Search results for 'reference to fictional objects' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  21
    Andriy Vasylchenko (2009). The Problem of Reference to Nonexistents in Cocchiarella's Conceptual Realism. Axiomathes 19 (2):155-166.
    This article is a critical review of Cocchiarella’s theory of reference. In conceptual realism, there are two central distinctions regarding reference: first, between active and deactivated use of referential expressions, and, second, between using referential expressions with and without existential presupposition. Cocchiarella’s normative restrictions on the existential presuppositions of reference lead to postulating two fundamentally different kinds of objects in conceptual realism: realia or concrete objects, on the one hand, and abstract intensional objects or (...)
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  2.  5
    Luke Manning (2015). Reply to Sartorelli on Pretense and Representing Fictional Objects. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2):193-196.
    I defend and clarify my arguments in "Real Representation of Fictional Objects" in response to criticisms from Joseph Sartorelli. In particular, I clarify why Kripke's notion of "levels of language" and a pragmatic principle suggested by van Inwagen do not support the view that works of fiction generate fictional objects but do not represent them.
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  3. Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146.
    I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to (...)
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  4.  8
    Jacek Paśniczek (2003). Ways of Reference to Meinongian Objects. Ontological Commitments of Meinongian Theories. Logic and Logical Philosophy 2 (5):69-86.
    A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . (...)
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  5.  11
    Marzenna Cyzman (2011). “Lying, Poets Tell the Truth …”. “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” by John Searle – a Still Possible Solution to an Old Problem? Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (4):317-326.
    The purpose of this article is to consider an answer to the question whether Searle’s idea of sentence in a literary text is still relevant. Understanding literary utterances as specific speech acts, pretended illocutions, is inherent in the process of considering the sentence in a literary text in broader terms. Accordingly, it appears necessary to outline it. Reference to other ideas formulated both in the theory of literature as a speech act [R. Ohmann, S. Levin] as well as in (...)
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  6. Erich Rast (2010). Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Fiction in Philosophy.
    An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a (...)
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  7.  23
    Daniel Hunter (1981). Reference and Meinongian Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:23-36.
    Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formahzation of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be estabHshed if Parsons' theory is correct. This (...)
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  8. Andrea Sauchelli, Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization.
    I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to (...)
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  9. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Consideration of the Problem with Special Reference to Husserl's Phenomenological Account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):161-184.
    In the succession of states of consciousness that constitute James’s stream of consciousness, there occur, among others, states of consciousness that are themselves, or that include, perceptual mental acts. It is assumed some of the latter states of consciousness are purely perceptual, lacking both imaginal and signitive contents. According to Husserl, purely perceptual acts present to consciousness, uniquely, their environmental objects in themselves, in person. They do not present, as imaginal mental acts do, an image or other representation of (...)
     
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  10.  41
    Hector-Neri Castañeda (1985). Objects, Existence, and Reference A Prolegomenon to Guise Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:3-59.
    This is an investigation into the fundamental connections between the referential use of language and our rich human experience. All types of experience — perceptual, practical, scientific, literary, esthetic, ludic, ... — are tightly unified into one total experience by the structure of reference to real or possible items. Singular reference is essential for locating ourselves in our own corner of the world. General reference, by means of quantifiers, is our main tool in ascertaining the accessible patterns (...)
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  11.  13
    Donna E. West (2010). Indexical Reference to Absent Objects. Semiotics:153-165.
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  12.  6
    Donna E. West (2010). Indexical Reference to Absent Objects. Semiotics:153-165.
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  13. Jacek Pasniczek (1994). Ways of Reference to Meinongian Objects. Logic and Logical Philosophy 2:69.
     
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  14. J. R. G. Williams (2002). Reference to Mathematical Objects.
     
