Search results for 'retributivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Some Second Thoughts On Retributivism (2011). Jeffrie G. Murphy. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
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  2. Retrieving Retributivism (2011). RA Duff. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press. 1.score: 60.0
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  3. Nathan Hanna (2014). Retributivism Revisited. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.score: 24.0
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends (...)
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  4. Jane Johnson (2008). Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307.score: 24.0
    The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his construction (...)
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  5. Thom Brooks (2005). Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark. Ratio 18 (2):237–245.score: 24.0
    In this journal, Michael Clark defends a "A Non-Retributive Kantian Approach to Punishment". I argue that both Kant's and Rawls's theories of punishment are retributivist to some extent. It may then be slightly misleading to say that by following the views of Kant and Rawls, in particular, as Clark does, we can develop a nonretributivist theory of punishment. This matter is further complicated by the fact Clark nowhere addresses Rawls's views on punishment: Rawls endorses a mixed theory combining retributive and (...)
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  6. Jami L. Anderson (1997). Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism. Criminal Justice Ethics 16 (1):13-25.score: 24.0
    Retributivism is regarded by many as an attractive theory of punishment. Its primary assumption is that persons are morally responsible agents, and it demands that the social practices of punishment acknowledge that agency. But others have criticized retributivism as being barbaric, claiming that the theory is nothing more than a rationalization for revenge that fails to offer a compelling non-consequentialist justification for the infliction of harm. Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on retributivism has attempted to meet (...)
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  7. Jesper Ryberg (2005). Retributivism and Multiple Offending. Res Publica 11 (3):213-233.score: 24.0
    This article addresses the question of how multiple offenders – that is, offenders who have committed more than one crime before they are apprehended – should be punished from a retributivist point of view. Two theories are evaluated, both defending the view that there should be a bulk discount for multiple offending. According to the first theory, a bulk discount follows from the idea of a punishment ceiling for types of crimes and the principle of parsimony in punishing. (...)
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  8. Jesper Ryberg (2010). Mass Atrocities, Retributivism, and the Threshold Challenge. Res Publica 16 (2):169-179.score: 24.0
    The purpose of this paper is to direct attention to a challenge—referred to as the threshold challenge —facing a non-absolutist retributivist view on international criminal justice. It is argued, on the one hand, that this challenge constitutes a practically pertinent problem for the retributivist approach to the punishment of mass crimes and, on the other, that it is very hard to imagine any principled way of meeting this challenge.
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  9. Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu (2013). Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital Punishment? Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.score: 24.0
    Does communicative retributivism necessarily negate capital punishment? My answer is no. I argue that there is a place, though a very limited and unsettled one, for capital punishment within the theoretical vision of communicative retributivism. The death penalty, when reserved for extravagantly evil murderers for the most heinous crimes, is justifiable by communicative retributive ideals. I argue that punishment as censure is a response to the preceding message sent by the offender through his criminal act. The gravity of (...)
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  10. Jami L. Anderson (1999). Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment. Cambridge University Press 5 (4):363-388.score: 24.0
    Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the (...)
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  11. Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2014). (Neuro)Predictions, Dangerousness, and Retributivism. Journal of Ethics 18 (2):137-151.score: 24.0
    Through the criminal justice system so-called dangerous offenders are, besides the offence that they are being convicted of and sentenced to, also punished for acts that they have not done but that they are believe to be likely to commit in the future. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss whether some adherents of retributivism give a plausible rationale for punishing offenders more harshly if they, all else being equal, by means of predictions are believed to be (...)
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  12. Paul Robinson, Joshua S. Barton & Matthew J. Lister (2014). Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply. New Criminal Law Review 17 (2):312-375.score: 24.0
    A number of articles and empirical studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, have suggested a relationship between the extent of the criminal law's reputation for being just in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment in the eyes of the community – its "moral credibility" – and its ability to gain that community's deference and compliance through a variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability and (...)
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  13. Jesper Ryberg (2014). When Should Neuroimaging Be Applied in the Criminal Court? On Ideal Comparison and the Shortcomings of Retributivism. Journal of Ethics 18 (2):81-99.score: 24.0
    When does neuroimaging constitute a sufficiently developed technology to be put into use in the work of determining whether or not a defendant is guilty of crime? This question constitutes the starting point of the present paper. First, it is suggested that an overall answer is provided by what is referred to as the “ideal comparative view.” Secondly, it is—on the ground of this view—argued that the answer as to whether neuroimaging technology should be applied presupposes penal theoretical considerations. Thirdly, (...)
