There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating (...) reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons. (shrink)

We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate (...) boundedly rational and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in new ways, it also offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts. (shrink)

[This version of the paper has been superseded by "Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework", forthcoming in Economics & Philosophy.] -/- We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly rational and (...) sophisticated rational behaviour, and predict choices in unobserved contexts, an issue neglected in standard choice theory. We characterize the behavioural implications of different reason-based models and distinguish two kinds of context-dependent motivation: “context-variant” motivation, where the agent cares about different properties in different contexts, and “context-regarding” motivation, where the agent cares not only about properties of the options, but also about properties relating to the context. (shrink)

People can reason about the preferences of other agents, and predict their behavior based on these preferences. Surprisingly, the psychology of reasoning has long neglected this fact, and focused instead on disinterested inferences, of which preferences are neither an input nor an output. This exclusive focus is untenable, though, as there is mounting evidence that reasoners take into account the preferences of others, at the expense of logic when logic and preferences point to different (...) conclusions. This article summarizes the most recent account of how reasoners predict the behavior and attitude of other agents based on conditional rules describing actions and their consequences, and reports new experimental data about which assumptions reasoners retract when their predictions based on preferences turn out to be false. (shrink)

This research examines the moderating role of regret aversion in reason-based choice. Earlier research has shown that regret aversion and reason-based choice effects are linked through a common emphasis on decision justification, and that a simple manipulation of regret salience can eliminate the decoy effect, a well-known reason-based choice effect. We show here that the effect of regret salience varies in theory-relevant ways from one reason-based choice effect to another. For effects such as the select/reject and (...) decoy effect, both of which were independently judged to be unreasonable bases for deciding, regret salience eliminated the effect. For the most-important attribute effect that is judged to be normatively acceptable, however, regret salience amplified the effect. Anticipated self-blame regret and perceived decision justifiability consistently predicted preferences and thus offer a parsimonious account of both attenuation and amplification of these reason-based choice effects. (shrink)

A paramount, yet unresolved issue in personalised medicine is that of automated reasoning with clinical guidelines in multimorbidity settings. This entails enabling machines to use computerised generic clinical guideline recommendations and patient-specific information to yield patient-tailored recommendations where interactions arising due to multimorbidities are resolved. This problem is further complicated by patient management desiderata, in particular the need to account for patient-centric goals as well as preferences of various parties involved. We propose to solve this problem of automated reasoning (...) with interacting guideline recommendations in the context of a given patient by means of computational argumentation. In particular, we advance a structured argumentation formalism ABA+G (short for Assumption-Based Argumentation with Preferences (ABA+) and Goals) for integrating and reasoning with information about recommendations, interactions, patient’s state, preferences and prioritised goals. ABA+G combines assumption-based reasoning with preferences and goal-driven selection among reasoning outcomes. Specifically, we assume defeasible applicability of guideline recommendations with the general goal of patient well-being, resolve interactions (conflicts and otherwise undesirable situations) among recommendations based on the state and preferences of the patient, and employ patient-centered goals to suggest interaction-resolving, goal-importance maximising and preference-adhering recommendations. We use a well-established Transition-based Medical Recommendation model for representing guideline recommendations and identifying interactions thereof, and map the components in question, together with the given patient’s state, prioritised goals, and preferences over actions, to ABA+G for automated reasoning. In this, we follow principles of patient management and establish corresponding theoretical properties as well as illustrate our approach in realistic personalised clinical reasoning scenaria. (shrink)

We describe a logic of preference in which modal connectives reflect reasons to desire that a sentence be true. Various conditions on models are introduced and analyzed.

