Search results for 'propositions' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Friederike Moltmann (2014). Propositions, Attitudinal Objects, and the Distinction Between Actions and Products. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701.
    This paper argues that attutudinal objects, entities of the sort of John's judgment, John's thought, and John's claim should play the role of propositions, as the cognitive products of cognitive acts, not the acts themselves.
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  2. Jonathan Schaffer (2012). Necessitarian Propositions. Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
    Kaplan (drawing on Montague and Prior, inter alia) made explicit the idea of world and time neutral propositions, which bear truth values only relative to world and time parameters. There was then a debate over the role of time. Temporalists sided with Kaplan in maintaining time neutral propositions with time relative truth values, while eternalists claimed that all propositions specify the needed time information and so bear the same truth value at all times. But there never was (...)
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  3. Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). A Neglected Resolution of Russell’s Paradox of Propositions. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):328-344.
    Bertrand Russell offered an influential paradox of propositions in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics, but there is little agreement as to what to conclude from it. We suggest that Russell's paradox is best regarded as a limitative result on propositional granularity. Some propositions are, on pain of contradiction, unable to discriminate between classes with different members: whatever they predicate of one, they predicate of the other. When accepted, this remarkable fact should cast some doubt upon some (...)
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  4.  14
    Christopher M. P. Tomaszewski (forthcoming). The Principle of Sufficient Reason Defended: There Is No Conjunction of All Contingently True Propositions. Philosophia:1-8.
    Toward the end of his classic treatise An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen offers a modal argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason which he argues shows that the principle “collapses all modal distinctions.” In this paper, a critical flaw in this argument is shown to lie in van Inwagen’s beginning assumption that there is such a thing as the conjunction of all contingently true propositions. This is shown to follow from Cantor’s theorem and a property of (...)
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  5. Mark Jago (2015). Hyperintensional Propositions. Synthese 192 (3):585-601.
    Propositions play a central role in contemporary semantics. On the Russellian account, propositions are structured entities containing particulars, properties and relations. This contrasts sharply with the sets-of-possible-worlds view of propositions. I’ll discuss how to extend the sets-of-worlds view to accommodate fine-grained hyperintensional contents. When this is done in a satisfactory way, I’ll argue, it makes heavy use of entities very much like Russellian tuples. The two notions of proposition become inter-definable and inter-substitutable: they are not genuinely distinct (...)
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  6.  64
    Kris McDaniel (2015). Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true (...)
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  7. Joshua Armstrong & Jason Stanley (2011). Singular Thoughts and Singular Propositions. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):205 - 222.
    A singular thought about an object o is one that is directly about o in a characteristic way—grasp of that thought requires having some special epistemic relation to the object o, and the thought is ontologically dependent on o. One account of the nature of singular thought exploits a Russellian Structured Account of Propositions, according to which contents are represented by means of structured n-tuples of objects, properties, and functions. A proposition is singular, according to this framework, if and (...)
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  8. Cody Gilmore (2014). Parts of Propositions. In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press 156-208.
    Do Russellian propositions have their constituents as parts? One reason for thinking not is that if they did, they would generate apparent counterexamples to plausible mereological principles. As Frege noted, they would be in tension with the transitivity of parthood. A certain small rock is a part of Etna but not of the proposition that Etna is higher than Vesuvius. So, if Etna were a part of the given proposition, parthood would fail to be transitive. As William Bynoe has (...)
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  9. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). The Story About Propositions. Noûs 46 (4):635-674.
    It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent linguistic commitment evident in our use of 'that'-clauses (in offering (...)
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  10. Rachael Briggs & Mark Jago (2012). Propositions and Same-Saying: Introduction. Synthese 189 (1):1-10.
    Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ‘propositions’. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of (...)
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  11. David Ripley (2012). Structures and Circumstances: Two Ways to Fine-Grain Propositions. Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper discusses two distinct strategies that have been adopted to provide fine-grained propositions; that is, propositions individuated more finely than sets of possible worlds. One strategy takes propositions to have internal structure, while the other looks beyond possible worlds, and takes propositions to be sets of circumstances, where possible worlds do not exhaust the circumstances. The usual arguments for these positions turn on fineness-of-grain issues: just how finely should propositions be individuated? Here, I compare (...)
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  12. Vasilis Tsompanidis (2013). The Structure of Propositions and Cross-Linguistic Syntactic Variability. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (39):399-419.
