Search results for 'rational animal' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Man is A. Rational Animal (2002). Discourses on Africa. In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy From Africa: A Text with Readings. Oxford University Press
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  4
    Kay Peggs (2010). Nonhuman Animal Experiments in the European Community: Human Values and Rational Choice. Society and Animals 18 (1):1-20.
    In 2008, the European Community adopted a Proposal to revise the EC Directive on nonhuman animal experiments, with the aim of improving the welfare of the nonhuman animals used in experiments. An Impact Assessment, which gauges the likely economic and scientific effects of future changes, as well as the effects on nonhuman animal welfare, informs the Proposal. By using a discourse analytical approach, this paper examines the Directive, the Impact Assessment and the Proposal to reflect critically upon assumptions (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  28
    Robert J. Fogelin (2003). Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal. Oxford University Press.
    Human beings are both supremely rational and deeply superstitious, capable of believing just about anything and of questioning just about everything. Indeed, just as our reason demands that we know the truth, our skepticism leads to doubts we can ever really do so. In Walking the Tightrope of Reason, Robert J. Fogelin guides readers through a contradiction that lies at the very heart of philosophical inquiry. Fogelin argues that our rational faculties insist on a purely rational account (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4. Edo Pivčević (2016). Man the Rational Animal: Questions and Arguments. Upa.
    This challenging and refreshingly innovative book addresses certain fundamental questions concerning rational legitimacy of some widely held beliefs and provides argument-based answers to such questions, while at the same time encouraging the reader to actively engage with the views put forward and form his/her own judgement.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  6
    Simon Blackburn (1981). Rational Animal? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  6.  90
    Ernest Sosa & David Galloway (2001). Man the Rational Animal? Synthese 122 (1-2):165-78.
    This paper considers well known results of psychological researchinto the fallibility of human reason, and philosophical conclusionsthat some have drawn from these results. Close attention to theexact content of the results casts doubt on the reasoning that leadsto those conclusions.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  37
    Diego E. Machuca (2006). Review of R. Fogelin's "Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal". New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, Xii + 203pp., $22.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 45 (1):188-191.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  47
    Thomas Kelly (2004). Review: Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):750-753.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Antony Flew (1978). A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Essays on the Nature of Man. Clarendon Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10.  4
    Diego E. Machuca (2006). Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal. Dialogue 45 (1):188-191.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  3
    Eric Matthews & Antony Flew (1980). A Rational Animal. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):85.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  2
    William H. Crilly (1965). Man, the Rational Animal - The Scope of Logic. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 39:194.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Gilbert Ryle (1962). A Rational Animal. [London]University of London, the Athlone Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  3
    Daniel H. Cohen (2004). Fogelin's Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal by Robert Fogelin. Informal Logic 23 (1).
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  7
    D. Pollard (1980). A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Essays on the Nature of Man. Philosophical Studies 27:413-415.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  1
    David Hull (1979). A Rational Animal And Other Philosophical Essays On The Nature Of Man By Antony Flew. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 70:278-279.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  6
    William H. Crilly (1965). Man, the Rational Animal. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 39:194-200.
  18.  2
    S. Richmond (1982). A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Essays on the Nature of Man. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (4):448-452.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  1
    Alburey Castell (1968). The Concept of Rational Animal. In P. T. Raju & Alburey Castell (eds.), East-West Studies on the Problem of the Self. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 71--86.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Daniel Cohen (2003). Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal by Robert Fogelin. [REVIEW] Informal Logic 23 (1).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Sheldon Richmond (1982). "A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Essays on the Nature of Man" by Antony Flew. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (4):448.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Godfrey Vesey (1980). A Rational Animal and Other Philosophical Essays on the Nature of Man. Philosophical Books 21 (1):48-50.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  36
    Nathan Nobis (2007). A Rational Defense of Animal Experimentation. Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):49-62.
    Many people involved in the life sciences and related fields and industries routinely cause mice, rats, dogs, cats, primates and other non-human animals to experience pain, suffering, and an early death, harming these animals greatly and not for their own benefit. Harms, however, require moral justification, reasons that pass critical scrutiny. Animal experimenters and dissectors might suspect that strong moral justification has been given for this kind of treatment of animals. I survey some recent attempts to provide such a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  3
    Nathan Nobis, Appendix to Rational Engagement, Emotional Response: ...Animal Use Debates...
    I now apply these logical skills to many other common arguments in defense of animal use. In each case, once we make the premises clear, precise and/or add the missing premise(s) needed to reveal the full pattern of reasoning, we see that each argument has at least one premise that is either false or in need of serious, but unsupplied, rational defense. Thus, we should believe these arguments are unsound.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  22
    Dale Jamieson (1981). Rational Egoism and Animal Rights. Environmental Ethics 3 (2):167-171.