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  15.  4
    Michael E. Levin (1976). On the Ascription of Functions to Objects, with Special Reference to Inference in Archaeology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (3):227-234.
  16. J. Arthur Harris (1915). Experimental Data on Errors of Judgment in the Estimation of the Number of Objects in Moderately Large Samples, with Special Reference to Personal Equation. Psychological Review 22 (6):490-511.
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  17.  81
    Jim Stone (2010). Harry Potter and the Spectre of Imprecision. Analysis 70 (4):638-644.
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  18.  28
    Theodore J. Everett (2005). Are There Non-Existent Entities? In Larry Lee Blackman (ed.), The Philosophy of Panayot Butchvarov: a collegial evaluation. Edwin Mellen Press 3-19.
    There are things of which it is true to say that there are no such things. How can we resolve this paradox? Panayot Butchvarov argues that there are objects of reference that are not also entities, where the former must merely be thinkable but the latter must be indefinitely re-identifiable. This paper argues that fictional and many other unreal objects are indeed indefinitely re-identifiable, so they must be counted as existing things on Butchvarov's theory. The paradox (...)
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  19.  27
    Eleonora Orlando (2008). Fictional Names Without Fictional Objects (Ficción Sin Metafísica). Critica 40 (120):111 - 127.
    In this paper, I criticize Mark Sainsbury's proposal concerning the semantic analysis of fictional discourse, as it has been put forward in chapter 6 of his Reference without Referents. His main thesis is that fictional names do not refer, and hence statements containing them are genuinely false and must be interpreted in terms of true paraphrases, arrived at on a case-by-case basis. In my opinion, the proposal has a problem derived from the fact that the relation between (...)
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  20. Francesco Berto (2008). Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects. Metaphysica 9 (2):205-218.
    Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) (...)
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  21.  21
    Giovanni Merlo (forthcoming). Multiple Reference and Vague Objects. Synthese:1-22.
    Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a ‘vague object’: it is only roughly 5895 m tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn’t make up our mind what the expression “Kilimanjaro” applies to that we can truthfully say such things (...)
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  22.  10
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2016). Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects, and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation. Res Philosophica 93 (2):1-23.
    My goal is to reflect on the phenomenon of inadvertent creation and argue that—various objections to the contrary—it doesn’t undermine the view that fictional characters are abstract artifacts. My starting point is a recent challenge by Jeffrey Goodman that is originally posed for those who hold that fictional characters and mythical objects alike are abstract artifacts. The challenge: if we think that astronomers like Le Verrier, in mistakenly hypothesizing the planet Vulcan, inadvertently created an abstract artifact, then (...)
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  23. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Reference to Numbers in Natural Language. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
    A common view is that natural language treats numbers as abstract objects, with expressions like the number of planets, eight, as well as the number eight acting as referential terms referring to numbers. In this paper I will argue that this view about reference to numbers in natural language is fundamentally mistaken. A more thorough look at natural language reveals a very different view of the ontological status of natural numbers. On this view, numbers are not primarily treated (...)
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  24.  71
    Friederike Moltmann (2013). Reference to Numbers in Natural Language. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
    A common view is that natural language treats numbers as abstract objects, with expressions like the number of planets, eight, as well as the number eight acting as referential terms referring to numbers. In this paper I will argue that this view about reference to numbers in natural language is fundamentally mistaken. A more thorough look at natural language reveals a very different view of the ontological status of natural numbers. On this view, numbers are not primarily treated (...)
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  25.  41
    Zsófia Zvolenszky (2015). An Argument for Authorial Creation. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):461–487.
    Artifactualism about fictional characters, positing Harry Potter as an abstract artifact created by J. K. Rowling, has been criticized on the grounds that the idea of creating such objects is mysterious and problematic. In the light of such qualms, it is worth homing in on an argument in favor of artifactualism, showing that it is the best way to include the likes of Harry Potter in our ontology precisely because it incorporates authorial creation. To that end, I will (...)
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  26. Øystein Linnebo (2009). Frege's Context Principle and Reference to Natural Numbers. In Sten Lindström (ed.), Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What Has Become of Them. Springer
    Frege proposed that his Context Principle—which says that a word has meaning only in the context of a proposition—can be used to explain reference, both in general and to mathematical objects in particular. I develop a version of this proposal and outline answers to some important challenges that the resulting account of reference faces. Then I show how this account can be applied to arithmetic to yield an explanation of our reference to the natural numbers and (...)
     
