Search results for 'psychological egoism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John J. Tilley (2015). John Clarke of Hull's Argument for Psychological Egoism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):69-89.
    John Clarke of Hull, one of the eighteenth century's staunchest proponents of psychological egoism, defended that theory in his Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice. He did so mainly by opposing the objections to egoism in the first two editions of Francis Hutcheson's Inquiry into Virtue. But Clarke also produced a challenging, direct argument for egoism which, regrettably, has received virtually no scholarly attention. In this paper I give it some of the attention it merits. (...)
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  2.  76
    Mark Steen (2011). Why Everyone Acts Altruistically All the Time: What Parodying Psychological Egoism Can Teach Us. Philosophia 39 (3):563-570.
    Psychological Altruism (PA) is the view that everyone, ultimately, acts altruistically all the time. I defend PA by showing strong prima facie support, and show how a reinterpretive strategy against supposed counterexamples is successful. I go on to show how PA can be argued for in ways which exactly mirror the arguments for an opposing view, Psychological Egoism. This shows that the case for PA is at least as plausible as PE. Since the case for PA is (...)
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  3. Scott Berman (2003). A Defense of Psychological Egoism. In Naomi Reshotko (ed.), Desire, Identity and Existence. Academic Printing and Publishing
    The purpose of this paper is to argue for psychological egoism, i.e., the view that the ultimate motivation for all human action is the agent’s self-interest. Two principal opponents to psychological egoism are considered. These two views are shown to make human action inexplicable. Since the reason for putting forward these views is to explain human action, these views fail. If psychological egoism is the best explanation of human action, then humans will not differ (...)
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  4. Joshua May (2011). Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence Against Psychological Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):39–58.
    Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person's intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the "empathy-altruism hypothesis" that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there (...)
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  5. Charles Sayward (2006). What Truth is There in Psychological Egoism? Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):145-159.
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
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  6. Joshua May, Psychological Egoism. Internet Encyclopeida of Philosophy.
    Provides an overview of the theory of psychological egoism—the thesis that we are all ultimately motivated by self-interest. Philosophical arguments for and against the view are considered as well as some empirical evidence.
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  7. W. D. Glasgow (1978). Broad on Psychological Egoism. Ethics 88 (4):361-368.
    In what follows, I shall first outline Broad's description of, and attitude to, psychological egoism. Then, I shall examine briefly the form which a defense against his criticisms might take. This raises the query whether such a defense is consistent with the doctrine's empirical character. It is suggested that the egoist could evade this difficulty by questioning an assumption which Broad (and others) make about psychological egoism. By abandoning this assumption, we can state the doctrine in (...)
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  8. Bernard Gert (1967). Hobbes and Psychological Egoism. Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (4):503-520.
    Hobbes has served for both philosophers and political scientists as the paradigm case of someone who held an egoistic view of human nature. In this article I shall attempt to show that the almost unanimous view that Hobbes held psychological egoism is mistaken, and further that Hobbes's political theory does not demand an egoistic psychology, but on the contrary is incompatible with psychological egoism. I do not maintain that Hobbes was completely consistent; in fact, I shall (...)
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  9. Michael Anthony Slote (1964). An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism. Journal of Philosophy 61 (18):530-537.
    In the present paper I wish to argue that psychological egoism may well have a basis in the empirical facts of human psychology. Certain contemporary learning theorists, e.g., Hull and Skinner, have put forward behavioristic theories of the origin and functioning of human motives which posit a certain number of basically "selfish, " unlearned primary drives or motives (like hunger, thirst, sleep, elimination, and sex), explain all other, higher-order, drives or motives as derived genetically from the primary ones (...)
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  10. Mark Mercer (2001). In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism. Erkenntnis 55 (2):217-237.
    Weak psychological egoism is the doctrine that anything an agent does intentionally, that agent does at least expecting thereby to realize one of her self-regarding ends. (Strong psychological egoism, by contrast, is the doctrine that agents act always intending thereby to realize a self-regarding end.) Though weak psychological egoism is a doctrine ultimately answerable to empirical evidence, we presently have excellent a priori reasons for accepting it and attempting to construct psychological theories that (...)
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  11. Mark Mercer (1998). Psychological Egoism and Its Critics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):557-576.
    I will present what I think is the best argument for the version of psychological egoism under consideration here, and explain why I think even that argument fails to go much distance toward establishing it. It turns out, though, I will caution, that defeating that argument means only that we are right to reject psychological egoism as extremely implausible; it does not entitle us to claim to have shown the thesis itself to be either confused and (...)
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  12.  73
    Norman J. Brown (1979). Psychological Egoism Revisited. Philosophy 54 (209):293 - 309.
