The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions (...) as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality. (shrink)

This paper is intended to be a summary of the author's views on the relationship between law and morality worked out over the past three decades in jurisprudence. The paper preliminarily clarifies the matter by isolating some lines of cleavage separating different questions askable about this relationship. With this done, the author argues for two theses. One, that judges are obligated to use morality in their decisions in particular cases; and two, that the morality judges are (...) obligated to use in their judicial reasonings, is best seen as the natural lawyer sees it, namely, as being part of the law that obligates judges in their role as judges. The author not only believes these theses to be true; he also thinks that these theses are practically important, in that their acceptance by judges makes for better judging. (shrink)

Although much recent social science and humanities work has been a revolt against simplification, this volume explores the contrast between simplicity and complexity to reveal that this dichotomy, itself, is too simplistic. John Law and Annemarie Mol have gathered a distinguished panel of contributors to offer—particularly within the field of science studies—approaches to a theory of complexity, and at the same time a theoretical introduction to the topic. Indeed, they examine not only ways of relating to complexity but complexity (...) _in practice._ Individual essays study complexity from a variety of perspectives, addressing market behavior, medical interventions, aeronautical design, the governing of supranational states, ecology, roadbuilding, meteorology, the science of complexity itself, and the psychology of childhood trauma. Other topics include complex wholes in the sciences, moral complexity in seemingly amoral endeavors, and issues relating to the protection of African elephants. With a focus on such concepts as multiplicity, partial connections, and ebbs and flows, the collection includes narratives from Kenya, Great Britain, Papua New Guinea, the Netherlands, France, and the meetings of the European Commission, written by anthropologists, economists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and scholars of science, technology, and society. _Contributors._ Andrew Barry, Steven D. Brown, Michel Callon, Chunglin Kwa, John Law, Nick Lee, Annemarie Mol, Marilyn Strathern, Laurent Thévenot, Charis Thompson. (shrink)

Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection (...) between law and morality. Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a claim to substantial correctness, which is derived from analytical arguments. Furthermore, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of moral elements into law, then the ‘necessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-positivism, can be justified. Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In his ‘Reply’ to Robert Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity of ‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of the ‘separation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as a moral claim. As a point of departure, I will argue that Raz’s three criticisms are misleading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Furthermore, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both positivistic, but in different forms: one may be called ‘exclusive’ legal positivism, the other ‘inclusive’ legal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together, they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived. Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which even leads him to acknowledge ‘necessary connections between law and morality’. One who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a normally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim of law to correctness, as per Alexy’s argument. (shrink)

How are general relations of law and morality typically conceived in an environment of Anglo-saxon common law? This paper considers some classical common law methods and traditions as these have confronted and been overlaid with modern ideas of legal positivism. While classical common law treated a community and its morality as the cultural foundation of law, legal positivism's analytical separation of law and morals, allied with liberal approaches to legal regulation, have made the relationship of legal and (...) moral principles more complex and contested. Using ideas from Durkheim's and Weber's sociology, I argue that the traditional common law emphasis on an inductive, empirical treatment of moral practices has continuing merit, but in contemporary conditions the vague idea of community embedded in classical common law thought must be replaced with a much more precise conceptualisation of coexisting communities, whose moral bonds are diverse and require a corresponding diversity of forms of legal recognition or protection. (shrink)

This article is primarily focused on two interconnected discussions presented by John Gardner in Law as a Leap of Faith. The first one is related to the thesis which, according to Gardner, all positivists agree on; the second one is referred to the positivist’s position regarding the connection between law and morality. In order to address these issues I rely on the distinction between two kinds of criteria: the conceptual criteria and the validity criteria. On this basis, (...) and against what Gardner asserts, I try to defend two main ideas. Firstly, that the thesis on which all positivists agree is not one about the validity criteria that norms must satisfy in order to belong to a legal system, but rather one concerning the conceptual criteria delimiting the concept of law. By the same token, I argue that, according to the positivist understanding of the concept of law, there is no necessary connection between law and morality. (shrink)

Two basic models of law and morality -- Essentially ambiguous concepts -- The debate between Fuller, Hart, and Dworkin -- The relations between law and morality -- A pluralist framework -- What is Legal Interactionism? -- Understanding the dynamics of law --Three apparent anomalies in modern law -- The necessary and contingent relationship between law and morality.

