Search results for 'reasons to live' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Kathy Behrendt (2011). Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die. Think 10 (28):67-76.score: 508.0
    ‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or (...)
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  2. Peter Singer, The Escalator of Reason Excerpted From How Are We to Live? , New York, 1995, Pp. 226-235.score: 186.0
    Reason's capacity to take us where we did not expect to go could also lead to a curious diversion from what one might expect to be the straight line of evolution. We have evolved a capacity to reason because it helps us to survive and reproduce. But if reason is an escalator, then although the first part of the journey may help us to survive and reproduce, we may go further than we needed to go for this purpose alone. We (...)
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  3. Kai F. Wehmeier (2012). How to Live Without Identity—And Why. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):761 - 777.score: 162.0
    Identity, we're told, is the binary relation that every object bears to itself, and to itself only. But how can a relation be binary if it never relates two objects? This puzzled Russell and led Wittgenstein to declare that identity is not a relation between objects. The now standard view is that Wittgenstein's position is untenable, and that worries regarding the relational status of identity are the result of confusion. I argue that the rejection of identity as a binary relation (...)
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  4. Paul Teller (2011). Learning to Live with Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):49 - 66.score: 162.0
    This paper examines and finds wanting the arguments against van Fraassen's voluntarism, the view that the only constraint of rationality is consistency. Foundationalists claim that if we have no grounds or rationale for a belief or rule, rationality demands that we suspend it. But that begs the question by assuming that there have to be grounds or a rationale. Instead of asking, why should we hold a basic belief or rule, the question has to be: why should not we be (...)
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  5. Chris Argyris (ed.) (2004). Reasons and Rationalizations: The Limits to Organizational Knowledge. OUP Oxford.score: 159.0
    What is the purpose of social science and management research? Do scholars/researchers have a responsibility to generate insights and knowledge that are of practical (implementable) value and validity? -/- We are told we live in turbulent and changing times, should this not provide an important opportunity for management researchers to provide understanding and guidance? Yet there is widespread concern about the efficacy of much research: -/- These are some of the puzzles/pressing problems that Chris Argyris addresses in this short (...)
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  6. Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Alan Gibbard's Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (2):406-412.score: 145.7
    I imagine that people will complain that the account of normative concepts defended in Gibbard’s new book makes the metaethical waters even muddier because it blurs the line between cognitivism and noncognitivism and between realism and antirealism. However, these labels are philosophic tools, and in the wake of Gibbard’s new book, one might rightly conclude that there are new and better philosophical tools emerging on the metaethical scene. The uptake of views about practical reasoning—as exhibited by planning—into debates about the (...)
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  7. Norvin Richards (2010). Lives No One Should Have To Live. Social Theory and Practice 36 (3):463-477.score: 145.7
    Prospective parents centainly ought to avoid creating a child whose life would be so terrible that no one should have to live it. However, those who sought to avoid it would risk making a serious moral error, if their reasoning did follow a certain pattern.The error would be failure to respect autonomy, which includes a claim to judge for oneself whether one's life is worth living. I explain how this applies to a decision about whether someone is to exist (...)
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  8. John Stanton-Ife (2006). Resource Allocation and the Duty to Give Reasons. Health Care Analysis 14 (3):145-156.score: 144.0
    In a much cited phrase in the famous English ‘Child B’ case, Mr Justice Laws intimated that in life and death cases of scarce resources it is not sufficient for health care decision-makers to ‘toll the bell of tight resources’: they must also explain the system of priorities they are using. Although overturned in the Court of Appeal, the important question remains of the extent to which health-care decision-makers have a duty to give reasons for their decisions. In this (...)
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  9. Bertha Alvarez Manninen (2013). Yes, the Baby Should Live: A Pro-Choice Response to Giubilini and Minerva. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):330-335.score: 127.0
    In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and (...)
