the distinction between sentence and proposition from the perspective of identity. After criticizing Quine, we discuss how objects of logical languages are constructed, explaining what is Kleene’s congruence—used by Bourbaki with his square—and Paul Halmos’s view about the difference between formulas and objects of the factor structure, the corresponding boolean algebra, in case of classical logic. Finally we present Patrick Suppes’s congruence approach to the notion of proposition, according to which a whole hierarchy of (...)

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17. Marek Nowak & Daniel Vanderveken (1995). A Complete Minimal Logic of the Propositional Contents of Thought. Studia Logica 54 (3):391 - 410.score: 24.0
Our purpose is to formulate a complete logic of propositions that takes into account the fact that propositions are both senses provided with truth values and contents of conceptual thoughts. In our formalization, propositions are more complex entities than simple functions from possible worlds into truth values. They have a structure of constituents (a content) in addition to truth conditions. The formalization is adequate for the purposes of the logic of speech acts. It imposes a stronger criterion of propositional (...)

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18. Xiaowu Li & Xuefeng Wen (2007). Plausibility, Necessity and Identity: A Logic of Relative Plausibility. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):629-644.score: 24.0
We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity.
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19. Steven E. Boër (1994). Propositional Attitudes and Formal Ontology. Synthese 98 (2):187 - 242.score: 21.0
This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.

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20. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2013). The Argument for Subject Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity Defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.score: 21.0
In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this (...)
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21. A. Pietarinen (2001). Intentional Identity Revisited. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):147-188.score: 21.0
The problem of intentional identity, as originally offered by Peter Geach, says that there can be an anaphoric link between an indefinite term and a pronoun across a sentential boundary and across propositional attitude contexts, where the actual existence of an individual for the indefinite term is not presupposed. In this paper, a semantic resolution to this elusive puzzle is suggested, based on a new quantified intensional logic and game-theoretic semantics (GTS) of imperfect information. This constellation leads to (...)

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22. Adrian Rahaman & Martina Angela Sasse (2010). A Framework for the Lived Experience of Identity. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):605-638.score: 21.0
This paper presents a framework for the design of human-centric identity management systems. Whilst many identity systems over the past few years have been labelled as human-centred, we argue that the term has been appropriated by technologists to claim moral superiority of their products, and by system owners who confuse administrative convenience with benefits for users. The framework for human-centred identity presented here identifies a set of design properties that can impact the lived experience of the individuals (...)
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23. Howard Burdick (1982). A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 52 (2):185 - 230.score: 21.0
The author puts forth an approach to propositional attitude contexts based upon the view that one does not have beliefs of ordinary extensional entitiessimpliciter. Rather, one has beliefs of such entities as presented in various manners. Roughly, these are treated as beliefs of ordered pairs — the first member of which is the ordinary extensional entity and the second member of which is a predicate that it satisfies. Such an approach has no difficulties with problems involving identity, such (...)

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24. Colin Gavaghan (2010). A Whole New... You? 'Personal Identity', Emerging Technologies and the Law. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):423-434.score: 21.0
In this article, I argue that lawmakers must abandon their previous reluctance to engage with questions of personal identity (PI). While frequently seen as an esoteric subject, of limited interest outside of academic philosophy departments, I attempt to show that, in fact, assumptions about PI—and its durability in the face of certain psychological or genetic changes—underpin many current legal rules. This is most perhaps obviously exemplified with regard to reproductive technologies. Yet the Parfitian challenge to identify a victim of (...)

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25. Silvio Ghilardi & Marek Zawadowski (1995). Undefinability of Propositional Quantifiers in the Modal System S. Studia Logica 55 (2):259 - 271.score: 21.0
We show that (contrary to the parallel case of intuitionistic logic, see [7], [4]) there does not exist a translation fromS42 (the propositional modal systemS4 enriched with propositional quantifiers) intoS4 that preserves provability and reduces to identity for Boolean connectives and.

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26. Adam Henschke (2010). Did You Just Say What I Think You Said? Talking About Genes, Identity and Information. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):435-456.score: 21.0
Genetic information is becoming increasingly used in modern life, extending beyond medicine to familial history, forensics and more. Following this expansion of use, the effect of genetic information on people’s identity and ultimately people’s quality of life is being explored in a host of different disciplines. While a multidisciplinary approach is commendable and necessary, there is the potential for the multidisciplinarity to produce conceptual misconnection. That is, while experts in one field may understand their use of a term like (...)