.The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do so.

In his work, Jules Coleman has held that the rule of recognition, if conceived of as a shared cooperative activity, should be the gateway through which to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. This analysis, however, leaves unanswered two important questions. For one thing, we do not know when or even why morality becomes a criterion of legality. And, for another thing, we still do not know what conception of morality it is that we are dealing (...) with. In this article, we will attempt to clarify in greater depth what relations there are between the social practice of law and morality. We will thus see how the cooperative nature of social practices imbues law with a moral force, and how this makes it possible to establish a "weak" connection between law and morality: To see this, we will need to single out some basic features of cooperative social practices, thus setting out a suitable framework for the view just mentioned. (shrink)

The 1973 archeological discovery of important documents of classical thought known as the Huang-Lao Boshu coupled with advancements in contemporary jurisprudence make possible a reassessment of the philosophies of pre-Qin and early Han China. This study attempts to elucidate the importance of the Huang-Lao school within the intellectual tradition of China through a comparison of the Boshu's philosophical position, particularly its understanding of the relation between law and morality, with the respective views of major thinkers of the period--Confucius, (...) Han Fei, Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, and to a lesser extent, Shen Dao, Shen Buhai and the authors of the Guan Zi and He Guan Zi. So doing reveals Huang-Lao to be a unique and sophisticated social and political philosophy which, until its expulsion from court by Emperor Wu and subsequent adoption by Daoist religion, served as the ideological foundation for the post-Qin reforms of the early Han. (shrink)

This essay aims to broaden the understanding of the nature of the physician–patient relationship. To do so, the concept of medical philia that Pedro Laín Entralgo proposes is analysed and is considered taking into consideration the relational trait of the human being and the structure of human action as a story of the permanent tension that exists between freedom and truth, where the ontological foundation of the hermeneutic of the "Gift" and the analogy of “Love” as the central dynamic (...) of this action, helps explain the nature of the doctor-patient relationship as a "friendship relationship". This understanding offers a perspective differing from just the utilitarian considerations of current "patient-centred" approaches and proposed the redirection of the teaching of medicine to more humanistic approaches. The dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship proposed here in its most genuine essence is effectively expressed in physician concrete attitudes that the patient usually captures and relates as the “the doctor’s way of being”. Goya's painting, Self-portrait with Dr Arrieta (1820), can be taken as an outstanding artistic representation of this expanded dimension of the medical act, capturing the “medical friendship” in action. (shrink)

