Search results for 'regress problem' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William Roche (2012). A Reply to Cling's “The Epistemic Regress Problem”. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.score: 240.0
    Andrew Cling presents a new version of the epistemic regress problem, and argues that intuitionist foundationalism, social contextualism, holistic coherentism, and infinitism fail to solve it. Cling’s discussion is quite instructive, and deserving of careful consideration. But, I argue, Cling’s discussion is not in all respects decisive. I argue that Cling’s dilemma argument against holistic coherentism fails.
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  2. Timo Kajamies (2009). A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem, Evidential Support, and Skepticism. Philosophia 37 (3):525-534.score: 240.0
    In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately (...)
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  3. Linda Radzik (1999). A Normative Regress Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):35-47.score: 240.0
    The article argues that theorists who try to justify 'ought'-claims, i.e., who try to show that a standard of behavior has normative authority, will run into a regress problem. The problem is similar in structure to the familiar regress in the justification of belief. The point of the paper is not skeptical. Rather, the aim is to help theorists better understand the challenges associated with formulating a theory of normative authority.
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  4. Andrew D. Cling (2014). The Epistemic Regress Problem, the Problem of the Criterion, and the Value of Reasons. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):161-171.score: 240.0
    There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we (...)
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  5. Andrew D. Cling (2008). The Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.score: 192.0
    The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that (...)
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  6. Declan Smithies (2014). Can Foundationalism Solve the Regress Problem? In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies in Epistemology. Routledge. 73-94.score: 192.0
    This chapter has two goals: to motivate the foundationalist solution to the regress problem and to defend it against arguments from Sellars, BonJour and Klein. Both the motivation and the defence of foundationalism raise larger questions about the relationship between foundationalism and access internalism. I argue that foundationalism is not in conflict with access internalism, despite influential arguments to the contrary, and that access internalism in fact supplies a theoretical motivation for foundationalism. I conclude that foundationalism and access (...)
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  7. R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.score: 192.0
    Abstract In the contemporary literature on self-knowledge discussion is framed by and large by two competing models of self-knowledge: the observational (or perceptual) model and the constitutive model. On the observational model self-knowledge is the result of ?cognitively viewing? one's mental states. Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, on the other hand, hold that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentional states. That is, self-ascription is a necessary condition for being in a particular mental state. Akeel Bilgrami is a defender of the constitutive model. (...)
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  8. Mylan Engel (2014). Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):146-160.score: 192.0
    As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type-(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) (...)
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  9. Scott F. Aikin (2011). Epistemology and the Regress Problem. Routledge.score: 180.0
    The regress problem -- Infinitism defended -- Metaepistemic varieties of epistemic infinitism -- Foundationalism, infinitism, and the given -- Argumentation and anti-dogmatism.
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  10. José L. Zalabardo (2006). BonJour, Externalism and the Regress Problem. Synthese 148 (1):135-169.score: 180.0
    In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put (...)
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  11. Hanti Lin (2014). On the Regress Problem of Deciding How to Decide. Synthese 191 (4):661-670.score: 180.0
    Any decision is made in some way or another. Which way? (Have I worked out enough alternatives to choose from? Which decision rule to apply?) That is a higher-order decision problem, to be dealt with in some way or other. Which way? That is an even higher-order decision problem. There seems to be a regress of decision problems toward higher and higher orders. But in daily life we stop moving to higher-order decision problems—stop the regress—at some (...)
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  12. Carlos J. Moya (1996). The Regress-Problem: A Reply to Vermazen. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2).score: 180.0
    This paper is intended to meet some objections that Vermazen has raised about the treatment of the regress-problem in the author's book on the philosophy of action. This problem is shown to involve a skeptical claim about the very existence of actions as distinct from happenings. It is argued, against Vermazen's contention, that only one version of the problem is at work in that book and that, while Danto's basic actions, McCann's volitions and O'Shaughnessy's and Hornsby's (...)
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  13. Paul K. Moser (1986). Perception and Belief: A Regress Problem. Philosophy of Science 53 (March):120-126.score: 156.0
    Some philosophers, Such as n r hanson, Have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, And not just some belief or other, About that object. This article constructs an argument showing that such a view generates an infinite regress of required perceptual beliefs.
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  14. Scott F. Aikin (2005). Who is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem? Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191 - 217.score: 152.0
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of “infinitism” consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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  15. Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.score: 150.0
  16. José Zalabardo (2008). Internalish Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58.score: 150.0
    I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be (...)
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  17. Holly Smith (1991). Deciding How to Decide: Is There a Regress Problem? In Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley (eds.), Essays in the Foundations of Decision Theory. Basil Blackwell, Inc..score: 150.0
  18. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2008). Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem. Studia Logica 89 (3):333 - 341.score: 150.0
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  19. Rosalind S. Simson (1986). An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):179-208.score: 150.0
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  20. Michael S. Brady (1998). Can Epistemic Contextualism Avoid the Regress Problem? Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):317-328.score: 150.0
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  21. José L. Zalabardo (2008). Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34-58.score: 150.0
    I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalismthat ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used (...)
