We all know the numbers: two million US troops were deployed to designated combat zones in Iraq. Of them, 4500 were killed in service. By the most conservative estimates, 30,000 were wounded, but this statistic fails to take into account the most commona and often just as disablinga category of combat-related injuries: post-traumatic stress disorder and related traumatic brain injury. For 'Army of One', photographer Elisabeth Real looks beyond these numbers to the individual soldier. From 2006 to (...) 2012, she spent time with six men who served in Iraq and whose lives have been irreversibly altered by the war. (shrink)

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as ``physically real" and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

On countable structures computability is usually introduced via numberings. For uncountable structures whose cardinality does not exceed the cardinality of the continuum the same can be done via representations. Which representations are appropriate for doing real number computations? We show that with respect to computable equivalence there is one and only one equivalence class of representations of the real numbers which make the basic operations and the infinitary normed limit operator computable. This characterizes the real (...) class='Hi'>numbers in terms of the theory of effective algebras or computable structures, and is reflected by observations made in real number computer arithmetic. Demanding computability of the normed limit operator turns out to be essential: the basic operations without the normed limit operator can be made computable by more than one class of representations. We also give further evidence for the well-known non-appropriateness of the representation to some base b by proving that strictly less functions are computable with respect to these representations than with respect to a standard representation of the real numbers. Furthermore we consider basic constructions of representations and the countable substructure consisting of the computable elements of a represented, possibly uncountable structure. For countable structures we compare effectivity with respect to a numbering and effectivity with respect to a representation. Special attention is paid to the countable structure of the computable real numbers. (shrink)

A notion of completeness and completion suitable for use in the absence of countable choice is developed. This encompasses the construction of the real numbers as well as the completion of an arbitrary metric space. The real numbers are characterized as a complete Archimedean Heyting field, a terminal object in the category of Archimedean Heyting fields.

In the first author's thesis [10], a sequential language, LRT, for real number computation is investigated. That thesis includes a proof that all polynomials are programmable, but that work comes short of giving a complete characterization of the expressive power of the language even for first-order functions. The technical problem is that LRT is non-deterministic. So a natural characterization of its expressive power should be in terms of relations rather than in terms of functions. In [2], Brattka examines a (...) formalization of recursive relations in the style of Kleene's recursive functions on the natural numbers. This paper is an expanded version of [13] which establishes the expressive power of LRTp, a variant of LRT, in terms of Brattka's recursive relations. Because Brattka already did the work of establishing the precise connection between his recursive relations and Type 2 Theory of Effectivity, we thus obtain a complete characterization of first-order definability in LRTp. (shrink)

A real is computable if it is the limit of a computable, increasing, computably converging sequence of rational...

Defining the real numbers by abstraction as ratios of quantities gives prominence to then- applications in just the way that Frege thought we should. But if all the reals are to be obtained in this way, it is necessary to presuppose a rich domain of quantities of a land we cannot reasonably assume to be exemplified by any physical or other empirically measurable quantities. In consequence, an explanation of the applications of the reals, defined in this way, must (...) proceed indirectly. This paper explains the main complications involved and answers the main objections advanced in Batitsky's paper in this issue. (shrink)

A real number x is computable iff it is the limit of an effectively converging computable sequence of rational numbers, and x is left computable iff it is the supremum of a computable sequence of rational numbers. By applying the operations “sup” and “inf” alternately n times to computable sequences of rational numbers we introduce a non-collapsing hierarchy {Σn, Πn, Δn : n ∈ ℕ} of real numbers. We characterize the classes Σ2, Π2 and (...) Δ2 in various ways and give several interesting examples. (shrink)

