This is an anthology of literary, religious, and philosophical texts from the entire Middle Ages and the early modern age that address already quite explicitly religious toleration and even tolerance.

Religious toleration first became legally enshrined in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Religious toleration led to the practice of more general inter-subjective recognition of members of democratic states which took precedence over differences of conviction and practice. After considering the extent to which a democracy may defend itself against the enemies of democracy and to which it should be prepared to tolerate civil disobedience, the article analyses the contemporary dialectic between the notion of civil (...) inclusion and multiculturalism. Religious toleration is seen as the pacemaker for modern multiculturalism, in which the claims of minorities to civic inclusion are recognized so long as members of all groups understand themselves to be citizens of one and the same political community. Footnotes1 Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture, 2003. (shrink)

The problem of religious tolerance is of supreme importance in the contemporary world. Just as, a few centuries ago, many wars were provoked by religious motifs, so today clashes on religious grounds provoke military conflicts that have long overgrown the walls of churches and mosques and keep growing in spite of the sacred traditions of the religions themselves. Orientation to love fails to work, and the ìneighborî becomes an enemy if he does not confess the same religion. (...) Where shall we search for the reason behind religious hostility? What is the history of intolerance? Who was the first to throw the stone that shook the foundations of peaceful coexistence of particular families and whole states? We propose to turn to the following themes: 1. World religions and relations between them (on the question of Christian- Judeo-Islamic dialogue) 2. Relations inside world religions (on the example of Christian confessions) 3. Interrelations between world religions and new religious movements. (shrink)

What motivated an absolutist Erastian who rejected religious freedom, defended uniform public worship, and deemed the public expression of disagreement a catalyst for war to endorse a movement known to history as the champion of toleration, no coercion in religion, and separation of church and state? At least three factors motivated Hobbes’s 1651 endorsement of Independency: the Erastianism of Cromwellian Independency, the influence of the politique tradition, and, paradoxically, the contribution of early-modern practices of toleration to maintaining (...) the public sphere’s religious uniformity. The third factor illustrates how a key function of the emerging private sphere in the early-modern period was to protect uniformity, rather than diversity; it also shows that what was novel was not so much the public/private distinction itself, but the separation of two previously conflated dimensions of publicity – visibility and representativeness – that enabled early-modern Europeans to envisage modes of worship out in the open, yet still private. (shrink)

Youths in Indonesia have different backgrounds, including religion, tradition, social environment, but there are similarities in-games. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of OMG app use and changes in mindset among youths regarding understanding religious tolerance. This study used mixed methods. The data was collected using questionnaires, observations, and interviews. The Moderate Game (OMG) app effectively improved youth religious tolerance with an average relegious tolerance score in the control class of 51.46. In the experimental category, the average (...) holy tolerance score was 74.56. Based on gender, the level of religious tolerance in youth males had a higher score of 75.08 than youth females of 74.04. While based on religion, Muslim youth had a higher level of religious tolerance than other religious youth, with 81.10. Contribution : The Moderate Game (OMG) app can help young people, communities, and governments overcome the rise of social, religious, and even overcoming intolerant, extreme societies. (shrink)

While many ground religious tolerance on a sense of unity or enrichment resulting from religious diversity, the acclaimed scholars contributing to this volume place under scrutiny a fascinating alternative proposal for a pathway to religious tolerance: that the serious consideration of religious diversity tends to reveal the weakness of support many have for their religious commitments and that the humility produced tends to result in religious tolerance. The authors illuminate the debate within philosophyabout the (...) way beliefs are supported, the controversy between internalism and externalism, and disagreement about how humility and tolerance are related. (shrink)

This article describes the implications for religious toleration of various non-cognitive views of religious belief, especially those adopted by Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, and Pierre Bayle. It suggests that while these men were of very different philosophical outlook, they did all share a deep hostility to the combination of clerical intolerance, scholastic philosophy, and pagan superstition that Hobbes labelled the Kingdom of Darkness. They all firmly held the view that the clergy should never wield power (...) and they only differed on the powers the civil authorities possessed over religion. (shrink)