    In Jeffrey King’s theory of structured propositions, propositional structure mirrors the syntactic structure of natural language sentences that express it. I provide cases where this claim individuates propositions too finely across languages. Crucially, King’s paradigmatic proposition-fact ^that Dara swims^ cannot be believed by a monolingual Greek speaker, due to Greek syntax requiring an obligatory article in front of proper names. King’s two possible replies are: (i) to try to streamline the syntax of Greek and English; or (ii) to (...)
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  13.  6
    Stephen Schiffer (forthcoming). Cognitive Propositions. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Soames's new theory of "cognitive propositions" is presented and several prima facie objections are presented to it.
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  14. Scott Soames (2008). Why Propositions Cannot Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):267 - 276.
    No semantic theory satisfying certain natural constraints can identify the semantic contents of sentences (the propositions they express), with sets of circumstances in which the sentences are true–no matter how fine-grained the circumstances are taken to be. An objection to the proof is shown to fail by virtue of conflating model-theoretic consequence between sentences with truth-conditional consequence between the semantic contents of sentences. The error underlines the impotence of distinguishing semantics, in the sense of a truth-based theory of logical (...)
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  15. Brian Rabern (2012). Propositions and Multiple Indexing. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):116-124.
    It is argued that propositions cannot be the compositional semantic values of sentences (in context) simply due to issues stemming from the compositional semantics of modal operators (or modal quantifiers). In particular, the fact that the arguments for double indexing generalize to multiple indexing exposes a fundamental tension in the default philosophical conception of semantic theory. This provides further motivation for making a distinction between two sentential semantic contents—what (Dummett 1973) called “ingredient sense” and “assertoric content”.
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  16.  93
    Jeffrey King (1996). Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (5):495 - 521.
    It is argued that taken together, two widely held claims ((i) sentences express structured propositions whose structures are functions of the structures of sentences expressing them; and (ii) sentences have underlying structures that are the input to semantic interpretation) suggest a simple, plausible theory of propositional structure. According to this theory, the structures of propositions are the same as the structures of the syntactic inputs to semantics they are expressed by. The theory is defended against a variety of (...)
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  17. Jeremy Wyatt (2013). Domains, Plural Truth, and Mixed Atomic Propositions. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):225-236.
    In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detailed-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what (...)
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  18.  15
    Kirk Ludwig (2014). Propositions and Higher-Order Attitude Attributions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):741-765.
    An important objection to sententialist theories of attitude reports is that they cannot accommodate the principle that one cannot know that someone believes that p without knowing what it is that he believes. This paper argues that a parallel problem arises for propositionalist accounts that has gone largely unnoticed, and that, furthermore, the usual resources for the propositionalist do not afford an adequate solution. While non-standard solutions are available for the propositionalist, it turns out that there are parallel solutions that (...)
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  19.  82
    Otávio Bueno, Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta (2013). Worlds and Propositions Set Free. Erkenntnis (4):1-24.
    The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worlds. Next the authors show that (...)
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  20.  21
    Pierre Le Morvan (2015). On the Ignorance, Knowledge, and Nature of Propositions. Synthese 192 (11):3647-3662.
    Deploying distinctions between ignorance of \ and ignorance that \ , and between knowledge of \ and knowledge that \ , I address a question that has hitherto received little attention, namely: what is it to have knowledge of propositions? I then provide a taxonomy of ontological conceptions of the nature of propositions, and explore several of their interesting epistemological implications.
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  21.  7
    Ulrich Meyer (forthcoming). Tense, Propositions, and Facts. Synthese:1-9.
    This paper aims to clarify the connection between the logic of temporal distinctions and the temporal features of propositions. Contra Prior, it argues that the adoption of tense operators does not commit one to the view that propositions can change their truth value over time.
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  22.  22
    Andrew W. Howat (2013). Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth. Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
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  23.  82
    Anssi Korhonen (2009). Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions. Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
    In Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. (...)
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  24.  66
    Thomas Hodgson (2012). Propositions, Structure and Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):339-349.
    Neo-Russellian theories of structured propositions face challenges to do with both representation and structure which are sometimes called the problem of unity and the Benacerraf problem. In §i, I set out the problems and Jeffrey King's solution, which I take to be the best of its type, as well as an unfortunate consequence for that solution. In §§ii–iii, I diagnose what is going wrong with this line of thought. If I am right, it follows that the Benacerraf problem cannot (...)
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  25.  61
    Christopher Menzel (1993). Singular Propositions and Modal Logic. Philosophical Topics 21 (2):113-148.
