Online research in philosophy

Existing interpretations of Kant’s appeal to the spontaneity of the mind focus almost exclusively on the discussion of pure apperception in the Transcendental Deduction. The risk of such a strategy lies in the considerable degree of abstraction at which the argument of the Deduction is carried out: existing interpretations fail to reconnect adequately with any ground-level perspective on our cognitive lives. This paper works in the opposite direction. Drawing on Kant’s suggestion that the most basic picture we can have of (...) our cognitive capacity already makes reference to its state of excellence, or health (“sound understanding”), I set out by assembling Kant’s normative ground-level view of our cognitive lives, and then search for the fundamental condition of its possibility. This leads me to Kant’s conception of reflection as a normative requirement of judgment. Through examination of Kant’s remarks on reflection, I connect Kant’s preoccupation with the enlightenment ideal of originality (thinking for oneself) with his central appeal to the spontaneity of the mind. (shrink)

Drawing on recent cognitive theories of the emotions, this article develops an account of critical reflection as requiring emotional flexibility and involving the ability to envisage alternative reasons for action. The focus on the role of emotions in critical reflection, and in agents' resistance to reflection, suggests the need to move beyond an introspective to a more social and relational conception of the process of reflection. It also casts new light on the intractable problem of explaining (...) how oppressive socialisation impairs the capacity for autonomy. (shrink)

Kierkegaard and the Role of Reflection in Second Immediacy Merold WESTPHAL 159 Demons and the Demonic: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Anxiety and Sexual ...

The tension in evidence-based practice and reflective practice -- The relationship between reflection and action research -- An overview of theories of consciousness and unconsciousness -- What do we mean by creativity? -- Using metaphor and symbolism as analysis -- Infinite possibilities of knowing and transformation -- Concluding thoughts; the linkages to action research and critical creativity.

In this article, I suggest an argument that seems to show a conflict between the reflection principle and conditionalization. In particular, I show that when the reflection principle is formulated in a standard way, the principle conflicts with Jeffrey conditionalization. And it is argued that the source of the conflict resides in an ambiguity of the standard formulation. Furthermore, I attempt to rescue the principle using Bayes factors. That is, I suggest a new formulation of the principle so (...) as to avoid the conflict. (shrink)

The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.

Abstract In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of ?mere reflection?. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of ?mere reflection? and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility (...) that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties. (shrink)

The Dutch pig husbandry has become a topic of public debate. One underlying cause is that pig farmers and urban-citizens have different perspectives and underlying norms, values and truths on pig husbandry and animal welfare. One way of dealing with such conflicts involves a learning process in which a shared vision is developed. A prerequisite for this process is that both parties become aware of their own fixed patterns of thoughts, actions, and blind spots. Therefore, we conducted five homogeneous focus (...) groups consisting of either urban-citizens or pig farmers. The first part of the sessions aimed to make the participants aware of their own perspectives and underlying norms and values concerning animal welfare, farm practices or consumer behavior. Then, by the use of role-play and film fragments showing the perspectives of the other party, we aimed to stimulate frame reflection. The farmers maintained their own perspective and defended their practices. They denied the perspective of the urban-citizens by portraying them as ignorant of the “factual” farm practices. They proposed the use of one-way information, but our results indicate that this is likely to fail as a strategy to support or restore public acceptance. Our case shows hardy any consensus regarding the relevance of the facts at stake and a very limited amount of shared values. However, the shared love for animals together with the recognition by the urban-citizens of the inescapable dilemma for farmers to adopt a use-framing towards animals might provide an opening for further learning strategies. (shrink)

This exploration of virtue ethics offers an original theory in moral philosophy, identifying a 'moral reflection' as a virtue that has not yet been considered properly by philosophers. The author argues that taking our moral lives seriously must involve some reflection on our moral past.

"This is one of the most interesting texts I have read for many years ... It is authoritative and clearly written. It provides a rich set of examples of teaching, and a reflective discourse." Professor George Brown "...succeeds in inspiring the reader by making the process of reflective learning interesting and thought provoking ... has a narrative drive which makes it a book too good to put down." Dr Mary Thorpe "...a delightful and unusual reflective journey...the whole book is driven (...) by a cycle of questions, examples, strategies and generalizations from the examples. In all, it is the clearest example of practise-what-you-preach that I have seen." Professor John Biggs This unusual, accessible and significant book begins each chapter by posing a question with which college and university teachers can be expected to identify; and then goes on to answer the question by presenting a series of examples; finally, each chapter closes with 'second thoughts', presenting a viewpoint somewhat distinct from that taken by John Cowan. This book will assist university teachers to plan and run innovative activities to enable their students to engage in effective reflective learning; it will help them adapt other teachers' work for use with their own students; and will give them a rationale for the place of reflective teaching and learning in higher education. (shrink)

Yin Haiguang’s investigation and pursuit of the idea of “Man” reflect not merely a limited historical or parochial academic interest, but indeed address an ultimate concern of humanity which transcends any spatio-temporal limitations. In criticizing “modern man” for its faceless and non-self-identical figure, Yin Haiguang brings the conditions, purposes and noble values of humanity to light. His work has extraordinary significance for the highest aims of humanity and civilization.

Preface In his book, African Philosophy, Theophilius Okere, after arguing that the way to African philosophy is the path of hermeneutics of culture, ...

How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment (the manner in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle-a version amended to handle cases of (...) information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own. Denying that view-call it the "equal weight view"-leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes. Accepting the view seems to lead to another absurdity: that one should suspend judgment about everything that one's smart and well-informed friends disagree on, which means suspending judgment about almost everything interesting. But despite appearances, the equal weight view does not have this absurd consequence. Furthermore, the view can be generalized to handle cases involving not just epistemic peers, but also epistemic superiors and inferiors. (shrink)

Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection (...) only if he or she is certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a "Distorted Reflection" principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence. In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls "self-doubt." The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt. (shrink)

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed. For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways that make the relationship (...) between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values. (shrink)

An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. (...) Further properties of consciousness, such as differentiated qualities of experience, including qualia, emerge with conscious reflection. In particular, qualia are not constituents or direct properties of consciousness per se. Assuming that they are so is a common and ultimately disastrous misconstrual of the problems of consciousness. (shrink)