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27. Ernesto Schwartz-Marín & Irma Silva-Zolezzi (2010). “The Map of the Mexican's Genome”: Overlapping National Identity, and Population Genomics. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):489-514.score: 21.0
This paper explores the intersections between national identity and the production of medical/population genomics in Mexico. The ongoing efforts to construct a Haplotype Map of Mexican genetic diversity offers a unique opportunity to illustrate and analyze the exchange between the historic-political narratives of nationalism, and the material culture of genomic science. Haplotypes are central actants in the search for medically significant SNP’s (single nucleotide polymorphisms), as well as powerful entities involved in the delimitation of ancestry, temporality and variability (www.hapmap.org). (...)
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28. Charles Sayward (2004). Roman Suzuko on Situational Identity. Sorites 15:42-49.score: 21.0
This paper gives a semantical account for the (i)ordinary propositional calculus, enriched with quantifiers binding variables standing for sentences, and with an identity-function with sentences as arguments; (ii)the ordinary theory of quantification applied to the special quantifiers; and (iii)ordinary laws of identity applied to the special function. The account includes some thoughts of Roman Suszko as well as some thoughts of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

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29. Andrew M. Pitts (1992). On an Interpretation of Second Order Quantification in First Order Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):33-52.score: 21.0
We prove the following surprising property of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus, IpC. Consider the collection of formulas, φ, built up from propositional variables (p,q,r,...) and falsity $(\perp)$ using conjunction $(\wedge)$ , disjunction (∨) and implication (→). Write $\vdash\phi$ to indicate that such a formula is intuitionistically valid. We show that for each variable p and formula φ there exists a formula Apφ (effectively computable from φ), containing only variables not equal to p which occur in φ, and such (...)

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30. Simone Gozzano (2012). Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. ambridge University Press.score: 21.0
In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of (...)

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31. D. Barnard-Wills & D. Ashenden (2010). Public Sector Engagement with Online Identity Management. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):657-674.score: 21.0
The individual management of online identity, as part of a wider politics of personal information, privacy, and dataveillance, is an area where public policy is developing and where the public sector attempts to intervene. This paper attempts to understand the strategies and methods through which the UK government and public sector is engaging in online identity management. The analysis is framed by the analytics of government (Dean 2010) and governmentality (Miller and Rose 2008). This approach draws attention to (...)
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32. Francis J. Pelletier (1993). Identity in Modal Logic Theorem Proving. Studia Logica 52 (2):291 - 308.score: 21.0
THINKER is an automated natural deduction first-order theorem proving program. This paper reports on how it was adapted so as to prove theorems in modal logic. The method employed is an indirect semantic method, obtained by considering the semantic conditions involved in being a valid argument in these modal logics. The method is extended from propositional modal logic to predicate modal logic, and issues concerning the domain of quantification and existence in a world's domain are discussed. Finally, we look (...)

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33. Anders Nordgren (2010). The Rhetoric Appeal to Identity on Websites of Companies Offering Non-Health-Related DNA Testing. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):473-487.score: 21.0
During the last few years a large number of companies have emerged offering DNA testing via the Internet “direct-to-consumer”. In this paper, I analyse the rhetoric appeal to personal identity put forward on the websites of some of these consumer genomics companies. The investigation is limited to non-health-related DNA testing and focuses on individualistic and communitarian—in a descriptive sense—visions of identity. The individualistic visions stress that each individual is unique and suggest that this uniqueness can be supported by, (...)

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34. Lothar Fritsch, Kristin Skeide Fuglerud & Ivar Solheim (2010). Towards Inclusive Identity Management. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):515-538.score: 21.0
The article argues for a shift of perspective in identity management (IDM) research and development. Accessibility and usability issues affect identity management to such an extent that they demand a reframing and reformulation of basic designs and requirements of modern identity management systems. The rationale for the traditional design of identity management systems and mechanisms has been security concerns as defined in the field of security engineering. By default the highest security level has been recommended and (...)

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35. Hidehito Gomi (2010). A Persistent Data Tracking Mechanism for User-Centric Identity Governance. Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):639-656.score: 21.0
Identity governance is an emerging concept for fine-grained conditional disclosure of identity information and enforcement of corresponding data handling policies. Although numerous technologies underlying identity management have been developed, people still have difficulty obtaining a clear picture of how their identity information is maintained, used, and propagated. An identity management framework is described for tracking the history of how a person’s identity information is handled after it is transferred across domains of control and for (...)
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36. John Perry (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.score: 18.0
Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and ...

