Search results for 'rule-circular' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. E. Goering * (2005). X-Ray Magnetic Circular Dichroism Sum Rule Correction for the Light Transition Metals. Philosophical Magazine 85 (25):2895-2911.
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  2. Sinan Dogramaci (2010). Knowledge of Validity. Noûs 44 (3):403-432.
    What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the (...)
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  3. Armando Cíntora Gómez (2005). ¿Es Legítima la Justificación Regla-Circular de la Inducción? Signos Filosóficos 7 (13):57-71.
    It is argued that the rule-circular justification of induction proposed by David Papineau is illegitimate, that is, that it is not a genuine justification.
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  4.  58
    Nicolaas P. Landsman, Macroscopic Observables and the Born Rule. I. Long Run Frequencies.
    We clarify the role of the Born rule in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics by deriving it from Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts, translated into the following mathematical statement: a quantum system described by a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables is empirically accessible only through associated commutative C*-algebras. The Born probabilities emerge as the relative frequencies of outcomes in long runs of measurements on a quantum system; it is not necessary to adopt the frequency interpretation of single-case probabilities (which will (...)
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  5.  59
    Lorenzo Bernasconi-Kohn (2006). How Not to Think About Rules and Rule Following: A Response to Stueber. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):86-94.
    This article offers a critique of Karsten Stueber’s account of rule following as presented in his article "How to Think about Rules and Rule Following." The task Stueber sets himself is of defending the idea that human practices are bound and guided by rules (both causally and normatively) while avoiding the discredited "cognitive model of rule following." This article argues that Stueber’s proposal is unconvincing because it falls foul of the very problems it sets out to avoid. Stueber’s defense of (...)
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  6.  18
    Allen Stairs (1982). Quantum Logic and the Luders Rule. Philosophy of Science 49 (3):422-436.
    In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Luders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that (...)
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  7.  22
    Lionel Shapiro (2006). The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
    According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...)
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  8.  5
    Martin Klebes (2008). Circular Art of Life. Idealistic Studies 38 (3):193-207.
    Kant’s Critique of Judgment and Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man are generally recognized as crucial documents in the development of modern aesthetics away from rule-based conceptions of objectivity. This paper claims that they are also, in crucial ways, circular. In both Kant and Schiller, aesthetic taste turns out to be grounded in the realm of the social in a way that challenges the idealist notion that aesthetic evaluation and education would—or should—occur against the backdrop of humanity in (...)
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  9. Matthias Kiesselbach (2012). Constructing Commitment: Brandom's Pragmatist Take on Rule-Following. Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):101-126.
    According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes (...)
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  10.  9
    Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford (2008). A Normative Theory of Argument Strength. Informal Logic 26 (1):1-24.
    In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.
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  11.  21
    Douglas Walton (2005). Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony. Argumentation 19 (1):85-113.
    This paper studies some classic cases of the fallacy of begging the question based on appeals to testimony containing circular reasoning. For example, suppose agents a, b and c vouch for d’s credentials, and agents b, d, and e vouch for a’s credentials. Such a sequence of reasoning is circular because a is offering testimony for d but d is offering testimony for a. The paper formulates and evaluates restrictions on the use of testimonial evidence that might be used to (...)
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  12.  19
    Felice Cimatti (2000). The Circular Semiosis of Giorgio Prodi. Sign Systems Studies 28:351-378.
    Prodi's semiotics theory comes into being to answer a radical question: if a sign is a cross-reference, what guarantees the relation between the sign and the object to which it is referring? Prodi rebukes all traditional solutions: a subject's voluntary intention, a convention, the iconic relation between sign and object. He refutes the fIrst answer because the notion of intention, upon which it is based, is, indeed, a fully mysterious entity. The conventionalist answer is just as unsatisfactory for it does (...)
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  13.  10
    Gerhard Schurz (2009). Meliorative Reliabilist Epistemology: Where Externalism and Internalism Meet. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):41-62.
    In sec. 1.1 I emphasize the meliorative purpose of epistemology, and I characterize Goldman's epistemology as reliabilistic, cognitive, social, and meliorative. In sec. 1.2 I point out that Goldman's weak notion of knowledge is in conflict with our ordinary usage of 'knowledge'. In sec. 2 I argue for an externalist-internalist hybrid conception of justification which adds reliability-indicators to externalist knowledge. Reliability-indicators produce a veritistic surplus value for the social spread of knowledge. In sec. 3 I analyze some particular meliorative rules (...)