How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in the (...) context in which you doxastically deliberate. The case reveals an important stability condition on doxastic commitment that plays no role in cases modeled on Ulysses and the Sirens, the scenario that has shaped previous attempts to draw an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. The stability condition thereby revealed is not diachronic -- it does not involve a shift in belief -- but we can construct specifically diachronic cases that reveal an important intrapersonal epistemic obligation. This obligation arises when you expect the shift in belief by ‘projecting’ yourself into a future doxastic context -- thus vindicating a restricted, but only this restricted, application of Bas van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. Despite some important differences, we can use these diachronic cases as a model for interpersonal cases that reveal an important role for doxastic context in the epistemology of disagreement. But the roles played by projection and context in disagreement ensure that there is no general obligation to be responsive to the opinion of an epistemic peer who disagrees with you. (shrink)

“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the (...) foundation of morals. This new edition of Practical Reflection contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science. (shrink)

Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemological or both) between veridical perceptual experiences occurring when one perceives and (...) perceptual experiences involved in hallucination. Common-kind theorists have denied this. In this paper, I examine the nature of introspection – a faculty that has often been compared and contrasted to perception. I reflect on cases where introspection goes wrong in ways analogous to that in which our perceptual faculties can go wrong and formulate, what I take to be, an attractive theory of introspection. The cases that I focus on in which things go wrong are the case of zombies and the case of subjects with Anton’s syndrome. (Anton’s syndrome is a condition in which people who are blind claim that they can see.) I suggest that, just as it is possible to be a disjunctivist about perception, it is possible to be a disjunctivist about introspection. I argue that this is a good view of one type of introspection, namely, introspection of states that have phenomenal character, such as perceptual experiences. It has a good account to give of the cases in which such introspection seems to go wrong and it yields a plausible metaphysical and epistemological view of the nature of introspection. However, while I favour a disjunctive view of introspection, I do not favour a disjunctive view of perception. And, I suspect, that many disjunctivists about perception would not wish to condone my disjunctivist theory of introspection. I therefore go on to examine to what extent.. (shrink)

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment (...) 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect. (shrink)

Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering (...) a new justification for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. There are ways to connect Conditionalization to Reflection, but these connections depend on poor assumptions about our introspective access, and are not tight enough to draw the sorts of conclusions van Fraassen wants. Upon close examination, the two principles seem to be getting at two quite independent epistemic norms. (shrink)

Most commentators working on Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics note that he rejects the very possibility of traditional normative ethics, that is, a philosophically justified normative guide for right conduct. In this article, Wittgenstein’s view of ethical reflection as presented in his notebooks from 1936 to 1938 is investigated, and the question of whether it involves ethical guidance is addressed. In Wittgenstein’s remarks, we can identify three requirements inherent in ethical reflection. The first two is revealed in the realisation (...) that ethical reflection presupposes both a clear understanding of oneself and a normative ideal of how one ought to live and reason. The third source of normativity springs from the fact that ethical reflection involves a relationship with the other, not as judge, but as example and addressee. In this way, ethical reflection is essentially relational. In the article, we unfold how these three normative sources figure in Wittgenstein’s remarks, especially how the third requirement, the relationship with the other, shows both a point of conversion and a difference between his view of ethics and religious faith. It will also be argued that even if Wittgenstein thus presents ethical reflection as a normatively guided activity, the content of the guidance is personal, springing solely from the reflecting individual. (shrink)

In Belief and the Will, van Fraassen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. There and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability are undertakings of commitments) that he espouses as an alternative to descriptivism (first-person reports of subjective probability are merely self-descriptions). Christensen and others have attacked Reflection, taking (...) it to have unpalatable consequences. We prescind from the question of the cogency of diachronic Dutch Book arguments, and focus on Reflection's proper interpretation. We argue that Reflection is not as counterintuitive as it appears — that once interpreted properly the status of the counterexamples given by Christensen and others is left open. We show also that descriptivism can make sense of Reflection, while voluntarism is not especially well suited to do so. (shrink)

Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of (...) wisdom with the results of these empirical studies? Should we even attempt to? I shall defend the view that philosophy and cognitive sciences genuinely interact in tackling questions such as whether reflection leads to making wise choices. (shrink)

Is it possible to investigate subjectivity reflectively? Can reflection give us access to the original experiential dimension, or is there on the contrary reason to suspect that the experiences are changed radically when reflected upon? This is a question that Natorp discusses in his Allgemeine Psychologie (1912), and the conclusion he reaches is highly anti-phenomenological. The article presents Natorp's challenge and then goes on to account in detail for Heidegger's subsequent response to it in his early Freiburg lectures, in (...) particular Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem (1919), Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/1920), Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (1920) and Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (1921–1922). Heidegger's early views on reflection, selfhood, and pre-reflective self-awareness are expounded, and the article concludes with a discussion of the relationship between reflective phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better (...) over time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs. Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection is both rational and necessary for persons. (shrink)

We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration (ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our general thesis is that (...) principles that base your current opinions on your current opinions about your future opinions need not make reference to the particular times in the future at which you believe you will have those opinions, but they do need to make reference to the particular degrees of belief you believe you will have in the future. (shrink)

Interpretations of recollection in the "Phaedo" are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible (...) particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the "Phaedo", recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum. (shrink)

Those concerned with Locke’s Essay have largely ignored his account of reflection. I present and defend an interpretation of Locke’s theory of reflection on which reflection is not a variety of introspection; rather, for Locke, we acquire ideas of our mental operations indirectly. Furthermore, reflection is involuntary and distinct from consciousness. The interpretation I present also explains reflection’s role in the acquisition of non-sensory ideas (e.g., ideas of pleasure, existence, succession, etc.). I situate this reading (...) within the secondary literature on reflection and discuss its consequences for interpretations of Locke’s views on empiricism, knowledge, and personal identity. -/- -/- . (shrink)

This is a review of Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer 2007).