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  14. Thom Brooks (2004). Retributivist Arguments Against Capital Punishment. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):188–197.score: 22.0
    This article argues that even if we grant that murderers may deserve death in principle, retributivists should still oppose capital punishment. The reason? Our inability to know with certainty whether or not individuals possess the necessary level of desert. In large part due to advances in science, we can only be sure that no matter how well the trial is administered or how many appeals are allowed or how many years we let elapse, we will continue to execute innocent persons (...)
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  15. J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Making Sense of Retributivism. Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.score: 18.0
    This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and (...)
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  16. David Dolinko (1991). Some Thoughts About Retributivism. Ethics 101 (3):537-559.score: 18.0
    Retributive accounts of the justification of criminal punishment are increasingly fashionable, yet their proponents frequently rely more on suggestive metaphor than on reasoned explanation. This article seeks to question whether any such coherent explanations are possible. I briefly sketch some general doubts about the validity of retributivist views and then critique three recent efforts (by George Sher, Jean Hampton, and Michael Moore) to put retributivism on a sound basis.
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  17. Larry Alexander (1983). Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent. Law and Philosophy 2 (2):233 - 246.score: 18.0
    Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. (...)
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  18. D. Dolinko (1997). Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment. Law and Philosophy 16 (5):507-528.score: 18.0
    Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an ``intrinsic good'' claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a ``desert'' (...)
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  19. Nathan Hanna (2008). Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.score: 18.0
    Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to correct for the traditional obscurity of retributivism. Retributivists often (...)
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  20. J. Angelo Corlett (2003). Making More Sense of Retributivism: Desert as Responsibility and Proportionality. Philosophy 78 (2):279-287.score: 18.0
    This paper is an elaboration of my previous paper published in Philosophy, ‘Making Sense of retributivism,’ which was a criticism of John Rawls' attempt in ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ to develop a rule utilitarian theory of punishment wherein utilitarianism is best construed as a justificatory basis for the institution of punishment and retributivism is best construed as serving as a justificatory basis for particular forms of punishment. I challenge this claim, arguing that retributivism must and can provide (...)
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  21. Dimitri Landa (2009). On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism. Utilitas 21 (3):276-296.score: 18.0
    One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is (...)
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  22. Daniel Z. Korman (2003). The Failure of Trust-Based Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 22 (6):561-575.score: 18.0
    Punishment stands in need of justification because it involves intentionally harming offenders. Trust-based retributivists attempt to justify punishment by appeal to the offender’s violation of the victim’s trust, maintaining that the state is entitled to punish offenders as a means of restoring conditions of trust to their pre-offense levels. I argue that trust-based retributivism fails on two counts. First, it entails the permissibility of punishing the legally innocent and fails to justify the punishment of some offenders. Second, it cannot (...)
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  23. George Schedler (2011). Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment. Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (3):240-266.score: 18.0
    Abstract I argue for the following, which I dub the ?fallibility syllogism?: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what (...)
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  24. David Wood (1997). Reductivism, Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders. Utilitas 9 (01):131-.score: 18.0
    The paper examines one objection to the suggestion that, rather than being subjected to extended prison sentences on the one hand, or simply released on the other, dangerous offenders should be in principle liable to some form of civil detention on completion of their normal sentences. This objection raises the spectre of a , pursuing various reductivist means outside the criminal justice system. The objection also threatens to undermine dualist theories of punishment, theories which combine reductivist and retributivist considerations. The (...)
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  25. Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan & Shaun Nichols (2013). Folk Retributivism And The Communication Confound. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):235-261.score: 18.0
    Retributivist accounts of punishment maintain that it is right to punish wrongdoers, even if the punishment has no future benefits. Research in experimental economics indicates that people are willing to pay to punish defectors. A complementary line of work in social psychology suggests that people think that it is right to punish wrongdoers. This work suggests that people are retributivists about punishment. However, all of the extant work contains an important potential confound. The target of the punishment is expected to (...)
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  26. Jesper Ryberg (2013). Retributivism and Resources. Utilitas 25 (1):66-79.score: 18.0
    A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation . Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of punishment.
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  27. Vincent Luizzi (2007). The "New Balance" Approach to Punishment and Its Utilitarian and Retributivist Rivals. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:23-28.score: 18.0
    This essay investigates the possibility of veering from an approach of doing bad to the offender as the primary response to crime to one of requiring the offender to do good. This approach, in effect, has us offset the evil which the offender has placed on the scales of justice with good which the offender is required to produce; hence the conception of New Balance. The specific focus here is to identify important deficiencies in the major approaches of retributivism (...)
