Search results for 'reference to fictional objects' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Andriy Vasylchenko (2009). The Problem of Reference to Nonexistents in Cocchiarella's Conceptual Realism. Axiomathes 19 (2):155-166.score: 500.0
    This article is a critical review of Cocchiarella’s theory of reference. In conceptual realism, there are two central distinctions regarding reference: first, between active and deactivated use of referential expressions, and, second, between using referential expressions with and without existential presupposition. Cocchiarella’s normative restrictions on the existential presuppositions of reference lead to postulating two fundamentally different kinds of objects in conceptual realism: realia or concrete objects, on the one hand, and abstract intensional objects or (...)
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  2. Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146.score: 468.0
    I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to (...)
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  3. Marzenna Cyzman (2011). “Lying, Poets Tell the Truth …”. “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” by John Searle – a Still Possible Solution to an Old Problem? Logic and Logical Philosophy 20 (4):317-326.score: 434.0
    The purpose of this article is to consider an answer to the question whether Searle’s idea of sentence in a literary text is still relevant. Understanding literary utterances as specific speech acts, pretended illocutions, is inherent in the process of considering the sentence in a literary text in broader terms. Accordingly, it appears necessary to outline it. Reference to other ideas formulated both in the theory of literature as a speech act [R. Ohmann, S. Levin] as well as in (...)
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  4. Jim Stone (2010). Harry Potter and the Spectre of Imprecision. Analysis 70 (4):638-644.score: 408.0
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  5. Erich Rast (2010). Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Fiction in Philosophy.score: 388.0
    An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a (...)
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  6. Daniel Hunter (1981). Reference and Meinongian Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:23-36.score: 363.0
    Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formahzation of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be estabHshed if Parsons' theory is correct. This (...)
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  7. Jacek Paśniczek (2003). Ways of Reference to Meinongian Objects. Ontological Commitments of Meinongian Theories. Logic and Logical Philosophy 2 (5):69-86.score: 351.0
    A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . (...)
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  8. Francesco Berto (2008). Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects. Metaphysica 9 (2):205-218.score: 290.3
    Drawing on different suggestions from the literature, we outline a unified metaphysical framework, labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM), combining Meinongian themes with a non-standard modal ontology. The MMM approach is based on (1) a comprehension principle (CP) for objects in unrestricted, but qualified form, and (2) the employment of an ontology of impossible worlds, besides possible ones. In §§1–2, we introduce the classical Meinongian metaphysics and consider two famous Russellian criticisms, namely (a) the charge of inconsistency and (b) (...)
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  9. Edward N. Zalta (2003). Referring to Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.score: 288.0
    The author engages a question raised about theories of nonexistent objects. The question concerns the way names of fictional characters, when analyzed as names which denote nonexistent objects, acquire their denotations. Since nonexistent objects cannot causally interact with existent objects, it is thought that we cannot appeal to a `dubbing' or a `baptism'. The question is, therefore, what is the starting point of the chain? The answer is that storytellings are to be thought of as (...)
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  10. Hector-Neri Castañeda (forthcoming). Objects, Existence, and Reference A Prolegomenon to Guise Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:3-59.score: 283.5
    This is an investigation into the fundamental connections between the referential use of language and our rich human experience. All types of experience — perceptual, practical, scientific, literary, esthetic, ludic, ... — are tightly unified into one total experience by the structure of reference to real or possible items. Singular reference is essential for locating ourselves in our own corner of the world. General reference, by means of quantifiers, is our main tool in ascertaining the accessible patterns (...)
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  11. Eleonora Orlando (2008). Fictional Names Without Fictional Objects (Ficción Sin Metafísica). Crítica 40 (120):111 - 127.score: 270.0
    In this paper, I criticize Mark Sainsbury's proposal concerning the semantic analysis of fictional discourse, as it has been put forward in chapter 6 of his Reference without Referents. His main thesis is that fictional names do not refer, and hence statements containing them are genuinely false and must be interpreted in terms of true paraphrases, arrived at on a case-by-case basis. In my opinion, the proposal has a problem derived from the fact that the relation between (...)
