Search results for 'psychopath' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Neil Levy (2007). The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.
    The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on (...)
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  2. Walter Glannon (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.
    Psychopathy involves impaired capacity for prudential and moral reasoning due to impaired capacity for empathy, remorse, and sensitivity to fear-inducing stimuli. Brain abnormalities and genetic polymorphisms associated with these traits appear to justify the claim that psychopaths cannot be morally responsible for their behavior. Yet psychopaths are capable of instrumental reasoning in achieving their goals, which suggests that they have some capacity to respond to moral reasons against performing harmful acts and refrain from performing them. The cognitive and affective impairment (...)
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  3. Paul Litton (2008). Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance. Rutgers Law Journal, Vol. No., 2008 39 (349):350-392.
    Responsibility theorists frequently discuss psychopathy because it challenges various accounts of the capacities required for appropriate ascriptions of moral and legal responsibility. As often described, the psychopath has the capacity to reason practically but lacks the capacity to grasp and control himself in light of moral considerations. As portrayed, then, the psychopath resides in the area of disagreement between two philosophical camps: (i) theorists who put forth the general capacity for practical reasoning or rational self-governance as sufficient for (...)
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  4.  65
    Carl Elliott (1992). Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214.
    The diagnosis of psychopathy is controversial largely because of two notions: first, that because of their defects, psychopaths cannot understand morality, and second, that these defects should thus excuse psychopaths from moral responsibility for their actions. However, it is not clear just what is involved in understanding morality. The argument that the psychopath is ignorant of morality in the same way that one might be ignorant of facts is difficult to sustain. However, a closer examination of the psychopath's (...)
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  5.  2
    Erick Ramirez (2015). Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath. Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath 18 (3):330-343.
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  6.  8
    Jeffrey Bedrick (2014). The "Reasonable Person" and the Psychopath. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):13-15.
    I have great sympathy for what seem to be two main goals in Michelle Ciurria’s (2014) “Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person,” although I am not sure the reasonable person standard achieves either of the goals. These central goals seem to be to preserve an objective standard of moral responsibility and to do so in a way that “does not depersonalize the target individual” (Ciurria 2014, 7). In this commentary, I focus on my doubts (...)
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  7.  12
    Walter Glannon (2014). Intervening in the Psychopath's Brain. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (1):43-57.
    Psychopathy is a disorder involving personality and behavioral features associated with a high rate of violent aggression and recidivism. This paper explores potential psychopharmacological therapies to modulate dysfunctional neural pathways in psychopaths and reduce the incidence of their harmful behavior, as well as the ethical and legal implications of offering these therapies as an alternative to incarceration. It also considers whether forced psychopharmacological intervention in adults and children with psychopathic traits manifesting in violent behavior can be justified. More generally, the (...)
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  8.  47
    R. J. R. Blair (1995). A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath. Cognition 57 (1):1-29.
    Various social animal species have been noted to inhibit aggressive attacks when a conspecific displays submission cues. Blair (1993) has suggested that humans possess a functionally similar mechanism which mediates the suppression of aggression in the context of distress cues. He has suggested that this mechanism is a prerequisite for the development of the moral/conventional distinction; the consistently observed distinction in subject's judgments between moral and conventional transgressions. Psychopaths may lack this violence inhibitor. A causal model is developed showing how (...)
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  9. R. J. R. Blair, D. Mitchell & K. Blair (2005). The Psychopath. Emotion and the Brain. Blackwell.
    Psychopaths continue to be demonised by the media and estimates suggest that a disturbing percentage of the population has psychopathic tendencies. This timely and controversial new book summarises what we already know about psychopathy and antisocial behavior and puts forward a new case for its cause - with far-reaching implications. Presents the scientific facts of psychopathy and antisocial behavior. Addresses key questions, such as: What is psychopathy? Are there psychopaths amongst us? What is wrong with psychopaths? Is psychopathy due to (...)
     
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  10. Heidi L. Maibom (2008). The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3):167-184.
    It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not (...)
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  11.  43
    Erick Ramirez (2015). Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath. Philosophical Explorations (3):1-14.
    I argue that psychopathy undermines three important assumptions thought to favor moderate reasons responsiveness. First, I argue that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate. Next, I claim that this bifurcation suggests that reactivity is not 'all of a piece.' Lastly, I argue that attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza do not want their theory to depend on the outcome of debates about the nature (...)
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  12.  15
    Heidi L. Maibom (2014). To Treat a Psychopath. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (1):31-42.