    According to many actualists, propositions, singular propositions in particular, are structurally complex, that is, roughly, (i) they have, in some sense, an internal structure that corresponds rather directly to the syntactic structure of the sentences that express them, and (ii) the metaphysical components, or constituents, of that structure are the semantic values — the meanings — of the corresponding syntactic components of those sentences. Given that reference is "direct", i.e., that the meaning of a name is its denotation, (...)
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  26.  60
    Paul Elbourne (2010). Why Propositions Might Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):101 - 111.
    Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987 , J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008 ) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.
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  27.  31
    Lorraine Juliano Keller & John A. Keller (2013). Compositionality and Structured Propositions. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):313-323.
    In this article, we evaluate the Compositionality Argument for structured propositions. This argument hinges on two seemingly innocuous and widely accepted premises: the Principle of Semantic Compositionality and Propositionalism (the thesis that sentential semantic values are propositions). We show that the Compositionality Argument presupposes that compositionality involves a form of building, and that this metaphysically robust account of compositionality is subject to counter-example: there are compositional representational systems that this principle cannot accommodate. If this is correct, one of (...)
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  28.  59
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1977). Prior’s Theory of Propositions. Analysis 37 (3):104-112.
    Prior propounded a theory that, if correct, explains how it is possible for a statement about propositions to be true even if there are no propositions. The major feature of his theory is his treatment of sentence letters as bindable variables in non-referential positions. His theory, however, does not include a semantical account of the resulting quantification. The paper tries to fill that gap.
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  29.  46
    Heather Dyke (2012). Propositions: Truth Vs. Existence. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Ratiois Defensor.
    I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a (...)
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  30. James A. Woodbridge (2006). Propositions as Semantic Pretense. Language and Communication 26 (3-4):343-355.
    Our linguistic and inferential practices are said to implicate a kind of abstract object playing various roles traditionally attributed to propositions, and our predictive and explanatory success with this ‘‘proposition-talk’’ is held to underwrite a realistic interpretation of it. However, these very same practices pull us in different directions regarding the nature of propositions, frustrating the development of an adequate unified theory of them. I explain how one could retain proposition-talk, and the advantages of interpreting it as being (...)
     
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  31.  19
    André Leclerc (2010). Fallibilism, Demonstrative Thoughts and Russellian Propositions. Principia 5 (1-2):43-54.
    Russeilian or singular propositions are very useful in sernantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a dernonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. Based on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling dernonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical (existential) beliefs. I defend (...)
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  32.  11
    Dionysis Christias (2014). An Interpretation and Extension of Sellars's Views on the Epistemic Status of Philosophical Propositions. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):348-371.
    This article examines Wilfrid Sellars's views on the epistemic status of philosophical propositions. It suggests that according to Sellars philosophical propositions are normative and practically oriented. They do not form a theory for the description of reality; their function is, rather, that of motivating actions which aim at changing reality. The article argues that the role of philosophical propositions can be illuminated if they are understood as a special kind of (proposed) “material” rules of inference, provided that (...)
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  33.  13
    Andrzej Wiśniewski (2011). Propositions, Possible Worlds, and Recursion. Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (1-2):73-79.
    The issue of reduction of propositions to sets of possible worlds is addressed. It is shown that, under some natural assumptions, there always exist recursive propositions, i.e. decidable sets of possible worlds, which are not assigned to any sentence of a language. Some consequences of this result are discussed.
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  34.  21
    Andrew Schumann (2013). On Two Squares of Opposition: The Leśniewski's Style Formalization of Synthetic Propositions. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (1):71-93.
    In the paper we build up the ontology of Leśniewski’s type for formalizing synthetic propositions. We claim that for these propositions an unconventional square of opposition holds, where a, i are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are subcontrary, a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation. Further, we construct a non-Archimedean extension of Boolean algebra and show that in this algebra just two squares of opposition are formalized: conventional and (...)
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  35.  25
    Heimir Geirsson (1996). Partial Propositions and Cognitive Content. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:117-128.
    Recently there has been a surge of new Fregeans who claim that the direct designation theory, as understood by contemporary Russellians, does not, and cannot, account for the different cognitive significance of statements containing different but codesignative names or indexicals. Instead, they say we must use a fine grained notion of propositions; one which builds a mode of presentation into proposition in addition to including in them the object referred to by the name or indexical in the sentence expressing (...)