    Jan Narveson has suggested that rational egoism might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of “marginal humans.”.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Nathan Nobis, Rational Engagement, Emotional Response and the Prospects for Progress in Animal Use ‘Debates’.
    This paper is designed to help people rationally engage moral issues regarding the treatment of animals, specifically uses of animals in medical and psychological experimentation, basic research, drug development, education and training, consumer product testing and other areas.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  2
    Judith Barad (1988). The Possibility of Settling the Issue of Animal Suffering on Rational Grounds. Between the Species 4 (4):5.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  3
    Retrieved Virtue (2009). Hegel's Examination of “the Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Itself”(PS 193–214/M 211–35) is the Second of Three Major Sections of His Chapter on “Reason.” Thematically This Section is Closely Related with the First Sub-Section of the Subsequent Third Major Section of “Reason,” Viz.,“The Animal Kingdom and Humbug, or What Really Matters”(PS 214–28/M 236–52). Accordingly, the Present Chapter Considers These Sections Together. [REVIEW] In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Wiley-Blackwell 136.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  1
    Sheldon Richmond (1974). Man The Rational Hunter: Some Comments on "The Imperial Animal" by Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (2/3):279.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  2
    George Cave (1985). Rational Egoism, Animal Rights, and the Academic Connection. Between the Species 1 (2):7.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  6
    Sheldon Richmond (1974). Review Symposium : Man= the Rational Hunter: Some Comments on the Book by Tiger and Fox, the Imperial Animal. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (2):279-291.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  49
    Carl B. Sachs (2012). Resisting the Disenchantment of Nature: McDowell and the Question of Animal Minds. Inquiry 55 (2):131-147.
    Abstract McDowell's contributions to epistemology and philosophy of mind turn centrally on his defense of the Aristotelian concept of a ?rational animal?. I argue here that a clarification of how McDowell uses this concept can make more explicit his distance from Davidson regarding the nature of the minds of non-rational animals. Close examination of his responses to Davidson and to Dennett shows that McDowell is implicitly committed to avoiding the following ?false trichotomy?: that animals are not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (2006). The Questions of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evidence. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press
    This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about animal rationality and mental processing in animals. This book discusses the theoretical issues and distinctions that bear on attributions of rationality to animals and draws some contrasts between rationality and certain other traits of animals to determine the relationships between them. It explores the relations between behaviour and the processes that explain behaviour, and the senses in which animal behaviour might be rational in virtue of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  27
    Kimberly K. Smith (2009). A Pluralist–Expressivist Critique of the Pet Trade. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (3):241-256.
    Elizabeth Anderson’s “pluralist–expressivist” value theory, an alternative to the understanding of value and rationality underlying the “rational actor” model of human behavior, provides rich resources for addressing questions of environmental and animal ethics. It is particularly well-suited to help us think about the ethics of commodification, as I demonstrate in this critique of the pet trade. I argue that Anderson’s approach identifies the proper grounds for criticizing the commodification of animals, and directs our attention to the importance of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  37
    Andrew Linzey (2009). Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction: Reason, ethics, and animals -- Part I: Making the rational case -- Why animal suffering matters morally -- How we minimize animal suffering and how we can change -- Part II: Three practical critiques -- First case: Hunting with dogs -- Second case: Fur farming -- Third case: Commercial sealing -- Conclusion: Re-establishing animals and children as a common cause and six objections considered.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  36. Matteo Mameli & Lisa Bortolotti (2006). Animal Rights, Animal Minds, and Human Mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89.
    Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientific studies by themselves do (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  37.  69
    Yew-Kwang Ng (1995). Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics of Animal Consciousness and Suffering. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):255-285.
    Welfare biology is the study of living things and their environment with respect to their welfare. Despite difficulties of ascertaining and measuring welfare and relevancy to normative issues, welfare biology is a positive science. Evolutionary economics and population dynamics are used to help answer basic questions in welfare biology : Which species are affective sentients capable of welfare? Do they enjoy positive or negative welfare? Can their welfare be dramatically increased? Under plausible axioms, all conscious species are plastic and all (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38.  6
    Kirsten Persson & David Shaw (2015). Empirical Methods in Animal Ethics. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (5):853-866.
    In this article the predominant, purely theoretical perspectives on animal ethics are questioned and two important sources for empirical data in the context of animal ethics are discussed: methods of the social and methods of the natural sciences. Including these methods can lead to an empirical animal ethics approach that is far more adapted to the needs of humans and nonhuman animals and more appropriate in different circumstances than a purely theoretical concept solely premised on rational (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  49
    Azam Golam (2009). Justification of Animal Rights Claim. Philosophy and Progress 43 (2):139-152.