    Some people are now quite optimistic about the possibility of treating psychopathy with drugs that directly modulate brain function. I argue that this optimism is misplaced. Psychopathy is a global disorder in an individual’s worldview, including his social and moral outlook. Because of the unity of this Weltanschauung, it is unlikely to be treatable in a piecemeal fashion. Recent neuroscientific methods do not give us much hope that we can replace, in a wholesale manner, problematic views of the world with (...)
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  13.  11
    Nathaniel E. Anderson & Kent A. Kiehl (2012). The Psychopath Magnetized: Insights From Brain Imaging. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):52-60.
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  14.  98
    Luca Malatesti (2009). Moral Understanding in the Psychopath. Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):337-348.
    A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that psychopaths (...)
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  15.  1
    Jeanette Kennett (2010). Reasons, Emotion, and Moral Judgment in the Psychopath. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. OUP Oxford
  16.  11
    Piers Benn (1999). Freedom, Resentment, and the Psychopath. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):29-39.
    This paper discusses the moral responsibility of psychopaths for their anti-social actions. Starting from P. F. Strawson's discussion of our participant reactive attitudes, which stresses their indispensability for meaningful human relations, the paper contrasts a variety of "normal" wrongdoers with psychopaths. It suggests that the latter are often seriously deficient in their capacity to entertain these attitudes, and that their resulting lack of proper self-evaluation may explain both their callousness and their imprudence. It is then argued that only creatures able (...)
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  17.  35
    Robert J. Smith (1984). The Psychopath as Moral Agent. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (2):177-193.
  18.  12
    Luca Malatesti (2010). Moral Understanding in the Psychopath. Synthesis Philosophica 24 (2):337-348.
    A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that psychopaths (...)
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  19.  10
    Robert L. Arrington (1979). Practical Reason, Responsibility and the Psychopath. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):71–89.
  20.  1
    Michael Schleifer (1970). The Responsibility of the Psychopath. Philosophy 45 (173):231 - 232.
  21. Clive R. Boddy (forthcoming). Psychopathic Leadership A Case Study of a Corporate Psychopath CEO. Journal of Business Ethics.
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  22. Robert M. Lindner, L. Radzinowicz, J. W. C. Turner & David Abrahamsen (1946). Rebel Without a Cause: The Hypnoanalysis of a Criminal Psychopath. Science and Society 10 (3):325-331.
     
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  23. Heidi L. Maibom (2010). Rationalism, Emotivism, and the Psychopath. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. OUP Oxford
  24. Ralph Slovenko (1999). Responsibility of the Psychopath. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):53-55.
  25.  49
    Ken Levy (2011). Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment And to Preventive Detention. San Diego Law Review 48:1299-1395.
    I argue for two propositions. First, contrary to the common wisdom, we may justly punish individuals who are not morally responsible for their crimes. Psychopaths – individuals who lack the capacity to feel sympathy – help to prove this point. Scholars are increasingly arguing that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their behavior because they suffer from a neurological disorder that makes it impossible for them to understand, and therefore be motivated by, moral reasons. These same scholars then infer from (...)
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  26.  71
    David Shoemaker (2009). Responsibility and Disability. Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461.
    This essay explores the boundaries of the moral community—the collection of agents eligible for moral responsibility—by focusing on those just inside it and those just outside it. In particular, it contrasts mild mental retardation with psychopathy, specifically among adults. For those who work with and know them, adults with mild mental retardation are thought to be obvious members of the moral community (albeit not full-fledged members). For those who work with and theorize about adult psychopaths, by contrast, they are not (...)
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  27.  77
    Gwen Adshead (1999). Psychopaths and Other-Regarding Beliefs. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):41-44.
  28.  29
    Daniel Moseley & Gary Gala (forthcoming). On the Nature of Psychopathy. In Fabrice Jotterand & James Giordano (eds.), The Neurobiology of Social Disruption: International Perspectives of Psychiatry, Pathology and Society. Potomic Institute Press
    The primary goal of this essay is to clarify the concept of psychopathy and distinguish it from other, related, concepts. We contend that the paradigmatic trait of psychopathy is a propensity to violence that is accompanied by a lack of conscience. We also argue that conceptual clarity on this point is important for devising empirical criteria for identifying psychopaths. We also argue that a full theory of psychopathy will require one to utilize theories and assumptions that pertain (...)
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  29.  11
    María José Edreira (2003). Fenomenología del acoso moral. Logos 36:131-151.
    El propósito de este artículo es describir el proceso por el cuál un individuo o grupo de individuos aplica violencia -psíquica o física- en pequeñas dosis a otro individuo con la intención de desestabilizarlo y hacerlo dudar de sus propios pensamientos y afectos. De esta forma se arrebata al otro su identidad, se niega y elimina la diferencia con el otro. El objetivo de esta conducta es paralizar a la víctima para evitar que surja el conflicto, para que no pueda (...)