This paper uses developments in externalist epistemology and philosophy of mind as a foundation for a tolerance-producing attitude of epistemic humility towards the beliefs one retains in light of religious diversity. The first section of this paper describes the conditions under which epistemic humility tends to occur in both the philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology due to what shall be called the resolution problem, and the second section argues that these conditions often obtain in the presence of (...) class='Hi'>religious diversity. A third section argues that epistemic humility tends to lead to religious tolerance. (shrink)

European and North American cultures are awash in stereotypes about religion. The recently published volume Stereotyping Religion: Critiquing Clichés (2017) tackles several of these and shows why scholars find them to be clichéd. By describing their origins and elucidating the social or political work they rhetorically accomplish in the present, the authors of the volume address some important clichés, namely, that religions are belief systems, that religion is a private matter or that it exclusively concerns the transcendent. In the same (...) way, scholars of religion in the Chinese speaking world find themselves often having to dispel the many myths that surround it. Does China have religion? What does it look like? And where does it stand vis-à-vis religious tolerance? In this short article, I take a comparative look at the late imperial period in China and the substantive changes that took place at the end of it. What does religious tolerance – and its opposite – mean in the context of China’s modern epistemic order? (shrink)

U ovom radu pokusacemo da ponudimo opstiji nacrt za razmatranje odnosa izmedju toga kako se na pitanje religijske tolerancije gleda u dva dokumenta koja hriscanska i islamska religijska tradicija priznaju i slave. Rec je o Milanskom ediktu i o Ustavu Medine. Ovi dokumenti su za svoje vreme bili revolucionarni. Medjutim, sami ovi dokumenti, kao i religijska ucenja, na kojima su oni zasnovani, ne mogu biti merilo za uredjivanje odnosa u nase vreme. Oni su izlozeni u pojmovnom okviru i u vrednosnom (...) sistemu koji je vladao u doba kada su ta ucenja i ti dokumenti nastali. Mnogi odnosi koji su tada postojali, danas ne postoje. Na primer, u Milanskom ediktu afirmise se opste pravo na religiju, a u Ustavu Medine uzajamna tolerancija avramovskih monoteistickih religija, dok se osobe koje danas nazivamo ateistima ili agnosticima uopste pominju. (shrink)

In his book Terror in the Mind of God Mark Juergensmeyer writes: ‘Perhaps the first question that came to mind when televisions around the world displayed the extraordinary aerial assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th 2001, was why anyone would do such a thing. When it became clear that the perpetrators’ motivations were couched in religious terms, the shock turned to anger. How could religion be related to such violent acts?’. That question – (...) ‘how can religion be related to violent acts?’ – is the question Susan Mendus addresses in this article. She discusses the concept of toleration; the specific problems associated, historically, with religious toleration and the differences between modern and historical understandings of religious belief. Her overall aim is to see whether the history of religious tolerance and intolerance can offer some lessons to us, now, in our attempts to secure political peace in the face of religious conflict and religious violence. (shrink)

The theme of this paper can be introduced in this way: does a pluralist approach to religion entail a pluralist approach to religion? My theme is not that odd, because I have two notions of pluralism in mind. There is what I will call ‘tolerant pluralism’ and what I will call ‘religious pluralism’. And thus my question is ‘Does tolerant pluralism re religion entail religious pluralism?’.