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  36.  38
    Phillip Bricker (1983). Worlds and Propositions: The Structure and Ontology of Logical Space. Dissertation, Princeton University
    In sections 1 through 5, I develop in detail what I call the standard theory of worlds and propositions, and I discuss a number of purported objections. The theory consists of five theses. The first two theses, presented in section 1, assert that the propositions form a Boolean algebra with respect to implication, and that the algebra is complete, respectively. In section 2, I introduce the notion of logical space: it is a field of sets that represents the (...)
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  37. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Propositions and Attitudinal Objects. Oxford UP.
    Preprint of Chapter 4 of 'Abstract Objects and The Semantics of Natural Language', Oxford UP 2013). -/- Propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language since Frege. Propositions are generally taken to be the objects of propositional attitude, the meaning of sentences, the primary bearers of truth and falsehood, and the kinds of things that quantifiers in sentential position range over. As objects of propositional attitudes, propositions can be shared by different agents and moreover can (...)
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  38.  42
    Berit Brogaard (2012). Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. OUP USA.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
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  39.  73
    Dilip Ninan (2012). Propositions, Semantic Values, and Rigidity. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):401-413.
    Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context (...)
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  40. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Higher-Order Attitudes, Frege's Abyss, and the Truth in Propositions. In Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), (unknown). Oxford
    In nearly forty years’ of work, Simon Blackburn has done more than anyone to expand our imaginations about the aspirations for broadly projectivist/expressivist theorizing in all areas of philosophy. I know that I am far from alone in that his work has often been a source of both inspiration and provocation for my own work. It might be tempting, in a volume of critical essays such as this, to pay tribute to Blackburn’s special talent for destructive polemic, by seeking to (...)
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  41. Kirk Ludwig (2012). What Role Should Propositions Have in the Theory of Meaning? Review Essay: Scott Soames. What is Meaning? Philosophia 40 (4):885-901.
    Critical review of Scott Soames's What is Meaning?
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  42.  35
    Juhani Yli‐Vakkuri (2013). Propositions and Compositionality. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):526-563.
  43.  88
    Jeff Speaks (2012). On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.
    Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition that Socrates exists can't exist unless Socrates does), Serious Actualism (the view that nothing can have a property at a world without existing at that world) and Contingency (the view that some objects, like Socrates, exist only contingently). I sketch a view of truth at a world which enables the Existentialist to resist Plantinga's argument without giving up either Serious Actualism (...)
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  44. Andrea Iacona (2002). Propositions. Name.
  45.  68
    Gloria Frost (2010). Thomas Aquinas on the Perpetual Truth of Essential Propositions. History of Philosophy Quarterly 48 (1):197-213.
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  46.  28
    Ulrich Meyer (2012). Review of Berit Broogard, Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions (Oxford, 2012). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201212.
  47.  69
    Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.
    In recent years, many philosophers have supposed that perceptual representations have propositional content. A prominent rationale for this supposition is the assumption that perceptions may justify beliefs, but this rationale can be doubted. This rationale may be doubted on the grounds that there do not seem to be any viable characterizations of the belief-justifying propositional contents of perceptions. An alternative is to model perceptual representations as marks in a perceptual similarity space. A mapping can be defined between points in perceptual (...)
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  48.  24
    Thomas Hodgson (2012). Structured Propositions and Shared Content. In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag
  49.  56
    Arthur Sullivan (2013). Multiple Propositions, Contextual Variability, and the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface. Synthese 190 (14):2773-2800.
    A ‘multiple-proposition phenomenon’ is a putative counterexample to the widespread implicit assumption that a simple indicative sentence semantically expresses at most one proposition. Several philosophers and linguists have recently developed hypotheses concerning this notion. The guiding questions motivating this research are: Is there an interesting and homogenous semantic category of MP phenomena? If so, what is the import? Do MP theories have any relevance to important current questions in the study of language? I motivate an affirmative answer to, and then (...)
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  50.  78
    Nellie Wieland (2010). Minimal Propositions and Real World Utterances. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):401 - 412.
    Semantic Minimalists make a proprietary claim to explaining the possibility of utterances sharing content across contexts. Further, they claim that an inability to explain shared content dooms varieties of Contextualism. In what follows, I argue that there are a series of barriers to explaining shared content for the Minimalist, only some of which the Contextualist also faces, including: (i) how the type-identity of utterances is established, (ii) what counts as repetition of type-identical utterances, (iii) how it can be determined whether (...)
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