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  22. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter.score: 150.0
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  23. Jeremy Fantl (2012). Epistemology and the Regress Problem. By Scott Aikin. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):157-160.score: 150.0
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  24. Carl Ginet (2005). Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 140--149.score: 150.0
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  25. Kenneth Baynes (1997). Deliberative Democracy and the Regress Problem. Modern Schoolman 74 (4):331-336.score: 150.0
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  26. Carl Ginet (2005). Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress Problem. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.score: 150.0
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  27. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.score: 150.0
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  28. Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (2013). Contextualismo Justificacionista: uma nova resposta ao problema do regresso epistêmico // Justificationist Contextualism: a new response to the epistemic regress problem. Conjectura: Filosofia E Educação 18 (3):60-78.score: 150.0
    Neste artigo eu ofereço uma nova abordagem para resolução do problema do regresso epistêmico. Tal problema pode ser considerado um dos mais tradicionais problemas em epistemologia, que nos segue desde a antiguidade. As teses tradicionais que tentam responder a este problema possuem dificuldades ainda não respondidas satisfatoriamente, fato que, inicialmente, serve de motivação para a procura de uma nova resposta. Primeiramente, apresento o problema do regresso epistêmico e as respostas tradicionais oferecidas na sua resolução. Como veremos todas elas possuem problemas (...)
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  29. B. Vermazen (1995). Carlos Moya's Regress-Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):73-81.score: 150.0
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  30. B. Vermazzen (1995). Moya, Carlos Regress-Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):73-81.score: 150.0
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  31. Holger Leerhoff (2008). Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):249-264.score: 126.0
    In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and (...)
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  32. D. M. Armstrong (1974). Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):191 – 201.score: 122.0
    What is it for a particular to have a property? many proposed analyses of this situation may be called relational accounts. The particular has some relation, R, To some entity p. R may be the relation of falling under, Being a member of, Resembling or "participating." p may be a predicate, A concept, A class, A paradigm instance or a form. A number of arguments seek to prove that all these accounts are involved in various vicious infinite regresses. These arguments (...)
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  33. Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2014). Probabilistic Regresses and the Availability Problem for Infinitism. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):211-220.score: 122.0
    Recent work by Peijnenburg, Atkinson, and Herzberg suggests that infinitists who accept a probabilistic construal of justification can overcome significant challenges to their position by attending to mathematical treatments of infinite probabilistic regresses. In this essay, it is argued that care must be taken when assessing the significance of these formal results. Though valuable lessons can be drawn from these mathematical exercises (many of which are not disputed here), the essay argues that it is entirely unclear that the form of (...)
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  34. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.score: 120.0
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  35. Tzachi Zamir (1999). The Omnipotence Paradox as a Problem of Infinite Regress. Sophia 38 (1):1-14.score: 120.0
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  36. Peter Railton (2006). How to Engage Reason: The Problem of Regress. In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press.score: 120.0
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  37. John Turri (2009). On the Regress Argument for Infinitism. Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.score: 96.0
    This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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  38. Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith (2011). Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 178 (3):515-527.score: 90.0
    Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.
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  39. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.score: 90.0
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a (...)
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  40. Jeanne Peijnenburg & Scott F. Aikin (2014). Introduction. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):139-145.score: 90.0
    This introduction presents selected proceedings of a two-day meeting on the regress problem, sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and hosted by Vanderbilt University in October 2013, along with other submitted essays. Three forms of research on the regress problem are distinguished: metatheoretical, developmental, and critical work.
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  41. John D. Norton (2013). A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction. Synthese 191 (4):1-20.score: 84.0
    In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. Attempts to recreate the problem in the material theory of induction fail. They require relations of inductive support to conform to an unsustainable, hierarchical empiricism.
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  42. Bernard Molyneux (2012). How the Problem of Consciousness Could Emerge in Robots. Minds and Machines 22 (4):277-297.score: 84.0
    I show how a robot with what looks like a hard problem of consciousness might emerge from the earnest attempt to make a robot that is smart and self-reflective. This problem arises independently of any assumption to the effect that the robot is conscious, but deserves to be thought of as related to the human problem in virtue of the fact that (1) the problem is one the robot encounters when it tries to naturalistically reduce its (...)
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  43. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg. Studia Logica 94 (3):347 - 353.score: 76.0
    We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a welldefined nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction we investigate what Herzberg (...)
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  44. Frederik Herzberg (2010). The Consistency of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson. Studia Logica 94 (3):331 - 345.score: 76.0
    In a recent paper, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson [ Studia Logica , 89(3):333-341 (2008)] have challenged the foundationalist rejection of infinitism by giving an example of an infinite, yet explicitly solvable regress of probabilistic justification. So far, however, there has been no criterion for the consistency of infinite probabilistic regresses, and in particular, foundationalists might still question the consistency of the solvable regress proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson.
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  45. Anna-Sofia Maurin (2010). Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress. Synthese 175 (3):311-326.score: 66.0
    Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in (...)
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  46. Jan Willem Wieland (2013). Infinite Regress Arguments. Acta Analytica 28 (1):95-109.score: 66.0
    Infinite regress arguments play an important role in many distinct philosophical debates. Yet, exactly how they are to be used to demonstrate anything is a matter of serious controversy. In this paper I take up this metaphilosophical debate, and demonstrate how infinite regress arguments can be used for two different purposes: either they can refute a universally quantified proposition (as the Paradox Theory says), or they can demonstrate that a solution never solves a given problem (as the (...)
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  47. Jan Willem Wieland (2012). And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy. Ghent University.score: 66.0
    This dissertation is on infinite regress arguments in philosophy. Its main goals are to explain what such arguments from many distinct philosophical debates have in common, and to provide guidelines for using and evaluating them. Two theories are reviewed: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, infinite regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the (...)
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  48. Jan Willem Wieland (2010). Anti-Positionalism's Regress. Axiomathes 20 (4):479-493.score: 66.0
    This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls (...)
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  49. Jan Willem Wieland (2012). Regress Argument Reconstruction. Argumentation 26 (4):489-503.score: 66.0
    If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend (...)
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  50. Jan Willem Wieland (2013). Strong and Weak Regress Arguments. Logique and Analyse 224:439-461.score: 66.0
    In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can (...)
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