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  14.  40
    Michael Veber (2006). Not Too Proud to Beg (the Question): Why Inferentialism Cannot Account for the a Priori. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):113-131.
    The inferentialist account of the a priori says that basic logical beliefs can be justified by way of rule circular inference. I argue that this account of the a priori fails to skirt the charge of begging the question, that the reasons offered in support of it are weak and that it makes justifying logical beliefs too easy. I also argue that recent modifications to inferentialism spell doom for it as a general theory of a priori justification.
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  15. Jonathan Birch (2014). Hamilton's Rule and Its Discontents. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):381-411.
    In an incendiary 2010 Nature article, M. A. Nowak, C. E. Tarnita, and E. O. Wilson present a savage critique of the best-known and most widely used framework for the study of social evolution, W. D. Hamilton’s theory of kin selection. More than a hundred biologists have since rallied to the theory’s defence, but Nowak et al. maintain that their arguments ‘stand unrefuted’. Here I consider the most contentious claim Nowak et al. defend: that Hamilton’s rule, the core explanatory principle (...)
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  16.  95
    Marcel Verweij (2015). How (Not) to Argue for the Rule of Rescue. Claims of Individuals Versus Group Solidarity. In Gohen Glen, Daniels Norman & Eyal Nir (eds.), Identified versus Statistical Victims. An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press 137-149.
    The rule of rescue holds that special weight should be given to protecting the lives of assignable individuals in need, implying that less weight is given to considerations of cost-effectiveness. This is sometimes invoked as an argument for funding or reimbursing life-saving treatment in public healthcare even if the costs of such treatment are extreme. At first sight one might assume that an individualist approach to ethics—such as Scanlon’s contractualism—would offer a promising route to justification of the rule of rescue. (...)
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  17. Michael Garnett (2013). Taking the Self Out of Self-Rule. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers believe that agents are self-ruled only when ruled by their (authentic) selves. Though this view is rarely argued for explicitly, one tempting line of thought suggests that self-rule is just obviously equivalent to rule by the self . However, the plausibility of this thought evaporates upon close examination of the logic of ‘self-rule’ and similar reflexives. Moreover, attempts to rescue the account by recasting it in negative terms are unpromising. In light of these problems, this paper instead proposes (...)
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  18. John McDowell (1981). Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge 141--62.
  19. Mike Collins (2010). Reevaluating the Dead Donor Rule. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (2):1-26.
    The dead donor rule justifies current practice in organ procurement for transplantation and states that organ donors must be dead prior to donation. The majority of organ donors are diagnosed as having suffered brain death and hence are declared dead by neurological criteria. However, a significant amount of unrest in both the philosophical and the medical literature has surfaced since this practice began forty years ago. I argue that, first, declaring death by neurological criteria is both unreliable and unjustified but (...)
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  20. Paola Cantù (2010). Aristotle's Prohibition Rule on Kind-Crossing and the Definition of Mathematics as a Science of Quantities. Synthese 174 (2):225 - 235.
    The article evaluates the Domain Postulate of the Classical Model of Science and the related Aristotelian prohibition rule on kind-crossing as interpretative tools in the history of the development of mathematics into a general science of quantities. Special reference is made to Proclus’ commentary to Euclid’s first book of Elements , to the sixteenth century translations of Euclid’s work into Latin and to the works of Stevin, Wallis, Viète and Descartes. The prohibition rule on kind-crossing formulated by Aristotle in Posterior (...)
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  21. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Parfit on Reasons and Rule Consequentialism. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge
    I argue that rule consequentialism sometimes requires us to act in ways that we lack sufficient reason to act. And this presents a dilemma for Parfit. Either Parfit should concede that we should reject rule consequentialism (and, hence, Triple Theory, which implies it) despite the putatively strong reasons that he believes we have for accepting the view or he should deny that morality has the importance he attributes to it. For if morality is such that we sometimes have decisive reason (...)
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  22. Mark Jago, Rule-Based and Resource-Bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.
    Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bounded agents and show that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties.
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  23. Markus E. Schlosser (2011). The Metaphysics of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369.
    This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity and two (...)
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  24.  80
    Mark Jago (2009). Epistemic Logic for Rule-Based Agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.
    The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic logics, as (...)
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  25.  8
    F. De Zela (forthcoming). Gleason-Type Theorem for Projective Measurements, Including Qubits: The Born Rule Beyond Quantum Physics. Foundations of Physics:1-14.
