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Bibliography: Quasi-Realism in Meta-Ethics
  1. Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
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  2. Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over (...)
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  3.  73
    Matt Bedke (2013). 22 Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge 416.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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    Sergio Tenenbaum (2003). Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
    Simon Blackburn defends a 'quasi-realist' view intended to preserve much of what realists want to say about moral discourse. According to error theory, moral discourse is committed to indefensible metaphysical assumptions. Quasi-realism seems to preserve ontological frugality, attributing no mistaken commitments to our moral practices. In order to make good this claim, quasi-realism must show that (a) the seemingly realist features of the 'surface grammar' of moral discourse can be made compatible with projectivism; and (b) certain realist-sounding statements (...)
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  5. Simon Blackburn (2005). Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 322--338.
  6. Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism. Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
  7. David Lewis (2005). Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 314-321.
  8. Andy Egan (2007). Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  9. Simon Blackburn (2009). Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, (...)
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  10.  60
    Cain Samuel Todd (2004). Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
    My primary aim in this paper is to outline a quasi-realist theory of aesthetic judgement. Robert Hopkins has recently argued against the plausibility of this project because he claims that quasi-realism cannot explain a central component of any expressivist understanding of aesthetic judgements, namely their supposed ‘autonomy’. I argue against Hopkins’s claims by contending that Roger Scruton’s aesthetic attitude theory, centred on his account of the imagination, provides us with the means to develop a plausible quasi-realist account of aesthetic (...)
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  11. C. S. Jenkins (2006). Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism. Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  12.  62
    Edward Harcourt (2005). Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances. Mind 114 (454):249-275.
    The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics, according to which expressivism about ethical discourse—understood as the thesis that the states that discourse expresses are non-representational—is consistent with some of the discourse's familiar surface features, thus ‘saving the ethical appearances’. A dilemma is posed for the quasi-realist. Either ethical discourse appears, thanks to those surface features, to express representational states, or else there is no such thing as its appearing to express such states. If the former then, by (...)
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  13. Simon Kirchin (2000). Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism. Inquiry 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42, pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect to, amongst (...)
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  14.  60
    Gunnar Björnsson (2013). Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag 96-120.
    The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgmentswould be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, andmoral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way inmaking sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and itsindependence (...)
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  15. Alan Thomas, Minimalism and Quasi-Realism.
    Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed (...)
     
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  16.  58
    Alan Thomas (1997). Minimalism Versus Quasi-Realism: Why the Minimalist has a Dialectical Advantage. Philosophical Papers 26 (3):233-239.
    Minimalist and quasi-realist approaches to problematic discourses such as the causal, moral and modal are compared and contrasted. The problem of unasserted contexts demonstrates that while quasi-realism can meet the challenge of reconstructing a logic of "commitment" to cover both "projected" and "detected" discourses, it can only do so at an unacceptable cost. The theory must globally revise logic, in spite of its implicit commitment to a substantial notion of truth for "detected" discourses. Thus, quasi-realism fails to meet (...)
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  17. Nicholas Unwin, Quasi-Realism, Negation, and the Frege-Geach Problem.
    Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of a sentence is easily (...)
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  18. Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press Usa.
    A collection of influential essays of one of our leading philosophers, this book explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. The essays articulate a fresh alternative to a primitive realist/anti-realist opposition, and their cumulative effect is to yield a new appreciation of the delicacy of the debate in central areas.
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  19.  28
    Deborah K. Heikes (1996). The Realism in Quasi-Realism. Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):75-83.
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  20.  89
    Huw Price (2007). Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism, and the Global Challenge. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press 91.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  21. Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
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  22. David Macarthur (2007). Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism, and the Global Challenge. In C. J. Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press 91.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  23. Crispin Wright (1988). Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
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  24. Simon Blackburn (1999). Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation? Inquiry 42 (2):213 – 227.
    This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...)
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  25. Simon Blackburn (2006). Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press 146--162.
     
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  26. Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press). Noûs 32 (3):386–405.
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  27. Jennifer Trusted (1990). Scientific Quasi-Realism. Mind 99 (393):109-111.
  28.  9
    Angela Coventry (2006). Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation. Continuum Books.
    Presents an interpretation of David Hume's account of what a 'cause' is. This book emphasises on the connections between Hume's theories of cause, space and time, morals, and aesthetics.
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  29. Jamie Dreier (2012). Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):269-287.
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  30. Simon Blackburn (1996). Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Mark Timmons (ed.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press 82--100.
     
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  31. Allan Gibbard (1996). Projection, Quasi-Realism, and Sophisticated Realism. Mind 105 (418):331-335.
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  32.  81
    Nick Zangwill (1990). Quasi-Quasi-Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):583-594.
    I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. Blackburn bcratcs philosophers for not sccing thc diffcrcncc, (...)
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    Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (1985). Quasi-Realism and Mind-Dependence. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):185-191.
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  34.  72
    Matthew McGrath (1998). Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.
  35.  20
    Per Lindström (2000). Quasi-Realism in Mathematics. The Monist 83 (1):122-149.
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  36.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & C. Samuel Todd (2004). Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and The Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
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  37.  8
    C. Samuel Todd (2004). Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
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  38.  17
    Stephen Davey (2012). The Problem With (Quasi-Realist) Expressivism. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):33-41.
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  39.  49
    A. W. Moore (2002). Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
  40.  31
    Richard Jennings (1989). Scientific Quasi-Realism. Mind 98 (390):225-245.
  41.  33
    A. W. Price (1995). Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, Pp. 262. Utilitas 7 (1):172.
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    Nick Zangwill (1993). Quasi-Realist Explanation. Synthese 97 (3):287 - 296.
    For any area of our thought — moral, modal, scientihc, or theological we can ask what explains the way we think. After all, we might never have thought in such terms, or that sort of thought might have been different from the way it is. So there must be some explanation of why it is as it is. Such an explanation would be part of a naturalistic account of the mind.
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  43.  27
    Arthur Fine (1995). Book Review:Essays in Quasi-Realism. Simon Blackburn. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):646-.
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  44.  4
    Mark Silcox (2012). Comments on Stephen Davey's “The Problem With (Quasi-Realist) Expressivism”. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):9-13.
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    Huw Price (1996). Essays in Quasi-Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):965-968.
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  46.  6
    Angela Coventry (2009). The Delicate Causalist: Reply to My Critics on "Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation". Manuscrito — Revista Internacional de Filosofia 32 (2).
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  47.  23
    John Biro (2007). Review of Angela Coventry, Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  48.  2
    Alstrup Stig Rasmussen (1985). Quasi-Realism and Mind-Dependence. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (39):185.
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    P. J. E. Kail (2007). Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation (Review). [REVIEW] Hume Studies 33 (1):190-192.
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    Iain Law (1996). Improvement and Truth in Quasi-Realism. Cogito 10 (3):189-193.
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