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  10. Neil Sinclair (2012). Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):647-659.score: 124.0
    In this paper I grant the Humean premise that some reasons for action are grounded in the desires of the agents whose reasons they are. I then consider the question of the relation between the reasons and the desires that ground them. According to promotionalism , a desire that p grounds a reason to φ insofar as A’s φing helps promote p . According to motivationalism a desire that p grounds a reason to φ insofar as it (...)
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  11. John Kaler (2000). Reasons to Be Ethical: Self-Interest and Ethical Business. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 27 (1-2):161 - 173.score: 120.0
    This paper examines the self-interested reasons that businesses can have for ethical behaviour. It distinguishes between economic and non-economic reasons and, among the latter, notes those connected with the self-esteem of managers. It offers a detailed typology of prudential reasons for ethical behaviour, laying particular stress on those to do with avoiding punishment by society for wrongdoing and, more particularly still, stresses the role of campaigning pressure groups within that particular category of reasons. It goes on (...)
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  12. Ingmar Persson (2013). From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
    Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...)
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  13. Christophe Malaterre (2010). On What It is to Fly Can Tell Us Something About What It is to Live. Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres 40 (2):169-177.score: 116.0
    The plurality of definitions of life is often perceived as an unsatisfying situation stemming from still incomplete knowledge about ‘what it is to live’ as well as from the existence of a variety of methods for reaching a definition. For many, such plurality is to be remedied and the search for a unique and fully satisfactory definition of life pursued. In this contribution on the contrary, it is argued that the existence of such a variety of definitions of life (...)
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  14. Julian Savulescu (1998). Consequentialism, Reasons, Value and Justice. Bioethics 12 (3):212–235.score: 114.0
    Over the past 10 years, John Harris has made important contributions to thinking about distributive justice in health care. In his latest work, Harris controversially argues that clinicians should stop prioritising patients according to prognosis. He argues that the good or benefit of health care is providing each individual with an opportunity to live the best and longest life possible for him or her. I call this thesis, opportunism. For the purpose of distribution of resources in health care, Harris (...)
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  15. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Preface/Introduction — Hollows of Memory: From Individual Consciousness to Panexperientialism and Beyond. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):213-215.score: 114.0
    Preface/Introduction: The question under discussion is metaphysical and truly elemental. It emerges in two aspects — how did we come to be conscious of our own existence, and, as a deeper corollary, do existence and awareness necessitate each other? I am bold enough to explore these questions and I invite you to come along; I make no claim to have discovered absolute answers. However, I do believe I have created here a compelling interpretation. You’ll have to judge for yourself. -/- (...)
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  16. Mark Colyvan, William Grey, Jay Odenbaugh & Stefan Linquist, A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Ecology.score: 114.0
    Philosophical interest in ecology is relatively new. Standard texts in the philosophy of biology pay little or no attention to ecology (though Sterelny and Griffiths 1999 is an exception). This is in part because the science of ecology itself is relatively new, but whatever the reasons for the neglect in the past, the situation must change. A good philosophical understanding of ecology is important for a number of reasons. First, ecology is an important and fascinating branch of biology (...)
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  17. Mathias Risse (2005). On God and Guilt: A Reply to Aaron Ridley. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 29 (1):46-53.score: 114.0
    1. Let me begin by distinguishing two conceptions of guilt. The first conceives of guilt as an experience of reprehensible failure in response to specific actions. I feel guilty if I break a promise for reasons that cannot justify this transgression. This conception of guilt as a responsive attitude, which I call locally- reactive guilt, captures a tension in one’s agency that arises from a local failure. The second conception understands guilt as a condition that shapes one’s whole existence. (...)
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  18. E. Haavi Morreim (1994). Of Rescue and Responsibility: Learning to Live with Limits. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (5):455-470.score: 114.0
    Universal access to health care is still a dream rather than a reality in the United States. This is partly because a rule of rescue, by impelling us to help people in need, urges us to ignore the limits of our health care policies wherever those limits would adversely affect a given individual. As the rule of rescue undermines whatever limits we set on health care entitlements, it can thwart the cost containment so essential to expanding access. Rather than accept (...)
