Search results for 'qualitative character' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Douglas B. Meehan (2002). Qualitative Character and Sensory Representation. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):630-641.score: 90.0
  2. Guillaume Frechette (2010). Intentionality and Qualitative Character of Experiences. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:91-117.score: 90.0
     
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  3. Tom McClelland (forthcoming). The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky? Topoi:1-14.score: 66.0
    Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ‘hard’, which has troubling implications for the science and metaphysics of consciousness. Some regard it as ‘easy’, which ignores the special explanatory difficulties that consciousness offers. Others are unable to decide between these two uncomfortable positions. All three camps assume that the problem of consciousness is either easy or hard. I argue against this disjunction and suggest that the problem may be ‘tricky’—that is, partly easy and partly hard. (...)
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  4. Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.score: 60.0
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  5. Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.score: 60.0
    Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, (...)
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  6. Danielle Mason (2005). Demystifying Without Quining: Wittgenstein and Dennett on Qualitative States. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):33-43.score: 48.0
    In his 1991 book ‘Consciousness Explained', Daniel Dennett presents his “Multiple Drafts” model of consciousness. Central to his theory is the rejection of the notion of ‘qualia'; of the existence of the purported ‘qualitative character' of conscious experience that many argue rules out the possibility of a purely materialist theory of mind. In eliminating qualia from his theory of consciousness, Dennett claims to be following in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, who also had much to say regarding the nature (...)
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  7. Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). The Multiply Qualitative. Mind 120 (478):239-262.score: 48.0
    Shoemaker argues that one could not hold both that the qualitative character of colour experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the experienced colour and that there are faultless forms of variation in colour perception. In this paper, I explain what is meant by inheritance and discuss in detail the problematic cases of perceptual variation. In so doing I argue that these claims are in fact consistent, and that the appearance to the contrary is due (...)
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  8. Mark Eli Kalderon, The Multiply Qualitative.score: 48.0
    What is the relation between colors and our experience of them? A na?ve thought is this?the phenomenal character of color experience is determined by the qualitative character of the perceived color. When Norm perceives a red tomato, the qualitative character of his color experience is determined by the qualitative character of the color manifest in his experience of the tomato. If however, colors are mind- independent qualities of material objects, as they seem, pre-philosophically (...)
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  9. Stephen L. White (1986). Curse of the Qualia. Synthese 68 (August):333-68.score: 42.0
    In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. (...)
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  10. M. Aase, J. E. Nordrehaug & K. Malterud (2008). "If You Cannot Tolerate That Risk, You Should Never Become a Physician": A Qualitative Study About Existential Experiences Among Physicians. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (11):767-771.score: 42.0
    Background and objectives: Physicians are exposed to matters of existential character at work, but little is known about the personal impact of such issues. Methods: To explore how physicians experience and cope with existential aspects of their clinical work and how such experiences affect their professional identities, a qualitative study using individual semistructured interviews has analysed accounts of their experiences related to coping with such challenges. Analysis was by systematic text condensation. The purposeful sample comprised 10 physicians (including (...)
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  11. Angus J. Dawson (2006). A Messy Business: Qualitative Research and Ethical Review. Clinical Ethics 1 (2):114-116.score: 42.0
    This paper argues that qualitative research is both useful and necessary, as it provides an essential means of gaining a richer understanding of patients' perceptions, social processes and meanings. In their paper in this edition of Clinical Ethics, Hallowell and Lawton raise many issues relating to the way that qualitative research is treated by RECs in the UK. In this paper I discuss just three key topics stimulated by their paper: the way that methodology relates to ethics, the (...)
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  12. Christopher J. Schroll & Richard J. Kenney (1997). Public Virtue: A Focus for Editorializing About Political Character. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 12 (1):36 – 50.score: 42.0
    This article argues that afirm and consistent editorial focus on a poilitician's public virtue would serve well as the essence of journalistic communication about piitical character. Public virtue is defined as the ethical character traits (a) attributed to a politician by an editorialist, (b) based on direct obsemation, (c) of the politician's words and deeds, broadly construed. After presenting the theoretical foundation of this definition, via qualitative case-study methodology, this essay analyzes the editorial claims made in the (...)
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  13. John C. Avise (1979). Considerations on the Evolution of Qualitative Multistate Traits. Acta Biotheoretica 28 (3).score: 42.0
    Simple models for the evolution of qualitative multistate traits are considered, in which the traits are permitted to evolve in time-dependent versus speciation-dependent fashion. Of particular interest are the means and variances of distances for these traits in evolutionary phylads characterized by different rates of speciation, when alternative characters are neutral with respect to fitness, and when the total number of observable characters is limited to small values. As attainable character states are increasingly restricted, mean distance (D) in (...)