One reason why religious intolerance is so widespread, according to Newman, is that many people do not understand what tolerance means. Thus, “many intolerant people actually think that they are tolerant, and liberal people usually have trouble explaining to them why they are wrong”. Newman therefore begins his book with an analysis of the concept of tolerance. “Tolerance involves tolerating, that is, accepting, enduring, bearing, putting up with; it involves acceptance in the sense of refraining from any strong reaction (...) to the thing in question; it is half hearted, an attitude towards something that is not liked, loved, respected, or approved of; and it is often, though not always, understood as a praiseworthy act or virtue”. (shrink)

This article is an introduction to a special issue on ‘Contexts of Religious Tolerance: New Perspectives from Early Modern Britain and Beyond’, which contains essays on the contributions to the debates on tolerance by non-canonical philosophers and theologians, mainly from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotland and England. Among the studied authors are the Aberdeen Doctors, Samuel Rutherford, James Dundas, John Finch, George Keith, John Simson, Archibald Campbell, Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull and John Witherspoon. The introduction draws attention to several methodological (...) points connected to the decision to look at the debates on tolerance through the prism of rarely studied authors. It then presents the essays, which offer novel perspectives by analysing and contextualising political, religious and moral treatments of tolerance. These are tied especially to debates on the articles of faith and on their status, on confessions of faith and their role in the quest for orthodoxy, on liberty of conscience, and on the relation between church and state. (shrink)

This article examines Paul Guyer’s claim that we should attempt to ground the principle of religious freedom on the basis of Kant’s arguments for religious liberty. I problematise Guyer’s suggestion by investigating a hypothetical ‘dogmatic conflict’ between a scientifically and a religiously grounded belief. I further suggest that considering Christian Wolff’s philosophy might provide us with an approach which shares the benefits that Guyer identifies in Kant, while at the same time avoiding the issues Kant might run into (...) that result from the occurrence of the dogmatic conflict. I start by providing a background to Wolff’s philosophy and explaining the notion of the dogmatic conflict. Then I present a potential contemporary case of the dogmatic conflict and try to see how it would be dealt with based on Guyer’s proposal. Finally, I consider what a Wolffian solution would look like, arguing that Guyer’s project might benefit from considering Wolff. (shrink)

The author analyses the problems faced by Continental Europe's legal systems as a result of the appearance of the so‐called new religious movements. He is of the opinion that the expected change towards the achievement of full legal neutrality regarding the religious phenomena cannot be based on the sole assumption that each and every religion deserves protection. In fact, he considers that any system of equality should be aimed at protecting the legitimate expression of the individual's free will; (...) that is to say, neither a particular religion nor all of them, but the person considered as a citizen, regardless of whether he believes or not. (shrink)

Toleration is perhaps the core commitment of liberalism, but this seemingly simple feature of liberal societies creates tension for liberal perfectionists, who are committed to justifying religious toleration primarily in terms of the goods and flourishing it promotes. Perfectionists, so it seems, should recommend restricting harmful religious practices when feasible. If such restrictions would promote liberal perfectionist values like autonomy, it is unclear how the perfectionist can object. A contemporary liberal perfectionist, Steven Wall, has advanced defense (...) of religious toleration that grounds perfectionist toleration in an innovative account of reasons of respect. He thus defends perfectionist toleration on two grounds: (i) the appropriate manner of responding to perfectionist goods like autonomy and membership is to respect the religious choices of others; (ii) citizens can acquire reasons to respect the religious choices of others through internalizing a value-promoting moral and political code. I argue that both defenses fail. The cornerstone of both arguments is the connection Wall draws between reasons to promote value and reasons to respect it. I claim that Wall’s conception of the relationship between promoting and respecting value is inadequate. I conclude that the failure of Wall’s defense of perfectionist toleration should motivate liberal perfectionists to develop more sophisticated accounts of normative reasons. The viability of a truly liberal perfectionism depends upon such developments. (shrink)

The time of the economic crisis, the prolonged collisions between the opposition and the main branches of power, the permanent election process, and the general instability of society, characteristic to modern Ukraine, give birth to the state of emotional and psychological stress - from sorrow, despair, and a sense of hopelessness to complete eclecticism of public opinion and opposition, even within one family.