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  30.  6
    Alexandre Billon (2010). « Dousir » et « plaileur » l'énigme de l'attribution d'expériences. Philosophie 105 (1):64.
    Cet article aborde le problème de la justification des attributions d'expérience à autrui (problem of other minds). Je compare ce problème à d'autres problèmes sceptiques contemporains dus à Nelson Goodman et Saoül Kripke et je montre qu'il constitue un défi plus pressant et auquel il est plus difficile de répondre de manière modeste. Je propose une solution radicale à ce problème, qui repose sur l'idée, avérée empiriquement, selon laquelle nous disposons de deux formes d'empathie distinctes pour accéder à autrui. Très (...)
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  31.  1
    José Adolfo Arias Muñoz (1984). La fenomenología hoy y la fenomenología en España (El Primer Congreso Nacional de Fenomenología). Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 4:197-202.
    The purpose of this article is to describe the process through one person or individuals from a particular group applies violence –psychological or physical– to another person in a small dosage with the intention of unbalancing and making him to be uncertain about his owns thoughts and affections. By this way such person destroys, denies and erases the another ones identity. This behaviour has as objec- tive to get that the victim can not to think or understand in order to (...)
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  32.  1
    Gabriela González Gómez & María De Lourdes González Chávez (2007). La Teoría Criminalística En la Individualización de la Pena. Cinta de Moebio 29:167-178.
    The article briefly approaches some questions on the main penal theories that they turn around the determination of the penalty in the sentenced ones of codified legal systems, being jurisdictional processes, among them, the theory of the danger of Cesar Lombroso. The tendency of these criminal po..
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  33. David Shoemaker (2011). Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility. Ethics 121 (3):602-632.
    Recently T. M. Scanlon and others have advanced an ostensibly comprehensive theory of moral responsibility—a theory of both being responsible and being held responsible—that best accounts for our moral practices. I argue that both aspects of the Scanlonian theory fail this test. A truly comprehensive theory must incorporate and explain three distinct conceptions of responsibility—attributability, answerability, and accountability—and the Scanlonian view conflates the first two and ignores the importance of the third. To illustrate what a truly comprehensive theory might (...)
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  34. Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
    Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is (...)
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  35.  55
    Hilary Greaves (2013). Epistemic Decision Theory. Mind 122 (488):915-952.
    I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogues of evidential and causal decision theory, and (...)
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  36.  45
    Neil Levy (2013). Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
    The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper (...)
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  37. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent (...)
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  38.  6
    Grant Gillett (2009). The Mind and its Discontents: An Essay in Discursive Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    The first edition of The Mind and its Discontents was a powerful analysis of how, as a society, we view mental illness. In the ten years since the first edition, there has been growing interest in the philosophy of psychiatry, and a new edition of this text is more timely and important than ever. -/- In The Mind and its Discontents, Grant Gillett argues that an understanding of mental illness requires more than just a study of biological models of mental (...)
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  39.  90
    John Deigh (1995). Empathy and Universalizability. Ethics 105 (4):743-763.
    The paper examines the question of whether a person could know the difference between right and wrong and have the capacity to control his or her conduct yet not be moved by his or her knowledge of right or wrong. It proceeds by considering psychopathy and inquiring into the nature of the psychopath's cognitive deficits, if any. One possibility is that psychopaths are inconsistent in the sense of Kant's test of universalizability. This possibility is rejected after considerable argument. A (...)
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  40. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Psychopathy, Ethical Perception, and Moral Culpability. Neuroethics 3 (2):135-150.
    I argue that emotional sensitivity (or insensitivity) has a marked negative influence on ethical perception. Diminished capacities of ethical perception, in turn, mitigate what we are morally responsible for while lack of such capacities may altogether eradicate responsibility. Impairment in ethical perception affects responsibility by affecting either recognition of or reactivity to moral reasons. It follows that emotional insensitivity (together with its attendant impairment in ethical perception) bears saliently on moral responsibility. Since one distinguishing mark of the psychopath is (...)
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  41.  45
    Johan E. Gustafsson (2011). A Note in Defence of Ratificationism. Erkenntnis 75 (1):147–150.
    Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.
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  42.  4
    Farah Focquaert (2014). Mandatory Neurotechnological Treatment: Ethical Issues. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (1):59-72.
    What if neurofeedback or other types of neurotechnological treatment, by itself or in combination with behavioral treatment, could achieve a successful “rewiring” of the psychopath’s brain? Imagine that such treatments exist and that they provide a better long-term risk-minimizing strategy compared to imprisonment. Would it be ethical to offer such treatments as a condition of probation, parole, or prison release? In this paper, I argue that it can be ethical to offer effective, non-invasive neurotechnological treatments to offenders as a (...)