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  27.  71
    Terence Parsons (1975). A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:73-86.
    This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
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  28. Anthony Everett (2007). Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.
    There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then (...)
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  29.  30
    Ryan Nichols (2002). Reid on Fictional Objects and the Way of Ideas. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):582-601.
    I argue that Reid adopts a form of Meinongianism about fictional objects because of, not in spite of, his common sense philosophy. According to 'the way of ideas', thoughts take representational states as their immediate intentional objects. In contrast, Reid endorses a direct theory of conception and a heady thesis of first-person privileged access to the contents of our thoughts. He claims that thoughts about centaurs are thoughts of non-existent objects, not thoughts about mental intermediaries, adverbial (...)
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  30.  4
    John Deely (1975). Reference to the Non-Existent. The Thomist 39 (2):253-308.
    Can we refer to objects which do not exist? Searle says that we cannot. He postulates an ‘axiom of existence’ such that, if an object does not exist, we cannot refer to it. This ‘axiom of existence’ could be taken simply as a way of defining the notion of ‘reference’; we would not count a reference to a non-existent object as a ‘reference’ in the philosophical sense; or perhaps it might count as a reference but (...)
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  31.  14
    A. M. Honoré (1971). Reference to the Non-Existent. Philosophy 46 (178):302 - 308.
    Can we refer to objects which do not exist? Searle says that we cannot. He postulates an ‘axiom of existence’ such that, if an object does not exist, we cannot refer to it. This ‘axiom of existence’ could be taken simply as a way of defining the notion of ‘reference’; we would not count a reference to a non-existent object as a ‘reference’ in the philosophical sense; or perhaps it might count as a reference but (...)
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  32. Edward N. Zalta (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.
    The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as (...)
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  33.  30
    Matthew Stone (1999). Reference to Possible Worlds. Technical Report 49, Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science.
    In modal subordination, a modal sentence is interpreted relative to a hypothetical scenario introduced in an earlier sentence. In this paper, I argue that this phenomenon reflects the fact that the interpretation of modals is an ANAPHORIC process. Modal morphemes introduce sets of possible worlds, representing alternative hypothetical scenarios, as entities into the discourse model. Their interpretation depends on evoking sets of worlds recording described and reference scenarios, and relating such sets to one another using familiar notions of restricted, (...)
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  34. Daniel Asher Krasner (2001). Reference and Fictional Names. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    Philosophical accounts of the semantics of fiction have tended to be problematic in one of two ways: either they have denied that items used in fictional discourse have their plain meaning, introducing complications into otherwise satisfactory accounts of semantics, or they have posited special kinds of entities, introducing complications into otherwise satisfactory accounts of ontology. Accounts that tried to avoid these problems by positing mere possibilia as fictional entities were thought to be hopeless inasmuch as it was thought (...)
     
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  35.  21
    Ioan-Radu Motoarca (2014). Fictional Surrogates. Philosophia 42 (4):1033-1053.
    It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names . In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity view. I also show that (...)
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  36.  2
    Jonas Grethlein (2010). Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with Thanks to Thucydides1. History and Theory 49 (3):315-335.
    Lately, the concept of experience, which postmodernist theoreticians declared dead, has seen a renaissance. The immediacy of experience seems to offer the possibility of reaching beyond linguistic discourses. In their attempt to overcome the “linguistic turn,” scholars such as Ankersmit, Gumbrecht, and Runia pit experience against narrative. This paper takes up the recent interest in experience, but argues against the opposition to narrative into which experience tends to be cast. The relation between experience and narrative is more complex than is (...)
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  37.  39
    R. J. Nelson (1992). Naming and Reference: The Link of Word to Object. Routledge.
    The problem of reference is central to the fields of linguistics, cognitive science, and epistemology yet it remains largely unresolved. Naming and Reference explains the reference of lexical terms, with particular emphasis placed on proper names, demonstrative pronouns and personal pronouns. It examines such specific issues as: how to account for the reference of names that are empty or speculative, which abound in science and philosophy, and how to account for intentional reference as in "he (...)
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  38.  28
    Jeanette K. Gundel & Nancy Ann Hedberg (eds.) (2008). Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    The ability to produce and understand referring expressions is basic to human language use and human cognition. Reference comprises the ability to think of and represent objects (both real and imagined/fictional), to indicate to others which of these objects we are talking about, and to determine what others are talking about when they use a nominal expression. The articles in this volume are concerned with some of the central themes and challenges in research on reference (...)
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  39.  31
    Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Eric Oberheim (2009). Reference, Ontological Replacement and Neo-Kantianism: A Reply to Sankey. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):203-209.
    Contrary to Sankey’s central assumption, incommensurability does not imply incomparability of content, nor threaten scientific realism by challenging the rationality of theory comparison. Moreover, Sankey equivocates between reference to specific entities by statements used to test theories and reference to kinds by theories themselves. This distinction helps identify and characterize the genuine threat that incommensurability poses to realism, which is ontological discontinuity as evidenced in the historical record: Successive theories reclassify objects into mutually exclusive sets of kinds (...)
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  40.  79
    Graham Harman (2011). The Road to Objects. Continent 3 (1):171-179.
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 171-179. Since 2007 there has been a great deal of interest in speculative realism, launched in the spring of that year at a well-attended workshop in London. It was always a loose arrangement of people who shared few explicit doctrines and no intellectual heroes except the horror writer H.P. Lovecraft, an improbable patron saint for a school of metaphysics. Lovecraft serves as a sort of mascot for the “speculative” part of speculative realism, since his grotesque semi-Euclidean monsters (...)
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  41.  82
    David B. Martens (1993). Close Enough to Reference. Synthese 95 (3):357 - 377.
    This paper proposes a response to the duplication objection to the descriptive theory of singular mental reference. This objection involves hypothetical cases in each of which there are a pair of qualitatively indistinguishable objects and a thought that apparently refers to only one of the pair, despite the descriptive indistinguishability of the two objects. I identify a concept of reference-likeness or closeness to reference, which is related to the concept of genuine singular reference as (...)
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  42.  21
    Frederique Janssen-Lauret (2016). Committing to an Individual: Ontological Commitment, Reference and Epistemology. Synthese 193 (2):583-604.
    When we use a directly referential expression to denote an object, do we incur an ontological commitment to that object, as Russell and Barcan Marcus held? Not according to Quine, whose regimented language has only variables as denoting expressions, but no constants to model direct reference. I make a case for a more liberal conception of ontological commitment—more wide-ranging than Quine’s—which allows for commitment to individuals, with an improved logical language of regimentation. The reason for Quine’s prohibition on commitment (...)
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  43. Eva M. Dadlez (1997). What's Hecuba to Him?: Fictional Events and Actual Emotions. Penn State University Press.
    The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that construals of our emotional responses to fictions as irrational or merely pseudo-emotional are not the only explanations available to us, and that necessary and sufficient conditions for an emotional response to a fiction can be established without abandoning either its intentionality or the assignment of a causal role to our beliefs. ;Colin Radford's claim that our emotional responses to fictions are irrational and inconsistent is challenged in two ways. First, distinctions can (...)
     
