Search results for 'repeated Prisoner's Dilemma' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Robert Hoffmann (1999). The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 47 (1):57-72.score: 1632.0
    The results of a series of computer simulations demonstrate how the introduction of separate spatial dimensions for agent interaction and learning respectively affects the possibility of cooperation evolving in the repeated prisoner's dilemma played by populations of boundedly-rational agents. In particular, the localisation of learning promotes the emergence of cooperative behaviour, while the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it.
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  2. Sylvain Béal (2010). Perceptron Versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 69 (2):183-204.score: 1626.0
    We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to (...)
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  3. Fernando Vega-Redondo (1994). Bayesian Boundedly Rational Agents Play the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 36 (2):187-206.score: 1254.0
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  4. H. Edwin Overcast & Gordon Tullock (1971). A Differential Approach to the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 1 (4):350-358.score: 1020.0
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  5. Stephen E. Rau & James Weber (2003). Can the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game Be Used as a Tool to Enhance Moral Reasoning? Teaching Business Ethics 7 (4):395-416.score: 1020.0
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  6. Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Reconsidering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Synthese 136 (2):135 - 157.score: 984.0
    According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by (...)
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  7. Charles H. Pence & Lara Buchak (2012). Oyun: A New, Free Program for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournaments in the Classroom. Evolution Education and Outreach 5 (3):467-476.score: 702.0
    Evolutionary applications of game theory present one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genuine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program designed to run iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments, competitions between prisoner’s dilemma strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this software, students are able to readily design and tweak their own strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “generation” directly (...)
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  8. Kevin Gibson (2003). Games Students Play: Incorporating the Prisoner's Dilemma in Teaching Business Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 48 (1):53-64.score: 702.0
    The so-called "Prisoner''s Dilemma" is often referred to in business ethics, but probably not well understood. This article has three parts: (1) I claim that models derived from game theory are significant in the field for discussions of prudential ethics and the practical decisions managers make; (2) I discuss using them as a practical pedagogical exercise and some of the lessons generated; (3) more speculatively, I suggest that they are useful in discussions of corporate personhood.
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  9. Ishtiyaque Haji (1992). Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):161-175.score: 702.0
    I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that (...)
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  10. Patrick Grim (1997). The Undecidability of the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 42 (1):53-80.score: 702.0
    In the spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor's strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May, 1993; Mar and St. Denis, 1993a,b; Grim 1995, 1996). Often a question arises as to what the eventual outcome of an initial spatial configuration of strategies will be: Will a single strategy prove triumphant in the sense of progressively conquering more and more territory without (...)
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  11. Esther Hauk (2003). Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(Out) an Outside Option: An Experimental Study. Theory and Decision 54 (3):207-229.score: 702.0
    Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite two-person prisoner's dilemma supergames with and without an outside option reveal that: (i) an attractive outside option enhances cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, (ii) if the payoff for mutual defection is negative, subjects' tendency to avoid losses leads them to cooperate; while this tendency makes them stick to mutual defection if its payoff is positive, (iii) subjects use probabilistic start and endeffect behavior.
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  12. Mark Thomas Walker (forthcoming). The Real Reason Why the Prisoner's Dilemma is Not a Newcomb Problem. Philosophia:1-19.score: 702.0
    It is commonly thought, in line with the position defended in an influential paper by David Lewis, that the decision problems faced in the prisoner’s dilemma and the Newcomb situation are essentially the same problem. José Luis Bermúdez has recently attacked the case Lewis makes for this claim. While I think the claim is false, I contend that Bermúdez’s reason for rejecting Lewis’s argument is inadequate, and then outline what I take to be a better reason for doing so.
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  13. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman (2010). Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem is Not a Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 69 (2):219-231.score: 702.0
    In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s (...)
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  14. Alison Watkins & Ronald Paul Hill (2005). The Impact of Personal and Organizational Moral Philosophies on Marketing Exchange Relationships: A Simulation Using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 62 (3):253 - 265.score: 632.3
    The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of individual and firm moral philosophies on marketing exchange relationships. Personal moral philosophies range from the extreme forms of true altruists and true egoists, along with three hybrids that represent middle ground (i.e., realistic altruists, tit-for-tats, and realistic egoists). Organizational postures are defined as Ethical Paradigm, Unethical Paradigm, and Neutral Paradigm, which result in changes to personal moral philosophies and company and industry performance. The study context is a simulation of (...)
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  15. Richmond Campbell & Lanning Snowden (eds.) (1985). Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. University of British Columbia Press.score: 614.3
    1 Background for the Uninitiated RICHMOND CAMPBELL Paradoxes are intrinsically fascinating. They are also distinctively ...