The Protestant conception of religion as a private matter of conscience organized into voluntary associations informed early liberalism's conception of religion and of religious toleration, assumptions that are still present in contemporary liberalism. In many other religions, however, including Hinduism (the main though not only focus of this article), practice has a much larger role than conscience. Hinduism is not a voluntary association, and the structure of its practices, some of which are inegalitarian, makes exit very difficult. This (...) makes liberal religious toleration an awkward fit for Hinduism; granting religious toleration in India undermines equality and autonomy in severe ways. Yet Hinduism is not without its virtues, and has historically been what I call externally tolerant-it has been relatively tolerant of other religions. Liberal toleration, by contrast, is internally tolerant-it is tolerant of religions that fit the Protestant model, while its tolerance of others is considerably more qualified. I briefly speculate at the end of the article about how to combine these two models of toleration. (shrink)

v. 1. Religions and their doctrines. -- v. 2. Religion and morality. -- v. 3. Religion and nation building. -- v. 4. Philosophy of religious tolerance.

The paper deals with the question of religious tolerance in Europe’s past and present. Tolerance within Christianity (and within the other so called “Abrahamitic” or “Biblical” Religions) is one of the main points. However, the reader is also invited to take a brief look at Europe’s pre-christian past. To some extent, the religious situation of the Roman Empire in particular rather seems to resemble our own experiences with pluralistic societies in today’s Europe than medieval and early modern circumstances (...) would do. Even the ancient problems with “religious freedom” can be linked with modern counterparts. So this paper will avoid long retrospectives at the well known facts of Europe’s Christian past such as inquisition and European religious wars in order to deal with some more hidden perspectives of European religious his- tory, which were often obscured by the main historiographical narrative. (shrink)

The paper analyses and criticizes Locke’s arguments for religious toleration presented in his Letter concerning Toleration. The author argues that the epistemology Locke developed in his Essay concerning Human Understanding made a more constructive contribution to the case for toleration.

In this essay we discuss an ethical dilemma that recently arose in our institution, involving healthcare workers who lamented the requirement to shave their facial hair as a condition to care for COVID-19 patients. The essay represents a genuine attempt to grapple with the dilemma sensibly and vigorously. We first provide a brief introduction, focusing on the tension between religious tolerance and the institutional obligation to optimize patient care and public health in the age of COVID-19. We then discuss (...) the complex relationship between facial hair and cultural as well as religious factors throughout history. Next, we make a case, based on several principles in Islam jurisprudence, that Muslim healthcare professionals in our institution should be expected to shave their facial hair so they could care for COVID patients. We end with considering two alternative solutions that were offered in the literature. (shrink)

Brian Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion? valuably clarifies the issues involved in granting religion-specific accommodations to laws and policies of general application. His arguments are careful, rigorous, and fair, and in rejecting the deontological arguments for religion-specific accommodations he seems to me largely correct. But when he turns to arguing against the utilitarian case for such accommodations, he employs a seemingly non-standard sense of utilitarianism in which demands of principled consistency constrain what would otherwise be utilitarian welfare-maximization. A more traditional and (...) stronger version of utilitarianism, however, has room for seemingly unprincipled or even irrational distinctions as long as employing those distinctions is utility- or welfare-maximizing. And thus although Leiter’s arguments against the deontological justifications for religion-specific accommodations are largely successful, his arguments against utilitarian justifications, by relying more heavily on the notion of “principle” than a utilitarian should accept, are open to challenge. (shrink)

The essay discusses the defense of religious tolerance presented in Johann Crell’s treatise On Freedom of Conscience, pointing to the tension between Christian exclusivism on the one hand and religious practicalism and rationalism on the other inherent in Crell’s views. This tension can be resolved by adopting theistic minimalism or extreme practicalism.