One recent topic of debate in Bayesian epistemology has been the question of whether imprecise credences can be rational. I argue that one account of imprecise credences, the orthodox treatment as defended by James M. Joyce, is untenable. Despite Joyce’s claims to the contrary, a puzzle introduced by Roger White shows that the orthodox account, when paired with Bas C. van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, can lead to inconsistent beliefs. Proponents of imprecise credences, then, must either provide a compelling reason (...) to reject Reflection or admit that the rational credences in White’s case are precise. (shrink)

Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ plainly has an anti-Cartesian conclusion: ‘inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general’ (B278). Due to wide-spread preoccupation with Cartesian skepticism, and to the anti-naturalism of early analytic philosophy, most of Kant’s recent commentators have sought to find a purely conceptual, ‘analytic’ argument in Kant’s Refutation of Idealism – and then have dismissed Kant when no such plausible argument can be reconstructed from his text. Kant’s argument supposedly cannot eliminate all relevant alternatives, (...) and so cannot justify its strong modal claims. Kant based his arguments on an inventory of our basic cognitive capacities to employ our forms of intuition and our forms of judgment. Kant provides a variety of considerations and arguments to determine what our cognitive capacities are. This involves ‘transcendental reflection’, which Kant held is absolutely crucial for judging matters a priori (A263/B319). I argue that there is a level of philosophical reflection on our own cognitive capabilities and their preconditions that is significantly richer than has been noticed by recent commentators, and that is a precondition of Kant’s transcendental reflection proper. I explicate certain thought experiments Kant proposes in order for us to recognize some our basic, characteristic cognitive capabilities, and the limits and requirements they entail for the nature and objects of human knowledge. These thought experiments involve a kind of reflection on who we as cognizant subjects are, on what our basic cognitive capabilities are. Engaging in this kind of reflection reveals that Kant’s transcendental arguments are significantly stronger and more persuasive than has been recognized in recent commentary. (shrink)

This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-reflective knower has authority over her own mental states, while the Spectator (...) does not. I highlight the implications of this construal for a theory of action, and call attention onto some other interesting normative relations between the self-reflective agent and the Other that escape both the first-person and the third-person approach. My contention is that the authority of self-reflection (and of reason) is best understood as a relation of mutual recognition between self and others, hence from a second-person stance. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increasing critique of the philosophically based reasoning in bioethics which is known as principlism. This article seeks to make a postmodern contribution to this emerging debate by using notions of power and discourse to highlight the limits and superficiality of this , rationalistic mode of reflection. The focus of the discussion will be on the principle of autonomy. Recent doctoral research on a hospice organization (Karuna Hospice Service) will be used to contextualize (...) the debate to end-of life ethical dilemmas. The conclusion will be reached that the discursive richness of this organization's notion of autonomy or choice, which incorporates a holistic respect for the individual and the active creation of alternatives, can provide important insights to our understanding of autonomy in bioethics. The concern is raised that if autonomy is reified as a principle outside of the context of discourse, it may only complement the hegemonic power of biomedicine. (shrink)

David Abram’s The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human-World convincingly demonstrates the contribution that phenomenology, especially the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can make to environmental theory. But Abram’s account suffers from several limitations that are explored here. First, although Abram intends to develop an “organic” account of thinking as grounded in the sensible world, his descriptions castigate reflection and reverse, rather than rethinking, the traditional hierarchy between mind and body. Second, Abram’s emphasis on perceptual reciprocity (...) as the basis for an environmental ethic underplays the importance of the symbolic level of our interaction with others. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, in particular his account of the reversibility of flesh, offers a fruitful alternative to Abram’s methodology. (shrink)

Frank Welz’s Kritik der Lebenswelt undertakes a sociology of knowledge criticism of the work of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz that construes them as developing absolutist, egological systems opposed to the “processual” worldview prominent since the modern rise of natural science. Welz, though, misunderstands the work of Schutz and Husserl and neglects how their focus on consciousness and eidetic features pertains to the kind of reflection that one must undertake if one would avoid succumbing to absolutism, that uncovers the (...) presuppositions of the processual worldview itself, and that secures a domain distinctive of philosophy over against sociology. Finally, Welz’s charge that Schutz favors a Neo-Kantian social scientific methodology contradictory to his phenomenology neglects the levels of Schutz’s discourse and ignores how the Weberian ideal-typical approach can be subsumed within phenomenology. (shrink)

A common objection to hierarchical approaches to truth is that they fragment the concept of truth. This paper defends hierarchical approaches in general against the objection of fragmentation. It argues that the fragmentation required is familiar and unprob-lematic, via a comparison with mathematical proof. Furthermore, it offers an explanation of the source and nature of the fragmentation of truth. Fragmentation arises because the concept exhibits a kind of failure of closure under reflection. This paper offers a more precise characterization (...) of the reflection involved, first in the setting of formal theories of truth, and then in a more general setting. (shrink)

The likelihood of nurse reflection is examined from the theoretical perspectives of Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action and Moral Action and Sumner's Moral Construct of Caring in Nursing as Communicative Action, through a critical social theory lens. The argument is made that until the nurse reaches the developmental level of post-conventional moral maturity and/or Benner's Stage 5: expert, he or she is not capable of being inwardly directed reflective on self. The three developmental levels of moral maturity and Benner's (...) stages are presented with discussion on whether or not there can be self-reflection because of an innate vulnerability that leads to self-protective behaviours. It is only when the confidence from mastery of practice has been achieved can the nurse be comfortable with reflection that enables him or her to become enlightened, emancipated, and empowered. The influences and constraints of the knowledge power between nurse and patient are acknowledged. The power hierarchy of the institution is recognized as constraining. (shrink)

The paper undertakes a critical examination of three key strands- relativism, antirealism, and reflection- in Bernard Williams's sceptical interpretation of ethical thought. The anti-realist basis of Williams's 'relativism of distance' is identified and the way this threatens to render his relativism more subversive than initially appears. Focusing on Williams's anti-realism, the paper argues that it fails because it is caught on the horns of a dilemma: either it draws on a conception of reality that is metaphysically incoherent, or else (...) it employs a 'best explanation' criterion that question-beggingly excludes from further consideration the sort of reason-based explanations that disclose ethical properties to be real. Finally, it is noted that Williams's relativism and anti-realism destabilize his picture of ethical reflection. (shrink)

Reflection represents an important form of human thought; from ancient to modern times, the human capacity for reflective thinking has held the imagination of various philosophers and educational theorists. Despite this interest, researchers define reflection in different ways. One of the purposes of this article is to explore the activity of reflection by examining characteristics and contextual factors associated with it. For this purpose, various philosophical and theoretical sources are considered including Socrates, Rousseau, and Bruner, among others. (...) Following this, empirical research is examined to determine whether elements associated with reflection are consistently integrated within regular classroom instruction. Next, practical and theoretical obstacles to reflection are proposed. One of these obstacles is an over-emphasis on the technical interest, a concept described by Jürgen Habermas. Last, some implications are suggested with regard to the use of reflection as a construct for infusing new points of discussion in teacher education and practice. (shrink)

We examine the Spiritual Exercises developed by St. Ignatius Loyola for the purpose of informing the structure of reflection as a tool in business ethics. At present, reflection in business is used to clarify moods, expectations, theories of use, and defining moments. We suggest here that Ignatius' Exercises, which focus on ends, engage the emotions and imagination, use role modeling, and require a response, might be useful as a model for reflection in business.