    Born’s quantum probability rule is traditionally included among the quantum postulates as being given by the squared amplitude projection of a measured state over a prepared state, or else as a trace formula for density operators. Both Gleason’s theorem and Busch’s theorem derive the quantum probability rule starting from very general assumptions about probability measures. Remarkably, Gleason’s theorem holds only under the physically unsound restriction that the dimension of the underlying Hilbert space \ must be larger than two. Busch’s theorem (...)
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  26.  19
    Alex Rajczi (forthcoming). On the Incoherence Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-20.
    For a long time many philosophers felt the incoherence objection was a decisive objection to rule-consequentialism, but that position has recently become less secure, because Brad Hooker has offered a clever new way for rule-consequentialists to avoid the incoherence objection. Hooker’s response defeats traditional forms of the incoherence objection, but this paper argues that another version of the problem remains. Several possible solutions fail. One other does not, but it introduces other problems into the theory. I conclude that the new (...)
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  27.  35
    Andreea Mihali (2015). Squaring the Circle in Descartes’ Meditations The Strong Validation of Reason STEPHEN I. WAGNER Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014; Xi + 244 Pp.; $99.95 ISBN: 9781107072060. [REVIEW] Dialogue 54 (4):799-802.
    In Squaring the Circle in Descartes’ Meditations, Stephen Wagner aims to show that Descartes’ project in the Meditations is best understood as a ‘strong validation of reason’ i.e., as proving in a non-circular way that human reason is a reliable, truth-conducive faculty. For such an enterprise to qualify as a ‘strong’ validation, Wagner contends, skeptical doubt must be given its strongest force. The most stringent doubt available in the Meditations is the deceiving God. To rule out the possibility that an (...)
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  28.  16
    Jeffrey A. Barrett (2013). The Evolution of Simple Rule-Following. Biological Theory 8 (2):142-150.
    We are concerned here with explaining how successful rule-following behavior might evolve and how an old evolved rule might come to be successfully used in a new context. Such rule-following behavior is illustrated in the transitive judgments of pinyon and scrub-jays (Bond et al., Anim Behav 65:479–487, 2003). We begin by considering how successful transitive rule-following behavior might evolve in the context of Skyrms–Lewis sender–receiver games (Lewis, Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms, Philos Sci 75:489–500, 2006). We then consider (...)
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  29.  12
    Aleksey V. Ilyin (2016). The Born Rule and Time-Reversal Symmetry of Quantum Equations of Motion. Foundations of Physics 46 (7):845-851.
    It was repeatedly underlined in literature that quantum mechanics cannot be considered a closed theory if the Born Rule is postulated rather than derived from the first principles. In this work the Born Rule is derived from the time-reversal symmetry of quantum equations of motion. The derivation is based on a simple functional equation that takes into account properties of probability, as well as the linearity and time-reversal symmetry of quantum equations of motion. The derivation presented in this work also (...)
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  30. Joshua Wilburn (2012). Akrasia and Self-Rule in Plato's Laws. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:25-53.
    In this paper I challenge the commonly held view that Plato acknowledges and accepts the possibility of akrasia in the Laws. I offer a new interpretation of the image of the divine puppet in Book 1 - the passage often read as an account of akratic action -- and I show that it is not intended as an illustration of akrasia at all. Rather, it provides the moral psychological background for the text by illustrating a broader notion of self-rule as (...)
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  31.  56
    Matthew H. Kramer (2007). Objectivity and the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press.
    What is objectivity? What is the rule of law? Are the operations of legal systems objective? If so, in what ways and to what degrees are they objective? Does anything of importance depend on the objectivity of law? These are some of the principal questions addressed by Matthew H. Kramer in this lucid and wide-ranging study that introduces readers to vital areas of philosophical enquiry.
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  32. Jochen Briesen (2013). Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity. Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject (...)
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  33. Kai-Yuan Cheng (2011). A New Look at the Problem of Rule-Following: A Generic Perspective. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):1 - 21.
    The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982) and Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953)—from the perspective of the study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The quantificational approach is rejected, due to its (...)
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  34.  35
    Giacomo Sillari (2013). Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Approach. Synthese 190 (5):871-890.
    Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines correctness conditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea that a rule (...)
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  35.  19
    Luka Burazin (2015). The Rule of Recognition and the Emergence of a Legal System. Revus 27.
