Search results for 'psychiatric classification' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  44
    Jonathan Y. Tsou (2015). DSM-5 and Psychiatry's Second Revolution: Descriptive Vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification. In Steeves Demazeux & Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Springer 43-62.
    A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSM’s descriptive (...)
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  2. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2011). The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):446-470.
    Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and informative philosophical perspective for critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is intended to demonstrate the importance of history for philosophy of psychiatry, and more (...)
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  3.  48
    José Eduardo Porcher (2014). A Note on the Dynamics of Psychiatric Classification. Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 18:27-47.
    The question of how psychiatric classifications are made up and to what they refer has attracted the attention of philosophers in recent years. In this paper, I review the claims of authors who discuss psychiatric classification in terms referring both to the philosophical tradition of natural kinds and to the sociological tradition of social constructionism — especially those of Ian Hacking and his critics. I examine both the ontological and the social aspects of what it means for (...)
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  4.  21
    J. Agich George (1994). On Values in Recent American Psychiatric Classification. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3).
    The DSM-IV, like its predecessors, will be a major influence on American psychiatry. As a consequence, continuing analysis of its assumptions is essential. Review of the manuals as well as conceptually-oriented literature on DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IV reveals that the authors of these classifications have paid little attention to the explicit and implicit value commitments made by the classifications. The response to DSM criticisms and controversy has often been to incorporate more scientific diversity into the classification, instead of careful (...)
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  5.  7
    Rachel Cooper (2012). Psychiatric Classification and Subjective Experience. Emotion Review 4 (2):197-202.
    This article does not directly consider the feelings and emotions that occur in mental illness. Rather, it concerns a higher level methodological question: To what extent is an analysis of feelings and felt emotions of importance for psychiatric classification? Some claim that producing a phenomenologically informed descriptive psychopathology is a prerequisite for serious taxonomic endeavor. Others think that classifications of mental disorders may ignore subjective experience. A middle view holds that classification should at least map the contours (...)
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  6. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis. Delusions and Confabulations. Paradigmi (1):99-112.
    In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to uniquely identify a pathological behaviour as the symptom of a (...)
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  7.  16
    S. N. Glackin (2010). Tolerance and Illness: The Politics of Medical and Psychiatric Classification. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (4):449-465.
    In this paper, I explore the links between liberal political theory and the evaluative nature of medical classification, arguing for stronger recognition of those links in a liberal model of medical practice. All judgments of medical or psychiatric "dysfunction," I argue, are fundamentally evaluative, reflecting our collective willingness or reluctance to tolerate and/or accommodate the conditions in question. Illness, then, is "socially constructed." But the relativist worries that this loaded phrase evokes are unfounded; patients, doctors, and communities will (...)
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  8.  25
    J. Z. Sadler, Y. F. Hulgus & G. J. Agich (1994). On Values in Recent American Psychiatric Classification. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):261-277.
    The DSM-IV, like its predecessors, will be a major influence on American psychiatry. As a consequence, continuing analysis of its assumptions is essential. Review of the manuals as well as conceptually-oriented literature on DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IV reveals that the authors of these classifications have paid little attention to the explicit and implicit value commitments made by the classifications. The response to DSM criticisms and controversy has often been to incorporate more scientific diversity into the classification, instead of careful (...)
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  9.  69
    Jonathan Y. Tsou (2016). Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification and the History of the DSM. History of Psychiatry 27 (4):406-424.
    This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a superior method for classifying natural kinds than the purely descriptive approach adopted by the DSM since DSM-III. My (...)
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  10.  23
    Massimiliano Aragona (2009). The Role of Comorbidity in the Crisis of the Current Psychiatric Classification System. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):1-11.
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  11.  8
    John Z. Sadler & George J. Agich (1995). Diseases, Functions, Values, and Psychiatric Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (3):219-231.
  12.  27
    Thor Grünbaum & Andrea Raballo (2012). Brain Imaging and Psychiatric Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):305-309.
    Fielding and Marwede attempt to lay down directions for an applied onto-psychiatry. According to their proposal, such an enterprise requires us to accept certain metaphysical and methodological claims about how brain and experience are related. To put it in one sentence, our critique is that we find their metaphysics questionable and their methodology clinically impracticable.A first fundamental problem for their project, as it is expressed in their paper, is that their overall aim is unclear. At least three different aims might (...)
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  13.  24
    Claudio Em Banzato (2009). Deflating Psychiatric Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):23-27.