We study some representations of real numbers. We compare these representations, on the one hand from the viewpoint of recursive functionals, and of complexity on the other hand.The impossibility of obtaining some functions as recursive functionals is, in general, easy. This impossibility may often be explicited in terms of complexity: - existence of a sequence of low complexity whose image is not a recursive sequence, - existence of objects of low complexity but whose images have arbitrarily high time- (...) complexity .Moreover, some representations of real numbers that are equivalent from the viewpoint of recursive functionals, are very distinct from the viewpoint of complexity.We make a particular study of representations via continued fractions . We precise exactly what part of information available in the x's dfc is equivalent to the information available in its Dedekinds cut. We show that the sum of two reals whose dfcs are polynomial-time computable may be a real whose dfc has time complexity arbitrarily high.This work confirms that the unique representation of real numbers suitable for the ordinary calculus is via explicit Cauchy sequences of rationals.RésuméNous étudions différentes manières de présenter les nombres réels. Nous comparons ces présentations du point de vue des fonctionnelles récursives d'une part, et de celui des classes de complexité d'autre part.L'impossibilité d'obtenir certaines fonctions sous forme de fonctionnelles récursives est en général facile à établir. Cette impossiblité peut souvent être explicitée en termes de complexité: - il existe une suite de faible complexité dont l'image est une suite non récursive, - il existe des objets de faible complexité mais dont les images sont des objets de complexité arbitrairement grande .En outre, certaines présentations des réels équivalentes du point de vue des fonctionnelles récursives se distinguent nettement du point de vue de la complexité.Nous faisons une étude particulière concernant les développements en fraction continue . Nous précisions exactement quelle est la partie de l'information disponible dans le dfc d'un réel x qui équivaut à l'information disponible dans sa coupure de Dedekind. Nous montrons également que la somme de deux réels dont le dfc est calculable en temps polynomial peut être un réel dont le dfc est de complexité arbitrairement grande.Ce travail confirme que seule une présentation des réels via des suites de rationnels explicitement de Cauchy est adaptée aux calculs avec les réels. (shrink)

It is known that Hume’s Principle, adjoined to a suitable formulation of second-order logic, gives a theory which is almost certainly consistent4 and suffices for arithmetic in the sense that it yields the Dedekind-Peano axioms as theorems. While Hume’s Principle cannot be taken as a definition in any strict sense requiring that it provide for the eliminative paraphrase of its definiendum in every admissible type of occurrence, we hold that it can be viewed as an implicit definition of a sortal (...) concept of cardinal number and, accordingly, as being analytic of that concept. This, coupled with the fact that Hume’s Principle so conceived requires a prior understanding only of (second-order) logical vocabulary, is enough to justify regarding the resulting account of the foundations of arithmetic as a form of logicism. Whether this claim can ultimately be sustained is of course still very much a matter of controversy. But here, rather than add to the debate on that issue, I should like to assume that it can be, and on that basis, address some further questions. (shrink)

Let ƒ be a real number. It is well known [7] that the set of rational numbers which are less than ƒ is a recursive set if and only if ƒ is representable as the limit of a recursive, recursively convergent sequence of rational numbers. In this paper we replace the condition that the set of rational numbers less than ƒ is recursive by the condition that this set is at various points in the Kleene hierarchy, (...) and we replace the recursive, recursively convergent limit by a variety of other recursive limiting processes. (shrink)

Frege's definition of the real numbers, as envisaged in the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, is fatally flawed by the inconsistency of Frege's ill-fated Basic Law V. We restate Frege's definition in a consistent logical framework and investigate whether it can provide a logical foundation of real analysis. Our conclusion will deem it doubtful that such a foundation along the lines of Frege's own indications is possible at all.

A real number is recursively approximable if there is a computable sequence of rational numbers converging to it. If some extra condition to the convergence is added, then the limit real number might have more effectivity. In this note we summarize some recent attempts to classify the recursively approximable real numbers by the convergence rates of the corresponding computable sequences ofr ational numbers.

Area number x is called k-monotonically computable , for constant k > 0, if there is a computable sequence n ∈ ℕ of rational numbers which converges to x such that the convergence is k-monotonic in the sense that k · |x — xn| ≥ |x — xm| for any m > n and x is monotonically computable if it is k-mc for some k > 0. x is weakly computable if there is a computable sequence s ∈ ℕ (...) of rational numbers converging to x such that the sum equation image|xs — xs + 1| is finite. In this paper we show that a mc real numbers are weakly computable but the converse fails. Furthermore, we show also an infinite hierarchy of mc real numbers. (shrink)

In mathematics, various representations of real numbers have been investigated. All these representations are mathematically equivalent because they lead to the same real structure – Dedekind-complete ordered field. Even the effective versions of these representations are equivalent in the sense that they define the same notion of computable real numbers. Although the computable real numbers can be defined in various equivalent ways, if “computable” is replaced by “primitive recursive” , these definitions lead to (...) a number of different concepts, which we compare in this article. We summarize the known results and add new ones. In particular we show that there is a proper hierarchy among p. r. real numbers by nested interval representation, Cauchy representation, b -adic expansion representation, Dedekind cut representation, and continued fraction expansion representation. Our goal is to clarify systematically how the primitive recursiveness depends on the representations of the real numbers. (shrink)