An elderly patient in a care home only wants human nurses to provide her care – not robots. If she selected her carers based on skin colour, it would be seen as racist and morally objectionable, but is choosing a human nurse instead of a robot also morally objectionable and speciesist? A plausible response is that it is not, because humans provide a better standard of care than robots do, making such a choice justifiable. In this paper, I show (...) why this response is incorrect, because robots can theoretically care as well as human nurses can. I differentiate between practical caring and emotional caring, and I argue that robots can match the standard of practical care given by human nurses, and they can simulate emotional care. There is growing evidence that people respond positively to robotic creatures and carebots, and AI software is apt to emotionally support patients in spite of the machine’s own lack of emotions. I make the case that the appearance of emotional care is sufficient, and need not be linked to emotional states within the robot. After all, human nurses undoubtedly ‘fake’ emotional care and compassion sometimes, yet their patients still feel adequately cared for. I show that it is a mistake to claim that ‘the human touch’ is in itself a contributor to a higher standard of care; ‘the robotic touch’ will suffice. Nevertheless, it is not speciesist to favour human nurses over carebots, because carebots do not suffer as the result of such a choice. (shrink)

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief (...) revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation. (shrink)

The patient preference predictor is a proposed computer-based algorithm that would predict the treatment preferences of decisionally incapacitated patients. Incorporation of a PPP into the decision-making process has the potential to improve implementation of the substituted judgement standard by providing more accurate predictions of patients’ treatment preferences than reliance on surrogates alone. Yet, critics argue that methods for making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients should be judged on a number of factors beyond simply providing them with the (...) treatments they would have chosen for themselves. These factors include the extent to which the decision-making process recognises patients’ freedom to choose and relies on evidence the patient themselves would take into account when making treatment decisions. These critics conclude that use of a PPP should be rejected on the grounds that it is inconsistent with these factors, especially as they relate to proper respect for patient autonomy. In this paper, we review and evaluate these criticisms. We argue that they do not provide reason to reject use of a PPP, thus supporting efforts to develop a full-scale PPP and to evaluate it in practice. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If (...) preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences. (shrink)

Although choice and preference are distinct categories, it may in some contexts be a useful idealization to treat choices as fully determined by preferences. In order to construct a general model of such preference-based choice, a method to derive choices from preferences is needed that yields reasonable outcomes for all preference relations, even those that are incomplete and contain cycles. A generalized choice function is introduced for this purpose. It is axiomatically characterized and is shown to compare (...) favourably with alternative constructions. (shrink)

This paper examines relationships between accountants’ personal values and their moral reasoning. In particular, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between accountants’ “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning. This investigation is important because the literature suggests that conformity with rule-based standards may be one reason for professional accountants’ relatively lower scores on measures of moral reasoning (Abdolmohammadi et al. J Bus Ethics 16 (1997) 1717). We administered the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) (Rokeach: 1973, The Nature of Human (...) Values (The Free Press, New York)) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest: 1979, Development in Judgment Moral Issues (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN)) to164 graduating accounting students enrolled in capstone courses at two universities in the Northeastern United States. As potential entrants into the accounting profession, these subjects bring their values and moral reasoning to bear on attitudes and behaviors in the workplace. We find a highly significant inverse relationship between “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning (i.e., those who prefer Conformity values have lower levels of moral reasoning). However, we also find that accounting students as a group do not prefer Conformity values above other values such as Self-actualization and Idealism, and we find positive relationships between Self-actualization and Idealism values and moral reasoning. Implications for values and ethics research are discussed. (shrink)

When a patient lacks sufficient capacity to make a certain treatment decision, whether because of deficits in their ability to make a judgement that reflects their values or to make a decision that reflects their judgement or both, the decision must be made by a surrogate. Often the best way to respect the patient’s autonomy, in such cases, is for the surrogate to make a ‘substituted’ judgement on behalf of the patient, which is the decision that best reflects the patient’s (...) values and identity-infused beliefs as they were when the patient last possessed capacity. It is by now well-known that there is troubling evidence that surrogates do only slightly better than chance at making accurate substituted judgements. The use of a patient preference predictor, an algorithm that predicts patient preferences based on characteristics like the patient’s age, gender, socioeconomic status and education level, could help. Rid and Wendler have done important work making a moral case for using the PPP.1 If it were shown to enhance accuracy, it is not at all obvious what objections there could be to its use. Yet several subtle criticisms of the PPP have emerged in the literature. In their feature article, Jardas, Wasserman and Wendler select six of the most prominent objections to the PPP in the literature and defend the PPP against them.2 Along the way they make significant contributions to broader issues concerning the proper uses of statistical evidence and limits on the kinds of preferences there can be reasons of autonomy to respect. Since I found the authors’ answers to the final two objections—that the PPP relies on naked statistical evidence and that it uses non-endorsed reasons—to be especially interesting and provocative, I will examine those answers and raise a few questions about …. (shrink)

As Kant claimed in the Groundwork, and as the idea has been developed by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for ends are provided by (...) desires. Instead, they may say, there is just one principle, a principle of, if you will, instrumental transmutation: if one desires the end, then one has reason to take the means. See the discussion of General Production, in section 8, for a doubt about this. (shrink)

History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.

