Search results for 'reviewed Edouard Machery' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Edouard Machery, Machery, E., 2006, Review of A. Zilhao, Ed., Evolution, Rationality and Cognition, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.score: 1080.0
  2. Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Edouard Machery (2010). Editorial: Dimensions of Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):315-318.score: 786.7
    Editorial: Dimensions of Experimental Philosophy Content Type Journal Article Pages 315-318 DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0037-9 Authors Joshua Knobe, Program in Cognitive Science and Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT USA Tania Lombrozo, Department of Psychology, UC Berkeley, 3210 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA Edouard Machery, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 CL, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal (...)
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  3. Edouard Machery, Jean-Louis Dessalles, Fiona Cowie & Jason Alexander (2010). Symposium on J.-L. Dessalles's Why We Talk (OUP, 2007): Precis by J.-L. Dessalles, Commentaries by E. Machery, F. Cowie, and J. Alexander, Replies by J.-L. Dessalles. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 25 (5):851-901.score: 540.0
    This symposium discusses J.-L. Dessalles's account of the evolution of language, which was presented in Why we Talk (OUP 2007).
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  4. Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.score: 520.0
    Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required (...)
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  5. Edouard Machery & Elizabeth O'Neill (eds.) (2014). Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.score: 520.0

    Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ (...)

    • Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)
    • Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)
    • Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)
    • Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).

    Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.

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  6. Edouard Machery (2007). Review of Robert J. Stainton, Words and Thoughts: Subsentences, Ellipsis, and the Philosophy of Language. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (6).score: 460.0
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  7. Edouard Machery (2006). Review of António Zilhão (Ed.), Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4).score: 460.0
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  8. Edouard Machery (2005). Review of Robert Boyd, Peter J.Richerson, The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).score: 460.0
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  9. Edouard Machery (2010). Explaining Why Experimental Behavior Varies Across Cultures: A Missing Step in “The Weirdest People in the World?”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):101-102.score: 450.0
    In this commentary, I argue that to properly assess the significance of the cross-cultural findings reviewed by Henrich et al., one needs to understand better the causes of the variation in performance in experimental tasks across cultures.
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  10. Daniel D. Hutto (2013). Edouard Machery , Doing Without Concepts . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 33 (2):142-145.score: 444.0
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  11. Jack M. C. Kwong (2010). Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 30 (2):115-117.score: 444.0
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  12. Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.score: 440.0
    Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.
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  13. Edouard Machery (2006). Essay Review: Debunking Adapting Minds. Philosophy of Science 73 (2):232-246.score: 430.0
    David Buller’s recent book, Adapting Minds, is a philosophical critique of the field of evolutionary psychology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology is utterly bankrupt from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Although Adapting Minds has been well received in both the academic press and the popular media, we argue that Buller’s critique of evolutionary psychology fails.
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  14. Edouard Machery, Review of R. Boyd and P. Richerson, the Origin and Evolution of Cultures. [REVIEW]score: 430.0
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  15. David J. Buller, Edouard Machery & H. Clark Barrett (2006). Essay Review-Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. 73--2.score: 430.0
     