    Psychological egoism is, I suppose, regarded by most philosophers as one of the more simple-minded fallacies in the history of philosophy, and dangerous and seductive too, contriving as it does to combine cynicism about human ideals and a vague sense of scientific method, both of which make the ordinary reader feel sophisticated, with conceptual confusion, which he cannot resist. For all of these reasons it springs eternal, in one form or another, in the breasts of first-year students, and (...)
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  13.  42
    Donald Clark Hodges (1961). Psychological Egoism: A Note on Professor Lemos' Discussion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (2):246-248.
    In his discussion of "Psychological Egoism" (PPR, June, 1960), Professor Lemos chooses to legislate it out of existence by means of a definition; so I choose to legislate it back into existence by a similar device. The pertinent question is whether definitions of psychological egoism are arbitrary or not.
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  14.  26
    Kai Nielsen (1973). A Short Way With Psychological Egoism. Journal of Social Philosophy 4 (2):15-16.
    Psychological egoists deny that men ever voluntarily act to promote the interests of others as an end in itself or ever act in such a way that they have the same regard for others as they have for themselves. [...] This theory has a long history and was supposedly decisively refuted by Butler. Yet it continues to haunt the scene. I want, in the tradition of Butler but not in his manner, to try to set out a short snappy (...)
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  15.  3
    Norman J. Brown (1979). Psychological Egoism Revisited: Norman J. Brown. Philosophy 54 (209):293-309.
    Psychological egoism is, I suppose, regarded by most philosophers as one of the more simple-minded fallacies in the history of philosophy, and dangerous and seductive too, contriving as it does to combine cynicism about human ideals and a vague sense of scientific method, both of which make the ordinary reader feel sophisticated, with conceptual confusion, which he cannot resist. For all of these reasons it springs eternal, in one form or another, in the breasts of first-year students, and (...)
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  16.  13
    Wayne G. Johnson (1992). Psychological Egoism. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:239-264.
    While psychological egoism “A”, the theory that all human actions are selfish, is easily defeated, an alternative formulation, “B”, is defended: “AU deliberate human actions are either self-interested or self-referential.” While “B” is not empirically testable, neither is any alternative altruistic theory. “B” escapes criticisms leveled at “A”, including those of Joseph Butler. “B” is shown to be theoretically superior to any theory of altruism since it brings coherence to moral theory by explaining the nature of moraI motivation.
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  17. Disinterest Egoism (2007). Chapter One ThPxEE Views of Love: Egoism, Disinterest, and Harmonism Alan Vincelette. In Thomas Jay Oord (ed.), The Many Facets of Love: Philosophical Explorations. Cambridge Scholars Publishing 1.
     
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  18. Joel Feinberg (1978). Psychological Egoism. In Russ Shafer-Landau & Joel Feinberg (eds.), Reason and Responsibility. Wadsworth 183.
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  19.  24
    Elliott Sober (1989). What is Psychological Egoism? Behaviorism 17 (2):89-102.
    Egoism and altruism need not be characterized as single factor theories of motivation, according to which there is a single kind of preference that moves people to action. Rather, each asserts a claim of causal primacy—a claim as to which sort of preference is the more powerful influence on behavior. This paper shows that this idea of causal primacy can be clarified in a standard scientific way. This formulation explains why many observed behaviors fail to discriminate between the hypothesis (...)
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  20.  8
    Elliott Sober (1993). Evolutionary Altruism, Psychological Egoism, and Morality: Disentangling the Phenotypes. In Matthew Nitecki & Doris Nitecki (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics. Suny Press 199--216.
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  21. Terrance C. McConnell (1978). The Argument From Psychological Egoism to Ethical Egoism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):41-47.
  22. Bruce Russell (1982). On the Relation Between Psychological and Ethical Egoism. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):91-99.
    Recently Terrance McConnell has attempted to show that not only does psychological egoism lend no support to ethical egoism but is even incompatible with it. 1 McConneU's attempt has been vitiated by Paul Simpson's critique of the version of psychological egoism that McConnell offered) In this discussion I will consider McConnell's and Simpson's arguments and then offer a version of psychological egoism that avoids Simpson's objections. After showing that one version of ethical (...) is incompatible with that version of psychological egoism, I will consider other versions of ethical egoism in an attempt to find the best version of that moral doctrine. It will turn out that even the best version of ethical egoism is incompatible with the version of psychological egoism that avoids Simpson's criticisms. However, another version of psychological egoism will be offered that is compatible with all versions of ethical egoism and that is also not open to Simpson's objections. An argument will be offered, and then criticized, that seems to lend support to ethical egoism and that rests, in part, on this other version of psychological egoism. (shrink)
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  23.  61
    Ramon M. Lemos (1960). Psychological Egoism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (4):540-546.
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  24.  6
    W. D. Glasgow (1976). Psychological Egoism. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1):75 - 79.
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  25.  1
    Clark Butler, Castaneda on Psychological Egoism.