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  19. Peter Olsthoorn (2009). A Critique of Integrity: Has a Commander a Moral Obligation to Uphold His Own Principles? Journal of Military Ethics 8 (2):90-104.score: 114.0
    Integrity is generally considered to be an important military virtue. The first part of this article tries to make sense of integrity’s many, often contradicting, meanings. Both in the military and elsewhere, its most common understanding seems to be that integrity requires us to live according to one’s personal principal values and principles we have a moral obligation to do so, and it is a prerequisite to be able to ‘look ourselves in the mirror.’ This notion of integrity as (...)
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  20. Simon Blackburn (2001). Being Good: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford University Press.score: 114.0
    From political scandals at the highest levels to inflated repair bills at the local garage, we are seemingly surrounded with unethical behavior, so why should we behave any differently? Why should we go through life anchored down by rules no one else seems to follow? Writing with wit and elegance, Simon Blackburn tackles such questions in this lively look at ethics, highlighting the complications and doubts and troubling issues that spring from the very simple question of how we ought to (...)
     
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  21. Matti Häyry (2001). Response to Special Section: “Cloning: Technology, Policy, and Ethics” (CQ Vol 7, No 2). Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (2):205-208.score: 114.0
    The idea of cloning adult human beings often gives rise to objections involving mad dictators producing copies of themselves, or deranged billionaires who want to live forever. But what about situations where we can more readily understand and accept the reasons for creating a clone? Consider, for instance, the case of parents who have simultaneously lost their newly born child and found out that they cannot have any more children of their own by other known methods. Would it (...)
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  22. James Morauta (2010). In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.score: 112.0
    A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based reasons do satisfy the constraint. (...)
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  23. Ted M. Preston & Scott Dixon (2007). Who Wants to Live Forever? Immortality, Authenticity, and Living Forever in the Present. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61 (2):99 - 117.score: 112.0
    Death is a bad thing by virtue of its ability to frustrate the subjectively valuable projects that shape our identities and render our lives meaningful. While the presumption that immortality would necessarily result in boredom worse than death proves unwarranted, if the constraint of mortality is a necessary element for virtues, relationships, and motivation to pursue our life-projects, then death might nevertheless be a necessary evil. Mortal or immortal, it’s clear that the value of one’s life depends on its subjectively (...)
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  24. Gerald Gaus, What is Deontology?, Part Two: Reasons to Act Gerald F. Gaus.score: 112.0
    Part One of this essay considered familiar ways of characterizing deontology, which focus on the notions of the good and the right. Here we will take up alternative approaches, which stress the type of reasons for actions that are generated by deontological theories. Although some of these alternative conceptualizations of deontology also employ a distinction between the good and the right, all mark the basic contrast between deontology and teleology in terms of reasons to act.
     
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  25. Clayton Littlejohn (2013). Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote? Logos and Episteme 4 (3).score: 112.0
    In trying to distinguish the right kinds of reasons from the wrong, epistemologists often appeal to the connection to truth to explain why practical considerations cannot constitute reasons. The view they typically opt for is one on which only evidence can constitute a reason to believe. Talbot has shown that these approaches don’t exclude the possibility that there are non-evidential reasons for belief that can justify a belief without being evidence for that belief. He thinksthat there are (...)
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  26. Philip Pettit (2006). On Thinking How to Live: A Cognitivist View. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1083 - 1105.score: 112.0
    Allan Gibbard’s strategy in his new book is to begin by describing a psychology of thinking and planning that certain agents might instantiate, then to argue that this psychology involves an ‘expressivism’ about thought that bears on what to do, and, finally, to try to show that ascribing that same psychology to human beings would explain the way we deploy various concepts in practical and normative deliberation. The idea is to construct an imaginary normative psychology, purportedly conforming to expressivist specifications, (...)