There is an increasing need for norms to be embedded in technology as the widespread deployment of applications such as autonomous driving, warfare and big data analysis for crime fighting and counter-terrorism becomes ever closer. Current approaches to norms in multi-agent systems tend either to simply make prohibited actions unavailable, or to provide a set of rules which the agent is obliged to follow, either as part of its design or to avoid sanctions and punishments. In this paper we argue (...) for the position that agents should be equipped with the ability to reason about a system’s norms, by reasoning about the social and moral values that norms are designed to serve; that is, perform the sort of moral reasoning we expect of humans. In particular we highlight the need for such reasoning when circumstances are such that the rules should arguably be broken, so that the reasoning can guide agents in deciding whether to comply with the norms and, if violation is desirable, how best to violate them. One approach to enabling this is to make use of an argumentation scheme based on values and designed for practical reasoning: arguments for and against actions are generated using this scheme and agents choose between actions based on their preferences over these values. Moral reasoning then requires that agents have an acceptable set of values and an acceptable ordering on their values. We first discuss how this approach can be used to think about and justify norms in general, and then discuss how this reasoning can be used to think about when norms should be violated, and the form this violation should take. We illustrate how value based reasoning can be used to decide when and how to violate a norm using a road traffic example. We also briefly consider what makes an ordering on values acceptable, and how such an ordering might be determined. (shrink)

Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice, we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain "motivationally salient" properties of the alternatives over which the preferences (...) are held. Preferences may change as new properties of the alternatives become salient or previously salient properties cease to be salient. Our approach captures endogenous preferences in various contexts and helps to illuminate the distinction between formal and substantive concepts of rationality, as well as the role of perception in rational choice. (shrink)

The complexity of cognitive emulation of human diagnostic reasoning is the major challenge in the implementation of computer-based programs for diagnostic advice in medicine. We here present an epistemological model of diagnosis with the ultimate goal of defining a high-level language for cognitive and computational primitives. The diagnostic task proceeds through three different phases: hypotheses generation, hypotheses testing and hypotheses closure. Hypotheses generation has the inferential form of abduction (from findings to hypotheses) constrained under the criterion of plausibility. Hypotheses (...) testing is achieved by a deductive inference (from generated hypotheses to expected findings), followed by an eliminative induction, constrained under the criterion of covering, which matches expected findings against patient''s findings to select the best explanation. Hypotheses closure is a deductive-inductive type of inference very similar to the inferences operating in hypotheses testing. In this case induction matches the consequences of the generated hypotheses against the patient''s characteristics or preferences under the criterion of utility. By using the language exploited in this epistemological model, it is possible to describe the cognitive tasks underlying the most influential knowledge-based diagnostic systems. (shrink)

We provide a general framework for constructing natural consequence relations for paraconsistent and plausible nonmonotonic reasoning. The framework is based on preferential systems whose preferences are based on the satisfaction of formulas in models. We show that these natural preferential In the research on paraconsistency, preferential systems systems that were originally designed for for paraconsistent reasoning fulfill a key condition (stopperedness or smoothness) from the theoretical research of nonmonotonic reasoning. Consequently, the nonmonotonic consequence relations that they induce (...) fulfill the desired conditions of plausible consequence relations. Hence our framework encompasses different types of preferential systems that were developed from different motivations of paraconsistent reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning, and reveals an important link between them. (shrink)

We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.

Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational issue of entanglement (...) between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory. (shrink)

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational (...) action, and rational decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)

When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even (...) if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient’s (former) autonomy since it draws on the ‘wrong’ kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the Personalized Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently ‘fine-tuned’ on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient’s preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient’s own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies. (shrink)

We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.