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  12. Peter Alward, Reading, Writing, and Speech Act Theory: Prolegomena to Any Future Logic of Fiction.score: 270.0
    meaning of a proper name is simply its referent.[1] This thesis, however, brings with it a whole host of problems. One particularly thorny difficulty is that of negative existentials, sentences of the form ‘N does not exist’ (where ‘N’ is a proper name). Intuitively, some such sentences are true, but the direct reference theory seems to imply that they must be either false or meaningless. After all, if the meaning of a name is just its referent, then a sentence (...)
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  13. Donna E. West (forthcoming). Indexical Reference to Absent Objects. Semiotics:153-165.score: 263.3
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  14. Jacek Pasniczek (1994). Ways of Reference to Meinongian Objects. Logic and Logical Philosophy 2:69.score: 263.3
     
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  15. D. E. West (forthcoming). Indexical Reference to Absent Objects: Extensions of the Peircean Notion of Index. Semiotics:153-165.score: 263.3
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  16. Terence Parsons (1975). A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 1:73-86.score: 259.0
    This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
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  17. Ioan-Radu Motoarca (forthcoming). Fictional Surrogates. Philosophia:1-21.score: 259.0
    It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names (e.g. ‘Napoleon’ in War and Peace). In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity (...)
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  18. Michael E. Levin (1976). On the Ascription of Functions to Objects, with Special Reference to Inference in Archaeology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (3):227-234.score: 256.5
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  19. T. Natsoulas (1996). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Consideration of the Problem with Special Reference to Husserl's Phenomenological Account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):161-184.score: 256.5
     
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  20. R. J. Nelson (1992). Naming and Reference: The Link of Word to Object. Routledge.score: 252.0
    The problem of reference is central to the fields of linguistics, cognitive science, and epistemology yet it remains largely unresolved. Naming and Reference explains the reference of lexical terms, with particular emphasis placed on proper names, demonstrative pronouns and personal pronouns. It examines such specific issues as: how to account for the reference of names that are empty or speculative, which abound in science and philosophy, and how to account for intentional reference as in "he (...)
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  21. Jeanette K. Gundel & Nancy Ann Hedberg (eds.) (2008). Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.score: 252.0
    The ability to produce and understand referring expressions is basic to human language use and human cognition. Reference comprises the ability to think of and represent objects (both real and imagined/fictional), to indicate to others which of these objects we are talking about, and to determine what others are talking about when they use a nominal expression. The articles in this volume are concerned with some of the central themes and challenges in research on reference (...)
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  22. Graham Harman (2011). The Road to Objects. Continent 3 (1):171-179.score: 244.0
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 171-179. Since 2007 there has been a great deal of interest in speculative realism, launched in the spring of that year at a well-attended workshop in London. It was always a loose arrangement of people who shared few explicit doctrines and no intellectual heroes except the horror writer H.P. Lovecraft, an improbable patron saint for a school of metaphysics. Lovecraft serves as a sort of mascot for the “speculative” part of speculative realism, since his grotesque semi-Euclidean monsters (...)
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  23. Friederike Moltmann (2013). Reference to Numbers in Natural Language. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.score: 225.0
    A common view is that natural language treats numbers as abstract objects, with expressions like the number of planets, eight, as well as the number eight acting as referential terms referring to numbers. In this paper I will argue that this view about reference to numbers in natural language is fundamentally mistaken. A more thorough look at natural language reveals a very different view of the ontological status of natural numbers. On this view, numbers are not primarily treated (...)
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  24. Heidi Savage, Four Problems with Empty Names.score: 222.0
    Empty names vary in their referential features. Some of them, as Kripke argues, are necessarily empty -- those that are used to create works of fiction. Others appear to be contingently empty -- those which fail to refer at this world, but which do uniquely identify particular objects in other possible worlds. I argue against Kripke's metaphysical and semantic reasons for thinking that either some or all empty names are necessarily non-referring, because these reasons are either not the right (...)