This article focuses on the relationship between morality and law through the debate between William Whewell (1794-1866) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), two important moral philosophers of 19th century Britain. Whewell belongs to a tradition maintaining that the basic moral principles can be known intuitively through an inherent faculty such as moral sense or conscience. In the meantime, Whewell argues that the process of knowing these basic principles intuitively is not an irrational process and that the reason (...) is active throughout the whole process of knowing. In this context, the reason is the most basic concept of Whewell's system. In Whewell's system, the will of God is the highest/ultimate good. Relatedly, action in accordance with the will of God is morally right action. On the other hand, utilitarianism, to which Mill belongs, is a moral theory that determines the greatest happiness of the highest number of people as the criterion for morally right action. This theory does not include any metaphysical and theological elements, which argues that morality should be based on experience and introspection. Utilitarianism rejects the claim that there are basic moral principles that can be intuitively known. This approach of utilitarianism makes these two theories natural opponents of each other. One of the topics of the Whewell-Mill debate is the juncture of morality and law. In this context, Whewell's views on the moral-law relationship, Mill's criticism of Whewell on this issue and Whewell's responses to Mill constitute the subject of the article. The main purpose of this study, in which the comparative method is adopted, is to gain new perspectives on the relationship between morality and law. When we focus on the Whewell-Mill debate, we see that Whewell deals with the moral-law relationship on the basis of the concept of right, while Mill deals with the concept of justice. According to Whewell, it is impossible to talk about morality unless there are rights determined by law. In this regard, justice basically means compliance with the law. Like Whewell, Mill accepts that justice is not static but dynamic, and argues that only the utility can determine what just is. Mill objects to Whewell's views on three main criticial points. These are; according to Mill, Whewell first makes law the basis of morality by claiming that it is not possible to talk about morality where there are no laws. Whewell, objecting to this criticism of Mill, states that he does not make law the basis of morality; he says that he needs law to put moral principles into the practice. The second criticism of Mill is that Whewell makes laws the criterion of moral righteousness, which narrows morality down to rights and therefore to law compliance. Whewell objects to Mill, saying that moral rightness is much broader concept than legal rightness. For him, obedience to the law is only part of moral righteousness. Mill’s last criticism is that Whewell made obedience to the law a moral duty, even if it is not just. In Whewell's system, obedience to laws confirming slavery is made a moral duty. Whewell, on the other hand, admits that laws may be immoral from time to time, but states that obedience to these laws is more reasonable than disobeying them; because the problems that will arise from non-compliance with the laws are much greater. What needs to be done is to make sure that more just laws are legislated. However, according to Whewell, legislation is the duty of the jurist, not the moralist. These criticisms made by Mill against Whewell are actually criticisms that is related Mill's own system. Mill neither himself can give satisfactory answers to these criticisms. In conclusion, in the polemic between Whewell and Mill, it is possible to find other different answers of both thinkers regarding the relationship between morality and law. However, it cannot be said that these answers completely solved the problems stated above. (shrink)

An examination of the relationship between law and morals, this wide-ranging book develops themes addressed by Hart and Devlin, relating them to issues and events of current interest. Lee covers such timely concerns as: the Moral Majority; embryo experiments and surrogate motherhood; contraception, children's rights, and parents' rights; informed medical consent; equality and discrimination; and freedom of expression and pornography. Stressing the relevance of these issues to the lives of all of us, Lee argues for broader participation in debate (...) on this topic. (shrink)

According to the conventional view, causal and moral responsibility have a strict hierarchical relationship. Determining causal responsibility comes first; then we sort through the factors to which we have assigned causal responsibility and determine which, if any, should be assigned moral responsibility too. Moral inquiry accordingly stands not only apart but also above causal inquiry. But I am going to argue that this way of looking at causal and moral responsibility is a mistake. Rather than being separate and independent inquires (...) with different purposes and concerns, I am going to argue that finding causal responsibility actually entails finding moral responsibility even when there is no evidence of what we would call traditional fault. Indeed, I am going to argue we cannot find someone causally responsible without finding them morally responsible too. (shrink)

This article introduces the main conceptual and normative questions about willful ignorance. The first section asks what willful ignorance is, while the second section asks why—and how much—it merits moral or legal condemnation. My approach is to critically examine the criminal law's view of willful ignorance. Doing so not only reveals the range of positions one might take about the phenomenon but also sheds light on foundational questions about the nature of culpability and the relation between law and (...) class='Hi'>morality. (shrink)

How does meaningfulness relate to morality? Despite several works on this topic, the relationship remains not only controversial but also strangely undefined within the field of objectivist theories of meaning in life. Moreover, some authors define the relationship contradictorily: on one hand, moral action is understood as a branch of a meaningful life, and on the other, meaningfulness is understood as a distinct dimension of value that stands alongside morality. In this paper, I examine this contradiction to redefine (...) the relationship between meaningfulness and morality. I resolve the contradiction by rejecting the distinctness claim and developing an understanding of meaningfulness as a comprehensive value that includes morality. The paper will also present the advantages that this approach offers and its defences against various possible objections. (shrink)

