Dans cet entretien, donné à Neuchâtel en automne 1986 à l�occasion dela remise du doctorat honoris causa en théologie, Paul Ric�ur commente ses travaux sur la narration et développe leurs implications du point de vue de la lecture des récits bibliques.
L�auteur se donne pour but de montrer en quoi les philosophies existentialistes rappellent à la foi chrétienne les questions décisives auxquelles elle doit sans cesse se confronter. Il le fait en partant de thèmes concrets traités par les existentialistes de manière à interpeller la foi de manière radicale : les enjeux de la liberté, l�incarnation de l�être humain dans un corps et une histoire, et les difficultés de la communication avec autrui. Par là même l�existentialisme est à même de «nettoyerc» (...) la foi chrétienne. (shrink)
In Etre, Monde, Imaginaire, Breton attempts to overcome the familiar opposition between being and world and, within the former, between mythos and logos. In The Word and the Cross, he refuses an opposition between the Pauline theology of the Cross and the Johanine theology of the Word. The success of these three moves depends on Breton’s claim for a Nothing that transcends both determination and reflection, as well as the contradictions that presuppose them.
In an intentionally provocative essay published in the journal Esprit (January, 1983) on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, I ventured the following slogan: “Death to personalism; long live the person!” I was attempting to suggest that Mounier's formulation of personalism was, as he himself readily admitted, connected with a certain cultural and philosophical constellation which is no longer ours today: existentialism and Marxism are no longer the only opponents. They are no longer even opponents at all, against which personalism (...) would be required to define itself, at the risk of becoming one or another system or `ism'. I concluded my essay with the following citation from Mounier's Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?: “We are witnessing [...] the first meanderings of a cyclical course where the explorations pursued to exhaustion along one path are are given up only to be rediscovered farther on, enriched by this forgetting and by the discoveries for which it cleared a path” (p. 11). In addition, I wanted to say that the person is still the most appropriate term to designate those investigations for which neither the term `con-sciousness', nor `subject', nor `individual' really apply, for the various reasons that I invoked at the time. I would like to discuss some of those investigations here, beyond the point reached in that essay, where I restricted myself to defining the person by an attitude in Eric Weil's sense, or as one would say in hermeneutics, by the everyday understanding that we have of it. Following Paul Landsberg, I used the criteria of crisis and commitment, adding to the latter certain corollaries such as fidelity over time to a higher cause, and acceptance of alterity and difference within personal identity. Now I would like to make use of contemporary investigations into language, action and narrative in order to provide the ethical constitution of the person with a substratum and roots, comparable to those explored by Emmanuel Mounier in Traité du Caractère. In this sense, the present study is an extension of Mounier's book. (shrink)
If Descartes's Cogito can be held as the opening of the era of modern subjectivity, it is to the extent that the I is taken for the first time in the position of foundation, i.e., as the ultimate condition for the possibility of all philosophical discourse. The question raised in this paper is whether the crisis of the Cogito, opened later by Hume, Nietzsche and Heidegger on different philosophical grounds, is not already contemporaneous to the very positing of the Cogito.