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  16. Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Edouard Machery (2010). Editorial: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):157-160.score: 310.0
    Recent years have seen an explosion of new work at the intersection of philosophy and experimental psychology. This work takes the concerns with moral and conceptual issues that have so long been associated with philosophy and connects them with the use of systematic and well-controlled empirical investigations that one more typically finds in psychology. Work in this new field often goes under the name "experimental philosophy".
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  17. Edouard Machery, Do We Talk to Be Relevant?score: 310.0
    In Why we Talk, cognitive scientist Jean-Louis Dessalles presents an original, in-depth account of the nature and evolution of human language. Written in a clear and engaging manner, Why we Talk is an impressive achievement. Dessalles reviews and contributes to most controversies about human language. He compares human language to other systems of communication found in the animal world, arguing for the originality of the former; he clearly shows that language is a biological trait and that we should study its (...)
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  18. Edouard Machery & Luc Faucher, Why Do We Think Racially? Culture, Evolution, and Cognition.score: 310.0
    Contemporary research on racial categorization is mostly encompassed by two research traditions—social constructionism and the cognitive-cum-evolutionary approach. Although both literatures have some plausible empirical evidence and some theoretical insights to contribute to a full understanding of racial categorization, there has been little contact between their proponents. In order to foster such contacts, we critically review both traditions, focusing particularly on the recent evolutionary/cognitive explanations of racial categorization. On the basis of this critical survey, we put forward a list of (...)
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  19. Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2012). The Two Sources of Moral Standing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):303-324.score: 310.0
    There are two primary traditions in philosophical theorizing about moral standing—one emphasizing Experience (the capacity to feel pain and pleasure) and one emphasizing Agency (complexity of cognition and lifestyle). In this article we offer an explanation for this divide: Lay judgments about moral standing depend importantly on two independent cues (Experience and Agency), and the two philosophical traditions reflect this aspect of folk moral cognition. In support of this two-source hypothesis, we present the results of a series of new experiments (...)
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  20. Hisashi Nakao & Edouard Machery (2012). The Evolution of Punishment. Biology and Philosophy 27 (6):833-850.score: 310.0
    Many researchers have assumed that punishment evolved as a behavior-modification strategy, i.e. that it evolved because of the benefits resulting from the punishees modifying their behavior. In this article, however, we describe two alternative mechanisms for the evolution of punishment: punishment as a loss-cutting strategy (punishers avoid further exploitation by punishees) and punishment as a cost-imposing strategy (punishers impair the violator’s capacity to harm the punisher or its genetic relatives). Through reviewing many examples of punishment in a wide range of (...)
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  21. Edouard Machery, From Meehl to Fast and Frugal Heuristics (and Back).score: 310.0
    It is difficult to overestimate Paul Meehl’s influence on judgment and decision-making research. His ‘disturbing little book’ (Meehl, 1986, p. 370) Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954) is known as an attack on human judgment and a call for replacing clinicians with actuarial methods. More than 40 years later, fast and frugal heuristics—proposed as models of human judgment—were formalized, tested, and found to be surprisingly accurate, often more so than the actuarial models (...)
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  22. Joseph McCaffrey & Edouard Machery (2012). Philosophical Issues About Concepts. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 3:265-279.score: 310.0
  23. Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2009). Against Arguments From Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.score: 300.0
    It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.
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  24. Edouard Machery, Christopher Y. Olivola & Molly De Blanc (2009). Linguistic and Metalinguistic Intuitions in the Philosophy of Language. Analysis 69 (4):689-694.score: 300.0
    Machery et al. (2004) reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications (see also Mallon et al. 2009). In a recent article, Genoveva Martı´ (2009) argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues (‘metalin- 10 guistic intuitions’) is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about (...)
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  25. Edouard Machery (2012). Reconceptualizing Human Nature: Response to Lewens. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 25 (4):475-478.score: 300.0
    There is a growing consensus that the traditional notion of human nature has failed and that human nature needs to be reconceptualized in light of our current scientific knowledge, including the knowledge gained in genetics and evolutionary biology. In “A Plea for Human Nature,” I highlighted this need, and I engaged in this reconceptualization effort, proposing a new notion of human nature, “the nomological notion of human nature” [Machery (Philosophical Psychology 21:321–330, 2008)]; for some more recent work, see Griffiths (...)
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  26. Edouard Machery (2010). The Heterogeneity of Knowledge Representation and the Elimination of Concept. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):231-244.score: 300.0
    In this response, I begin by defending and clarifying the notion of concept proposed in Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) against the alternatives proposed by several commentators. I then discuss whether psychologists and philosophers who theorize about concepts are talking about distinct phenomena or about different aspects of the same phenomenon, as argued in some commentaries. Next, I criticize the idea that the cognitive-scientific findings about induction, categorization, concept combination, and so on, could be explained by positing a single (...)
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  27. Kevan Edwards (2011). Higher-Level Concepts and Their Heterogeneous Implementations: A Polemical Review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):119-133.score: 286.0
    Doing Without Concepts Edouard Machery New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 296 pages, ISBN: 0195306880 (hbk); $65.00 This paper offers a critical review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts, with a particular emphasis on an approach to concept individuation that is consistent with many of Machery's arguments but has the potential to avoid his eliminativist conclusion. The approach agrees with Machery's claims to the effect that prototypes, exemplars, theories (and so on) form a heterogeneous (...)
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  28. Machery Edouard (forthcoming). Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science.score: 280.0
    In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings' higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning...). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the Natural Kind Assumption. This article challenges the Natural Kind Assumption. It is (...)
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  29. Machery Edouard, Kelly Daniel & P. Stich Stephen (2005). Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6).score: 280.0
