Search results for 'reliabilism' (try it on Scholar)

379 found
Sort by:
  1. Causal Tracking Reliabilism (2012). Mark McEVOY Hofstra University. Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 86:73 - 92.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Chris Tucker (forthcoming). On What Inferentially Justifies What: The Vices of Reliabilism and Proper Functionalism. Synthese.score: 18.0
    We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Valeriano Iranzo (2008). Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1):115 - 120.score: 18.0
    According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism makes no qualifications about the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.score: 18.0
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problem or the easy-knowledge-problem). For (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Stewart Clem (2008). Warrant and Epistemic Virtues: Toward and Agent Reliabilist Account of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Dissertation, Oklahoma State Universityscore: 18.0
    Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark Newman (2010). The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem. Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.score: 18.0
    The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ernest Sosa (1992). Generic Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 2:79-92.score: 18.0
    Problems for Generic Reliabilism lead to a more specific account of knowledge as involving the exercise of intellectual virtues or faculties.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Wayne Davis & Christoph Jäger (2012). Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.score: 18.0
    Goldman and Olsson ( 2009 ) have responded to the common charge that reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowledge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their “conditional probability solution” in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jack C. Lyons (2009). Perception and Virtue Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261.score: 18.0
    In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that ) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.score: 18.0
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Kelly Becker (2013). Why Reliabilism Does Not Permit Easy Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3751-3775.score: 18.0
    Reliabilism furnishes an account of basic knowledge that circumvents the problem of the given. However, reliabilism and other epistemological theories that countenance basic knowledge have been criticized for permitting all-too-easy higher-level knowledge. In this paper, I describe the problem of easy knowledge, look briefly at proposed solutions, and then develop my own. I argue that the easy knowledge problem, as it applies to reliabilism, hinges on a false and too crude understanding of ‘reliable’. With a more plausible (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Christoph Jäger (2011). Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem. Theoria 77 (3):201-213.score: 18.0
    Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Erik J. Olsson & Martin L. Jönsson (2011). Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem. Theoria 77 (3):214-222.score: 18.0
    We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Patrick Bondy (forthcoming). Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure. Episteme:1-14.score: 18.0
    Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Mark McEvoy (2013). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.score: 18.0
    The lottery problem is often regarded as a successful counterexample to reliabilism. The process of forming your true belief that your ticket has lost solely on the basis of considering the odds is, from a purely probabilistic viewpoint, much more reliable than the process of forming a true belief that you have lost by reading the results in a normally reliable newspaper. Reliabilism thus seems forced, counterintuitively, to count the former process as knowledge if it so counts the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Thomas Grundmann (forthcoming). How Reliabilism Saves the Apriori/Aposteriori Distinction. Synthese:1-22.score: 18.0
    Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and (...). While for the evidentialist, experience is epistemically relevant only if it is used as evidence, the reliabilist requires that the reliability of the relevant process depends on the reliability of experiential processes. I will argue that the reliabilist account accommodates our pre-theoretic classifications much better. In the final part of my paper I will use the reliabilist criterion to defend the a priori—a posteriori distinction against recent challenges by Hawthorne and Williamson. (shrink)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Kawalec Pawel (2003). Structural Reliabilism: Inductive Logic as a Theory of Justification. Kluwer Academic Publishers.score: 18.0
    This book revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. It is claimed to set up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. While the book is addressed to both professionals and students of philosophical logic, probability, epistemology, and philosophy of science, it (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.score: 16.0
    Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jon Altschul (2011). Reliabilism and Brains in Vats. Acta Analytica 26 (3):257-272.score: 15.0
    According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Sanford C. Goldberg (2009). Reliabilism in Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.score: 15.0
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jennifer Wilson Mulnix (2008). Reliabilism, Intuition, and Mathematical Knowledge. Filozofia 62 (8):715-723.score: 15.0
    It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical know- ledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of ‘rational intuition.’ On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. J. Brown (2000). Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.score: 15.0
    I consider whether one particular anti-individualist claim, the doctrine of object-dependent thoughts (DODT), is compatible with the Principle of Privileged Access, or PPA, which states that, in general, a subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her thought contents. The standard defence of the compatibility of anti-individualism and PPA emphasises the reliability of the process which produces a subject's second order beliefs about her thought contents. I examine whether this defence can be applied to DODT, given that DODT generates the possibility (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David Christensen (2007). Three Questions About Leplin's Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43 - 50.score: 15.0
    Jarrett Leplin’s paper is multifaceted; it’s rich with ideas, and I won’t even try to touch on all of them. Instead, I’d like to raise three questions about the paper: one about its definition of reliable method, one about its solution to the generality problem, and one about its answer to clairvoyance-type objections.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Kelly Becker (2006). Reliabilism and Safety. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.score: 15.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter J. Graham (2014). Against Transglobal Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.score: 15.0
    David Henderson and Terry Horgan argue that doxastic epistemic justification requires the transglobal reliability of the belief-forming process. Transglobal reliability is reliability across a wide range of experientially possible global environments. Focusing on perception, I argue that justification does not require transglobal reliability, for perception is non-accidentally reliable and confers justification but not always transglobally reliable. Transglobal reliability is an epistemically desirable property of belief-forming processes, but not necessary for justification.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.score: 12.0