Frege's theory of real numbers has undeservedly received almost no attention, in part because what we have is only a fragment. Yet his theory is interesting for the light it throws on logicism, and it is quite different from standard modern approaches. Frege polemicizes vigorously against his contemporaries, sketches the main features of his own radical alternative, and begins the formal development. This paper summarizes and expounds what he has to say, and goes on to reconstruct the most (...) important steps which he is likely to have subsequently taken. The various difficulties facing his theory in this reconstruction are outlined, and some surprising consequences drawn about the nature of his logicism. (shrink)

I defend Putnam’s modal structuralist view of mathematics but reject his claims that Wittgenstein’s remarks on Dedekind, Cantor, and set theory are verificationist. Putnam’s “realistic realism” showcases the plasticity of our “fitting” words to the world. The applications of this—in philosophy of language, mind, logic, and philosophy of computation—are robust. I defend Wittgenstein’s nonextensionalist understanding of the real numbers, showing how it fits Putnam’s view. Nonextensionalism and extensionalism about the real numbers are mathematically, philosophically, and logically (...) robust, but the two perspectives are often confused with one another. I separate them, using Turing’s work as an example. (shrink)

Given a class ℱ oft otal functions in the set oft he natural numbers, one could study the real numbers that have arbitrarily close rational approximations explicitly expressible by means of functions from ℱ. We do this for classes ℱsatisfying certain closedness conditions. The conditions in question are satisfied for example by the class of all recursive functions, by the class of the primitive recursive ones, by any of the Grzegorczyk classes ℰnwith n ≥ 2, by the (...) class of all functions recursive in a given function and by the class of the functions primitive recursive in it, as well as by the class of all total functions in the set of the natural numbers. (shrink)

In 1996, W. Veldman and F. Waaldijk present a constructive (intuitionistic) proof for the homogeneity of the ordered structure of the Cauchy real numbers, and so this result holds in any topos with natural number object. However, it is well known that the real numbers objects obtained by the traditional constructions of Cauchy sequences and Dedekind cuts are not necessarily isomorphic in an arbitrary topos with natural numbers object. Consequently, Veldman and Waaldijk's result does not (...) apply to the ordered structure of Dedekind real numbers in toposes. The main result to be proved in the present paper is that the ordered structure of the Dedekind real numbers object is homogeneous, in any topos with natural numbers object. This result is obtained within the framework of local set theory. (shrink)

Let h : ℕ → ℚ be a computable function. A real number x is called h-monotonically computable if there is a computable sequence of rational numbers which converges to x h-monotonically in the sense that h|x – xn| ≥ |x – xm| for all n andm > n. In this paper we investigate classes h-MC of h-mc real numbers for different computable functions h. Especially, for computable functions h : ℕ → ℚ, we show that (...) the class h-MC coincides with the classes of computable and semi-computable real numbers if and only if Σi∈ℕ) = ∞and the sum Σi∈ℕ) is a computable real number, respectively. On the other hand, if h ≥ 1 and h converges to 1, then h-MC = SC no matter how fast h converges to 1. Furthermore, for any constant c > 1, if h is increasing and converges to c, then h-MC = c-MC. Finally, if h is monotone and unbounded, then h-MC contains all ω-mc real numbers which are g-mc for some computable function g. (shrink)

When it comes to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, even sympathetic admirers are cowed into submission by the many criticisms of influential authors in that field. They say something to the effect that Wittgenstein does not know enough about or have enough respect for mathematics, to take him as a serious philosopher of mathematics. They claim to catch Wittgenstein pooh-poohing the modern set-theoretic extensional conception of a real number. This article, however, will show that Wittgenstein's criticism is well grounded. A (...) real number, as an 'extension', is a homeless fiction; 'homeless' in that it neither is supported by anything nor supports anything. The picture of a real number as an 'extension' is not supported by actual practice in calculus; calculus has nothing to do with 'extensions'. The extensional, set-theoretic conception of a real number does not give a foundation for real analysis, either. The so-called complete theory of real numbers, which is essentially an extensional approach, does not define (in any sense of the word) the set of real numbers so as to justify their completeness, despite the common belief to the contrary. The only correct foundation of real analysis consists in its being 'existential axiomatics'. And in real analysis, as existential axiomatics, a point on the real line need not be an 'extension'. (shrink)

Let ℜ = (R, + R , ...) be the ordered field of real numbers. It will be shown that the L(Q n 1 ∣ n ≥ 1)-theory of ℜ is decidable, where Q n 1 denotes the Malitz quantifier of order n in the ℵ 1 -interpretation.