Modal accounts of normality in non-monotonic reasoning traditionally have an underlying semantics based on a notion of preference amongst worlds. In this paper, we motivate and investigate an alternative semantics, based on ordered accessibility relations in Kripke frames. The underlying intuition is that some world tuples may be seen as more normal, while others may be seen as more exceptional. We show that this delivers an elegant and intuitive semantic construction, which gives a new perspective on defeasible necessity. (...) Technically, the revisited logic does not change the expressive power of our previously defined preferential modalities. This conclusion follows from an analysis of both semantic constructions via a generalisation of bisimulations to the preferential case. Reasoners based on the previous semantics therefore also suffice for reasoning over the new semantics. We complete the picture by investigating different notions of defeasible conditionals in modal logic that can also be captured within our framework. (shrink)

The ways in which the decisions we make for others differ from the ones we make for ourselves has received much attention in the literature, although less is known about their relationship to our p...

Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational issue of entanglement (...) between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory. (shrink)

Introduction: Cognitive behavioral therapy for children and adolescents has shown efficacy in treating different psychiatric disorders. It has been added to multiple clinical guidelines as the first-line treatment. However, despite more studies of its efficacy, CBT is underutilized in clinical settings due to a lack of rigorous training programs and qualified CBT therapists. The limited knowledge of parents in this intervention and their negative attitudes toward it have been considered as possible reasons.Methods: This is a cross-sectional survey-based study (...) among 464 Saudi parents living in Riyadh city. We aimed to evaluate the preference, knowledge, and attitudes of Saudi parents toward CBT for their children. We compared the difference in the level of knowledge and attitudes toward CBT in relation to the characteristics of parents. An online questionnaire that included 39 questions was carefully reconstructed from four validated scales, approved by an expert panel, and piloted. Participants were recruited to participate through online social media.Results: Saudi parents had average knowledge about CBT; however, they had positive attitudes toward the therapy itself and its role in treating the behavioral issues of children. Male participants showed better knowledge than female participants. Participants with higher education and those with high income had more favorable attitudes toward CBT than others.Conclusion: The knowledge of parents is considered inadequate and indicated the need for more awareness and perhaps mass education. In contrast, they maintained positive attitudes and were interested in evidence-based treatment, with more preference toward non-psychopharmacological interventions. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze two recent conditional interpretations of defaults, one based on probabilities, and the other, on models. We study what makes them equivalent, explore their limitations and develop suitable extensions. The resulting framework ties together a number of important notions in default reasoning, like high-probabilities and model-preference, default priorities and argument systems, and independence assumptions and minimality considerations.

The standard approach to treatment decision making for incapacitated patients often fails to provide treatment consistent with the patient’s preferences and values and places significant stress on surrogate decision makers. These shortcomings provide compelling reason to search for methods to improve current practice. Shared decision making between surrogates and clinicians has important advantages, but it does not provide a way to determine patients’ treatment preferences. Hence, shared decision making leaves families with the stressful challenge of identifying the patient’s (...) preferred treatment option. To address this concern, the present paper proposes to incorporate the use of a “Patient Preference Predictor” (PPP) into the shared decision-making process between surrogates and clinicians. A PPP would predict which treatment option a given incapacitated patient would most likely prefer, based on the individual’s characteristics and information on what treatment preferences are correlated with these characteristics. Use of a PPP is likely to increase the chances that incapacitated patients are treated consistent with their preferences and values and might reduce the stress and burden on their surrogates. Including a PPP in the shared decision-making process therefore has the potential to realize important ethical goals for making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients. The present paper justifies this approach on conceptual and normative grounds. (shrink)

Evidence based medicine (EBM) is under critical debate, and person centered healthcare (PCH) has been proposed as an improvement. But is PCH offered as a supplement or as a replacement of EBM? Prima facie PCH only concerns the practice of medicine, while the contended features of EBM also include methods and medical model. I here argue that there are good philosophical reasons to see PCH as a radical alternative to the existing medical paradigm of EBM, since the two (...) seem committed to conflicting ontologies. This paper aims to make explicit some of the most fundamental assumptions that motivate EBM and PCH, respectively, in order to show that the choice between them ultimately comes down to ontological preference. While EBM has a solid foundation in positivism, or what I here call Humeanism, PCH is more consistent with causal dispositionalism. I conclude that if there is a paradigmatic revolution on the way in medicine, it is first of all one of ontology. (shrink)

This paper proposes a two-level modeling perspective which combines intrinsic 'betterness' and reason-based extrinsic preference, and develops its static and dynamic logic in tandem. Our technical results extend, integrate, and re-interpret earlier theorems on preference representation and update in the literature on preference change.

The aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected issues often leads to collective inconsistency. This study examines two collective decision-making procedures designed to avoid such inconsistency—one premise-based and the other conclusion-based. While the relative desirability of the two procedures has been studied extensively from a theoretical perspective, the preference of individuals regarding the two procedures has been less studied empirically. In the present study, a scenario-based questionnaire survey of participant preferences for the two procedures was conducted, (...) taking into consideration prevailing social norms in the society to which the participants belong and the heterogeneity of the participants’ past experiences. Results show that a minority opinion not matching a prevailing social norm is more likely to be supported when the conclusion-based procedure is used. This can be explained by a basic property of the conclusion-based procedure: The procedure does not require voters to reveal their reasons for reaching a particular conclusion. This property proves appealing for participants who have a minority opinion. Such a finding is highly relevant to future studies on strategic behaviors in choosing a collective decision-making procedure. (shrink)

The Qur’an has been transmitted as both a written text and an oral recital. This has led to the development of a reading tradition that permits numerous different vocalisations to be made upon the basic skeletal text of the established ʿUthmānī codex. Ibn al-Jazarī chose ten early readers whom he felt were most representative of this tradition and whose readings are treated as canonical up until this day. One of these, the Kufan linguist al-Kisāʾī has been characterised in the literature (...) as more focused on the grammar of the Qur’an than his reader peers. This article explores al-Kisāʾī’s process of ikhtiyār when deciding between various possible readings. The sample for analysis consists of Kisāʾī’s tafarrudāt, the approximately fifty cases in which his reading differs from the other nine readers. By comparing his reading with the comments of early scholars of Qur’anic linguistics, especially his near-contemporary al-Farrāʾ, it is possible to construct a typology of the suspected principal reasons for al-Kisāʾī’s tafarrudāt. Not only are many of these based on grammatical preferences, but they demonstrate a significant degree of consistency. Furthermore, analysis of a cluster of readings with implications for the interpretation of the sharīʿa provides evidence for a subtle exegetical dimension to al-Kisāʾī’s work as a reader-grammarian. (shrink)

Recently, Jardas _et al_ have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas _et al_. I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as powerful as the ones discussed by Jardas (...) _et al._. (shrink)

I develop and defend a version of what I call Disposition-Based Decision Theory (or DBDT). I point out important problems in David Gauthier’s (1985, 1986) formulation of DBDT, and carefully develop a more defensible formulation. I then compare my version of DBDT to the currently most widely accepted decision theory, Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Traditional intuition-based arguments fail to give us any strong reason to prefer either theory over the other, but I propose an alternative strategy for resolving (...) this debate. I argue that we should embrace DBDT because it does better than CDT at the work that we, as a matter of empirical fact, commonly call upon a notion of rationality to do. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation theory, which concerns the translation of individual judgments on logical propositions into consistent group judgments, has shown that group consistency generally cannot be guaranteed if each proposition is treated independently from the others. Developing the right method of abandoning independence is thus a high-priority goal. However, little work has been done in this area outside of a few simple approaches. To fill the gap, we compare four methods based on distance metrics between judgment sets. The methods generalize (...) the premise-based and sequential priority approaches to judgment aggregation, as well as distance-based preference aggregation. They each guarantee group consistency and implement a range of distinct functions with different properties, broadening the available tools for social choice. A central result is that only one of these methods (not previously considered in the literature) satisfies three attractive properties for all reasonable metrics. (shrink)