    The New Evil Demon Problem is supposed to show that straightforward versions of reliabilism are false: reliability is not necessary for justification after all. I argue that it does no such thing. The reliabilist can count a number of beliefs as justified even in demon worlds, others as unjustified but having positive epistemic status nonetheless. The remaining beliefs---primarily perceptual beliefs---are not, on further reflection, intuitively justified after all. The reliabilist is right to count these beliefs as unjustified in demon (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.score: 12.0
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Alvin I. Goldman, Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.score: 12.0
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.score: 12.0
    This paper reviews two skeptical arguments and argues that a reliabilist framework is necessary to avoid them. The paper also argues that agent reliabilism, which makes the knower the seat of reliability, is the most plausible version of reliabilism.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Berit Brogaard (2006). Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.score: 12.0
    Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 12.0
    Reliabilism is a general approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth conduciveness of a belief forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant factor. The reliability theme appears both in theories of knowledge and theories of justification. ‘Reliabilism’ is sometimes used broadly to refer to any theory of knowledge or justification that emphasizes truth getting or truth indicating properties. These include theories originally proposed under different labels, such as ‘tracking’ theories. More commonly, ‘reliabilism’ is used narrowly to refer (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1317-1336.score: 12.0
    Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Developmental Process Reliabilism: On Justification, Defeat, and Evidence. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 73 (1):1 - 17.score: 12.0
    Here I present and defend an etiological theory of objective, doxastic justification, and related theories of defeat and evidence. The theory is intended to solve a problem for reliabilist epistemologies— the problem of identifying relevant environments for assessing a process's reliability. It is also intended to go some way to accommodating, neutralizing, or explaining away many internalist-friendly elements in our epistemic thinking.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Brian Weatherson, A Reductio for Reliabilism.score: 12.0
    In “A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping”, Hilary Kornblith (2009) proposes a reliabilist solution to the bootstrapping problem. I’m going to argue that Kornblith’s proposal, far from solving the bootstrapping problem, in fact makes the problem much harder for the reliabilist to solve. Indeed, I’m going to argue that Kornblith’s considerations give us a way to develop a quick reductio of a certain kind of reliabilism. Let’s start with a crude statement of the problem. The bootstrapper, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Recursive Tracking Versus Process Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230.score: 12.0
    Sherrilyn Roush’s Tracking Truth (2005) is an impressive, precisioncrafted work. Although it sets out to rehabilitate the epistemological theory of Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981), its departures from Nozick’s line are extensive and original enough that it should be regarded as a distinct form of epistemological externalism. Roush’s mission is to develop an externalism that averts the problems and counterexamples encountered not only by Nozick’s theory but by other varieties of externalism as well. Roush advances both a theory of knowledge (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.score: 12.0
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jeff Kochan (2008). Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.score: 12.0
    In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens's proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme's principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2008). Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.score: 12.0
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Thomas Grundmann (2009). Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.score: 12.0
    It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.score: 12.0
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.score: 12.0
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Linda Zagzebski (2000). From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.score: 12.0
    In Virtues of the Mind I object to process reliabilism on the grounds that it does not explain the good of knowledge in addition to the good of true belief. In this paper I wish to develop this objection in more detail, and will then argue that this problem pushes us first in the direction of two offspring of process reliabilism—faculty reliabilism and proper functionalism, and, finally, to a true virtue epistemology.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Jarrett Leplin (2007). In Defense of Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.score: 12.0
    Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions. The reliability property does not appear closed under truth-preserving inference, whereas closure principles have strong intuitive appeal. And epistemic paradoxes, like the preface and the lottery, seem unavoidable if knowledge or justification depends on the frequency with (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Juan Comesaña (2009). What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.score: 12.0
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.score: 12.0
    In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Peter Baumann (2009). Reliabilism—Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):77-89.score: 12.0
    This paper discusses two versions of reliabilism: modal and probabilistic reliabilism. Modal reliabilism faces the problem of the missing closeness metric for possible worlds while probalistic reliabilism faces the problem of the relevant reference class. Despite the severity of these problems, reliabilism is still very plausible (also for independent reasons). I propose to stick with reliabilism, propose a contextualist (or, alternatively, harmlessly relativist) solution to the above problems and suggest that probabilistic reliabilism has (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Sven Bernecker (2008). Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):164–172.score: 12.0
    This paper argues that John Greco’s agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double requirement of accounting for the internalist intuition that knowledge requires sensitivity to the reliability of one’s evidence and evading the charge of psychological implausibility.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. James Chase (2004). Indicator Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115–137.score: 12.0
    In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. J. R. Beebe (2004). Reliabilism, Truetemp and New Perceptual Faculties. Synthese 140 (3):307 - 329.score: 12.0
    According to the thought experiment most commonly used to argue against reliabilism, Mr. Truetemp is given an unusual but reliable cognitive faculty. Since he is unaware of the existence of this faculty, its deliverances strike him as rather odd. Many think that Truetemp would not have justified beliefs. Since he satisfies the reliabilist conditions for justified belief, reliabilism appears to be mistaken. I argue that the Truetemp case is underdescribed and that this leads readers to make erroneous assumptions (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Christian Piller (2009). Reliabilist Responses to the Value of Knowledge Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):121-135.score: 12.0
    After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 379