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  14. A. I. Padela, H. Shanawani, J. Greenlaw, H. Hamid, M. Aktas & N. Chin (2008). The Perceived Role of Islam in Immigrant Muslim Medical Practice Within the USA: An Exploratory Qualitative Study. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (5):365-369.score: 42.0
    Background: Islam and Muslims are underrepresented in the medical literature and the influence of physician’s cultural beliefs and religious values upon the clinical encounter has been understudied. Objective: To elicit the perceived influence of Islam upon the practice patterns of immigrant Muslim physicians in the USA. Design: Ten face-to-face, in-depth, semistructured interviews with Muslim physicians from various backgrounds and specialties trained outside the USA and practising within the the country. Data were analysed according to the conventions of qualitative research (...)
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  15. Benjamin D. Young (2014). Smelling Phenomenal. Frontiers in Psychology 5 (713):doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00713.score: 42.0
    Qualitative-consciousness arises at the sensory level of olfactory processing and pervades our experience of smells to the extent that qualitative character is maintained whenever we are aware of undergoing an olfactory experience. Building upon the distinction between Access and Phenomenal Consciousness the paper offers a nuanced distinction between Awareness and Qualitative-consciousness that is applicable to olfaction in a manner that is conceptual precise and empirically viable. Mounting empirical research is offered substantiating the applicability of the distinction (...)
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  16. Fernando Charro & Juan J. Colomina (2014). Points of View Beyond Models: Towards a Formal Approach to Points of View as Access to the World. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 19 (2):137-151.score: 36.0
    According to Vázquez and Liz (Found Sci 16(4): 383–391, 2011), Points of View (PoV) can be considered in two different ways. On the one hand, they can be explained following the model of propositional attitudes. This model assumes that the internal structure of a PoV is constituted by a subject, a set of contents, and a set of relations between the subject and those contents. On the other hand, we can analyze points of view taking as a model the notions (...)
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  17. Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 292--312.score: 30.0
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special (...)
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  18. Hilan Bensusan & Eros de Carvalho (2011). Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.score: 30.0
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept (...)
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  19. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.score: 30.0
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  20. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.score: 30.0
    <b>Key Terms:</b> Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight.
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  21. Galen Strawson (1999). Realistic Materialist Monism. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III.score: 30.0
    Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) (...)
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  22. Uriah Kriegel (2002). Phenomenal Content. Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.score: 30.0
    This paper defends a version of Sheomaker-style representationalism about qualitative character.
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  23. Richard Brown (2007). The Mark of the Mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.score: 30.0
    The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component of the, say, the belief, is qualitative? Is the qualitative component part of the content of the belief, or part of the mental attitude that we take towards the content? Some argue that the qualitative character (...)
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  24. Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).score: 30.0
    The book under review is a collection of thirteen essays on the nature phenomenal concepts and the ways in which phenomenal concepts figure in debates over physicalism. Phenomenal concepts are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences (aka “qualia”) whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. There are recent arguments, originating in Descartes’ famous conceivability argument, that purport to show that phenomenal experience is irreducibly non-physical. (...)
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  25. Galen Strawson (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press.score: 30.0
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic (...)
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  26. Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2008). Martian Colours. Philosophical Writings 37.score: 30.0
    Developmental synesthesia typically involves either the stimulation of one sensory modality which gives rise to an experience in a different modality (when a sound, for example, evokes a colour) or the stimulation of a single sensory modality giving rise to different qualitative aspects of experience (when the sight of a number, for example, evokes a colour). These occurrences seem to support Grice’s (1989) argument that sense modalities cannot be individuated without reference to the introspective-character of experience. This, however, (...)
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  27. Amy Kind (2007). Restrictions on Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.score: 30.0
    According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest (...)
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  28. Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.score: 30.0
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according (...)
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  29. Austen Clark (1985). Spectrum Inversion and the Color Solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):431-43.score: 30.0
    The possibility that what looks red to me may look green to you has traditionally been known as "spectrum inversion." This possibility is thought to create difficulties for any attempt to define mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions or functional roles. If spectrum inversion is possible, then it seems that two perceptual states may have identical functional antecedents and effects yet differ in their qualitative content. In that case the qualitative character of the states could not (...)
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  30. Galen Strawson (1989). Red and 'Red'. Synthese 78 (February):193-232.score: 30.0
    THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRUM INVERSION ARGUMENT', THAT TWO PEOPLE (...)
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  31. Ned Block (2002). Behaviorism Revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):977-978.score: 30.0
    O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, (...)
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  32. Andrea Borghini, Dispositions and Their Intentions.score: 30.0
    – Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen <span class='Hi'>Mumford</span>, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this (...)
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  33. Tom McClelland (2013). The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):125 - 151.score: 30.0
    We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above certain physical properties. However, doubt is cast on this by the apparent epistemic gap that arises for attempts to account for phenomenal properties in physical terms. I argue that the epistemic gap should be divided into two more fundamental conceptual gaps. The first of these pertains to the distinctive subjectivity of phenomenal states, and the second pertains to the intrinsicality of phenomenal qualities. Stoljars ignorance hypothesis (IH) attempts (...)