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  25. Graham Harman (2012). Object-Oriented France: The Philosophy of Tristan Garcia. Continent 2 (1):6-21.score: 210.0
    continent. 2.1 (2012): 6–21. The French philosopher and novelist Tristan Garcia was born in Toulouse in 1981. This makes him rather young to have written such an imaginative work of systematic philosophy as Forme et objet , 1 the latest entry in the MétaphysiqueS series at Presses universitaires de France. But this reference to Garcia’s youthfulness is not a form of condescension: by publishing a complete system of philosophy in the grand style, he has already done what none of (...)
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  26. Øystein Linnebo (2009). Frege's Context Principle and Reference to Natural Numbers. In Sten Lindström (ed.), Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What Has Become of Them. Springer.score: 207.0
    Frege proposed that his Context Principle—which says that a word has meaning only in the context of a proposition—can be used to explain reference, both in general and to mathematical objects in particular. I develop a version of this proposal and outline answers to some important challenges that the resulting account of reference faces. Then I show how this account can be applied to arithmetic to yield an explanation of our reference to the natural numbers and (...)
     
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  27. Ryan Nichols (2002). Reid on Fictional Objects and the Way of Ideas. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):582-601.score: 207.0
    I argue that Reid adopts a form of Meinongianism about fictional objects because of, not in spite of, his common sense philosophy. According to 'the way of ideas', thoughts take representational states as their immediate intentional objects. In contrast, Reid endorses a direct theory of conception and a heady thesis of first-person privileged access to the contents of our thoughts. He claims that thoughts about centaurs are thoughts of non-existent objects, not thoughts about mental intermediaries, adverbial (...)
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  28. O. Bueno & M. Colyvan (2003). Yablo's Paradox and Referring to Infinite Objects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):402 – 412.score: 206.3
    The blame for the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes is often placed on self-reference and circularity. Some years ago, Yablo [1985; 1993] challenged this diagnosis, by producing a paradox that's liar-like but does not seem to involve circularity. But is Yablo's paradox really non-circular? In a recent paper, Beall [2001] has suggested that there are no means available to refer to Yablo's paradox without invoking descriptions, and since Priest [1997] has shown that any such description is circular, Beall concludes that (...)
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  29. Matthew Stone, Reference to Possible Worlds.score: 204.0
    In modal subordination, a modal sentence is interpreted relative to a hypothetical scenario introduced in an earlier sentence. In this paper, I argue that this phenomenon reflects the fact that the interpretation of modals is an ANAPHORIC process. Modal morphemes introduce sets of possible worlds, representing alternative hypothetical scenarios, as entities into the discourse model. Their interpretation depends on evoking sets of worlds recording described and reference scenarios, and relating such sets to one another using familiar notions of restricted, (...)
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  30. Anthony Everett (2007). Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.score: 202.5
    There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then (...)
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  31. Peter Simons (2000). Continuants and Occurrents, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):59–75.score: 198.0
    [Peter Simons] Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being (...)
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  32. Joseph Melia (2000). Continuants and Occurrents, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):77–92.score: 198.0
    [Peter Simons] Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being (...)
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  33. Charles Crittenden (1973). Thinking About Non-Being. Inquiry 16 (1-4):290 – 312.score: 198.0
    There are genuine references to non?existent objects, as can be seen through elucidating reference in common language and applying the criteria enumerated to expressions used in writing and speaking about fiction. The concept of a fictitious entity is simply accepted in the adoption of the ?language?game? of fiction and has no undesirable ontological consequences. To think otherwise is to fail to attend to the conceptual status of such talk. Accounts of fictional discourse by Russell, Ryle, and Chisholm (...)
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  34. Mohan P. Matthen (2006). On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.score: 196.5
    John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on (...)
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  35. David B. Martens (1993). Close Enough to Reference. Synthese 95 (3):357 - 377.score: 193.5
    This paper proposes a response to the duplication objection to the descriptive theory of singular mental reference. This objection involves hypothetical cases in each of which there are a pair of qualitatively indistinguishable objects and a thought that apparently refers to only one of the pair, despite the descriptive indistinguishability of the two objects. I identify a concept of reference-likeness or closeness to reference, which is related to the concept of genuine singular reference as (...)