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  43.  44
    Nicole A. Vincent (2008). Responsibility, Dysfunction and Capacity. Neuroethics 1 (3):199-204.
    The way in which we characterize the structural and functional differences between psychopath and normal brains – either as biological disorders or as mere biological differences – can influence our judgments about psychopaths’ responsibility for criminal misconduct. However, Marga Reimer (Neuroethics 1(2):14, 2008) points out that whether our characterization of these differences should be allowed to affect our judgments in this manner “is a difficult and important question that really needs to be addressed before policies regarding responsibility... can be (...)
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  44. Heidi Maibom & James Harold (2010). Without Taste: Psychopaths and the Appreciation of Art. Nouvelle Revue d'Esthétique 6:151-63.
    Psychopaths are the bugbears of moral philosophy. They are often used as examples of perfectly rational people who are nonetheless willing to do great moral wrong without regret; hence the disorder has received the epithet “moral insanity” (Pritchard 1835). But whereas philosophers have had a great deal to say about psychopaths’ glaring and often horrifying lack of moral conscience, their aesthetic capacities have received hardly any attention, and are generally assumed to be intact or even enhanced. Popular culture often portrays (...)
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  45.  23
    Carlo Caponecchia, Andrew Y. Z. Sun & Anne Wyatt (2012). 'Psychopaths' at Work? Implications of Lay Persons' Use of Labels and Behavioural Criteria for Psychopathy. Journal of Business Ethics 107 (4):399-408.
    In attempting to explain or deal with negative workplace behaviours such as workplace bullying, the notion of ‘workplace psychopaths’ has recently received much attention. Focusing on individual aspects of negative workplace behaviour is at odds with more systemic approaches that recognise the contribution of individual, organisational and societal influences, without seeking to blame a person(s) for their behaviour or personality disorder. Regarding a coworker as a psychopath is highly stigmatising, and given the relatively low prevalence of psychopathy in (...)
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  46. Grant Gillett (1999). The Mind and its Discontents: An Essay in Discursive Psychiatry. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Grant Gillett argues that to understand mental illness fully requires more than a study of biological models of mental processes and pathologies. As intensely social animals, he argues, we need to look for the causes of human mental disorders in our interactions with others; in social rule-following and its role in the organization of mental content; in the power relations embedded within social structures and cultural norms; in the way that our mental life is inscribed by a cumulative life of (...)
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  47.  18
    Carl Elliott & Grant Gillett (1992). Moral Insanity and Practical Reason. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):53 – 67.
    The psychopathic personality disorder historically has been thought to include an insensitivity to morality. Some have thought that the psychopath's insensitivity indicates that he does not understand morality, but the relationship between the psychopath's defects and moral understanding has been unclear. We attempt to clarify this relationship, first by arguing that moral understanding is incomplete without concern for morality, and second, by showing that the psychopath demonstrates defects in frontal lobe activity which indicate impaired attention and adaptation (...)
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  48.  19
    Katrina Sifferd & William Hirstein (2012). On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsucessful Psychopaths. Neuroethics 6 (1):129-140.
    The psychological literature now differentiates between two types of psychopath:successful (with little or no criminal record) and unsuccessful (with a criminal record). Recent research indicates that earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity, reduced prefrontal grey matter, and compromised executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful psychopaths. In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show autonomic and executive function that exceeds that of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal volume from normals. We argue that many successful psychopaths are legally responsible (...)
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  49.  38
    Andrew J. Turner (2010). Are Disorders Sufficient for Reduced Responsibility? Neuroethics 3 (2):151-160.
    Reimer ( Neuroethics 2008 ) believes that how we use language to characterize psychopathy may affect our judgments of moral responsibility. If we say a psychopath has a disorder we may reduce their responsibility for moral failure. If we say a psychopath is merely different, we may not reduce their responsibility. Vincent ( Neuroethics 2008 ) argues that if this were the case, a diagnosis of disorder would be both necessary and sufficient to reduce the responsibility of some (...)
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  50.  14
    Ben Spiecker (1988). Psychopathy: The Incapacity to Have Moral Emotions. Journal of Moral Education 17 (2):98-104.
    Abstract ?Lovelessness? and ?guiltlessness? are often seen as the distinctive features of the psychopath. These characteristics can be interpreted as a failure to have two sub?classes of moral emotions, the (moral) rule?emotions and the altruistic emotions. For a better understanding of this moral defect, a more detailed analysis of these types of moral emotions is given. The analysis indicates that the disorder is caused by the absence of the second component of both types of emotions. The psychopath misses (...)
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