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  14.  19
    Tim Thornton (2002). Reliability and Validity in Psychiatric Classification: Values and Neo-Humeanism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):229-235.
    KEYWORDS: Validity, reliability, values, taxonomy, clas- sification, McDowell.
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  15. Staffan Norell (1984). Comments on Malmgren's 'Psychiatric Classification: The Status of So-Called “Diagnostic Criteria”'. In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. I. B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel 89--90.
  16.  10
    Jennifer Radden (1996). Lumps and Bumps:Kantian Faculty Psychology, Phrenology, and Twentieth-Century Psychiatric Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):1-14.
  17.  5
    Timothy Thornton (2002). Reliability and Validity in Psychiatric Classification: Values and Neo-Humeanism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):229-235.
  18. Rachel Cooper (2012). Is Psychiatric Classification a Good Thing? In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. OUP Oxford
  19. Anthony Vincent Fernandez (forthcoming). Phenomenology and Dimensional Approaches to Psychiatric Research and Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
    The classification of mental illness—enshrined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)—has historically followed a categorial model of disorder. However, in light of psychiatry’s failure to validate the DSM categories, psychiatrists have developed dimensional models for understanding and classifying disorders, such as the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria initiative (RDoC). While some philosophers have recently contributed to the literature on dimensional approaches to psychiatric research and classification, no sustained engagement has yet (...)
     
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  20.  56
    Bill Fulford, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2014). Taking the Long View: An Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2):110-117.
    Understood in their historical context, current debates about psychiatric classification, prompted by the publication of the DSM-5, open up new opportunities for improved translational research in psychiatry. In this paper, we draw lessons for translational research from three time slices of 20th century psychiatry. From the first time slice, 1913 and the publication of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, the lesson is that translational research in psychiatry requires a pluralistic approach encompassing equally the sciences of mind (including the social sciences) (...)
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  21.  2
    Dalena van Heugten – van der Kloet & Ton van Heugten (2015). The Classification of Psychiatric Disorders According to DSM-5 Deserves an Internationally Standardized Psychological Test Battery on Symptom Level. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  22. John Z. Sadfer, Osborne P. Wiggins, Michael A. Schwartz & Edwin Harari (1996). Philosophical Perspectives on Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification. Bioethics 10 (2):158-160.
  23.  3
    N. Sartorius (2015). Classification of Psychiatric Disorders: Challenges and Perspectives. Emotion Review 7 (3):204-208.
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  24.  2
    Cyd Cipolla (2011). “Preventative Corrections”: Psychiatric Representation and the Classification of Sexually Violent Predators. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 32 (2):103-113.
    This paper examines the representation of mental illness and mental disorder in the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990 (WCPA), the first package of sexual predator legislation passed in the United States. I focus on the public outcry over a violent crime committed by a repeat sexual offender, Earl Shriner, and show how the act was drafted in direct response to this outcry. Following his arrest, there was a public discussion of a) whether the state had a responsibility to cure (...)
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  25.  2
    Floris Tomasini (2009). Psychiatric Treatment and the Problem of Equality: Whose Justice, Which Rationality?: EdwardsCraig.Ethical Decisions in the Classification of Mental Conditions as Mental Illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):101-103.
  26.  7
    J. Savulescu (1995). Philosophical Perspectives on Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification. Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (4):253-254.
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  27. Josef Parnas (2012). Comments: The Nature of the Psychiatric Object and Classification. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. OUP Oxford
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  28. Josef Parnas (2012). The Nature of the Psychiatric Object and Classification. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. OUP Oxford 118.
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  29. John Z. Sadler, Osborne P. Wiggins, Michael A. Schwartz & Mario Rossi Monti (1996). Philosophical Perspectives on Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 18 (2):241.
  30.  18
    Hanna M. Van Loo & Jan-Willem Romeijn (2015). Psychiatric Comorbidity: Fact or Artifact? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (1):41-60.
    The frequent occurrence of comorbidity has brought about an extensive theoretical debate in psychiatry. Why are the rates of psychiatric comorbidity so high and what are their implications for the ontological and epistemological status of comorbid psychiatric diseases? Current explanations focus either on classification choices or on causal ties between disorders. Based on empirical and philosophical arguments, we propose a conventionalist interpretation of psychiatric comorbidity instead. We argue that a conventionalist approach fits well with research and (...)
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  31. Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (2014). Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. In Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. MIT 1-10.