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  34. Aaron Kagan (2007). Face to Face with an Enactive Approach: A Sensorimotor Account of Face Detection and Recognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):509-525.score: 30.0
    The enactive approach to perception describes experience as a temporally extended activity of skillful engagement with the environment. This paper pursues this view and focuses on prosopagnosia both for the light that the theory can throw on the phenomenon, and for the critical light the phenomenon can throw on the theory. I argue that the enactive theory is insufficient to characterize the unique nature of experience specific to prosopagnosic subjects. There is a distinct difference in the overall process of detection (...)
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  35. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.score: 30.0
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  36. H. Jacoby (1990). Empirical Functionalism and Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.score: 30.0
    Functionalism, the philosophical theory that defines mental states in terms of their causal relations to stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states, has often been accused of being unable to account for the qualitative character of our experimential states. Many times such objections to functionalism take the form of conceivability arguments. One is asked to imagine situations where organisms who are in a functional state that is claimed to be a particular experience either have the qualitative (...)
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  37. Timothy Schroeder, Moravcsik and the Contents of Consciousness.score: 30.0
    There is a doctrine in the theory of consciousness known as representationalism, or intentionalism. According to this doctrine, what it feels like to be in a particular state of consciousness — the qualitative character of that state — is identical to the content of some mental representation(s) For instance, the state of consciousness I am enjoying just now as I see a pattern of sunlight and shadow falling on my wall is, in part, a state of consciousness that (...)
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  38. Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan (2007). On the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590–611.score: 30.0
    The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience.
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  39. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.score: 30.0
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the (...)
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  40. Austen Clark (2010). Color, Qualia, and Attention : A Non-Standard Interpretation. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 203.score: 30.0
    A standard view in philosophy of mind is that qualia and phenomenal character require consciousness. This paper argues that various experimental and clinical phenomena can be better explained if we reject this assumption. States found in early visual processing can possess qualitative character even though they are not in any sense conscious mental states. This non-standard interpretation bears the burden of explaining what must be added to states that have qualitative character in order to yield (...)
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  41. Robert Clowes (2007). A Self-Regulation Model of Inner Speech and its Role in the Organisation of Human Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):59-71.score: 30.0
    This paper argues for the importance of inner speech in a proper understanding of the structure of human conscious experience. It reviews one recent attempt to build a model of inner speech based on a grammaticization model (Steels, 2003) and compares it with a self-regulation model here proposed. This latter model is located within the broader literature on the role of language in cognition and the inner voice in consciousness. I argue that this role is not limited to checking the (...)
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  42. Jonathan Waskan (2011). A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia (a Gift to Computationalists). Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103 - 125.score: 30.0
    I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential (...)
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  43. Ben Caplan (2007). On the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590-611.score: 30.0
    The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it's like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske (1995), Mike Thau (2002), Michael Tye (1995) and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we thereby have special access to the nature of these contents. In this (...)
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  44. Anthony Peressini (2013). Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):180-206.score: 30.0
    Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a “provisional manifesto.” I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITC’s scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, (...)
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  45. Michael Watkins (2008). Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.score: 30.0
    Intentionalism holds that two experiences differ in their representational content if and only if they differ in phenomenal character. It is generally held that Intentionalism cannot allow for the possibility of spectrum inversion without systematic error, unless it abandons the idea that, for example, the qualitative character of color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of colors. The paper argues that the conjunction of all three -- the possibility of spectrum inversion, Intentionalism, and the (...)
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  46. Steven Mcfarlane, Can Value Properties Earn Their Keep? The Metaphysics Of Value.score: 30.0
    Can Value Properties Earn Their Keep? The Metaphysics of Value Supposing they exist, what work are value properties supposed to do? What difference do they make? What is the difference between a world in which they exist and a world in which they do not? One obvious answer invokes the claim that evaluative properties make a causal difference. While this is an interesting topic, it is well-covered elsewhere by Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon. But there are other possibilities put forth (...)
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  47. E. Sayan (1988). A Closer Look at the Chinese Nation Argument. Philosophy Research Archives 13:129-36.score: 30.0
    Ned Block’s Chinese Nation Argument is offered as a counterexample to Turing-machine functionalism. According to that argument, one billion Chinese could be organized to instantiate Turing-machine descriptions of mental states. Since we wouldn’t want to impute qualia to such an organized population, functionalism cannot account for the qualitative character of mental states like pain. Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland have challenged that argument by trying to show that an adequate representation of the complexity of mind requires at least (...)
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  48. Tom McClelland (2012). Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Dissertation, Sussexscore: 30.0
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the (...)
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  49. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.score: 30.0
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on (...)
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  50. Susanna Radovic, Watching Representations. 10th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness.score: 30.0
    One kind of substantial critique which has been raised by several philosophers against the so called higher order perception theory (HOP), advocated for mainly by William Lycan, concerns the combination of two important claims: (i) that qualia are wide contents of perceptual experiences, and (ii) that the subject becomes aware of what the world is like (to her) by perceiving her own experiences of the world. In what sense could we possibly watch our own mental states if they are representations (...)
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