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  36. Anthony Everett (2014). Sainsbury on Thinking About Fictional Things. Acta Analytica 29 (2):181-194.score: 193.5
    In a number of places Mark Sainsbury has recently developed an attractive irrealist account of fiction and intentionality, on which there are no fictional objects or exotic intentional entities. A central component of his account is an ambitious argument, which aims to establish that the truth of intensional transitives such as “I think about Holmes” and “Alexander feared Zeus” does not require the existence of fictional or intentional objects. It would be good news indeed for the (...)
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  37. Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.score: 192.0
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  38. Edgar Chan, Oliver Baumann, Mark Bellgrove & Jason Mattingley (2012). From Objects to Landmarks: The Function of Visual Location Information in Spatial Navigation. Frontiers in Psychology 3:304-1.score: 189.0
    Landmarks play an important role in guiding navigational behavior. A host of studies in the last 15 years has demonstrated that environmental objects can act as landmarks for navigation in different ways. In this review, we propose a parsimonious four-part taxonomy for conceptualizing object location information during navigation. We begin by outlining object properties that appear to be important for a landmark to attain salience. We then systematically examine the different functions of objects as navigational landmarks based on (...)
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  39. Øystein Linnebo (2012). Reference by Abstraction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):45-71.score: 184.5
    Frege suggests that criteria of identity should play a central role in the explanation of reference, especially to abstract objects. This paper develops a precise model of how we can come to refer to a particular kind of abstract object, namely, abstract letter types. It is argued that the resulting abstract referents are ‘metaphysically lightweight’.
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  40. R. M. Sainsbury (1999). Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really': R.M. Sainsbury. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.score: 178.0
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...)
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  41. David Wiggins (1999). Names, Fictional Names and 'Really': David Wiggins. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):271–286.score: 178.0
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...)
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  42. Francesco Berto (2011). Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35.score: 175.5
    We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make (...)
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  43. Gerald Vision (1980). Fictional Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:45-59.score: 172.5
    Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional names are not referential (...)
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  44. Paisley Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli (2011). Philosophical Perspectives on Fictional Characters. New Literary History 42 (2):337-360.score: 170.0
    This paper takes up a series of basic philosophical questions about the nature and existence of fictional characters. We begin with realist approaches that hinge on the thesis that at least some claims about fictional characters can be right or wrong because they refer to something that exists, such as abstract objects. Irrealist approaches deny such realist postulations and hold instead that fictional characters are a figment of the human imagination. A third family of approaches, based (...)
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  45. Francesco Berto (2012). Existence as a Real Property. Synthèse Library, Springer.score: 166.5
    This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date Meinongian theory (...)
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  46. Francesco Berto (2012). The Selection Problem. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262:519-37.score: 166.5
    In 'Fiction and Fictionalism', Mark Sainsbury has recently dubbed “Selection Problem” a serious trouble for Meinongian object theories. Typically, Meinongianism has been phrased as a kind of realism on nonexistent objects : these are mind-independent things, not mental simulacra, having the properties they have independently from the activity of any cognitive agent. But how can one single out an object we have no causal acquaintance with, and which is devoid of spatiotemporal location, picking it out from a pre-determined, mind-independent (...)
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  47. Gabriele Contessa (2010). Scientific Models and Fictional Objects. Synthese 172 (2):215 - 229.score: 162.0
    In this paper, I distinguish scientific models in three kinds on the basis of their ontological status—material models, mathematical models and fictional models, and develop and defend an account of fictional models as fictional objects—i.e. abstract objects that stand for possible concrete objects.
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  48. Luke Manning (2014). Real Representation of Fictional Objects. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (1):13-24.score: 162.0
    Assuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds (...)
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  49. Katharina Felka (2014). Number Words and Reference to Numbers. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):261-282.score: 159.0
    A realist view of numbers often rests on the following thesis: statements like ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’ are identity statements in which the copula is flanked by singular terms whose semantic function consists in referring to a number (henceforth: Identity). On the basis of Identity the realists argue that the assertive use of such statements commits us to numbers. Recently, some anti-realists have disputed this argument. According to them, Identity is false, and, thus, we may deny (...)
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