    In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, asking whether current systems are sufficient for effective diagnosis, treatment, and research. Doing so, they take up the question of whether mental disorders are natural kinds, grounded in something in the outside world. Psychiatric categories based on natural kinds should group phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of causal explanations and (...)
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  32.  1
    Geert Keil, Lara Keuck & Rico Hauswald (eds.) (2016). Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press Uk.
    In psychiatry there is no sharp boundary between the normal and the pathological. Although clear cases abound, it is often indeterminate whether a particular condition does or does not qualify as a mental disorder. For example, definitions of ‘subthreshold disorders’ and of the ‘prodromal stages’ of diseases are notoriously contentious. -/- Philosophers and linguists call concepts that lack sharp boundaries, and thus admit of borderline cases, ‘vague’. Although blurred boundaries between the normal and the pathological are a recurrent theme in (...)
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  33.  50
    Shadia Kawa & James Giordano (2012). A Brief Historicity of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Issues and Implications for the Future of Psychiatric Canon and Practice. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-9.
    The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, currently in its fourth edition and considered the reference for the characterization and diagnosis of mental disorders, has undergone various developments since its inception in the mid-twentieth century. With the fifth edition of the DSM presently in field trials for release in 2013, there is renewed discussion and debate over the extent of its relative successes - and shortcomings - at iteratively incorporating scientific evidence on the often ambiguous (...)
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  34.  9
    Yazan Abu Ghazal (2014). Perspectivity in Psychiatric Research: The Psychopathology of Schizophrenia in Postwar Germany. [REVIEW] Medicine Studies 4 (1-4):103-111.
    The reorganization of psychiatric knowledge at the turn of the twentieth century derived from Emil Kraepelin’s clinical classification of psychoses. Surprisingly, within just few years, Kraepelin’s simple dichotomy between dementia praecox and manic-depressive psychosis succeeded in giving psychiatry a new framework that is still used until the present day. Unexpectedly, Kraepelin’s simple clinical scheme based on the dichotomy replaced the significantly more differentiated nosography that dominated psychiatric research in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Moreover, (...)
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  35. Nick Haslam (2002). Kinds of Kinds: A Conceptual Taxonomy of Psychiatric Categories. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):203-217.
    A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms—non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds—is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied (...)
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  36.  8
    Natalie F. Banner (2013). Mental Disorders Are Not Brain Disorders. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):509-513.
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  37.  17
    Jason Scott Robert (2007). Gene Maps, Brain Scans, and Psychiatric Nosology. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (2):209-218.
    Neuroethics to date has tended to focus on social and ethical implications of developments in brain science, especially in functional neuroimaging. Within clinical neuroethics, the emphasis has been on ethical issues in clinical neuroscience practice, including informed consent to neuroimaging; the development of ethical research protocols for functional magnetic resonance imaging especially, and especially in children; and the ethical clinical management of incidental findings. Within normative neuroethics, we have witnessed the more philosophical and/or social scientific study of the meanings of (...)
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  38.  12
    Şerife Tekin (2014). Psychiatric Taxonomy: At the Crossroads of Science and Ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):513-514.
    The scientific investigation of mental disorders is an invigorating area of inquiry for philosophers of mind and science who are interested in exploring the nature of typical and atypical cognition as well as the overarching scientific project of ‘carving nature at its joints’. It is also important for philosophers of medicine and bioethicists who are concerned with concepts of disease and with the development of effective and ethical treatments of mental disorders and the just distribution of mental health services. Philosophical (...)
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  39.  9
    Lisa Bortolotti & Luca Malatesti (2010). Conceptual Challenges in the Characterisation and Explanation of Psychiatric Phenomena. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):5-10.
    b is collection focuses on conceptual issues that arise within the theoretical dimension of psychiatry. In particular, the invited contributions centre on the nature of psychiatric classification and explanation by addressing important methodological issues. Two strategies are exemplified here. Either the authors directly contribute to foundational issues in psychiatry concerning the nature of psychiatric classification and explanation; or they provide a conceptual analysis that can play a role in developing adequate theories of specific psychiatric disorders.
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  40.  11
    Anthony Vincent Fernandez (2016). Phenomenology and the Crisis of Contemporary Psychiatry: Contingency, Naturalism, and Classification. Dissertation, University of South Florida
    This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its (...)
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  41. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicago
    This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? -/- In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing that biological research (...)