The sources of religious tolerance but also of religious nationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically in the group identification of nationality and religion. In crisis situations, the historical religion of the Russian society - Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying the national identity. However, despite the fact that the majority of Russians in our times consider themselves Orthodox, many of them are not believers. The observable effect of the “external belief” results in the fact that (...) the religion tends to become a matter of personal choice and an individual value. It assumes a nationalistic function and to become an ideology. As a result, the political elite considers religion as a means of achieving different non- religious purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church, the official church, is compelled to take this fact into consider- ation and even support it. This is why religious intolerance and religious nationalism in modern Russia are often directed towards religion. (shrink)

As one might expect, throughout his life Leibniz assumed an attitude of religious toleration both ad intra (that is, toward Christians of other confessions) and ad extra (that is, toward non-Christians, notably Muslims). The aim of this paper is to uncover the philosophical and theological foundations of Leibniz’s views on this subject. Focusing in particular on his epistolary exchange with the French Catholic convert Paul Pellisson-Fontanier, I argue that neither toleration ad intra nor toleration ad extra (...) is grounded for Leibniz in indifference toward the content of revealed religion. On the contrary, Leibniz remained convinced of the objective truth of the Christian religion as it is handed down by the millennia-old tradition of the truly universal church. In his view, reasons internal to the very nature of salvation and to the conception of God and man explicitly contained in or, at least, in accord with this tradition present religious toleration as the only justifiable answer to the differences among religions. (shrink)

The central thesis of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise is that the state not only can permit freedom of philosophizing without endangering piety or the public peace, but that it must do so if it is not to destroy piety and the public peace. Spinoza’s argument is not limited to religious toleration, but is an argument for freedom of philosophizing generally. Nevertheless, freedom of philosophizing in religion is the central case. In making such an argument, he contributed greatly toward the (...) transformation of Western culture with respect to toleration and religious liberty. As an historian, I want to understand how this transformation came about and what role Spinoza played in it. As a philosopher, I also want to know whether any of the arguments philosophers made in favor of religious toleration deserved to be effective in bringing about this transformation. (shrink)

In relating philosophy to intercultural understanding, one of the key problems that arises is that of the relationship between tolerance and religious belief.This paper challenges the common understanding of tolerance in contemporary debates over religious diversity. It argues that tolerance is overused and over-applied in these debates, and has wrongfully come to refer to tactlessness, harshness of condemnation, and even exclusivity of belief. In seeking to clarify the concept and ensure its appropriate usage, it proposes that religious (...) tolerance should only be applied to beliefs and actions following from those beliefs. It offers a framework in which tolerance about epistemic matters and tolerance about metaphysical matters is differentiated, and proposes that rejecting a certain element of metaphysical tolerance, namely the coexistence of incompatible content, is not a legitimate condition for intolerance. These clarifications enable a more consistent way of understanding tolerance and religious diversity. (shrink)

In relating philosophy to intercultural understanding, one of the key problems that arises is that of the relationship between tolerance and religious belief.This paper challenges the common understanding of tolerance in contemporary debates over religious diversity. It argues that tolerance is overused and over-applied in these debates, and has wrongfully come to refer to tactlessness, harshness of condemnation, and even exclusivity of belief. In seeking to clarify the concept and ensure its appropriate usage, it proposes that religious (...) tolerance should only be applied to beliefs and actions following from those beliefs. It offers a framework in which tolerance about epistemic matters and tolerance about metaphysical matters is differentiated, and proposes that rejecting a certain element of metaphysical tolerance, namely the coexistence of incompatible content, is not a legitimate condition for intolerance. These clarifications enable a more consistent way of understanding tolerance and religious diversity. (shrink)

This paper takes the form of aletter to fledgling democracies such asAlgeria, Turkey, and Iran. It explores thenature of democracy and argues that theequality of citizens requires that differentreligions be treated equally. It presents some``lessons'''' from United States constitutionalhistory which might be useful to fledglingdemocracies as they seek to achieve aseparation of church and state. Developing atheme first presented in ``A Third Principle ofJustice,'''' The Journal of Ethics 1 (1997),pp. 355–374, it argues that religious tolerationsometimes may require a heightened (...) sensitivityto the needs of some religious associations. Itconcludes, however, that religious tolerationdoes not require a toleration of intolerantreligious extremists who pose a threat todemocracy. (shrink)