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  27. Zsuzsa Baross (2008). Lessons to Live (1): Posthumous Fragments, for Jacques Derrida. Derrida Today 1 (2):247-265.score: 112.0
    Written as a last, long posthumous letter to Jacques Derrida, the essay turns to the philosopher's last and, for the living, most important lesson – on ‘learning to live.’ In particular, it addresses – as constitutive of his unique ‘heterodidactics’ – two discrete communications on the subject. The first, in Spectres de Marx (1993), declares the lesson to be at once impossible and necessary, that is, ‘ethics itself’; in the second, the last interview ‘Je suis en guerre contre moi-même’ (...)
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  28. B. K. Putt (2011). Learning to Live Up to Death -- Finally: Ricoeur and Derrida on the Textuality of Immortality. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (2):239-247.score: 112.0
    In the ninth fragment of his posthumous work Living Up to Death , Paul Ricoeur reflects on Jacques Derrida’s final interview given to the French newspaper Le Monde just months prior to his death. Although he confesses to a genuine distanciation from Derrida regarding salient aspects of their individual memento mori , he does so within the context of significant concessions of agreement. I argue in this article that their differing positions de facto agree at a critical structural level with (...)
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  29. Philip Pettit (2006). Review: On Thinking How to Live: A Cognitivist View. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1083-1106.score: 112.0
    Allan Gibbard’s strategy in his new book is to begin by describing a psychology of thinking and planning that certain agents might instantiate, then to argue that this psychology involves an ‘expressivism’ about thought that bears on what to do, and, finally, to try to show that ascribing that same psychology to human beings would explain the way we deploy various concepts in practical and normative deliberation. The idea is to construct an imaginary normative psychology, purportedly conforming to expressivist specifications, (...)
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  30. Morwenna Griffiths (2012). Is It Possible to Live a Philosophical, Educational Life in Education, Nowadays? Journal of Philosophy of Education 46 (3):397-413.score: 112.0
    I consider if and how far it is possible to live an educational philosophical life, in the fast-changing, globalised world of Higher Education. I begin with Socrates’ account of a philosophical life in the Apology. I examine some tensions within different conceptions of what it is to do philosophy. I then go on to focus more closely on what it might be to live a philosophical, educational life in which educational processes and outcomes are influenced by philosophy, using (...)
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  31. Derick Wilson (2011). Unveiling the Past—Preparing the Conditions for Human Beings to Live in the Midst of One Another Again? A Response From Living in Northern Ireland. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (4):333-335.score: 112.0
    Unveiling the Past—Preparing the Conditions for Human Beings to Live in the Midst of One Another Again? A Response From Living in Northern Ireland Content Type Journal Article Category Symposium Pages 333-335 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9334-y Authors Derick Wilson, University of Ulster, School of Education, Coleraine, Co. Londonderry, BT52 1SA UK Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4.
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  32. Lisa Coulthard (2004). Visible Violence in Kiki Smith's Life Wants to Live. Journal of Medical Humanities 25 (1):21-32.score: 112.0
    Recent theoretical analyses of domestic violence have posited the complicity of medical communities in erasing and obfuscating the cause of injuries. Although medical cultures have engaged in progressive initiatives to address and treat domestic violence, these medical and clinical models can render domestic violence invisible by framing the battered woman as evidentiary object. By analyzing this invisibility of domestic violence through the concept of public secrecy, in this article I consider Kiki Smith's 1982 installation piece Life Wants to Live. (...)
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  33. Elizabeth Wijaya (2012). To Learn to Live with Spectral Justice: Derrida–Levinas. Derrida Today 5 (2):232-247.score: 112.0
    Early on in Specters of Marx, the first sentence in Exordium reads: ‘Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I would like to learn to live finally’. In the last paragraph of the last chapter, Derrida gives the injunction: ‘If he loves justice at least, the “scholar” of the future, the “intellectual” of tomorrow should learn it and from the ghost’. The ghost is the gift Derrida leaves us, yet, what can ghosts teach us about justice and how (...)