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  42. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2007). Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications: What is an Interactive and Indifferent Kind? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):329 – 344.
    This paper examines Ian Hacking's analysis of the looping effects of psychiatric classifications, focusing on his recent account of interactive and indifferent kinds. After explicating Hacking's distinction between 'interactive kinds' (human kinds) and 'indifferent kinds' (natural kinds), I argue that Hacking cannot claim that there are 'interactive and indifferent kinds,' given the way that he introduces the interactive-indifferent distinction. Hacking is also ambiguous on whether his notion of interactive and indifferent kinds is supposed to offer an account of classifications (...)
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  43.  56
    John Z. Sadler (2004). Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis. Oxford University Press.
    The public, mental health consumers, as well as mental health practitioners wonder about what kinds of values mental health professionals hold, and what kinds of values influence psychiatric diagnosis. Are mental disorders socio-political, practical, or scientific concepts? Is psychiatric diagnosis value-neutral? What role does the fundamental philosophical question "How should I live?" play in mental health care? In his carefully nuanced and exhaustively referenced monograph, psychiatrist and philosopher of psychiatry John Z. Sadler describes the manifold kinds of values (...)
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  44.  4
    F. Callard (2014). Psychiatric Diagnosis: The Indispensability of Ambivalence. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):526-530.
    The author analyses how debate over the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has tended to privilege certain conceptions of psychiatric diagnosis over others, as well as to polarise positions regarding psychiatric diagnosis. The article aims to muddy the black and white tenor of many discussions regarding psychiatric diagnosis by moving away from the preoccupation with diagnosis as classification and refocusing attention on diagnosis as a temporally and spatially complex, as well (...)
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  45.  8
    Lisa Bortolotti (2013). Rationality and Sanity: The Role of Rationality Judgments in Understanding Psychiatric Disorders. In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press 480.
    The main objective in this chapter is to examine the role of judgments of rationality in the current understanding of psychiatric disorders. To what extent are the criteria for classification and diagnosis independent of judgments of rationality? The typical symptoms of many psychiatric disorders are described as instances of epistemic, procedural, or emotional irrationality, and references to such forms of irrationality are frequently made in the current classificatory and diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, dementia, depression, and personality disorders. (...)
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  46.  7
    Nick Haslam (2010). Symptom Networks and Psychiatric Categories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):158-159.
    The network approach to psychiatric phenomena has the potential to clarify and enhance psychiatric diagnosis and classification. However, its generally well-justified anti-essentialism views psychiatric disorders as invariably fuzzy and arbitrary, and overlooks the likelihood that the domain includes some latent categories. Network models misrepresent these categories, and fail to recognize that some comorbidity may represent valid co-occurrence of discrete conditions.
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  47. John Z. Sadler (2004). Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Advance praise for Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis: 'One thinks of the great cartographers at work in reading Dr Sadler's exploration of the values embedded in current psychiatric diagnostic classifications - the DSM-IV. This is a huge, ten-year, interdisciplinary undertaking. Usually, authors who cut across disciplines are at home in one, but inexpertly borrow from the others, their extractions somewhat derivative and impoverished. But Sadler enriches as he draws on science, clinical practice, cultural analysis, the history of science and (...)
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  48. Lawrie Reznek (1987). The Nature of Disease. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  49.  40
    Peter Zachar & Kenneth Kendler (2012). The Removal of Pluto From the Class of Planets and Homosexuality From the Class of Psychiatric Disorders: A Comparison. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):4-.
    We compare astronomers' removal of Pluto from the listing of planets and psychiatrists' removal of homosexuality from the listing of mental disorders. Although the political maneuverings that emerged in both controversies are less than scientifically ideal, we argue that competition for "scientific authority" among competing groups is a normal part of scientific progress. In both cases, a complicated relationship between abstract constructs and evidence made the classification problem thorny.
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  50.  4
    A. R. Singh & S. A. Singh (2009). Notes on a Few Issues in the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Mens Sana Monographs 7 (1):128.
    _The first part called the Preamble tackles: (a) the issues of silence and speech, and life and disease; (b) whether we need to know some or all of the truth, and how are exact science and philosophical reason related; (c) the phenomenon of Why, How, and What; (d) how are mind and brain related; (e) what is robust eclecticism, empirical/scientific enquiry, replicability/refutability, and the role of diagnosis and medical model in psychiatry; (f) bioethics and the four principles of beneficence, non-malfeasance, (...)
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