    The objective of the paper is to justify the claim for animals‟ rights. For years, it is one of the most debated questions in the field of applied ethics whether animals‟ have rights or not. There are a number of philosophers who hold that animals are neither moral agent nor rational being and hence animals have no rights because the concept of rights is applicable only to the rational beings. On the other hand the proponents of animals‟ rights (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  31
    Arianna Ferrari (2012). Animal Disenhancement for Animal Welfare: The Apparent Philosophical Conundrums and the Real Exploitation of Animals. A Response to Thompson and Palmer. [REVIEW] NanoEthics 6 (1):65-76.
    Abstract In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” ( Nanoethics 2: 305-36, 2008) Thompson argued that technological attempts to reduce or eliminate selected non-human animals’ capabilities (animal disenhancements) in order to solve or mitigate animal welfare problems in animals’ use pose a philosophical conundrum, because there is a contradiction between rational arguments in favor of these technological interventions and intuitions against them. In her response “Animal (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  33
    Carl B. Sachs (2011). The Shape of a Good Question: McDowell, Evolution, and Transcendental Philosophy. Philosophical Forum 42 (1):61-78.
    I examine John McDowell's attitude towards naturalism in general, and evolutionary theory in particular, by distinguishing between "transcendental descriptions" and "empirical explanations". With this distinction in view we can understand why McDowell holds that there is both continuity and discontinuity between humans qua rational animals and other animals -- there is continuity with regards to empirical explanations and discontinuity with regards to transcendental descriptions. The result of this examination is a clearer assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of McDowell's (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  19
    Hung-Yul So (2007). Beyond Rational Insanity. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:221-227.
    Insanity is identified with irrationality, while rationality is considered to be the mark of sanity. Yet we want to say that rationality could be the cause of insanity. We can see a subtle kind of insanity inherent in an institution believed to be highly rational. Rationality in an ideological belief also turns into rational insanity when the ideology itself works for the interest of the advantaged as a tool of deception. We believe in the rationality of open communication. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Tomas Machula (2011). Human Being as Animal Rationale and an Embodied Spirit. Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Thomistic Perspective. Filozofia 66 (1):49-58.
    The paper is focused on the question whether a human person should be treated as a rational animal or an embodied spirit. The first definition of a human being goes back to Aristotle. In his conception human being is the highest animal, i.e. he is on the top of the hierarchy of material beings. The second definition shows human being on the lowest position in the realm of spirits. Here human being is the lowest and the least (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.) (2006). Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? -/- This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a (...) thought processes. It does this with attention to three key questions, which recur throughout the book and which have both empirical and philosophical aspects: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What if any mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book is distinctive in pursuing these questions not only in relation to our closest relatives, the primates, whose intelligence usually gets the most attention, but also in relation to birds and dolphins, where striking results are also being obtained. -/- Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species - using tools in novel ways to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems - and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language. -/- The book includes many of the world's leading figures doing empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds, as well as distinguished philosophers of mind and science. The book includes an editors' introduction which summarises the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  45. Mark Rowlands (1997). Contractarianism and Animal Rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247.
    It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that non-human animals (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  46. M. Oaksford & N. Chater (eds.) (1998). Rational Models of Cognition. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This book explores a new approach to understanding the human mind - rational analysis - that regards thinking as a facility adapted to the structure of the world. This approach is most closely associated with the work of John R Anderson, who published the original book on rational analysis in 1990. Since then, a great deal of work has been carried out in a number of laboratories around the world, and the aim of this book is to bring (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  47. Stephen P. Stich (1985). Could Man Be an Irrational Animal? Synthese 64 (1):115-35.
    1. When we attribute beliefs, desires, and other states of common sense psychology to a person, or for that matter to an animal or an artifact, we are assuming or presupposing that the person or object can be treated as an intentional system. 2. An intentional system is one which is rational through and through; its beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography…. Its desires are those it ought (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  48.  68
    Colin McLear (2011). Kant on Animal Consciousness. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (15).
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  9
    Toni Vogel Carey (2011). The 'Sub-Rational' in Scottish Moral Science. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2):225-238.
    Jacob Viner introduced the term ‘sub-rational’ to characterize the faculties – human instinct, sentiment and intuition – that fall between animal instinct and full-blown reason. The Scots considered sympathy both an affective and a physiological link between mind and body, and by natural history, they traced the most foundational societal institutions – language and law, money and property – to a sub-rational origin. Their ‘social evolutionism’ anticipated Darwin's ‘dangerous idea’ that humans differ from the lower animals only (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50.  26
    Karl Schudt (2003). Are Animal Rights Inimical to Human Dignity? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:189-203.
    Do animals possess rights? The argument works from marginal cases: we attribute value to humans because of some minimal set of characteristics thathumans possess. Animals possess these characteristics; therefore they deserve moral consideration. Such arguments depend on a functionalist attribution of value. Any turn to functionalism will necessarily be detrimental to human dignity, since some humans will not qualify. I will show how the methods used to establish animal rights are generally some form of functionalism, with particular emphasis on (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000