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37. James Giles (1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200.score: 18.0
The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of (...)

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38. Derek Parfit (1982). Personal Identity and Rationality. Synthese 53 (2):227-241.score: 18.0
There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.

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39. Derek A. Parfit (1995). The Unimportance of Identity. In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in (...)

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40. score: 18.0
What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments (...)

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41. Shelley Weinberg (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.score: 18.0
Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own (...)

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42. Marya Schechtman (2005). Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.score: 18.0
Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon (...)

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43. Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects several famous (...)

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44. Eric T. Olson (2002). What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity? Noûs 36 (4):682-698.score: 18.0
Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells (...)

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45. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between (...)

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46. Shelley Weinberg (2012). The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.score: 18.0
Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal (...). But the former stumble on circularity and the latter is insufficient for Locke’s moral theory insofar as he is committed to a theory of divine rectification. The common problem is that Locke’s theory seems to demand an objective, or metaphysical, fact of a continuing consciousness that does not appeal to a traditional notion of substance for the continuity. I’m suggesting something new. In II.xxvii of the Essay, we see an ambiguity in Locke’s use of the term ‘consciousness’. Locke seems to see consciousness as both a mental state by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceiving and as the ongoing self we are aware of in these conscious states. First, I make the textual argument why we should read Locke as having a conception of a metaphysical fact of a continuing consciousness that does not appeal to thinking or bodily substance to establish its continuity. I then argue that the metaphysical fact of an enduring consciousness is revealed to us as a phenomenological fact of experience. Due to the nature of certain kinds of perceptual situations we have an experience of ourselves as temporally extended. Although the text bears out that Locke seemed to think there is a fact of an ongoing consciousness, I argue that it is consistent with his reluctance elsewhere that he makes no further epistemological or ontological claims about it. Finally, I provide an account of Locke’s understanding of memory and its relation to consciousness that supports the claim that consciousness is something ontologically distinct from either thinking or bodily substance. (shrink)

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47. James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.score: 18.0
In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts (...)

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48. Amy Kind (2004). The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.score: 18.0
Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding (...)

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49. Christopher Hughes (2004). Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
Saul Kripke, in a series of classic writings of the 1960s and 1970s, changed the face of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Christopher Hughes offers a careful exposition and critical analysis of Kripke's central ideas about names, necessity, and identity. He clears up some common misunderstandings of Kripke's views on rigid designation, causality and reference, and the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Through his engagement with Kripke's ideas Hughes makes a significant contribution to ongoing debates on, inter (...)

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50. David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.score: 18.0
Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding (...)

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51. Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.score: 18.0
This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.

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52. score: 18.0
The first book synthesizing the many different topics that surround the issue of personal identity, this text makes an important contribution to the philosophy of personal identity and mind, and to epistemology.

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53. Simone Gozzano (2009). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In Marcelo Suarez, Miklos Redei & Mauro Dorato (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Kluwer.score: 18.0
In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. Is properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.

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54. Mauro Dorato & Matteo Morganti (2013). Grades of Individuality. A Pluralistic View of Identity in Quantum Mechanics and in the Sciences. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):591-610.score: 18.0
This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian ‘reductionist’ tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of ‘primitivism’ that denies that facts of identity and individuality must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that—contrary to a widespread consensus—‘naturalised’ metaphysics supports both (...)

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55. Simon Beck (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.score: 18.0
Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for her thought-experiment. I also (...)

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56. Robert Francescotti (2005). Fetuses, Corpses and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81.score: 18.0
Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.

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57. score: 18.0
Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It (...)

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58. Michael C. Rea & David Silver (2000). Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):185-194.score: 18.0
In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses (PC-analyses) of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks's argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks's argument is valid.

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59. Andrew Apter (1991). The Problem of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity, and the Double Brain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):219-48.score: 18.0
The received view of multiple personality disorder (MPD) presupposes a form of realism, according to which the 'secondary personality' is an independent conscious entity joined to the psyche of the host. The received view of MPD is endorsed by the majority of psychologists, as are the major diagnostic criteria for MPD. Realism of this type, gives rise to a certain problem concerning the personal identity of the secondary personality, namely, who this individual is. It is argued that three broad (...)

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60. Theodore Sider (2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):189-209.score: 18.0
It is easy to become battle-weary in metaphysics. In the face of seemingly unresolvable disputes and unanswerable questions, it is tempting to cast aside one’s sword, proclaiming: “there is no fact of the matter who is right!” Sometimes that is the right thing to do. As a case study, consider the search for the criterion of personal identity over time. I say there is no fact of the matter whether the correct criterion is bodily or psychological continuity.1 There exist (...)