Introduction The central aim of this book is to focus attention upon and illuminate the character of a certain phase of philosophical reflection: namely, ...

Reflection seems today to be highest fashion ineducation, especially in discussions aboutteacher education and the teaching profession.This has created the paradoxical situation that reflection is often used in an unreflectedmanner. Furthermore, this discovery ofreflection is not supported by earlierresearch. In philosophy, however, reflectionhas always played a central role.

The relationship among morality, reflection, and ideology is extremely intricate, with many avenues open for investigation. In this intriguing collection, an eminent group of scholars, including Bernard Williams, address the question of how far our moral beliefs and practices can survive the reflective understanding we have of them. From the work of a particular historical figure to the discussion of moral metaphysics, psychology, and political theory, the contributors approach the question from a variety of different fascinating angles.

The Story of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, (...) but ignores the fact that this interpretation disregards strategic considerations that might influence betting behavior. A lesson to be learned concerns the interpretation of probabilities in terms of fair bets and, more generally, the role of strategic considerations in epistemic contexts. Another lesson concerns Group-Reflection, which in its unrestricted form is highly counter-intuitive. We consider how this principle of social epistemology should be re-formulated so as to make it tenable. (shrink)

Strictly speaking, the immanent critique presented in the context of this overall critical reflection applies directly only to Hegel's thought. ...

Coleridge's relation to his German contemporaries constitutes the toughest problem in assessing his standing as a thinker. For the last half-century this relationship has been described, ultimately, as parasitic. As a result, Coleridge's contribution to religious thought has been seen primarily in terms of his poetic genius. This book revives and deepens the evaluation of Coleridge as a philosophical theologian in his own right. Coleridge had a critical and creative relation to, and kinship with, German thought. Moreover, the principal impulse (...) behind his engagement with that philosophy is traced to the more immediate context of the English Unitarian-Trinitarian controversy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The book re-establishes Coleridge as a philosopher of religion and as a vital source for contemporary theological reflection. (shrink)

The author begins with an outline of Bernard William's moral philosophy, within which he locates William's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defence of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgements and tensed judgements. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the re-adoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in the (...) one case, a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this. Footnotes1 This essay is derived from a lecture entitled ‘Bernard Williams’, delivered at Oxford University in 2000, in the series ‘Oxford Philosophers on Oxford Philosophers’, organized by Peter Hacker and David Wiggins. I am grateful to those who attended the lecture, and to Bernard Williams, for helpful comments. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

How has philosophical reflection contributed to the ways that we think about teaching? In this paper I explore two forms of narrative reflection on teaching—genealogies and portraits. Genealogies tell a story about the origins of teaching; portraits find expression in myths and other narrative forms. I explore two genealogies of teaching—one deriving from the sophist, Protagoras, in which teaching is viewed as a technical skill employing methods of instruction; the other, deriving from Plato, in which teaching is seen (...) fundamentally in terms of a special relationship between teacher and pupil. The Platonic account of the origins of teaching that finds expression in the myth, recounted in the dialogue Phaedrus, gives rise to a tradition of pedagogic portraiture that views the teacher/pupil relationship as foundational and presents the teacher as a wounded healer. This paper explores the grounds of this image and suggests that a tradition of portraiture in which the teacher is represented as a wounded healer can be traced back from Plato to the myth of Chiron and forward to St Augustine, Rousseau, and Nietzsche. (shrink)

. The term inversion principle goes back to Lorenzen who coined it in the early 1950s. It was later used by Prawitz and others to describe the symmetric relationship between introduction and elimination inferences in natural deduction, sometimes also called harmony. In dealing with the invertibility of rules of an arbitrary atomic production system, Lorenzen’s inversion principle has a much wider range than Prawitz’s adaptation to natural deduction. It is closely related to definitional reflection, which is a principle for (...) reasoning on the basis of rule-based atomic definitions, proposed by Hallnäs and Schroeder-Heister. After presenting definitional reflection and the inversion principle, it is shown that the inversion principle can be formally derived from definitional reflection, when the latter is viewed as a principle to establish admissibility. Furthermore, the relationship between definitional reflection and the inversion principle is investigated on the background of a universalization principle, called the ω-principle, which allows one to pass from the set of all defined substitution instances of a sequent to the sequent itself. (shrink)

The article explores a gradual refinement of the notion of reflection in Husserlian phenomenology. In his early period, Husserl takes phenomenological reflection to attain adequate evidence, since its object is self-given in an absolute and complete manner. However, this conception of reflection does not remain unchanged. Husserl later realizes that immanent perception or phenomenological reflection also involves a certain horizonality and naivety that has to do with its temporal nature and must be queried in a further (...) critical, apodictic reflection. Focusing more on the notion of apodicticity than adequacy, Husserl subsequently ascribes a new methodological role to reflection: instead of a mere epistemic warrant that guarantees for us the ultimate truth of our experiential life once and for all, phenomenological reflection ensures the strictness of phenomenology insofar as it entails an ethical-existential dimension as the norm of a life-form where the subject pursues full self-understanding and self-justification. (shrink)

God as the universal reflection of Human essence has discovered Materialistic monism with understanding of substance as the reality of all existed, including universal: qualities – continuity, interruptness, corpuscleness, reflection; characteristics – transition from quantity to quality and vice versa, unity and struggle of opposites, denial of denial, unity of substance; states – rest, development, form, motion; processes – physical, chemical, biological, mental, where Man and God are united. The Materialistic consists of the unity of methodological, theoretical, sociological, (...) statistical and practical levels of cognition, mastered by the Man through five known historical ways of the vital activity. Each successive historical period of life is characterized by more perfect forms of the Man bodiness, his common character and relationships, subject interaction, reflection and consciousness, and hence by it considerable broadening of the boarders of cognition and its set of instruments. Philosophical significance of the levels of cognition consists in their possibility to consider a phenomenon as universal, general, particular,separate and single; stratificated methods of cognition and technologies of penetration into different aspects of the phenomenon essence. The methodological cognition with its own distinctive methods contains all other methods, thus unity pretends to be the Modern Philosophy, including monistic, systemic, dialectial, metaphisical and empirical methods of cognition, where there is no contradiction of Science and Religion. (shrink)