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  44.  28
    Reina Hayaki (2009). Fictional Characters as Abstract Objects: Some Questions. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):141 - 149.
    Sir Arthur Conan doyle wrote fifty-six short stories and four novels about Sherlock Holmes, collectively known as the Canon. The following are all true facts about the Canon: It is true according to the Canon that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. It is true according to the Canon that Queen Victoria hired a private consulting detective, gave him an emerald tiepin, and offered him a knighthood which he refused. The Canon is about Sherlock Holmes. The Canon is about a brilliant (...)
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  45.  7
    Louise McNally & Henriëtte de Swart (2015). Reference to and Via Properties: The View From Dutch. Linguistics and Philosophy 38 (4):315-362.
    Many languages offer a surprisingly complex range of options for referring to entities using expressions whose main descriptive content is contributed by an adjective, such as Dutch de blinde ‘the blind,’ het besprokene, ‘the discussed,’ or het ongewone van het niet roken ‘the strange about not smoking.’ In this paper, we present a case study of the syntax and compositional semantics of three such constructions in Dutch, one of which we argue has not previously been identified in the literature. The (...)
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  46.  8
    O. Chateaubriand (2004). Boole on Reference and Universe of Discourse: Reply to John Corcoran. Manuscrito 27 (1):173-182.
    In §1 I examine Boole’s “principle of wholistic reference” in relation to Frege’s postulation of truth-values as referents for sentences. I also consider in this connection Frege’s interpretation of quantification and his view that functions and concepts must be defined for all objects. I then present my own contrasting views on the reference of sentences. In §2 I discuss Boole’s introduction of the notion of universe of discourse and consider whether one of the issues implicit in John’s (...)
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  47. Jonathan Kramnick (2010). Actions and Objects From Hobbes to Richardson. Stanford University Press.
    How do minds cause events in the world? How does _wanting_ to write a letter _cause_ a person's hands to move across the page, or _believing_ something to be true _cause_ a person to make a promise? In _Actions and Objects_, Jonathan Kramnick examines the literature and philosophy of action during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when philosophers and novelists, poets and scientists were all concerned with the place of the mind in the world. These writers asked whether (...)
     
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  48. Graham D. Martin (1982). A New Look at Fictional Reference: Graham D. Martin. Philosophy 57 (220):223-236.
    In Chapters 6 and 7 of Language, Truth and Poetry I attempted to solve the ancient problem of fictional reference by claiming that a fictional construct ‘points’ or refers to certain features of reality in rather the same way as an abstraction like ‘gravitation’ or ‘cruelty’ does. I now believe that this theory of mine is unsatisfactory; and I should like to propose a new solution to the problem.
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  49.  22
    Peter Alward, Reading, Writing, and Speech Act Theory: Prolegomena to Any Future Logic of Fiction.
    meaning of a proper name is simply its referent.[1] This thesis, however, brings with it a whole host of problems. One particularly thorny difficulty is that of negative existentials, sentences of the form ‘N does not exist’ (where ‘N’ is a proper name). Intuitively, some such sentences are true, but the direct reference theory seems to imply that they must be either false or meaningless. After all, if the meaning of a name is just its referent, then a sentence (...)
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  50.  2
    Lucía Lewowicz, The Term Phlogiston and the Notion of "Failure to Refer".
    Finding out which terms – scientific or otherwise— fail to refer is an extremely complex business since both felicitous reference and failure to refer must be negotiated. Causal theories of reference –even so-called hybrid theories – posit that in order to refer to something, we need the regulative idea of an ontological reference, which operates even when we refer to impossibilia or inconceivable objects. Evidently, this is not the case of the referent of phlogiston, which is (...)
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