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  28. M. Tunick (1996). Is Kant a Retributivist? History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.score: 18.0
    Retributivists are often thought to give 'deontological' theories of punishment, arguing that we should punish not for the beneficial consequences of doing so such as deterrence or incapacitation, but purely because justice demands it. Kant is often regarded as the paradigmatic retributivist. In some passages Kant does appear to give a deontological theory of punishment. For example, Kant insists that on an island where all the people were to leave the next day, forever dissolving and dispersing the community, the last (...)
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  29. Richard L. Lippke (2014). Some Surprising Implications of Negative Retributivism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1):49-62.score: 18.0
    Negative retributivism is the view that though the primary justifying aim of legal punishment is the reduction of crime, the state's efforts to do so are subject to side-constraints that forbid punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty. I contend that insufficient attention has been paid to what the side-constraints commit us to in constructing a theory of legal punishment, even one primarily oriented toward reducing crime. Specifically, I argue that the side-constraints limit the kinds of (...)
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  30. Tunick M. (1996). Is Kant a Retributivist? History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.score: 18.0

    The label ‘retributive’ has been sloppily attached to Kant. Kant is wrongly said to give a deontological theory of legal punishment, or to be a paradigmatic ‘bold retributivist’. By exploring precisely in what sense we can speak of Kant as a retributivist I hope at the very least to have promoted a more accurate understanding of his theory of legal punishment, an understanding that is not obfuscated by a loose label.

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  31. Hegel On Punishment & A. More (2011). Sophisticated Retributivism. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  32. Thom Brooks (2011). Is Bradley a Retributivist? History of Political Thought 32 (1):83-95.score: 18.0
    Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley's writings relates to his views on punishment. Commentators universally recognize Bradley's theory of punishment as a retributivist theory of punishment. This article challenges the received wisdom. I argue that Bradley does not endorse retributivism as commonly understood. Instead, he defends the view that punishment is non-retributivist and serves the end of societal maintenance. Moreover, Bradley defends this view consistently from Ethical Studies to later work on punishment. Instead of holding a theory (...)
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  33. Mark White (2011). Introduction to 'Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy'. In , Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press. 16.score: 18.0
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  34. Robert S. Gerstein (1974). Capital Punishment-"Cruel and Unusal&Quot;?: A Retributivist Response. Ethics 85 (1):75-79.score: 15.0
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  35. Daniel McDermott (2001). A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (3):317–333.score: 15.0
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  36. Richard Wasserstrom (1978). Retributivism and the Concept of Punishment. Journal of Philosophy 75 (11):620-622.score: 15.0
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  37. Russ Shafer-Landau (1996). The Failure of Retributivism. Philosophical Studies 82 (3):289 - 316.score: 15.0
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  38. Russ Shafer-Landau (2000). Retributivism and Desert. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):189–214.score: 15.0
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  39. Don E. Scheid (1983). Kant's Retributivism. Ethics 93 (2):262-282.score: 15.0
  40. Andrew Brien (1995). Mercy, Utilitarianism and Retributivism. Philosophia 24 (3-4):493-521.score: 15.0
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  41. Aaron Fichtelberg (2005). Crimes Beyond Justice? Retributivism and War Crimes. Criminal Justice Ethics 24 (1):31-46.score: 15.0
  42. Jeffrie G. Murphy (1985). Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State. Criminal Justice Ethics 4 (1):3-11.score: 15.0
  43. Douglas Husak (2013). Retributivism In Extremis. Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.score: 15.0
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  44. C. L. ten (1990). Positive Retributivism. Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (02):194-.score: 15.0
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  45. K. G. Armstrong (1961). The Retributivist Hits Back. Mind 70 (280):471-490.score: 15.0
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  46. Okeoghene Odudu (2003). Retributivist Justice in an Unjust Society. Ratio Juris 16 (3):416-431.score: 15.0
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  47. Jeffrie G. Murphy (1971). Three Mistakes About Retributivism. Analysis 31 (5):166 - 169.score: 15.0
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  48. Mark A. Michael (1992). Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What's the Difference? American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):173 - 182.score: 15.0
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  49. S. Dimock (1997). Retributivism and Trust. Law and Philosophy 16 (1):37-62.score: 15.0
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  50. Jules Holroyd (forthcoming). Mark D. White (Ed): Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-12.score: 15.0
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