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  16. John W. Carroll (1993). The Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Reply to Becker and Cudd. Theory and Decision 34 (1):63-72.score: 614.3
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  17. Joshua M. Epstein (1998). Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma. Complexity 4 (2):36-48.score: 614.3
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  18. C. L. Sheng (1994). A Note on the Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 36 (3):233-246.score: 614.3
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  19. John J. Tilley (1996). Prisoner's Dilemma From a Moral Point of View. Theory and Decision 41 (2):187-193.score: 614.3
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  20. Christoph Hauert & György Szabó (2003). Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games in Different Geometries: Compulsory Versus Voluntary Interactions. Complexity 8 (4):31-38.score: 614.3
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  21. David Kraines & Vivian Kraines (1989). Pavlov and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 26 (1):47-79.score: 614.3
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  22. David Kraines & Vivian Kraines (1993). Learning to Cooperate with Pavlov an Adaptive Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Noise. Theory and Decision 35 (2):107-150.score: 614.3
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  23. Xavier Thibert‐Plante & Lael Parrott (2007). Prisoner's Dilemma and Clusters on Small‐World Networks. Complexity 12 (6):22-36.score: 614.3
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  24. Fengjie Xie, Wentian Cui & Jun Lin (2013). Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Adaptive Networks Under Limited Foresight. Complexity 18 (3):38-47.score: 614.3
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  25. Robert Hoffmann (2001). The Ecology of Cooperation. Theory and Decision 50 (2):101-118.score: 612.0
    In the evolutionary approach to the repeated prisoner's dilemma, strategies spread in populations of emulating and experimenting agents through the principle of survival of the fittest. Although no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in such populations, the processes of differential strategy propagation provide a promising area of study. This paper employs computer simulations to uncover how these processes govern the oscillating and open-ended evolution of alternative forms of behaviour. Certain `ecological' relationships between important strategy types which are (...)
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  26. Christoph Schmidt-Petri (2005). Newcomb's Problem and Repeated Prisoners' Dilemmas. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1160-1173.score: 568.0
    I present a game-theoretic way to understand the situation describing Newcomb’s Problem (NP) which helps to explain the intuition of both one-boxers and two-boxers. David Lewis has shown that the NP may be modelled as a Prisoners Dilemma game (PD) in which ‘cooperating’ corresponds to ‘taking one box’. Adopting relevant results from game theory, this means that one should take just one box if the NP is repeated an indefinite number of times, but both boxes if it is (...)
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  27. Duncan Macintosh (1991). Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.score: 562.5
    For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other (...)
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  28. Max Albert & Hannes Rusch, Indirect Reciprocity, Golden Opportunities for Defection, and Inclusive Reputation. MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.score: 553.0
    In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, reputation mechanisms can stabilize cooperation even in severe cooperation problems like the prisoner’s dilemma. Under certain circumstances, conditionally cooperative strategies, which cooperate iff their partner has a good reputation, cannot be invaded by any other strategy that conditions behavior only on own and partner reputation. The first point of this paper is to show that an evolutionary version of backward induction can lead to a breakdown of this kind of indirectly reciprocal cooperation. Backward (...)
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  29. Doede Nauta & Jeljer Hoekstra (1995). Effective Choice in the Single-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament. Theory and Decision 39 (1):1-30.score: 551.3
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  30. Harvey S. James Jr & Jeffrey P. Cohen (2004). Does Ethics Training Neutralize the Incentives of the Prisoner's Dilemma? Evidence From a Classroom Experiment. Journal of Business Ethics 50 (1):53 - 61.score: 535.5
    Teaching economics has been shown to encourage students to defect in a prisoner's dilemma game. However, can ethics training reverse that effect and promote cooperation? We conducted an experiment to answer this question. We found that students who had the ethics module had higher rates of cooperation than students without the ethics module, even after controlling for communication and other factors expected to affect cooperation. We conclude that the teaching of ethics can mitigate the possible adverse incentives of (...)
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  31. Elias L. Khalil (2002). Is the Prisoner's Dilemma Metaphor Suitable for Altruism? Distinguishing Self-Control and Commitment From Altruism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):264-265.score: 526.5
    Rachlin basically marshals three reasons behind his unconventional claim that altruism is a subcategory of self-control and that, hence, the prisoner's dilemma is the appropriate metaphor of altruism. I do not find any of the three reasons convincing. Therefore, the prisoner's dilemma metaphor is unsuitable for explaining altruism.
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  32. Leon Felkins, The Prisoner's Dilemma.score: 526.5
    The "Prisoner's Dilemma" game has been extensively discussed in both the public and academic press. Thousands of articles and many books have been written about this disturbing game and its apparent representation of many problems of society. The origin of the game is attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher. I quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Puzzles with this structure were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand (...)
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  33. Douglas D. Heckathorn (1991). Extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma Paradigm: The Altruist's Dilemma and Group Solidarity. Sociological Theory 9 (1):34-52.score: 526.5
    Many recent studies of norm emergence employ the "prisoner's dilemma" (PD) paradigm, which focuses on the free-rider problem that can block the cooperation required for the emergence of social norms. This paper proposes an expansion of the PD paradigm to include a closely related game termed the "altruist's dilemma" (AD). Whereas egoistic behavior in the PD leads to collectively irrational outcomes, the opposite is the case in the AD: altruistic behavior (e.g., following the Golden Rule) leads to (...)