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61. Basil Smith (2006). John Locke, Personal Identity and Memento. In Mark T. Conard (ed.), The Philosophy of Neo-Noir. University of Kentucky Press.score: 18.0
In this paper, I compare John Locke’s “memory theory” of personal identity and Memento (directed by Christopher Nolan). I argue that the plot of Memento is ambiguous, in that the main character (Leonard Shelby, played by Guy Pearce) seems to have two histories. As such, Memento is but a series of puzzle cases that intend to illustrate that, although our memories may not be chronologically related to one another, and may even be fused with the memories of other persons, (...)

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62. Mark T. Brown (2001). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.score: 18.0
If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with (...)

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63. Rafael De Clercq (2005). A Criterion of Diachronic Identity Based on Locke's Principle. Metaphysica 6 (1):23-38.score: 18.0
The aim of this paper is to derive a perfectly general criterion of identity through time from Locke’s Principle, which says that two things of the same kind cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In this way, the paper pursues a suggestion made by Peter F. Strawson almost thirty years ago in an article called ‘Entity and Identity’. The reason why the potential of this suggestion has so far remained unrealized is twofold: firstly, the suggestion (...)

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64. Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.score: 18.0
Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce (...) to desire—the desire of a person to express his or her social being. From an internalist point of view, that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a key role in social explanations as mental entities, this article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped. (shrink)

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65. Santiago Echeverri (2011). McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.score: 18.0
Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could (...)

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66. Matti Eklund (2004). Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.score: 18.0
Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two (...)

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67. Thomas Kelly (2002). The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.score: 18.0
In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we (...)

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68. Steve Matthews (1998). Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.score: 18.0
Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may (...)

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69. Robert Schroer (forthcoming). Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self. American Philosophical Quarterly.score: 18.0
The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)

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70. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.score: 18.0
The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view (...)

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71. score: 18.0
Recently, several authors have claimed to have found graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In this paper, I argue that their counterexamples presuppose a certain view of what unlabeled graphs are, and that this view is optional at best.

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72. Fraser MacBride (ed.) (2006). Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
The eleven new papers in this volume address fundamental and interrelated philosophical issues concerning modality and identity, issues that were pivotal to the development of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century, and remain a key focus of debate in the twenty-first. Identity and Modality brings together leading researchers in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mathematics.

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73. Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.score: 18.0
Among theories of personal identity over time the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such (...)

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74. Galen Strawson (2011). The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
This lucid book is the first to be wholly dedicated to Hume's theory of personal identity, and presents a bold new interpretation which bears directly on ...

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75. Nicholas Mantegani (2013). Instantiation is Not Partial Identity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):697-715.score: 18.0
In order to avoid the problems faced by standard realist analyses of the “relation” of instantiation, Baxter and, following him, Armstrong each analyze the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of their partial identity. I introduce two related conceptions of partial identity, one mereological and one non-mereological, both of which require at least one of the relata of the partial identity “relation” to be complex. I then introduce a second non-mereological conception of partial (...), which allows for both relata to be simple. I take these three conceptions to exhaust the plausible ways of construing two entities as being partially identical. I then argue that there is no analysis (including those offered by Baxter and Armstrong) of a universal and a particular as being partially identical consistent with any of these three conceptions that (i) is coherent, (ii) is consistently realist, (iii) does not lead to absurd consequences, and (iv) offers a “solution” to the problem of instantiation that avoids the problems with the other standard realist responses. In so arguing, I offer a criticism of the analysis of instantiation as partial identity that is independent of the standard criticism that it entails the necessity of predication. (shrink)

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76. score: 18.0
This paper disputes a common definition of token identity theory. It also observes that within the philosophical literature there are two significantly different definitions of token identity theory that are commonly used.

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77. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.score: 18.0
This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important (...)

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78. Charles B. Cross (2009). Causal Independence, the Identity of Indiscernibles, and the Essentiality of Origins. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):277-291.score: 18.0
In his well-known 1952 dialogue Max Black describes a counterexample to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). The counterexample is a world containing nothing but two purportedly indiscernible iron spheres. Reflecting on Black's example, Robert Adams uses the possibility of a world containing two almost indiscernible spheres to argue for the possibility of the indiscernible spheres world. One of Adams's almost indiscernible spheres has a small impurity, and, Adams writes, "Surely... the absence of the impurity would not (...)