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  34. Maria Antonaccio (2012). A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch. Oup Usa.score: 112.0
    A Philosophy to Live By highlights Murdoch's distinctive conception of philosophy as a spiritual or existential practice and enlists the resources of her thought to explore a wide range of thinkers and debates at the intersections of moral philosophy, religion, art, and politics.
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  35. Jelle L. Epker, Yorick J. De Groot & Erwin J. O. Kompanje (2013). Obtaining Consent for Organ Donation From a Competent ICU Patient Who Does Not Want to Live Anymore and Who is Dependent on Life-Sustaining Treatment; Ethically Feasible? Clinical Ethics 8 (1):29-33.score: 112.0
    We anticipate a further decline of patients who eventually will become brain dead. The intensive care unit (ICU) is considered a last resort for patients with severe and multiple organ dysfunction. Patients with primary central nervous system failure constitute the largest group of patients in which life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. Almost all these patients are unconscious at the moment physicians decide to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining measures. Sometimes, however competent ICU patients state that they do not want to live (...)
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  36. Gernot Kamecke (forthcoming). What is It to Live? Critical Considerations with Regard to Badiou and Bergson Concerning Life Theory and its Language. Filozofski Vestnik.score: 112.0
    This essay raises a philosophical question concerning the language of Life Theory. It aims to prove the assumption that in contrast to Life Science, which today is connected to neuroscience and biotechnology, a theory that comprehends “life itself” must exceed the computerized mathematics of modern materialistic positivism. For this purpose, the conceptual possibility of such a theory is analysed from the perspective of 20th century philosophy of life. Beginning with Henri Bergson, who developed an immanent concept of life“from within itself” (...)
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  37. Nicholas Tebben & John Waterman (forthcoming). Epistemic Free Riders and Reasons to Trust Testimony. Social Epistemology.score: 112.0
    Epistemic Free Riders and Reasons to Trust Testimony. . ???aop.label???
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  38. Jean-Francois Bonnefon (2007). Reasons to Act and the Mental Representation of Consequentialist Aberrations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):453-454.score: 112.0
    If imagination is guided by the same principles as rational thoughts, then we ought not to stop at the way people make inferences to get insights about the workings of imagination; we ought to consider as well the way they make rational choices. This broader approach accounts for the puzzling effect of reasons to act on the mutability of actions.
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  39. A. C. Grayling (2003). What is Good?: The Search for the Best Way to Live. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.score: 112.0
    In his major new book A.C. Grayling examines the different ways to live a good life, as proposed from classical antiquity to the recent present. Grayling focuses on the two very different conceptions of what a good life should be: one is a broadly secular view rooted in attitudes about human nature and the human condition; the other is a broadly transcendental view which locates the source of moral value outside the human realm. In the modern world - the (...)
     
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  40. Chuck Ward & Steven Gimbel (2010). Retroductive Analogy: How to and How Not to Make Claims of Good Reasons to Believe in Evolutionary and Anti-Evolutionary Hypotheses. [REVIEW] Argumentation 24 (1):71-84.score: 112.0
    This paper describes an argumentative fallacy we call ‘Retroductive Analogy.’ It occurs when the ability of a favored hypothesis to explain some phenomena, together with the fact that hypotheses of a similar sort are well supported, is taken to be sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis. This fallacy derives from the retroductive or abductive form of reasoning described by Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce’s account, retroduction can provide good reasons to pursue a hypothesis but does not, by itself, (...)
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  41. Kurt Sylvan (forthcoming). What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 109.3
    Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to $\phi $ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to $\phi $ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to $\phi $ when (i) R’s truth would constitute (...)
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  42. Mark van Roojen (2013). Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Righ Kind of Reasons to Believe. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. 59-78.score: 109.3
    T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to expect (...)