    The paper claims that the rule of recognition, given the way it is presented by Hart, cannot be a constitutive rule of any legal system as a whole, but rather a constitutive rule of legal rules as elements of a legal system. Since I take the legal system to be an institutional artifact kind, I claim that, in order to account for a legal system as a whole, at least two further constitutive rules, in addition to the rule of recognition (...)
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  36.  31
    Kevin Tobia (2013). Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):643-652.
    Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a new Rule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms of Rule Utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum Rate Rule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing Expectation Rate Rule (...)
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  37.  46
    Baron Reed (2006). Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197.
    Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects (...)
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  38.  37
    Andrew Botterell (2014). Reconciling the Principled Approach to Hearsay with the Rule of Law. Supreme Court Law Review 65 (2d):145-168.
    My goal in this paper is to argue that the principled approach to hearsay is consistent with the rule of law. I begin by contrasting an instrumental conception of the rule of law with a conception that views the rule of law in primarily normative terms. I then turn my attention to a recent criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s principled approach to hearsay and suggest that if Michael Oakeshott’s normative interpretation of the rule of law is adopted, there (...)
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  39. Ira Kiourti (2008). Killing Baby Suzy. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):343 - 352.
    In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin. I argue (...)
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  40. Adam M. Croom (2010). Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein's Rule Following Considerations. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and the Wittgensteinian considerations upon (...)
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  41.  24
    Vincent Conitzer (2015). A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1985-1992.
    How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple (...)
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  42.  14
    Franz Huber (forthcoming). Why Follow the Royal Rule? Synthese:1-26.
    This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.
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  43.  84
    Frank A. Hindriks (2004). A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.
    A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification problem. Finally, (...)
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  44.  77
    Carla Merino-Rajme (2015). Why Lewis’ Appeal to Natural Properties Fails to Kripke’s Rule-Following Paradox. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):163-175.
    I consider Lewis’ appeal to naturalness to solve Kripke ’s rule - following paradox. I then present a different interpretation of this paradox and offer reasons for thinking that this is what Kripke had in mind. I argue that Lewis’ proposal cannot provide a solution to this version of paradox.
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  45.  3
    Åsbjørn Melkevik (forthcoming). Four Concepts of Rules: A Theory of Rule Egalitarianism. European Journal of Political Theory:1474885116653366.
    This article outlines the foundations of a nomos-observing theory of social justice, termed ‘rule egalitarianism’, that explains how the seemingly contradictory merger of classical liberalism and social justice is conceivable. The first step towards such a theory consists in ensuring that a concern for the rule of law is etched in the very core of our understanding of social justice, in which case some egalitarian rules will be acceptable from a classical liberal viewpoint. The legal framework of capitalism can indeed (...)
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  46.  64
    Jonathan Hughes & Tom Walker (2009). The Rule of Rescue in Clinical Practice. Clinical Ethics 4 (1):50-54.
    People often have a strong intuitive sense that we ought to rescue those in serious need, even in cases where we could produce better outcomes by acting in other ways. It has become common in such cases to refer to this as the Rule of Rescue. Within the medical field this rule has predominantly been discussed in relation to decisions about whether to fund particular treatments. Whilst in this setting the arguments in favour of the Rule of Rescue have generally (...)
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  47.  48
    Robert E. Goodin & Christian List (2006). A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem in a Restricted Informational Environment. American Journal of Political Science 50 (4):940-949.
    May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote (...)
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  48.  12
    François Recanati (2014). First Person Thought. In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassion & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. 506-511.
    First person thoughts are the sort of thought one may express by using the first person ; they are also thoughts that are about the thinker of the thought. Neither characterization is ultimately satisfactory. A thought can be about the thinker of the thought by accident, without being a first person thought. The alternative characterization of first person thought in terms of first person sentences also fails, because it is circular : we need the notion of a first person thought (...)
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  49. J. Alcalde, M. C. Marco-Gil & J. A. Silva, The Minimal Overlap Rule: Restrictions on Mergers for Creditors' Consensus.
    As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982).
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  50. Sergio Martinez (1991). Lüders's Rule as a Description of Individual State Transformations. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):359-376.
    Usual derivations of Lilders's projection rule show that Liuders's rule is the rule required by quantum statistics to calculate the final state after an ideal (minimally disturbing) measurement. These derivations are at best inconclusive, however, when it comes to interpreting Liuders's rule as a description of individual state transformations. In this paper, I show a natural way of deriving Liiders's rule from well-motivated and explicit physical assumptions referring to individual systems. This requires, however, the introduction of a concept of individual (...)
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