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79. Peter K. Unger (1990). Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving (...)

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80. David Barrett (2013). Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.score: 18.0
In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, (...)

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81. Andrew A. Brennan (1988). Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
Addressing many topics in epistemology and metaphysics, this treatise sets out a new theory of the unity of objects, and discusses personal identity, the metaphysics of possible worlds, the continuity in space time, and the nature of philosophical theorizing.

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82. Michael Pauen (2002). Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):37-49.score: 18.0
It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even (...)

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83. Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4).score: 18.0
Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold (tacitly if not explicitly) that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes (...)

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84. Timothy J. Bayne (2002). Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.score: 18.0
Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological (...)

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85. score: 18.0
Book review of 'More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms' (2009, Wiley-Blackwell). By E. J. LOWE.

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86. Harold W. Noonan (1980). Objects and Identity: An Examination of the Relative Identity Thesis and its Consequences. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada [by] Kluwer Boston.score: 18.0
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IDENTITY On the classical, or Fregean, view of identity it is an equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law (so<alled), ...

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87. Lawrence H. Davis (1998). Functionalism and Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.score: 18.0
Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a "Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but-notably-not appeals to our "intuitions" concerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic insight is correct: there is a connection between the two theories. Specifically, functionalism implies that "non-branching functional (...)

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88. Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). Many-One Identity and the Trinity. In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity's application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn't already (...)

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89. Peter Van Inwagen (2001). Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.score: 18.0
This book gathers together thirteen of Peter van Inwagen's essays on metaphysics, several of which have acquired the status of modern classics in their field. They range widely across such topics as Quine's philosophy of quantification, the ontology of fiction, the part-whole relation, the theory of 'temporal parts', and human knowledge of modal truths. In addition, van Inwagen considers the question as to whether the psychological continuity theory of personal identity is compatible with materialism, and defends the thesis that (...)

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90. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.score: 18.0
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically (...)

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91. score: 18.0
This book is part of the growing field of practical approaches to philosophical questions relating to identity, agency and ethics, working across continental and analytical traditions. Kim Atkins explains and justifies the basis of the practical approach through an explication of the structures of human embodiment and an account of how those structures necessitate a narrative model of selfhood, understanding and ethics. She highlights how recent work on agency and autonomy implicitly draws upon conceptions of embodiment and intersubjectivity that (...)

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92. score: 18.0
A prospective introduction -- The received view -- Troubles with the received view -- Are propositional attitudes relations? -- Foundations of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes -- The basic measurement-theoretic account -- Elaboration and explication of the proposed measurement-theoretic account.

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93. Steven Rieber (1998). The Concept of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.score: 18.0
Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description. The analysis coheres with out judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate. The apparent indeterminacy results from attempting to apply a definite description (...)

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94. score: 18.0
One reason why the Biological Approach to personal identity is attractive is that it doesn’t make its advocates deny that they were each once a mindless fetus.[i] According to the Biological Approach, we are essentially organisms and exist as long as certain life processes continue. Since the Psychological Account of personal identity posits some mental traits as essential to our persistence, not only does it follow that we could not survive in a permanently vegetative state or irreversible coma, (...)

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95. score: 18.0
Introduction -- John Locke and the problem of personal identity : the principium individuationis, personal immortality, and bodily resurrection -- On separation and immortality : Descartes and the nature of the soul -- On materialism and immortality or Hobbes' rejection of the natural argument for the immortality of the soul -- Henry More and John Locke on the dangers of materialism : immateriality, immortality, immorality, and identity -- Robert Boyle : on seeds, cannibalism, and the resurrection of the (...)

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96. Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind 121 (483):677-702.score: 18.0
Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the (...)

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97. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in Primary Truths. In M. Carrara, A. M. Nunziante & G. Tomasi (eds.), Individuals, minds and bodies: themes from Leibniz. Franz Steiner Verlag.score: 18.0
In this paper I reconstruct Leibniz's argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his *Primary Truths*. I criticise the alternative interpretation put forward by Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne and defend my own interpretation, both on philosophical and hermeneutical grounds.

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98. Robert Lane (2006). Safety, Identity and Consent: A Limited Defense of Reproductive Human Cloning. Bioethics 20 (3):125–135.score: 18.0
Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally (...)

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99. Eli Hirsch (1982). The Concept of Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
In this book, Eli Hirsch focuses on identity through time, first with respect to ordinary bodies, then underlying matter, and eventually persons.