This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude. Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences (...) and expectations mutually cross-referring. As with a Lewis-norm, the loop can get started in a variety of ways. It is self-sustaining in the sense that people with social preferences have sufficient reason not to deviate. (shrink)

The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving counterintuitive conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three equally probable options, whereas the second choice takes place after the elimination of one of the non-selected options which does not hide the prize. Differing from most Bayesian problems, statistical information in the MHD has to be inferred, either by learning outcome probabilities or by reasoning from the presented sequence of events. This often leads to suboptimal decisions and erroneous (...) probability judgments. Specifically, decision makers commonly develop a wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with a preference for their first choice. Several studies have shown that repeated practice enhances sensitivity to the different reward probabilities, but does not facilitate correct Bayesian reasoning. However, modest improvements in probability judgments have been observed after guided explanations. To explain these dissociations, the present review focuses on two types of causes producing the observed biases: Emotional-based choice biases and cognitive limitations in understanding probabilistic information. Among the latter, we identify a crucial cause for the universal difficulty in overcoming the equiprobability illusion: Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities. We conclude that repeated practice and/or high incentives can be effective for overcoming choice biases, but promoting an adequate partitioning of possibilities seems to be necessary for overcoming cognitive illusions and improving Bayesian reasoning. (shrink)

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain‐specific moral psychology. However, the candidate “principles” we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more (...) class='Hi'>reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within‐subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Desire‐Based Theories of Reasons for Action Parfit on the Nature of Value Value‐Based Theories of Reasons for Action Why Parfit Prefers Value‐Based Theories of Reasons for Action to Desire‐Based Theories Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason and Parfit's Response.

What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based)certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanation occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action (...) provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. Many external things, usually inert from the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into what I call epistemic mediators, which are illustrated in the last part of the paper, together with an analysis of the related notions of ``perceptual and inceptual rehearsal'' and of ``external representation''. (shrink)

Objective We conducted a process evaluation to (a) assess the effectiveness of a new problem-based learning curriculum designed to teach professionalism and scientific integrity to biomedical graduate students and (b) modify the course to enhance its relevance and effectiveness. The content presented realistic cases and issues in the practice of science, to promote skill development and to acculturate students to professional norms of science. Method We used 5-step Likert-scaled questions, open-ended questions, and interviews of students and facilitators to assess (...) curricular effectiveness. Results Both facilitators and students perceived course objectives were achieved. For example, respondents preferred active learning over lectures; both faculty and students perceived that the curriculum increased their understanding of norms, role obligations and responsibilities of professional scientists. They also reported an increased ability to identify ethical situations and felt that they had developed skills in moral reasoning and effective group work. Conclusions These data helped to improve course implementation and instructional material. For example, to correct a negative perception that this was an ‘ethics’ course, we redesigned case debriefing activities to reinforce learning objectives and important skills. We refined cases to be more engaging and relevant for students, and gave facilitators more specific training and resources for each case. The problem-based learning small group strategy can stimulate an environment whereby participants are more aware of ethical implications of science, and increase their socialisation and open communication about professional behaviour. (shrink)