As an advocate of the empirical method in both science and philosophy, Reid believed that the central method for studying the mind should be internal observation, whose evidence he believed to be the most reliable in comparison with all other mental operations. The fact that his contemporary “science of mind” was not as highly developed as the natural sciences was explained by Reid to be the fault of philosophers, such as John Locke, who “confounded” two completely different powers of the (...) mind: consciousness and reflection. In this paper I will present Reid's criticism of Locke, as well as Reid's own attempt to distinguish between consciousness and reflection, and the difficulties he is facing in this process. The paper concludes that Reid failed to depart from the essential Lockean characterizations of inner awareness, because of his failure to dissociate from premises he shares with Locke – such as the belief that we are conscious of all our thoughts, and the primacy of the introspective method in studying the mind. Therefore, while narrowing his concept of consciousness to an internal-sense, perceiving only present mental operations, he broadens respectively his concept of reflection. (shrink)

Early strategy scholars have pointed to the importance of reflecting on moral issues within the scope of strategic management. Although strategy content and context have been discussed in relation to ethical reflection, the third aspect, strategy process, has found only little or no attention with regard to ethics. We argue that by emphasizing the process perspective one can understand the related character of strategic management and ethical reflection. We discuss this relatedness along formal, functional, and procedural similarities. Whereas (...) formal aspects refer to the conditions under which both processes occur, functional aspects look at the role that strategy process and ethical reflection fulfill. Procedural aspects account for similarities in the nature of both processes insofar as the activities that are conducted within each process phase share common characteristics. We claim that ethical reflection can be thought of as an integrative part of strategic management – either explicitly or implicitly. (shrink)

A case study provides the basis for consideration of the purpose of business ethics teaching, the importance of reflection and the evaluation of ethics teaching. The way in which personal reflection and an increased capacity for ethical action can be encouraged and openly identified as aims of the course is discussed. The paper considers changes in the design and delivery of the international management ethics and values course taught at the University of South Australia as part of the (...) undergraduate management degree in Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. As a result of student and teaching staff responses, and course evaluations, the course design, teaching and assessment has moved steadily toward an aim which explicitly refers to behaviour, without losing the significant conceptual base. Ways in which opportunities can be provided to enhance the development of a reflective capability are considered, including narrative, role models, ethical reflection, journal-keeping and practice. The changes required a change in assessment practice. The difficulties of assessing intention and commitment to ethical action, whether in an individual course or across the curriculum, are discussed. (shrink)

Several studies have indicated that scientists are likely to have an outlook on both facts and values that are different to that of lay people in important ways. This is one significant reason it is currently believed that in order for scientists to exercise a reliable ethical reflection about their research it is necessary for them to engage in dialogue with other stakeholders. This paper reports on an exercise to encourage a group of scientists to reflect on ethical issues (...) without the presence of external stakeholders. It reports on the use of a reflection process with scientists working in the area of animal disease genomics (mainly drawn from the EADGENE EC Network of Excellence). This reflection process was facilitated by using an ethical engagement framework, a modified version of the Ethical Matrix. As judged by two criteria, a qualitative assessment of the outcomes and the participants’ own assessment of the process, this independent reflective exercise was deemed to be successful. The discussions demonstrated a high level of complexity and depth, with participants demonstrating a clear perception of uncertainties and the context in which their research operates. Reflection on stakeholder views and values appeared to be embedded within the discussions. The finding from this exercise seems to indicate that even without the involvement of the wider stakeholder community, valuable reflection and worthwhile discourse can be generated from ethical reflection processes involving only scienitific project partners. Hence, the previous assumption that direct stakeholder engagement is necessary for ethical reflection does not appear to hold true in all cases; however, other reasons for involving a broad group of stakeholders relating to governance and social accountability of science remain. (shrink)

In his Reflection Revisited, James Swindal interprets Habermas's formal pragmatics as recasting the traditional philosophy of reflection in intersubjective, augmentation-theoretic terms. In this review essay, I consider some aspects of Swindal's interpretation for situated moral criticism. I focus in particular on Swindal's claim that moral discourse must be preceded by meta-discourses in which actors discuss issues related to the initiation of moral discourse. Although I reject Swindal's arguments for the necessity of such meta-discourses, I provide further (...) arguments for their theoretical possibility and practical desirability for a contextualized critical social theory. Key Words: critical theory • formal pragmatics • Habermas • moral discourse • reflection • theory of communicative action. (shrink)

In response to widespread policy prescriptions for responsible innovation, social scientists and engineering ethicists, among others, have sought to engage natural scientists and engineers at the ‘midstream’: building interdisciplinary collaborations to integrate social and ethical considerations with research and development processes. Two ‘laboratory engagement studies’ have explored how applying the framework of midstream modulation could enhance the reflections of natural scientists on the socio-ethical context of their work. The results of these interdisciplinary collaborations confirm the utility of midstream modulation in (...) encouraging both first- and second-order reflective learning. The potential for second-order reflective learning, in which underlying value systems become the object of reflection, is particularly significant with respect to addressing social responsibility in research practices. Midstream modulation served to render the socio-ethical context of research visible in the laboratory and helped enable research participants to more critically reflect on this broader context. While lab-based collaborations would benefit from being carried out in concert with activities at institutional and policy levels, midstream modulation could prove a valuable asset in the toolbox of interdisciplinary methods aimed at responsible innovation. (shrink)

We investigate the theory IΔ 0 + Ω 1 and strengthen [Bu86. Theorem 8.6] to the following: if NP ≠ co-NP. then Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas is not provable in bounded arithmetic. i.e. $I\delta_0 + \Omega_1 + \nvdash \forall b \forall c (\exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a.c) \wedge \forall = \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf} (z.b))\\ \rightarrow \operatorname{Prov} (\ulcorner \exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a. \bar{c}) \wedge \forall z \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf}(z.\bar{b})) \urcorner)).$ Next we study a "small reflection principle" in bounded arithmetic. We prove that (...) for all sentences φ $I\Delta_0 + \Omega_1 \vdash \forall x \operatorname{Prov}(\ulcorner \forall y \leq \bar{x} (\operatorname{Prf} (y. \overline{\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner}) \rightarrow \varphi)\urcorner).$ The proof hinges on the use of definable cuts and partial satisfaction predicates akin to those introduced by Pudlak in [Pu86]. Finally, we give some applications of the small reflection principle, showing that the principle can sometimes be invoked in order to circumvent the use of provable Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas. (shrink)