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  34. J. L. Bermudez (2013). Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem: Why Lewis's Argument Fails. Analysis 73 (3):423-429.score: 526.5
    According to David Lewis, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Newcomb's problem (NP) are really just one dilemma in two different forms (Lewis 1979). Lewis's argument for this conclusion is ingenious and has been widely accepted. However, it is flawed. As this paper shows, the considerations that Lewis brings to bear to show that the game he starts with is an NP equally show that the game is not a PD.
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  35. Rob Boyd, Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.score: 526.5
    The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in the biological and social sciences to model dyadic cooperation. While most of this work has focused on the discrete prisoner’s dilemma, in which actors choose between cooperation and defection, there has been some analysis of the continuous IPD, in which actors can choose any level of cooperation from zero to one. Here, we analyse a model of the continuous IPD with a limited strategy set, and show that a (...)
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  36. Louis Marinoff (1990). The Inapplicability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4):461-472.score: 526.5
    Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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  37. John J. Tilley (1994). Accounting for the 'Tragedy' in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Synthese 99 (2):251–76.score: 526.5
    The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a tragedy in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a trembling-hand equilibrium. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of (...)
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  38. Patrick Grim, Undecidability in the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma: Some Philosophical Implications.score: 526.5
    A version of this paper was presented at the IEEE International Conference on Computational Intelligence, combined meeting of ICNN, FUZZ-IEEE, and ICEC, Orlando, June-July, 1994, and an earlier form of the result is to appear as "The Undecidability of the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma" in Theory and Decision . An interactive form of the paper, in which figures are called up as evolving arrays of cellular automata, is available on DOS disk as Research Report #94-04i . An expanded version (...)
     
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  39. Wolfgang Spohn, A Rationalization of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.score: 526.5
    The paper is essentially a short version Spohn "Strategic Rationality" which emphasizes in particular how the ideas developed there may be used to shed new light on the iterated prisoner's dilemma (and on iterated Newcomb's problem).
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  40. Randall K. Campbell (1989). The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Symmetry Argument for Cooperation. Analysis 49 (2):60 - 65.score: 526.5
    Several philosophers have discussed informal versions of a "symmetry argument" that seems to show that two rational maximizers will cooperate when they are in a prisoner's dilemma. I present a more precise version of that argument and I argue that it is valid only if some crucial statements are misinterpreted as material conditionals instead of being interpreted correctly as subjunctive conditionals.
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  41. Toby Ord & Alan Blair, Exploitation and Peacekeeping: Introducing More Sophisticated Interactions to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.score: 526.5
    – We present a new paradigm extending the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma to multiple players. Our model is unique in granting players information about past interactions between all pairs of players – allowing for much more sophisticated social behaviour. We provide an overview of preliminary results and discuss the implications in terms of the evolutionary dynamics of strategies.
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  42. Derek Hook (2013). Towards a Lacanian Group Psychology: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trans‐Subjective. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (2):115-132.score: 526.5
    Revisiting Lacan's discussion of the puzzle of the prisoner's dilemma provides a means of elaborating a theory of the trans-subjective. An illustration of this dilemma provides the basis for two important arguments. Firstly, that we need to grasp a logical succession of modes of subjectivity: from subjectivity to inter-subjectivity, and from inter-subjectivity to a form of trans-subjective social logic. The trans-subjective, thus conceptualized, enables forms of social objectivity that transcend the level of (inter)subjectivity, and which play a (...)
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  43. José Luis Bermúdez (2013). Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem: Why Lewis's Argument Fails. Analysis 73 (3):423-429.score: 526.5
    According to David Lewis, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Newcomb's problem (NP) are really just one dilemma in two different forms (Lewis 1979). Lewis's argument for this conclusion is ingenious and has been widely accepted. However, it is flawed. As this paper shows, the considerations that Lewis brings to bear to show that the game he starts with is an NP equally show that the game is not a PD.
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  44. Daniel R. Gilbert Jr (1996). The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Business Ethics Quarterly 6 (2):165-178.score: 526.5
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modem corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriouslyour parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma-as clever a rhetoricaldevice as it is-is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners (...)
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  45. Lisa Bruttel & Ulrich Kamecke (2012). Infinity in the Lab. How Do People Play Repeated Games? Theory and Decision 72 (2):205-219.score: 498.0
    We introduce a novel mechanism to eliminate endgame effects in repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments. In the main phase of a supergame our mechanism generates more persistent cooperation than finite horizon or random continuation rules. Moreover, we find evidence for cooperation-enhancing “active/reactive” strategies which concentrate in the initial phase of a supergame as subjects gain experience.
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  46. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). McClennen's Early Co-Operative Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):341-358.score: 474.8
  47. Tomislav Bracanovic (2002). The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory. Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.score: 465.8
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. (...)
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  48. Eric Rasmusen (1992). Folk Theorems for the Observable Implications of Repeated Games. Theory and Decision 32 (2):147-164.score: 462.0
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  49. Neal C. Becker & Ann E. Cudd (1990). Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll. Theory and Decision 28 (2):189-195.score: 462.0
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  50. Mark Irving Lichbach (1992). The Repeated Public Goods Game: A Solution Using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl Point. Theory and Decision 32 (2):133-146.score: 462.0
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