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  30. Hugo Mercier (2010). How to Cut a Concept? Review of Doing Without Concepts by Edouard Machery. Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):269-277.score: 271.0
    As the title “Doing without Concepts” suggests Edouard Machery argues that psychologists should stop using the notion of concept because: (1) the only interesting generalizations about concepts can be drawn at the level of types of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories) and not the level of concept in general; and (2) competences such as categorization or induction can rely on these different types of concepts (there is not a one to one correspondence between type of concept and competence). (...)
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  31. Georges Rey (2009). Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).score: 241.3
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  32. David Danks, David Rose & Edouard Machery (2013). Demoralizing Causation. Philosophical Studies:1-27.score: 240.0
    There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular (...)
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  33. Edouard Machery (2011). Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.score: 240.0
    Abstract: While thought experiments play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy, much remains unclear about thought experiments. In particular, it is still unclear whether the judgments elicited by thought experiments can provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments. This article argues that, if an influential and promising view about the nature of the judgments elicited by thought experiments is correct, then many thought experiments in philosophy fail to provide any evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments.
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  34. Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2004). Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style. Cognition 92 (3):1-12.score: 240.0
    Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (...)
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  35. Edouard Machery & David Rose (2013). Experimental Philosophy. In Encyclopedia of Mind. Sage.score: 240.0
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  36. Edouard Machery (2005). You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.score: 240.0
    recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while (...)
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  37. Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2013). If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):618-635.score: 240.0
    We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address (...)
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  38. Edouard Machery (2010). The Bleak Implications of Moral Psychology. Neuroethics 3 (3):223-231.score: 240.0
    In this article, I focus on two claims made by Appiah in Experiments in Ethics: Doris’s and Harman’s criticism of virtue ethics fails, and moral psychology can be used to identify erroneous moral intuitions. I argue that both claims are erroneous.
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  39. Edouard Machery (2012). Why I Stopped Worrying About the Definition of Life... And Why You Should as Well. Synthese 185 (1):145-164.score: 240.0
    In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that (...)
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  40. Edouard Machery, Daniel Kelly & Stephen P. Stich (2005). Moral Realism and Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):830-830.score: 240.0
    We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.
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  41. Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2010). Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.score: 240.0
    Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering (...)
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  42. Edouard Machery (web). Discovery and Confirmation in Evolutionary Psychology. In Jesse J. Prinz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    The defining insight of evolutionary psychology consists of bringing considerations drawn from evolutionary biology to bear on the study of human psychology. So characterized, evolutionary psychology encompasses a large range of views about the nature and evolution of human psychology as well as diverging opinions about the proper method for studying them.1 In this article, I propose to clarify and evaluate various aspects of evolutionary psychologists’ methodology, with a special focus on their heuristics of discovery—i.e., their methods for developing plausible (...)
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  43. Jonathan Livengood & Edouard Machery (2007). The Folk Probably Don't Think What You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation by Absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):107–127.score: 240.0
    Folk theories—untutored people’s (often implicit) theories about various features of the world—have been fashionable objects of inquiry in psychology for almost two decades now (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), and more recently they have been of interest in experimental philosophy (Nichols 2004). Folk theories of psy- chology, physics, biology, and ethics have all come under investigation. Folk meta- physics, however, has not been as extensively studied. That so little is known about folk metaphysics is unfortunate for (at least) two reasons. (...)
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  44. Edouard Machery (2005). Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.score: 240.0
    In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings.
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  45. Paul Griffiths, Edouard Machery & Stefan Linquist (2009). The Vernacular Concept of Innateness. Mind and Language 24 (5):605-630.score: 240.0
    The proposal that the concept of innateness expresses a 'folk biological' theory of the 'inner natures' of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why these analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses of the (...)
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  46. Edouard Machery (2006). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.score: 240.0
    Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action (...)
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  47. David Colaco, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich & Edouard Machery (2014). Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments. Episteme 11 (2):199-212.score: 240.0
    In epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether non-philosophers share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with (...)
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  48. Edouard Machery (2007). Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):825-838.score: 240.0
    Quartz (2002) argues that some recent findings about the evolution of the brain (Finlay & Darlington, 1995) are inconsistent with evolutionary psychologists’ massive modularity hypothesis. In substance, Quartz contends that since the volume of the neocortex evolved in a concerted manner, natural selection did not act on neocortical systems independently of each other, which is a necessary condition for the massive modularity of our cognition to be true. I argue however that Quartz’s argument fails to undermine the massive modularity hypothesis.
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  49. Daniel Kelly, Luc Faucher & Edouard Machery (2010). Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (3):293-322.score: 240.0
    At the end of a chapter in his book Race, Racism and Reparations, Angelo Corlett notes that “[t]here remain other queries about racism [than those he addressed in his chapter], which need philosophical exploration. … Perhaps most important, how might racism be unlearned?” (2003, 93). We agree with Corlett’s assessment of its importance, but find that philosophers have not been very keen to directly engage with the issue of how to best deal with, and ultimately do away with, racism. Rather, (...)
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