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  43. Pekka Väyrynen (2011). A Wrong Turn to Reasons? In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 108.0
    This paper argues that the recent metaethical turn to reasons as the fundamental units of normativity offers no special advantage in explaining a variety of other normative and evaluative phenomena, unless perhaps a form of reductionism about reasons is adopted which is rejected by many of those who advocate turning to reasons.
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  44. Simon Rippon (2014). Imposing Options on People in Poverty: The Harm of a Live Donor Organ Market. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (3):145-150.score: 108.0
    A prominent defence of a market in organs from living donors says that if we truly care about people in poverty, we should allow them to sell their organs. The argument is that if poor vendors would have voluntarily decided to sell their organs in a free market, then prohibiting them from selling makes them even worse off, at least from their own perspective, and that it would be unconscionably paternalistic to substitute our judgements for individuals' own judgements about what (...)
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  45. Richard Norman (2007). Particularism and Reasons: A Reply to Kirchin. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):33-39.score: 108.0
    Valency switching can appear especially puzzling if we think of moral reasons as ‘pushes and pulls’—considerations whose job it is to get us to act or to stop us acting. Talk of ‘default valency’ doesn't remove the puzzle, it merely restates it. We need a different picture of reasons—perhaps as providing a map of the moral terrain which helps us to see which actions are appropriate to which situations, and who the appropriate agents are. The role of virtue (...)
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  46. Jesse R. Steinberg (2005). Response to Fritz Allhoff, "Telomeres and the Ethics of Human Cloning" (AJOB 4:2). American Journal of Bioethics 5 (1):W27-W28.score: 108.0
    Fritz Allhoff has recently offered an extremely compelling challenge to the morality of human cloning (Allhoff 2004). He argues that a biological phenomenon, that of telomere shortening, undermines the moral permissibility of human cloning. Telomere shortening is caused by cell replication, and appears to be one of the central reasons that cells and organisms age and die. Allhoff considers a thirty-year-old woman who wishes to create a genetic clone. He notes that the DNA from her cell that would be (...)
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  47. Alexandra D. Twyman & Nora S. Newcombe (2010). Five Reasons to Doubt the Existence of a Geometric Module. Cognitive Science 34 (7):1315-1356.score: 108.0
    It is frequently claimed that the human mind is organized in a modular fashion, a hypothesis linked historically, though not inevitably, to the claim that many aspects of the human mind are innately specified. A specific instance of this line of thought is the proposal of an innately specified geometric module for human reorientation. From a massive modularity position, the reorientation module would be one of a large number that organized the mind. From the core knowledge position, the reorientation module (...)
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  48. Victoria McWilliams & Afsaneh Nahavandi (2006). Using Live Cases to Teach Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 67 (4):421 - 433.score: 108.0
    This paper describes a live ethics case project that can be used to teach ethics in a broad variety of business classes. The live case differs from regular cases in that it involves a current situation. Students select an on-going or current event that involves ethical violations and write a case about it. They then present their case and run a debate about the challenges and issues outlined in the case and the actions that could have or should (...)
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  49. Julie van Camp, Judging Aesthetic Value: 2 Live Crew, Pretty Woman, and the Supreme Court.score: 108.0
    The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a parody by the rap group 2 Live Crew of Ray Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was "fair use" and thus did not infringe the copyright. Although the court insisted that it was not evaluating the quality of the parody, I argue that it does in fact make several aesthetic evaluations and sometimes even seems to praise the content of the parody. I first consider the stated reasons for the claimed refusal (...)
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  50. Frank Chessa (2005). Endangered Species and the Right to Die. Environmental Ethics 27 (1):23-41.score: 108.0
    Assuming that both humans and nonhuman organisms have intrinsic value, the concept of a “death with dignity” should extend to the natural world. Recently, an effort has been undertaken to save the razorback sucker, an endangered species of fish in the Colorado River. Razorback are bred and raised in captivity and transferred to the river only when large enough to survive predation by nonnative fish. While this effort is well-intentioned, there is little chance that the razorback will again live (...)
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