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be (...) rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project. (shrink)

This article, while disclosing the conception of rights, their relation to law and their nature, presents the constructive criticism and motivated support of legal personalism, i. e. the original theory presented by prof. A. Vaišvila. This article presents the criticism of terms “positive law” and “natural law”. It emphasizes that the term “natural rights,” while historically very important and common, is rarely used of late. The primary reason for its fall from favor seems to be that it was used in (...) too many different ways and therefore ceased to be useful. So, the author, while defending the indispensable relation between law and morals, offers the term “good morals” instead of “natural law” and also offers to refuse the usage of terms “positive law” and “natural law”. This article represents the view that morality is the source of law. The author accepts a position asserting that the terms “human rights”, “natural rights” and “fundamental moral rights” are synonymous. However, some institutional rights (for example, social rights) flow from statutes, but not morals. (shrink)

Hart’s criticism of Devlin’s stance on the legal enforcement of morality has been highly influential in shaping a new liberal sensibility and in paving the way to many important legal reforms in the UK. After 50 years it is perhaps time to go back to Law, Liberty and Morality to see it in the perspective of the general evolution of Hart’s thought since the early 50s. This is a period of extraordinary creativity for the Oxford philosopher, in which (...) he writes many important contributions to legal, moral and political philosophy. Prominent among these is ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, an article that sets the agenda for Hart’s subsequent work on liberty, fairness and rights, and provides the philosophical background for the liberal understanding of the relations between law and morality defended in Law, Liberty and Morality. (shrink)

In the past twenty years Joseph Raz has consolidated his reputation as one of the most acute, inventive, and energetic scholars currently at work in analytic moral and political theory. This new collection of essays forms a representative selection of his most significant contributions to a number of important debates, including the extent of political duty and obligation, and the issue of self-determination. He also examines aspects of the common (and ancient) theme of the relations between law and (...) morality. This volume of essays, available in one volume for the first time, will be essential to legal philosophers and political theorists. (shrink)

While Autonomous Weapons Systems have obvious military advantages, there are prima facie moral objections to using them. By way of general reply to these objections, I point out similarities between the structure of law and morality on the one hand and of automata on the other. I argue that these, plus the fact that automata can be designed to lack the biases and other failings of humans, require us to automate the formulation, administration, and enforcement of law as (...) much as possible, including the elements of law and morality that are operated by combatants in war. I suggest that, ethically speaking, deploying a legally competent robot in some legally regulated realm is not much different from deploying a more or less well-armed, vulnerable, obedient, or morally discerning soldier or general into battle, a police officer onto patrol, or a lawyer or judge into a trial. All feature automaticity in the sense of deputation to an agent we do not then directly control. Such relations are well understood and well-regulated in morality and law; so there is not much challenging philosophically in having robots be some of these agents — excepting the implications of the limits of robot technology at a given time for responsible deputation. I then consider this proposal in light of the differences between two conceptions of law. These are distinguished by whether each conception sees law as unambiguous rules inherently uncontroversial in each application; and I consider the prospects for robotizing law on each. Likewise for the prospects of robotizing moral theorizing and moral decision-making. Finally I identify certain elements of law and morality, noted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, which robots can participate in only upon being able to set ends and emotionally invest in their attainment. One conclusion is that while affectless autonomous devices might be fit to rule us, they would not be fit to vote with us. For voting is a process for summing felt preferences, and affectless devices would have none to weigh into the sum. Since they don't care which outcomes obtain, they don't get to vote on which ones to bring about. (shrink)