We will study several weak axiom systems that use the Subtraction and Division primitives (rather than Addition and Multiplication) to formally encode the theorems of Arithmetic. Provided such axiom systems do not recognize Multiplication as a total function, we will show that it is feasible for them to verify their Semantic Tableaux, Herbrand, and Cut-Free consistencies. If our axiom systems additionally do not recognize Addition as a total function, they will be capable of recognizing the consistency of their Hilbert-style deductive (...) proofs. Our axiom systems will not be strong enough to recognize their Canonical Reflection principle, but they will be capable of recognizing an approximation of it, called the "Tangibility Reflection Principle". We will also prove some new versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem stating essentially that it is not possible to extend our exceptions to the Incompleteness Theorem much further. (shrink)

This paper describes the different dimensions of the relation between moral reflection and legislative processes. It discusses some examples of the institutionalisation of moral reflection. It is argued that the relation between ethics and law is still an actual and relevant question. Ethics also has to reflect on its own role in political life. The paper defends the relevance of a theological perspective on the relation between law and ethics. In the last part it is argued that the (...) modality of relation between ethics and law depends on the specific character of social domain. (shrink)

Reflection is today a watchword in many learning contexts. Experience is said to be transformed to knowledge when we reflect on it, university students are expected to acquire the ability to reflect critically, and we want practitioners to be reflective practitioners in order to improve their professional practice. If we consider what people mean when they talk about reflection in practice, we will discover that they often mean different things. Moreover, their conceptions of reflection are guided by (...) images rather than by definitions. This paper explores six distinct images of reflection and discusses the consequences of adopting one or more of these images in learning situations: (1) dedoublement, (2) analogical thinking, (3) mirror, (4) experiment, (5) puzzle solving, (6) criss-crossing a landscape. Reflective thinking can be improved if we are sensible of what we are reflecting about and according to which image of reflection we are doing it, since the step between using an image and seeing this image as a model is short. Using models, in turn, implies knowing their limits. (shrink)

There are many insightful discussions of Hegel's practical philosophy that emphasize the uniqueness of his expressivist and social theory of agency, but few recognize that these two aspects of Hegel's theory of the will are insufficient to avoid the traditional problem of free will. In fact, the problem can easily be shown to recur in the very language used to express why Hegel's theory is a theory of freedom at all. In part, this lack of recognition results from the fact (...) that there has not yet been a study of Hegel's theory of the will that has formulated the problem against the background of the contemporary literature on free will, where basic concerns about the explicability of action loom large. By using the continuity between the contemporary concerns and those of Hegel's predecessors (particularly Kant), Yeomans shows the necessity of reference to the Logic in order to supplement Hegel's own practical philosophy and the scholarship based on it. In addition to adding significantly to our understanding of Hegel's theory of agency and recapturing its significance with respect to continuing modern reflection on free will, this study also shows that Hegel's Logic can do some real philosophical work on a specific problem. Though Hegel's logical terminology is notorious for its impenetrability, Yeomans translates Hegel's jargon into a more easily comprehensible vocabulary. He further helps the reader by providing introductory discussions framing the central issues of each chapter both in terms of the problem of free will and in terms of the development of Hegel's argument to that point in the Logic. Presenting the reader with frequent use of examples, Yeomans leavens the abstractness of Hegel's presentation and makes the topic accessible to readers new to Hegel as well as those well versed in his work. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a recursive notation system O(Π 3 ) of ordinals. An element of the notation system is called an ordinal diagram. The system is designed for proof theoretic study of theories of Π 3 -reflection. We show that for each $\alpha in O(Π 3 ) a set theory KP Π 3 for Π 3 -reflection proves that the initial segment of O(Π 3 ) determined by α is a well ordering. Proof theoretic study for (...) such theories will be reported in [4]. (shrink)

This article presents a description and a critical reflection of some methodological issues involved in a number of participative planning projects that have been carried out in several cities and/or communities in Mexico and other Latin-American countries since 1994. The projects involved the design of regional development plans based on a vision shared by the corresponding communities. The projects include the participation of a large number of people, representing the various sectors of the populations concerned as well as the (...) leading opinion groups of those communities. The methodological approach of the projects is based on prospective and participative planning techniques. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a notation system for the infinitary derivations occurring in the ordinal analysis of KP + Π₃-Reflection due to Michael Rathjen. This allows a finitary ordinal analysis of KP + Π₃-Reflection. The method used is an extension of techniques developed by Wilfried Buchholz, namely operator controlled notation systems for RS∞-derivations. Similarly to Buchholz we obtain a characterisation of the provably recursive functions of KP + Π₃-Reflection as <-recursive functions where < is the ordering (...) on Rathjen's ordinal notation system J(K). Further we show a conservation result for $\Pi _{2}^{0}$-sentences. (shrink)

We introduce a sequent calculus B for a new logic, named basic logic. The aim of basic logic is to find a structure in the space of logics. Classical, intuitionistic, quantum and non-modal linear logics, are all obtained as extensions in a uniform way and in a single framework. We isolate three properties, which characterize B positively: reflection, symmetry and visibility. A logical constant obeys to the principle of reflection if it is characterized semantically by an equation binding (...) it with a metalinguistic link between assertions, and if its syntactic inference rules are obtained by solving that equation. All connectives of basic logic satisfy reflection. To the control of weakening and contraction of linear logic, basic logic adds a strict control of contexts, by requiring that all active formulae in all rules are isolated, that is visible. From visibility, cut-elimination follows. The full, geometric symmetry of basic logic induces known symmetries of its extensions, and adds a symmetry among them, producing the structure of a cube. (shrink)

In response to William Rehg's and Barbara Fultner's criticisms, I clarify and extend some arguments found in my book Reflection Revisited. I first redescribe how Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of reflection opens up the possibility for an intersubjective reflection. Habermas, I argue, can exploit such a theory of reflection since it is immune from the problems attendant on a 'theory of consciousness'. Second, I address how by means of meta-discourses temporal claims can be formalized for (...) the pragmatics Habermas is developing. Finally, I take up Fultner's suggestion that Robert Brandom provides a fruitful point of comparison with Habermas's theory, and argue that norms are in fact formed and critiqued on the basis of - as Brandom describes - the modal capabilities or incompatibilities of their entailments. Key Words: Robert Brandom • commitments • contextualization • discourse ethics • Jürgen Habermas • reflection • time • truth. (shrink)

Swindal seeks to incorporate temporality into the formal-pragmatic analysis of discourse by developing what he calls 'event-determining' reflection. After outlining his motivations for introducing this new form of reflection, I offer a critique, first, of his appeal to meta-discourse about when to engage in discourse and, second, of the function of truth in his account. Finally, I suggest that Swindal's theory of reflective acceptability fruitfully complements Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics. Key Words: discourse • Habermas • justification • (...) class='Hi'>reflection • temporality • truth. (shrink)