This paper first adumbrates the theory of religious intolerance in early modern Europe. Then it turns to three leading philosophers of the age, Spinoza, Bayle and Locke, who elaborated philosophical defences of religious toleration. The problem it analyzes is that though these thinkers depart from radically different premises concerning the roles of state and church, the abilities of speculative reason, and the concept of God, yet they conclude that government and church alike must grant an almost complete (...) freedom to the individual in the choice of his or her religion at least in foro interno. As an explanation, we first reconstruct the metaphysical foundation on which Spinoza’s political theological theory rests in the TTP, in order to show that through this theory, his intention was to enable the philosopher to spread a rational enlightenment deriving from an unconditioned philosophy of God; to advocate not the freedom of religion but the freedom to philosophize. Bayle, by contrast, builds his defence of religious toleration on the superiority of natural practical reason over speculative reason, asserting that while the divine nature is only very imperfectly known by speculative reason, the moral commands of religion have to be controlled by the divinely inspired, universal principles of practical reason. Locke advocates the necessary separation of state and church ultimately on the grounds that the individual is able to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God all alone – his rationale of religious toleration is a corollary of his metaphysical theory concerning the nominal knowability, by natural speculative reason, of the divine nature. We conclude that the similarities in their respective defences of religious toleration are only formal, and determined by their different metaphysical presuppositions. (shrink)

With the publication of Locke’s early manuscripts on toleration and the drafts for the Essay, it is possible to understand to what extent Locke’s ideas on religious toleration have developed. Although the important arguments for toleration can already be found in these early texts, Locke was confronted with a problem in his defence of toleration that he needed to solve. If faith, as a form of judgement, is involuntary, as Locke claims, how can one be (...) held accountable for the faith one has? In answer to this question reason comes to play a more prominent role in Locke’s notion of faith and in his defence of religious toleration, and in his philosophy in general. This notion of reason is not the reason we use for mathematical demonstrations. It is rather reason as we use it in discussion, and is thus fallible. It is precisely this kind of reason that played a central role in the Remonstrant religion to which Locke was closely connected at the time he developed a new argument for religious toleration when he was in the Netherlands. (shrink)

The essay discusses the defense of religious tolerance presented in Johann Crell’s treatise On Freedom of Conscience, pointing to the tension between Christian exclusivism on the one hand and religious practicalism and rationalism on the other inherent in Crell’s views. This tension can be resolved by adopting theistic minimalism or extreme practicalism.

The very founding of the town Neuwied-am-Rhein was closely linked to policies and practices of religious toleration. It was the hope and intent of Count Friedrich of Wied (1618-1698) that a town, well planned and advantageously located, would bring economic relief and eventually prosperity to his small land, which had suffered particularly in the last years of the Thirty Years’ War. From the outset he saw that the best means of attracting residents would be to guarantee as large (...) a degree of religious freedom as possible.The Treaty of Westphalia provided a viable legal framework within which Protestants, adherents to the Augsburg Confession be they Lutherans or Reformed, and Roman Catholics could exercise their religion within the German Empire. The treaty basically defined three types of religious practice: the exercitium religionis publicum, which gave the members of the minority religion in any territorial unit full freedom to worship openly; the exercitium privatum, restricting the worship of the congregation to specific places; and finally the devotio domestica, which allowed the “individual exercise of religion by the common subject, practiced by him alone, without further ecclesiastical ceremony,... within the walls of his own living quarters.” The treaty further offered the beneficium emigrandi, and specified the conditions under which forced or voluntary emigration was to take place. (shrink)

This article is the revised and annotated version of a lecture given at the German Historical Institute in London on 16 February 1982. I have discussed aspects of the same topic in other articles, e.g. ‘Wandel der Argumente für religiöse Toleranz und Glaubensfreiheit im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert’, in H. Lutz . Zur Geschichte der Toleranz und Religionsfreiheit , pp. 455–481, and ‘Parität, Neutralität und Toleranz’, to be published in Zwingliana 15.

A review of Why Tolerate Religion? by Brian Leiter.