이 글은 아름다움이 윤리적 선의 상징이라는 칸트의 주장을, 칸트의 미학과 윤리학의 한계 안에서 그 사유의 내부 논리를 비판적으로 재음미함으로써 새롭게 이해해보려는 시도다. 미와 선은 부인할 수 없는 질적 차이에도 불구하고, 양자 모두 자기목적성에 기인한 무조건적 흡족이라는 쾌감을 동반한다는 점에서 본질적 유사성을 갖는다. 그러나 양자의 상호관계에 대한 칸트의 인식은, 기본적인 타당성에도 불구하고, 매우 본질적인 측면에서 결정적인 한계를 드러낸다. 필자가 볼 때, 이러한 한계는 무엇보다 윤리적 선의 기원과 본질에 대한 칸트적 접근의 한계에 기인한다. 이러한 진단 아래, 필자는 미의 사태가 윤리적 선의 상징으로 (...) 기능할 수 있는 근본적 이유가 무엇인지, 나아가 양자의 근친적 상호관계를 상징관계로만 규정하는 것은 과연 정당한 것인지를 미의 측면에서뿐 아니라 윤리의 측면에서 비판적으로 재검토하려 한다. 이러한 시도를 통하여 우리는 아름다움에 담긴 윤리적 함의를 좀 더 분명한 형태로 마주보게 될 뿐만 아니라, 윤리의 기원과 본질에 대해서도 더 깊은 이해를 얻게 될 것이다. (shrink)

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical (...) and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

Consciousness and confidence seem intimately related. Accordingly, some researchers use confidence ratings as a measure of, or proxy for, consciousness. Rosenthal discusses the potential connections between the two, and rejects confidence as a valid measure of consciousness. He argues that there are better alternatives to get at conscious experiences such as direct subjective reports of awareness (i.e. subjects’ reports of perceiving something or of the degree of visibility of a stimulus). In this chapter, we offer a different perspective. Confidence (...) ratings in general, and metacognitive measures in particular, may offer important advantages over subjective ratings. The arguments we offer here are supported by empirical, practical and socio-strategic considerations. However, we do not suggest consciousness and confidence are interchangeable. We recognize the limitations of confidence ratings in some experimental designs and for some research questions. Nevertheless, we also address a potential conceptual link between consciousness and confidence that stems from Rosenthal’s very own work on mental quality space theory. (shrink)

This paper describes the different dimensions of the relation between moral reflection and legislative processes. It discusses some examples of the institutionalisation of moral reflection. It is argued that the relation between ethics and law is still an actual and relevant question. Ethics also has to reflect on its own role in political life. The paper defends the relevance of a theological perspective on the relation between law and ethics. In the last part it is argued that (...) the modality of relation between ethics and law depends on the specific character of social domain. (shrink)

The article considers the development of the ideas of Christian realism as a philosophical and ethical concept of Reinhold Niebuhr. The background of the development of Christian realism’s ideas is described. It is noted that the most impact had Niebuhr’s personal attitude to philosophy and epistemology, as well as the practical experience of serving in Detroit. The methodological approach of Niebuhr is defined as a contrast between the ideal and the real, with the subsequent solving of the conflict (...) class='Hi'>between them. It is noted that from the Niebuhr’s point of view, the transforming power of Christianity is rooted in moral and metaphysical dualism, where ethics subordinates metaphysics and gives strength to social and cultural transformations of humanity. It turned out that the ethical concept of Christian realism includes the classification of people as idealists, realists and cynics. Idealists are people who are mainly focused on idealistic concepts that are not represented in the real world. Idealists usually have distorted worldview because they deny taking into account the realities of the world. That also makes them vulnerable to manipulation of cynics. Realists are people who take into account all factors and all known sources of power in the real world, and have a pragmatic position, which is based on moral and ethical qualities. Cynics are those who have a pragmatic position to the world and relations with others, but they guide themselves only by personal interest and egoistic needs, and do not bother with moral restraints. In addition, the relationship of Niebuhr and other neo-orthodoxy theologians is described. Among them there are Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Emil Brunner and Rudolf Bultmann. The polemic between Niebuhr and Bart is noted. It is shown that the main difference between Bart and Niebuhr was in the theological perspective: for Bart it was mostly dogmatic, and for Niebuhr - ethical and apologetical. The most similar to the theological position of Niebuhr is Brunner's theology, but the differences between them are in relation to the natural law. It is noted that the discrepancy between Niebuhr and Bultmann was an interpretation of the concept of myth. Finally, the contribution of neo-orthodoxy to the development of theology of the twentieth century is considered. It consists of five main achievements: the definition of theology of revelation as a concept of knowledge of God, the rethinking of biblical texts as carriers of kerigma, the historical contextualization of theological tradition, the rethinking of the Reformation’s ideas, and the ecumenical emphasis in theology. (shrink)