The intra-school controversies in Hanafī school are remarkable. These controversies pose a risk for legal safety and stability and creates difficulties for muqallīd Hanafī judges and muftīs. In the historical process, different types of literature such as mukhtaṣar and fatwa (legal opinion) books, and applications such as aṣṣaḥ-ı aqvāl and maʻrūdhāt, emerged to solve this problem. One of the last example of these applications is the codification movement. The subject of this study is the relationship between the Majalla al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyyah, (...) which is the first product of codification based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and the intra-school preference. In order to describe this relationship, it is briefly emphasized that one of the aims of codification of Majalla is to satisfy the need for intra-school preference. The function and content of Majallaʼs necessary reasons, (asbāb al-mūjiba) was analyzed in terms of intra-school preference. The interventions on the preferences of the Majalla Commission are also emphasized. The Majalla is a text of the intra-school preference. The analysis of its content in relation to intra-school preference is very important. Therefore, in order to reveal what kind of method is used in intra-school preferences and to determine different aspects of intra-school preference in the Majalla, the chapter about ‘sale’ (Kitāb al-Buyūʿ) of the Majalla are examined.Summary: The intra-school controversies in Hanafī School, which is quite important in terms of freedom of ijtihād (independent legal judgment) and legal wealth, possible to threaten legal safety and stability. These controversies also make difficult for judges to reach a judgment or fatwa in controversial affairs. For this reason, determination of the rājiḥ (preferred opinion) in controversial issues in the school, is a need that must be eliminated.The intra-school preference can be described as "to determine the superior, preponderant of different opinion or narrations about a specific issue in the school". In the historical process different types of literature such as mukhtaṣar and fatwa books, and different applications such as asaḥḥ-ı aqvāl and maʻrūzāt, emerged to meet this need. One of the applications aimed to meet this need is the codifications in the last period of the Ottoman State.The relationship between the Majalla al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah, which is the first example of codification based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and the intra-school preference; and in this context, while preparing the Majalla how a method was followed in the intra-school preference; at what rate be obeyed the rājiḥ (preferred) opinion; articles contrary to the rājiḥ (preferred) opinion in Majalla and their reasons; whether legal arrangements have been made in all controversial issues; at what rate be met the need of determination of rājiḥ (preferred) opinion are the issues that need to be examined.One of the main reasons for the need for a law text such as Majalla al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah is the multitude of the intra-school controversies in Hanafī School. Therefore, the goal of Majalla is to prepare a code that contains rājiḥ opinion.When Majallaʼs necessary reasons, i.e. asbāb al-mūjiba, are examined in terms of the intra-school preference, it is seen that there are two basic functions of necessary reasons. The first of them is, emphasizing that the code is prepared substantially in accordance with the râjih opinion in the school. In fact, that this issue in the asbāb al-mūjiba of the first ten books of Majalla is expressly stated. The other function of the asbāb al-mūjiba is to justify that why rājiḥ opinion are not be confirmed in some article. In the necessary reasons it is stated that twelve articles are prepared in the direction of unrâcih (unpreferable) opinion. Considering that Majalla is formed of 1851 article, it will be better understood that how the rājiḥ opinions are effective in Majalla's content. Essentially, the conditions of the period also make it necessary. The preference of the non-preferred opinion of Züfer (d. 158/775) in 692nd article of Kitāb al-Ḥavala, caused the reaction of some circles mainly Şeyhülislam Hasan Fehmi Efendi (d.1298/1881) and for this reason Ahmet Cevdet Pasa (d.1895) was dismissed from the ministry of Divan al-Ahkâm al-Adliyyah and the chairman of the Majalla Commission.When the asbāb al-mūjibas of contrary articles to rājiḥ opinions are examined, it is seen that maṣlaḥa and customs are determinative in these preferences. It is also seen that the preferences of some jurists are also mentioned as a reason of preference. The most widespread preference’s reason in Hanafī sources is in congruity with the texts. On the contrary, it is noteworthy that, besides the interdiction of extravagant (safih), it is not operated as a preference’s reason in Majalla.Some preferences of the Majalla Commission were intervened by other institutions. The chapters prepared by the commission were examined both by Majlis-i Wukalā and Mashihat, and these chapters were subject to some revisions at this time. Here, two articles prepared on the basis of the non-preferred opinion were intervened by Majlis-i Wukalā. The first of these is 216th article that written in the direction of opinion of Mashāyikh Balkh, which argues that it is permissible to sell separately ḥaqq al-murūr (the right of passage) and ḥaqq al-shirb (water right), the second is the 611th article which regulates the liability to damage of ajīr al-mushtarak (joint salaried employee).When the content of Kitāb al-Buyū, the first and the most voluminous book of Majalla, is examined in terms of the intra-school preference, it is seen that the rājiḥ opinions in the school are generally taken as basis. It is stated that in the asbāb al-mūjiba of the Kitāb al-Buyūʿ the four issues are prepared basing on the non-preferred opinion and these preferences are justified with custom and maṣlaḥa. However, the contrary articles to the rājiḥ opinion in the Kitāb al-Buyūʿ are not limited to these. According to our research, in addition to these, three articles were prepared with the preference of non-preferred opinion. These are the 118th article regarding that the bayʻ bi-l-wafā is permissible in chattels, 165th article on the definition of al-ghabn al-faḥiş (lesion), and the 309th article concerning the provision of the khiyār al-sharṭ (right of cancellation). These three articles show that the regulations contrary to the rājiḥ opinion in Majalla are not just those explained in the asbāb al-mūjiba and this situation is contrary to the method that is followed when preparing the Majalla.In some controversial issues in the Hanafi School, authorized jurists to preference (asḥāb al-tarjīh) disagreed over which opinion is rājiḥ. It wasn’t explained that how a method would be followed in Majalla when the legal arrangements were made in these matters. When these issues are examined, it can be said that the preferences of the majority, the providing of convenience and the preference by some jurists are effective.Preferences in Majalla have not been occurred only among the sharʻī (related to Islamic Law) provisions. In addition, the definitions and the inscription in the definitions are also the subject of preference. In this context, the preferences related to the definition of the sales contract, the suspended contract (al-ʻaqd al-maqqūf) and the al-ghabn al-faḥiş in Kitāb al-Buyūʿ can be mentioned as an example.Some controversial issues in the Hanafi School are not regulated in Majalla. When considering the multiplicity of controversial issues and therefore the difficulty of making legal arrangements to cover all of them, this situation is natural. Moreover, some of these issues may not have been regulated in Majalla because they are not frequent and necessary. However, it is not possible to explain all the controversial issues that have not been regulated for these reasons. Because some of the controversial issues that have not been legislated are basic, relatively important issues and they are included in the mukhtaṣars. This indicates that when preparing the Majalla, instead of making preference on some controversial issues, the method of non-regulation of these matters is adopted. It can be said that this method is applied as a way of creating law text which is clear of controversy. Thus, the determining of the rājiḥ opinion in these matters has been left to the judges. This situation is not suitable to meet the need of determining the rājiḥ opinion, which is the goal of Majalla. But it is the result of the difficulty of making a law that encompasses all legal issues. (shrink)

Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent’s knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which (...) KDTs relate knowledge and rational action. In this paper, I suggest a new axiomatic method for justifying KDTs and providing them with stronger normative foundations. I argue that such theories may be derived from constraints on the relation between knowledge and preference, and that these constraints may be evaluated relative to intuitions regarding practical reasoning. To demonstrate this, I offer a representation theorem for a KDT proposed by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) and briefly evaluate it through its underlying axioms. -/- In section 1, I present knowledge-based decision theories generally and the versions of such theories suggested in the literature. In section 2, I argue that KDTs and theories of practical reasoning conjoined with Knowledge-Reasons norms generate constraints on the same relation—the relation between knowledge and preference. In section 3, I present a formal framework in which constraints on this relation may be expressed and from which KDTs may be derived. In section 4, I present a representation theorem for a specific KDT. In section 5, I briefly evaluate the axioms of the theory, and in section 6, I conclude. (shrink)

We investigate in intuitionistic first-order logic various principles of preference relations alternative to the standard ones based on the transitivity and completeness of weak preference. In particular, we suggest two ways in which completeness can be formulated while remaining faithful to the spirit of constructive reasoning, and we prove that the cotransitivity of the strict preference relation is a valid intuitionistic alternative to the transitivity of weak preference. Along the way, we also show that the acyclicity axiom is not (...) finitely axiomatizable in first-order logic. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant searched for a universal concept of reason different from the understanding and offered the short formula “the faculty of principles”. I will argue that this is only one and not the most pertinent and general mark of the concept of reason. There are more compelling short expressions in Kant’s Reflexionen, the third Critique and/or in the reception of Kant’s works: “the faculty of ideas” or reason in the narrower sense. The latter narrows down the logical (...) sphere of the concept of rational faculties, and the former contains reason’s most basic mark: ideas. The first part of this article will focus on preliminary remarks on Kant’s philosophical methodology and conceptual analysis. The second part will analyze the division of the logical sphere of the concept of reason by nine necessary and coherent marks. These marks are centered around the concept of ideas, which allows for an ideas-first understanding of reason and preference for the formulas the faculty of ideas and reason in the narrower sense. The article will end with an “imperfect definition” of reason based on those nine marks. (shrink)