Search results for 'psychological explanation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 113--130.score: 242.0
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To (...)
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  2. Cory D. Wright (2007). Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.score: 242.0
    Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic (...)
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  3. Robert Lockie (2004). Knowledge, Provenance and Psychological Explanation. Philosophy 79 (3):421-433.score: 240.0
    Analytic theories of knowledge have traditionally maintained that the provenance of a true belief is critically important to deciding whether it is knowledge. However, a comparably widespread view is that it is our beliefs alone, regardless of their (potentially dubious) provenance which feature in psychological explanation, including the explanation of action: thus, that knowledge itself and as such is irrelevant in psychological explanation. The paper gives initial reasons why the ‘beliefs alone’ view of explanation (...)
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  4. Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.score: 236.0
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches (...)
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  5. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2011). Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation. Synthese 183 (3):313-338.score: 234.0
    Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track record of advancing our understanding of complex, hierarchically organized physical systems, particularly biological and neural systems. But not every complex system can be understood mechanistically. Psychological capacities are often understood by providing cognitive models of the systems that underlie them. I argue that these models, while superficially similar to mechanistic models, in fact have a substantially more complex relation to the real underlying system. They are typically constructed using a range of techniques (...)
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  6. Susan Schneider (2005). Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases. Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.score: 204.0
    In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally (...)
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  7. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Anti-Individualism and Psychological Explanation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 204.0
  8. Frank Jackson (2000). Psychological Explanation and Implicit Theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.score: 188.0
    I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an (...)
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  9. Paul K. Moser (1994). Naturalism and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):63-84.score: 186.0
    This article explores the possibility of naturalized theory of action. It distinguishes ontological naturalism from conceptual naturalism, and asks whether a defensible theory of action can be either ontologically or conceptually naturalistic. The distinction between conditions for an ontology and conditions for a concept receives support from Donald Davidson's identification of two modes of explanation for action: rational and physical causal explanation. Davidson's action theory provides a naturalized ontology for action theory, but not a naturalized concept of intentional (...)
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  10. Robert Klee (1992). Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus, and Psychological Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.score: 184.0
    Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue (...)
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  11. Sara Bernal (2005). Object Lessons: Spelke Principles and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.score: 182.0
    There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is (...)
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  12. P. D. Magnus & Jonathan Cohen (2003). Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):37-52.score: 180.0
    According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the (...)
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  13. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.score: 174.0
  14. Angela Arkway (2000). The Simulation Theory, the Theory Theory and Folk Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.score: 174.0
  15. Jose Luis Bermudez (2002). Rationality and Psychological Explanation Without Language. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.score: 174.0
  16. Sarah Sawyer (2006). The Role of Object-Dependent Content in Psychological Explanation. Teorema 25 (1):181-192.score: 174.0
  17. Joseph Owens (1998). Psychological Explanation and Causal Deviancy. Synthese 115 (2):143-169.score: 174.0
  18. Keith Quillen (1986). Propositional Attitudes and Psychological Explanation. Mind and Language 1 (2):133-57.score: 174.0
  19. D. R. Finn (1968). Categories of Psychological Explanation. Mind 77 (October):550-555.score: 174.0
  20. D. Knight (1997). A Poetics of Psychological Explanation. Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):63-80.score: 174.0
  21. Anthony Peressini (1997). Psychological Explanation and Behavior Broadly Conceived. Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):137 - 159.score: 174.0
    I argue that a broad conception of behavior makes considerable headway toward an account of <span class='Hi'>psychological</span> <span class='Hi'>explanation</span> that preserves the intuitive correctness of belief/desire (folk) <span class='Hi'>psychological</span> explanations and whose explanatory utility is not undercut by neurophysiological explanations. The rough idea behind a broad conception of behavior is that the basic units of behavior, which constitute the primary explananda of psychology, are themselves essentially goal-directed. As such, behavior supervenes on more than the (local) physical properties (...)
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  22. Jerry A. Fodor (1968). Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Psychology. Ny: Random House.score: 174.0
  23. Jeffrey Hershfield (2001). Structural Causation and Psychological Explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):249-261.score: 174.0
     
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  24. Clark Glymour (1998). Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):39-60.score: 166.0
    I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that a recent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that human (...)