Rousseau's Du contrat social develops an important, unjustly neglected type of theory, which I call 'Natural Law Constructivism' ('NLC'), which identifies and justifies strictly objective basic moral principles, with no appeal to moral realism or its alternatives, nor to elective agreement, nor to prudentialist reasoning. The Euthyphro Question marks a dilemma in moral theory which highlights relations between artifice and arbitrariness. These relations highlight the significance of Hume's founding insight into NLC, and how NLC addresses Hobbes's insight (...) that our most fundamental moral problems concern social coordination. Part 2 systematically re-examines the core of Rousseau's theory of justice to show that it assigns no constitutive role to contractual agreement in identifying or justifying basic normative principles. Part 3 highlights his NLC. (shrink)

. The interaction between law and morality in Jewish law in the areas of feticide and killing a terminally ill individual. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 76-84.

This article insists on the relationship between law and morality from the internal point of view. H.L.A. Hart makes distinction between internal and external viewpoints. In the framework of Hart’s approach, it is difficult to imagine the internal point of view as a moral point of view. In fact, the internal point of view illuminates the normative character of rules; it shows that the members of the group accept the rules as standards of behavior for the group (...) as a whole. To explain the internal point of view which includes also moral view, we should leave Hart’s definition. But we may use his definition as accepting and using a rule. For this, we should question the meaning of accepting a rule and using a rule. (shrink)

The paper aims at a critical discussion of Alexy’s conception of the relationship between law and morality, which is known to insist on their necessary connection. After a brief recapitulation of this conception, the author scrutinizes three of its essential elements: the thesis of the dual nature of law, the argument from law’s claim to moral correctness, and the idea of an objective morality. Finally, he sketches his own position which, in some respects, resembles Alexy’s view, but (...) also differs from it in certain relevant points. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Ideal Form of Mutual Recognition Hegel's State of Nature De Facto Authority De Jure Authority Legitimate Authority Constitutional Authority Conclusion Notes References.

Instead of being embarrassed and uneasy about the implications of the separation thesis, positivists should welcome the fact that they cannot account for the obligatoriness of law. The rule of recognition is only a social rule and introduces no grounds for obligation.

If positivism is interpreted as requiring that nothing is law that does not conform to socially accepted criteria, it is inconsistent with positive law. This is because law purports to be morally in order. Hence it is always possible to argue against a certain interpretation of the law that it is morally indefensible and there is always a certain pressure within a legal system to render it morally defensible. In that way critical morality necessarily becomes a persuasive source of (...) law. (shrink)

The relationship between law and morality is a topic which receives special importance and attention, especially in "liberal democracies" in which the law is supposed to regulate highly pluralized and fragmented societies. Under conditions of plurality of values, many social forces and legal theories require a certain kind of neutrality from the legal system, a means of compatibility of the many "world views" and "moral systems" that are present within the same social space. Such a conciliating commitment sounds (...) particularly relevant in times of the doctrinal ubiquity of ideas such as "peace based on human rights". This was the title of the 28th World Congress of the IVR in Lisbon, with the special workshop "Law and Morals" on which this book is based. It is divided into four parts: "Law and Practical Reason", "Conceptual Approaches on Law and Morals", "Legal versus Moral Normativity", and "Morals and Legal Positivism". (shrink)