Procedural theories of practical reasoning provide rules according to which agents' reasons for action are constructed. Those procedures operate on some given input (an agent's desires, other mental states, and circumstances) to the reasoning process in a way that determines the output of an agent's reasons for action. I argue that a procedural theory of practical reasoning must include a previously unrecognized normative restriction on what counts as acceptable input, roughly, that agents should take features of their own, but not (...) others', selves as input. Using Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity as a case study, I show that common features of procedural theories result in a threat to each person's view of themselves as practically distinct from others. I then show that psychological claims are insufficient to defeat this threat, and that maintaining a practical distinction between ourselves and others requires a normative restriction on the input to practical reflection. (shrink)

This reflection focuses on lived experience with the Technological Other (Quasi-Other) while pursuing creative video and film activities. In the last decade work in the video and film industries has been transformed through digital manipulation and enhancement brought about by increasingly sophisticated computer technologies. The rules of the craft have not changed but the relationship the artist/editor experiences with these new digital tools has brought about increasingly interesting existential experiences in the creative process. How might this new way of (...) being with technology change the craft and the crafter? Through a phenomenological understanding of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Don Ihde, and their contributions to the human-technology conversation, this essay moves to reveal the lived experiences of artists/editors who use computers to create by means of film and digital video formats. Exploring notions of lived space, lived body, lived time, and lived relation through the computer interface allows for digging deeper into inhabiting technology and experiencing the Technological Other. (shrink)

This paper considers two accounts of the self that have gained prominence in contemporary feminist psychoanalytic theory and draws out the implications of these views with respect to the problem of moral reflection. I argue that our account of moral reflection will be impoverished unless it mobilizes the capacity to empathize with others and the rhetoric of figurative language. To make my case for this claim, I argue that John Rawls's account of reflective equilibrium suffers from his exclusive (...) reliance on impartial reason. (shrink)

Erratum to: What Happens in the Lab Does Not Stay in the Lab: Applying Midstream Modulation to Enhance Critical Reflection in the Laboratory Content Type Journal Article Category Erratum Pages 789-789 DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9334-7 Authors Daan Schuurbiers, Centre for Society and Genomics, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Science and Engineering Ethics Online ISSN 1471-5546 Print ISSN 1353-3452 Journal Volume Volume 17 Journal Issue Volume 17, Number 4.

This text includes the interventions of Alfred Schutz at the 1955 Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, entitled “Aspects of Human Equality,” to which his paper, later published as “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World,” had been submitted. In Schutz’s reactions to the comments of other conference participants, one can see his views on: the “secularization” of more theoretical philosophical and theological ideas, the need to distinguish levels of abstraction, the importance of self-reflection on one’s own (...) viewpoint, and the significance of common sense. In the end, he recommends that theoreticians return to kindergartens and playgrounds to examine the equality practiced there. (shrink)

Interpretation strives, for one thing, toward unification. One means of unifying is the category I call "repetition"; and reflection is one of its types. In order to identify the concept of reflection, I shall outline the various types of repetition and add some comments on this type in particular. I shall then consider several of the philosophical problems raised by the supposition that the reflective relationships do exist in the materials interpreted.

To discover how to couple reflection with reaction we have been studying how people play the computer game Tetris. Our basic intuition is that the job of the reasoned is to monitor the environment and the agent’s behavior over time to discover trends or deviations from the agent’s normative policy and tune the priorities of the Attentional system accordingly.

This article sets forward a new concept of reflection, to be contrasted with more usual reading of the concept for which we use the term `reflectivity'. The contrast is related to a distinction between normalizing education and counter-education. We claim that within the framework of normalizing education there is no room for reflection, but only for reflectivity. In contrast to reflectivity, reflection manifests a struggle of the subject against the effects of power which govern the constitution of (...) her conceptual apparatus, her knowledge, her consciousness and her limitations and possibilities for successful functioning. Reflectivity re-presents the hegemonic realm of self-evidence and the productive violence of social and cultural order. Reflection, by contrast, aims to challenge the supposedly self-evident and the present order of things. Reflection aims at transcendence and represents a moral commitment in respect of the otherness of the Other, which power relations in every realm of self-evidence oblige us to neglect, to destroy or consume. Transcendence is a concrete utopia, and so is the subject in her nonrepressive communication with the Other: they are part and parcel of our present possibilities, sometimes in microscopic arenas, struggled for, and from time to time even realized. (shrink)

The merit of Plato’s Laws remains largely untapped by those seeking genuinely collaborative models of the doctor–patient tie as alternatives to paternalism and autonomy. A persistent difficulty confronting proposed alternatives has been surpassing the notion of pronounced intellectual and values asymmetry favoring the doctor. Having discussed two prominent proposals, both of which evince marked paternalism, I argue that reflection on Plato yields four criteria that a genuinely collaborative model must meet and suggest how the Laws addresses them. In the (...) process, the Laws’ doctor–patient tie is shown to be far more nuanced than interpreters have previously observed. Although Plato’s account will not solve our own quandaries, it illustrates how one might retain asymmetry of a kind without capitulating to familiar oppositional modalities. Through this account, I hope to show that the Laws merits fuller inclusion in contemporary discussions than it has heretofore received. (shrink)

In this paper, we reflect upon our experience in Mexico, as well as review the literature on reflection developed by adult educators in the United States in order to begin to develop a theory of “relevant reflection” useful for family literacy practitioners. We feel that engaging in relevant reflection can help to empower family literacy practitioners in the United States to work more effectively with participants and help participants think more critically about the meaning of literacy in (...) their lives. It is the participant’s perception of their life-world that we hold to be valid. In the context of family literacy, our initial interest is in promoting the exploration of the educational validity of a certain form of reflection as it relates to learning process and outcomes. Our theory derived from reviewing the literature on reflection and critical reflection is thus stated: When family literacy participants are encouraged to reflect upon the relevance of literacy as it relates to their life-world, learning is significantly enhanced. Relevant reflection can be facilitated through engaging participants in reflecting upon the relevance of literacy to their lives, their families, their communities and their livelihoods. Indeed, this can be done individually, in dialogue with another and/or as a group. Family literacy practitioners are provided a framework for facilitating relevant reflection for participants. (shrink)

This study examined the role of reflection on personal cases for making ethical decisions with regard to new ethical problems. Participants assumed the position of a business manager in a hypothetical organization and solved ethical problems that might be encountered. Prior to making a decision for the business problems, participants reflected on a relevant ethical experience. The findings revealed that application of material garnered from reflection on a personal experience was associated with decisions of higher ethicality. However, whether (...) the case was viewed as positive or negative, and whether the outcomes, processes, or outcomes and processes embedded in the experience were examined, influenced the application of case material to the new problem. As expected, examining positive experiences and the processes involved in those positive experiences resulted in greater application of case material to new problems. Future directions and implications for understanding ethical decision making are discussed. (shrink)

“Sentential reflection” in the sense of [Fr03] is based on reflecting down from a category of classes. “Elemental sentential reflection” is based on reflecting down from a category of elemental classes. We present various forms of elemental sentential reflection, which are shown to interpret and be interpretable in certain set theories with large cardinal axioms.