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  26. Thomas C. Brickhouse (1979). Zeigler On Plato's "Gorgias" and Psychological Egoism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):451.
     
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  27. Gregory Zeigler (1979). Plato's "Gorgias" and Psychological Egoism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2):123.
     
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  28.  10
    John J. Tilley (2016). Hutcheson's Theological Objection to Egoism. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (1):101-123.
    Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheson's objection and its intellectual context. And nowhere in the scholarship on Hutcheson (...)
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  29.  17
    Laurence Thomas (1980). Ethical Egoism and Psychological Dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1):73 - 78.
  30.  8
    Thomas McClintock (1971). The Egoist's Psychological Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1):79 - 85.
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  31. Larry Thomas (1978). Ethical Egoism and Psychological Dispositions. Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 3.
     
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  32.  73
    Christine Clavien & Rebekka A. Klein (2010). Eager for Fairness or for Revenge? Psychological Altruism in Economics. Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):267-290.
    To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, (...)
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  33.  28
    Peter Nilsson (2013). Butler's Stone and Ultimate Psychological Hedonism. Philosophia 41 (2):545-553.
    This paper discusses psychological hedonism with a special reference to the writings of Bishop Butler, and Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, Sober and Wilson have claimed that Butler failed to refute psychological hedonism. In this paper it is argued: (1) that there is a difference between reductive and ultimate psychological hedonism; (2) that Butler failed to refute ultimate psychological hedonism, but that he succeeded in refuting reductive psychological hedonism; and, finally (...)
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  34.  21
    Guy Elgat (2013). Nietzsche's Critique of Pure Altruism—Developing an Argument From Human, All Too Human. Inquiry 58 (3):308-326.
    Nietzsche often appears, especially in his writings from the middle period, to endorse psychological egoism, namely the claim that all actions are motivated by, and are for the sake of, the agent’s own self-interest. I argue that Nietzsche’s position in Human, All Too Human should not be so understood. Rather, he is claiming, more weakly and more plausibly, that no action is entirely unegoistic, entirely free of egoistic motivations. Thus some actions might be motivated both by egoistic and (...)
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  35. Alison Hills (2010). The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge From Egoism. Oxford University Press.
    The Beloved Self is about the holy grail of moral philosophy, an argument against egoism that proves that we all have reasons to be moral. Part One introduces three different versions of egoism. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that egoism is false, and shows that even the more modest arguments that do not try to answer the egoist in her own terms seem to fail. But in part Three, Hills defends morality and develops a new (...)
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  36.  65
    Christine Clavien (2012). Altruistic Emotional Motivation: An Argument in Favour of Psychological Altruism. In Katie Plaisance & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer Press
    In this paper, I reframe the long-standing controversy between ‘psychological egoism’, which argues that human beings never perform altruistic actions, and the opposing thesis of ‘psychological altruism’, which claims that human beings are, at least sometimes, capable of acting in an altruistic fashion. After a brief sketch of the controversy, I begin by presenting some representative arguments in favour of psychological altruism before showing that they can all be called into question by appealing to the idea (...)
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  37.  33
    Michael Slote (2013). Egoism and Emotion. Philosophia 41 (2):313-335.
    Recently, the idea that human beings may be totally egoistic has resurfaced in philosophical and psychological discussions. But many of the arguments for that conclusion are conceptually flawed. Psychologists are making a conceptual error when they think of the desire to avoid guilt as egoistic; and the same is true of the common view that the desire to avoid others’ disapproval is also egoistic. Sober and Wilson argue against this latter idea on the grounds that such a desire is (...)
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  38.  29
    A. P. Martinich (2012). Egoism, Reason, and the Social Contract. Hobbes Studies 25 (2):209-222.
    Bernard Gert’s distinctive interpretation of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes in his recent book may be questioned in at least three areas: (1) Even if Hobbes is not a psychological egoist, he seems to be a desire egoist, which has the consequence, as he understands it, that a person acts at least for his own good in every action. (2) Although there are several senses of reason, it seems that Hobbes uses the idea that reason is calculation of means (...)
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  39. Stephen Stich, John M. Doris & Erica Roedder (2010). Altruism. In John M. Doris & The Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press
    We begin, in section 2, with a brief sketch of a cluster of assumptions about human desires, beliefs, actions, and motivation that are widely shared by historical and contemporary authors on both sides in the debate. With this as background, we’ll be able to offer a more sharply focused account of the debate. In section 3, our focus will be on links between evolutionary theory and the egoism/altruism debate. There is a substantial literature employing evolutionary theory on each side (...)