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  25. Nigel Mackay (1999). Reason, Cause, and Rationality in Psychological Explanation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):1-21.score: 164.0
  26. Robert C. Cummins (2000). "How Does It Work" Versus "What Are the Laws?": Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation. In F. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (eds.), Explanation and Cognition, 117-145. MIT Press.score: 162.0
    In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion.
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  27. George Botterill (2009). Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk-Psychological Explanation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):463 – 488.score: 162.0
    Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (_Pacific Philosophical Quarterly_, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively (...)
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  28. Marc Champagne (2013). Choosing Between the Long and Short Informational Routes to Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):129-138.score: 158.0
    Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as (...)
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  29. Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.score: 156.0
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, (...)
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  30. Jason Bridges (2006). Teleofunctionalism and Psychological Explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):359-372.score: 156.0
    Fred Dretske’s teleofunctional theory of content aims to simultaneously solve two ground-floor philosophical puzzles about mental content: the problem of naturalism and the problem of epiphenomenalism. It is argued here that his theory fails on the latter score. Indeed, the theory insures that content can have no place in the causal explanation of action at all. The argument for this conclusion depends upon only very weak premises about the nature of causal explanation. The difficulties Dretske’s theory encounters indicate (...)
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  31. John Heil (1985). Rationality and Psychological Explanation. Inquiry 28 (1-4):359 – 371.score: 156.0
    Certain philosophical arguments apparently show that the having of beliefs is tied conceptually to rationality. Such a view, however, seems at odds both with the possibility of irrational belief and with recent empirical discoveries in the psychology of reasoning. The aim of this paper is to move toward a reconciliation of these apparently conflicting perspectives by distinguishing between internalist and externalist conceptions of rationality. It is argued that elements of each are required for a satisfactory theory, one that allows for (...)
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  32. Randall K. Campbell (1991). Nonnomic Properties of Stimuli and Psychological Explanation. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):77 - 92.score: 156.0
    Recently there has been a great deal of argument about what justifies references to representational states in explanations of behavior. I discuss Jerry Fodor's claim that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms that respond to "nonnomic properties" of stimuli. Zenon Pylyshyn's (apparently equivalent) claim that it is necessary to ascribe representational states to organisms that respond to "nonprojectable properties" of stimuli and Fodor's claim that an organism's ability to respond to nonnomic properties of stimuli is a criterion (...)
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  33. Jerry A. Fodor (1968). The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.score: 154.0
  34. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1995). Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.score: 154.0
  35. Joseph Owens (1994). Psychological Externalism and Psychological Explanation. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):921-928.score: 154.0
  36. Michel Treisman (1962). Psychological Explanation: The 'Private Data' Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (August):130-143.score: 154.0
  37. Martin Davies (1986). Individualism and Supervenience: Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.score: 154.0
  38. John Heil (1986). Formalism and Psychological Explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (1):1-10.score: 154.0
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  39. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1995). Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.score: 154.0
  40. Robert C. Cummins (1983). The Nature of Psychological Explanation. MIT Press.score: 154.0
  41. Adelbert H. Jenkins (1996). Review of Time and Psychological Explanation. [REVIEW] Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):67-72.score: 152.0
  42. Jay Rosenberg (1991). 10" Tractarian States" and Folk-Psychological Explanation. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. 226.score: 152.0
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  43. James Faulconer (1990). Heidegger and Psychological Explanation: Taking Account of Derrida. In James E. Faulconer & R. Williams (eds.), Reconsidering Psychology. Duquesne University Press. 116--135.score: 152.0
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  44. Adelbert H. Jenkins (1996). Time and Psychological Explanation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):67-72.score: 152.0
     
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  45. J. Morton (1974). The Use of Natural and Linguistic Concepts in Psychological Explanation. In Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology. London,: Macmillan. 158--174.score: 152.0
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  46. Christopher Peacocke (1981). Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation. Synthese 49 (2):187-217.score: 150.0
  47. John Perry & David J. Israel (1991). Fodor and Psychological Explanation. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 150.0
    [In Meaning in Mind, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey. Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1991, 165.
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  48. Angela Arkway, Folk Psychological Explanation, and Causal Laws.score: 150.0
  49. D. W. Hamlyn (1951). Psychological Explanation and the Gestalt Hypothesis. Mind 60 (240):506-520.score: 150.0
  50. B. A. Farrell (1977). On the Psychological Explanation of Visual Perception. Synthese 35 (3):353 - 379.score: 150.0
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