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly (...) random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

The usual completeness theorem for first-order logic is extended in order to allow for a natural incorporation of real analysis. Essentially, this is achieved by building in the set of real numbers into the structures for the language, and by adjusting other semantical notions accordingly. We use many-sorted languages so that the resulting formal systems are general enough for axiomatic treatments of empirical theories without recourse to elements of set theory which are difficult to interprete empirically. Thus (...) we provide a way of applying model theory to empirical theories without tricky detours. Our frame is applied to axiomatizations of three empirical theories: classical mechanics, phenomenological thermodynamics, and exchange economics. (shrink)

Do there exist real numbers d with d2 = 0? The question is formulated provocatively, to stress a formalist view about existence: existence is consistency, or better, coherence.Also, the provocation is meant to challenge the monopoly which the number system, invented by Dedekind et al., is claiming for itself as THE model of the geometric line. The Dedekind approach may be termed “arithmetization of geometry”.We know that one may construct a number system out of synthetic geometry, as Euclid (...) and followers did : “geometrization of arithmetic”..Starting from the geometric side, nilpotent elements are somewhat reasonable, although Euclid excluded them. The sophist Protagoras presented a picture of a circle and a tangent line; the apparent little line segment D which tangent and circle have in common, are, by Pythagoras' Theorem, precisely the points, whose abscissae d have d2 = 0. Protagoras wanted to use this argument for destructive reasons: to refute the science of geometry.A couple of millenia later, the Danish geometer Hjelmslev revived the Protagoras picture. His aim was more positive: he wanted to describe Nature as it was. According to him, the Real Line, the Line of Sensual Reality, had many nilpotent infinitesimals, which we can see with our naked eyes. (shrink)

The spectrum of a first-order sentence is the set of natural numbers occurring as the cardinalities of finite models of the sentence. In a recent survey, Durand et al. introduce a new class of real numbers, the spectral reals, induced by spectra and pose two open problems associated to this class. In the present note, we answer these open problems as well as other open problems from an earlier, unpublished version of the survey. Specifically, we prove that (...) every algebraic real is spectral, every automatic real is spectral, the subword density of a spectral real is either 0 or 1, and both may occur, and every right-computable real number between 0 and 1 occurs as the subword entropy of a spectral real. In addition, Durand et al. note that the set of spectral reals is not closed under addition or multiplication. We extend this result by showing that the class of spectral reals is not closed under any computable operation satisfying some mild conditions. (shrink)

In mathematics, various representations of real numbers have been investigated. All these representations are mathematically equivalent because they lead to the same real structure - Dedekind-complete ordered field. Even the effective versions of these representations are equivalent in the sense that they define the same notion of computable real numbers. Although the computable real numbers can be defined in various equivalent ways, if computable is replaced by primitive recursive (p. r., for short), these (...) definitions lead to a number of different concepts, which we compare in this article. We summarize the known results and add new ones. In particular we show that there is a proper hierarchy among p. r. real numbers by nested interval representation, Cauchy representation, b -adic expansion representation, Dedekind cut representation, and continued fraction expansion representation. Our goal is to clarify systematically how the primitive recursiveness depends on the representations of the real numbers. (shrink)

We give a constructive proof of the open induction principle on real numbers, using bar induction and enumerative open sets. We comment the algorithmic content of this result.

We discuss mathematical and physical arguments against continuity and in favor of discreteness, with particular emphasis on the ideas of Émile Borel.

In the first half of this paper, we study the way that sets of real numbers closed under Turing equivalence sit inside the real line from the perspective of algebra, measure and orders. Afterwards, we combine the results from our study of these sets as orders with a classical construction from Avraham to obtain a restriction about how non trivial automorphism of the Turing degrees (if they exist) interact with 1-generic degrees.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Kant held that under the concept of √2 falls a geometrical magnitude, but not a number. In particular, he explicitly distinguished this root from potentially infinite converging sequences of rationals. Like Kant, Brouwer based his foundations of mathematics on the a priori intuition of time, but unlike Kant, Brouwer did identify this root with a potentially infinite sequence. In this paper I discuss the systematical reasons why in Kant's philosophy this identification is impossible.

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly (...) random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)