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  40. Alexander Moseley, Egoism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In philosophy, egoism is the theory that one’s self is, or should be, the motivation and the goal of one’s own action. Egoism has two variants, descriptive or normative. The descriptive (or positive) variant conceives egoism as a factual description of human affairs. That is, people are motivated by their own interests and desires, and they cannot be described otherwise. The normative variant proposes that people should be so motivated, regardless of what presently motivates their behavior. Altruism (...)
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  41. Alejandro Rosas (2002). Psychological and Evolutionary Evidence for Altruism. Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):93-107.
    Sober and Wilson have recently claimed that evolutionary theory can do what neither philosophy nor experimental psychology have been able to, namely, "break the deadlock" in the egoism vs. altruism debate with an argument based on the reliability of altruistic motivation. I analyze both their reliability argument and the experimental evidence of social psychology in favor of altruism in terms of the folk-psychological "laws" and inference patterns underlying them, and conclude that they both rely on the same patterns. (...)
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  42. C. D. Broad (1950). Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives. Hibbert Journal 48:105-114.
    Now it is plain that such consequences as these conflict sharply with common-sense notions of morality. If we had been obliged to accept Psychological Egoism, in any of its narrower forms, on its merits, we should have had to say: 'So much the worse for the common-sense notions of morality!' But, if I am right, the morality of common sense, with all its difficulties and incoherences, is immune at least to attacks from the basis of Psychological (...). (shrink)
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  43. Joshua May (2011). Egoism, Empathy, and Self-Other Merging. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):25-39.
    [Emerging Scholar Prize Essay for Spindel Supplement] Some philosophers and psychologists have evaluated psychological egoism against recent experimental work in social psychology. Dan Batson (1991; forthcoming), in particular, argues that empathy tends to induce genuinely altruistic motives in humans. However, some argue that there are egoistic explanations of the data that remain unscathed. I focus here on some recent criticisms based on the idea of self-other merging or "oneness," primarily leveled by Robert Cialdini and his collaborators (1997). These (...)
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  44. Robert Shaver, Egoism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary (...)
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  45. John Lemos (2004). Psychological Hedonism, Evolutionary Biology, and the Experience Machine. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):506-526.
    In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of (...)
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  46.  87
    Wim J. Van Der Steen (1995). Egoism and Altruism in Ethics: Dispensing with Spurious Generality. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1):31-44.
    Is human behavior exclusively motivated by self-interest? Common sense indicates that we should flatly deny this, or so it seems to me. Yet the doctrine of universal self-interest, psychological egoism for short, has gained the support of many researchers in science. Common sense also seems to allow the rejection of ethical egoism, the doctrine that human behavior should be motivated exclusively by self-interest. It appears to be at variance with widely endorsed moralities. Yet it is a perennial (...)
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  47.  50
    John Jenkins (2009). Max Stirner's Egoism. Heythrop Journal 50 (2):243-256.
    My aim in what follows is to provide and criticise a consistent account of Stirnerian egoism. Despite the many obscurities and complexities surrounding Stirner's conception of self‐interested action, a detailed examination of The Ego and Its Own does, I believe, offer us an interpretation that remains true to the overall aims of the book. My main concern throughout will be to focus on the interpretation of Stirner as a psychological egoist. I believe that the textual evidence in favour (...)
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  48.  45
    Robert M. Stewart (1992). Butler's Argument Against Psychological Hedonism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):211-221.
    It is widely thought among philosophers that Joseph Butler's criticism of psychological egoism in his Sermons is, in the words of A.E. Duncan-Jones, 'the classic refutation of it.' Indeed, no less a philosopher than David Hume restated and put forth Butler's central argument against hedonistic egoism - without due credit - as part of his own critique. Yet recent commentators have begun to question Butler's arguments, albeit usually with sympathy and in the hope of saving what they (...)
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  49.  25
    John Langan (1991). Egoism and Mortality in the Teleology of Thomas Aquinas. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:411-426.
    Aquinas holds that human actions are directed to a last end which is the supreme good and the complete satisfaction of the agent’s desires. He confronts serious difficulties in explaining how morally wrong or sinful choices and renunciatory acts are possible and in avoiding psychological egoism. The distinction that he makes between the concept of the last end as the fulfillment of desire and the object (God) in which that ful fillment is found enables him to alleviate these (...)
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  50.  4
    Jonathan Lavery (2005). Reflection and Exhortation in Butler's Sermons: Practical Deliberation, Psychological Health and the Philosophical Sermon. The European Legacy 10 (4):329-348.
    I begin by noting the disparate legacies of Thomas Hobbes (1588?1679) and Bishop Joseph Butler (1692?1752). I suggest that part of the reason Butler's arguments in Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel (2nd ed. 1729) have been comparatively neglected by contemporary philosophers is due to the genre in which they are presented, i.e. the sermon. Like other non-standard genres of philosophical writing (dialogue, disputatio, meditation, etc.) both the genre and the purpose towards which Butler puts it have become unfashionable in (...)
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