We present two forms of “sentential reflection”, which are shown to be mutually interpretable with Z2 and ZFC, respectively.

We present a variety of (ω 1 ,∞)-distributive forcings which when applied to models of Martin's Maximum separate certain well known reflection principles. In particular, we do this for the reflection principles SR, SR α (α ≤ ω 1 ), and SRP.

Several studies have indicated that scientists are likely to have an outlook on both facts and values that are different to that of lay people in important ways. This is one significant reason it is currently believed that in order for scientists to exercise a reliable ethical reflection about their research it is necessary for them to engage in dialogue with other stakeholders. This paper reports on an exercise to encourage a group of scientists to reflect on ethical issues (...) without the presence of external stakeholders. It reports on the use of a reflection process with scientists working in the area of animal disease genomics (mainly drawn from the EADGENE EC Network of Excellence). This reflection process was facilitated by using an ethical engagement framework, a modified version of the Ethical Matrix. As judged by two criteria, a qualitative assessment of the outcomes and the participants’ own assessment of the process, this independent reflective exercise was deemed to be successful. The discussions demonstrated a high level of complexity and depth, with participants demonstrating a clear perception of uncertainties and the context in which their research operates. Reflection on stakeholder views and values appeared to be embedded within the discussions. The finding from this exercise seems to indicate that even without the involvement of the wider stakeholder community, valuable reflection and worthwhile discourse can be generated from ethical reflection processes involving only scienitific project partners. Hence, the previous assumption that direct stakeholder engagement is necessary for ethical reflection does not appear to hold true in all cases; however, other reasons for involving a broad group of stakeholders relating to governance and social accountability of science remain. (shrink)

Hegel famously argues that Kant’s account of critical distance depends upon an impoverished conception of freedom. In its place, Hegel introduces a richer conception of freedom, according to which the self who is capable of self-determination is multifaceted: wanting and thinking, social and individual. This richer conception gives rise to an account of critical reflection that emphasizes engagement with our motives and practices rather than radical detachment from them. But what is most distinctive about Hegel’s account is the idea (...) that when we reflect upon motives and practices, we draw upon shared self-understandings that are neither universal nor just particular to individuals. There is, Hegel argues, no presocial identity or self that can be detached from our socially constituted contexts of thought and value. This has important implications for how we conceive of critical reflection. (shrink)

A case study of growers conception of irrigation strategies indicates that pot plant growers in Scandinavia base their management approaches on experientially based art. The study also indicates that there is a gap between experientially based art and available greenhouse technology. In order to standardize production and produce quality, both the grower’s experience and available technology should be taken into account. In order to achieve this, the present study proposes to arrange reflection on reflection in action with a (...) group of growers by means of the dialogue seminar method. The concept of reflection on reflection in action is novel to horticultural practice. Therefore, we suggest future inter- and multidisciplinary research within this domain. (shrink)

When, in my invitation to commentators, I told them I should write a brief editorial 'reflection', I little realised how shockingly accurate a reflection of JCS and its character -- both its strengths and limitations -- their own brief articles would provide. The disgraceful gender imbalance I mentioned in my introduction; what the commentaries also show is how confined we are to scientific materialism as a basic working paradigm. I knew it of course, and certain correspondents chide me (...) for it regularly, but I confess this exercise brought it home with a fresh force. (shrink)

Undergraduate economics students begin and end their study of economics with the simple claim that economics is value free. Only in a policy role will values and beliefs enter into economic work; there can be little meaningful dialogue by economists about such personal views and opinions. This view, now well over 200 years old, has been challenged by heterodox thinkers in economics, and philosophers and social scientists outside the discipline all along the way. However, much of the debate in modern (...) times has been narrowly focused on philosophical methodological issues on one hand or theological/sectarian concerns on the other. None of this filters down to the typical undergraduate even in advanced courses of the history of economic thought. This book presents the notion that economic thinking cannot escape value judgments at any level and that this understanding has been the dominant view throughout most of history. It shows how, from ancient times, people who thought about economic matters integrated moral reflection into their thinking. Reflecting on the Enlightenment and the birth of economics as a science, Halteman and Noell illustrate the process by which values and beliefs were excluded from economics proper. They also bring the reader up to date, given the changes over the last half-century. With the advent of interdependency concepts and game theory, behavioral economics and the infusion of other social sciences, especially psychology, into economic considerations, the door is once again open to moral reflection. It is a sensitive subject that can be divisive for many and there is little if any assessable literature on the topic at the undergraduate level. One way to approach the subject is to follow the path of the great thinkers of the past and observe how they worked through economic issues from a set of values that was foundational to their thinking. This places moral thinking in a context illuminating the complexity and importance of moral reflection and illustrating its impact on the culture of the times. Reckoning With Markets follows this method with a deliberate effort to cast the material in terms that will engage the undergraduate student. (shrink)

This reflection considers my dawning realization that Zapatista insurgency reflects not only opposition to racist devaluation of the cultures of indigenous peoplesbut more fundamentally a struggle to overcome spiritual deracination. I contest two basic assumptions of much contemporary social theory: that race and deracination are entirely socio-cultural phenomena and that the central role played by dialogical accord in Zapatista communities can be understood without a spiritual conception of human existence. I propose that only a spiritual understanding of these three (...) pivotal issues—race, deracination, and dialogue (or accord)—aptly captures the core intuitions that inform Zapatista insurgency. (shrink)

The reflections put forward in this text concern the clinical and practical difficulties posed by the existence of patients in PVS, and the essential ethical issues raised, combining these ethical questions with practical and theoretical experience.Section 1 presents the methodology of the ethical reflection as we see it.