Public policy on the development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has mainly been concerned with defining proper strategies of risk management. However, surveys and focus group interviews show that although lay people are concerned with risks, they also emphasize that genetic modification is ethically questionable in itself. Many people feel that this technology “tampers with nature” in an unacceptable manner. This is often identified as an objection to the crossing of species borders in producing transgenic organisms. Most scientists (...) reject these opinions as based on insufficient knowledge about biotechnology, the concept of species, and nature in general. Some recent projects of genetic modification aim to accommodate the above mentioned concerns by altering the expression of endogenous genes rather than introducing genes from other species. There can be good scientific reasons for this approach, in addition to strategic reasons related to greater public acceptability. But are there also moral reasons for choosing intragenic rather than transgenic modification? I suggest three interrelated moral reasons for giving priority to intragenic modification. First, we should respect the opinions of lay people even when their view is contrary to scientific consensus; they express an alternative world-view, not scientific ignorance. Second, staying within species borders by strengthening endogenous traits reduces the risks and scientific uncertainty. Third, we should show respect for nature as a complex system of laws and interconnections that we cannot fully control. The main moral reason for intragenic modification, in our view, is the need to respect the “otherness” of nature. (shrink)

Biobank research and genomic information are changing the way we look at health and medicine. Genomics challenges our values and has always been controversial and difficult to regulate. In the future lies the promise of tailored medical treatments and pharmacogenomics but the borders between medical research and clinical practice are becoming blurred. We see sequencing platforms for research that can have diagnostic value for patients. Clinical applications and research have been kept separate, but the blurring lines challenges existing regulations (...) and ethical frameworks.Then how do we regulate it? This book contains an overview of the existing regulatory landscape for biobank research in the Western world and some critical chapters to show how regulations and ethical frameworks are developed and work. How should international sharing work? How design an ethical informed consent? An underlying critique: the regulatory systems are becoming increasingly complex and opaque. The international community is building systems that should respond to that. According to the authors in fact, it is time to turn the ship around. Biobank researchers have a moral responsibility to look at and assess their work in relation to the bigger picture: the shared norms and values of current society. Research ethics shouldn't only be a matter of bioethicists writing guidelines that professionals have to follow. Ethics should be practiced through discourse and regulatory frameworks need to be part of that public discourse. Ethics review should be then not merely application of bureaucracy and a burden for researchers but an arena where researchers discuss their projects, receive advice and practice their ethics skills. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Law Morality From Morality to Law From Law to Morality Converging Law and Morality Diverging Law and Morality: Beyond the Liberal Model References Further reading.

Statistical learning enables humans to involuntarily process and utilize different kinds of patterns from the environment. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the simultaneous acquisition of multiple regularities from different perceptual modalities remain unclear. A novel multidimensional serial reaction time task was developed to test 40 participants’ ability to learn simple first‐order and complex second‐order relations between uni‐modal visual and cross‐modal audio‐visual stimuli. Using the difference in reaction times between sequenced and random stimuli as the index of domain‐general (...) statistical learning, a significant difference and dissociation of learning occurred between the initial and final learning phases. Furthermore, we used a negative and positive occurrence‐frequency‐and‐reaction‐time correlation to indicate implicit and explicit learning, respectively, and found that learning simple uni‐modal patterns involved an implicit‐to‐explicit segue, while acquiring complex cross‐modal patterns required an explicit‐to‐implicit segue, resulting in a X‐shape crossing of regularity learning. Thus, we propose an X‐way hypothesis to elucidate the dynamic interplay between the implicit and explicit systems at two distinct stages when acquiring various regularities in a multidimensional probability space. (shrink)

I extract some philosophical morals from some aspects of Lagrangian mechanics. One main moral concerns methodology: Lagrangian mechanics provides a level of description of phenomena which has been largely ignored by philosophers, since it falls between their accustomed levels---``laws of nature'' and ``models''. Another main moral concerns ontology: the ontology of Lagrangian mechanics is both more subtle and more problematic than philosophers often realize. The treatment of Lagrangian mechanics provides an introduction to the subject for philosophers, and is technically (...) elementary. In particular, it is confined to systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom, and for the most part eschews modern geometry. (shrink)