Search results for 'safety and sensitivity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  75
    Wolfgang Freitag (2014). Safety, Sensitivity and “Distant” Epistemic Luck. Theoria 80 (1):44-61.
    Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new (...)
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  2. Sven Bernecker (2012). Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure. Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
    It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
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  3. Keith DeRose (2004). Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses. In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell 22--41.
    Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more from Sosa’s (...)
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  4. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
    This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
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  5. Marc Alspector-Kelly (2011). Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure. Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
    Knowledge closure is, roughly, the following claim: For every agent S and propositions P and Q, if S knows P, knows that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is so implied, then S knows Q. Almost every epistemologist believes that closure is true. Indeed, they often believe that it so obviously true that any theory implying its denial is thereby refuted. Some prominent epistemologists have nevertheless denied it, most famously Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. There are closure advocates (...)
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  6.  16
    Jens Kipper (2015). Safety, Closure, and the Flow of Information. Erkenntnis 80 (5):1-18.
    In his earlier writings, Fred Dretske proposed an anti-skeptical strategy that is based on a rejection of the view that knowledge is closed under known entailment. This strategy is seemingly congenial with a sensitivity condition for knowledge, which is often associated with Dretske’s epistemology. However, it is not obvious how Dretske’s early account meshes with the information-theoretic view developed in Knowledge and the Flow of Information. One aim of this paper is to elucidate the connections between these accounts. First (...)
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  7. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015). Sensitivity Actually. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for (...)
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  8. Jonathan Vogel (2007). Subjunctivitis. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily (...)
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  9. David Manley (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.
    This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute ‘strong privileged access’, and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge.
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  10.  76
    Avram Hiller (2013). Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s (...)
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  11.  43
    Kelly Becker (2006). Reliabilism and Safety. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
    : Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least (...)
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  12.  48
    Robert McGinn (2008). Ethics and Nanotechnology: Views of Nanotechnology Researchers. [REVIEW] NanoEthics 2 (2):101-131.
    A study was conducted of nanotechnology (NT) researchers’ views about ethics in relation to their work. By means of a purpose-built questionnaire, made available on the Internet, the study probed NT researchers’ general attitudes toward and beliefs about ethics in relation to NT, as well as their views about specific NT-related ethical issues. The questionnaire attracted 1,037 respondents from 13 U.S. university-based NT research facilities. Responses to key questionnaire items are summarized and noteworthy findings presented. For most respondents, the ethical (...)
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  13.  35
    Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal (2016). No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag. Theoria 82 (1):89-100.
    In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier-style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that Freitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck.
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  14.  12
    Jeffrey G. Caron & Gordon A. Bloom (2015). Ethical Issues Surrounding Concussions and Player Safety in Professional Ice Hockey. Neuroethics 8 (1):5-13.
    Concussions in professional sports have received increased attention, which is partly attributable to evidence that found concussion incidence rates were much higher than previously thought. Further to this, professional hockey players articulated how their concussion symptoms affected their professional careers, interpersonal relationships, and qualities of life. Researchers are beginning to associate multiple/repeated concussions with Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, a structural brain injury that is characterized by tau protein deposits in distinct areas of the brain. Taken together, concussions impact many people in (...)
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  15.  28
    Guido Melchior (2014). A Generality Problem for Bootstrapping and Sensitivity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (40):31-47.
    Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not consider the belief-forming method as sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as (...)
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  16.  33
    Bruce Russell (2005). Contextualism on a Pragmatic, Not a Skeptical, Footing. Acta Analytica 20 (2):26-37.
    Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively (...)
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  17. Wesley H. Holliday (2015). Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do (...)
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  18. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). What is the Benacerraf Problem? In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity.
    In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf articulated an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. His formulation of the problem relied on a causal theory of knowledge which is now widely rejected. But it is generally agreed that Benacerraf was onto a genuine problem for mathematical realism nevertheless. Hartry Field describes it as the problem of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, realistically construed. In this paper, I argue that the Benacerraf Problem cannot be made out. There simply is no intelligible problem (...)
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  19. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press
    In an influential book, Gilbert Harman writes, "In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles [1977, 9 – 10]." What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? In this article, I argue that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what I will call the justificatory challenge for realism about an (...)
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  20.  42
    Jan Heylen (2016). Counterfactual Theories of Knowledge and the Notion of Actuality. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1647-1673.
    The central question of this article is how to combine counterfactual theories of knowledge with the notion of actuality. It is argued that the straightforward combination of these two elements leads to problems, viz. the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of missing knowledge. In other words, there is overgeneration of knowledge and there is undergeneration of knowledge. The combination of these problems cannot be solved by appealing to methods by which beliefs are formed. An alternative solution is put (...)
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  21.  43
    Peter Murphy (2006). A Strategy for Assessing Closure. Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.
    This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument (...)
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  22. Tomas Bogardus (2014). Knowledge Under Threat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
    Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at (...)
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  23.  2
    Michael Blome‐Tillmann (2015). Sensitivity Actually. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):n/a-n/a.
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for (...)
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  24.  72
    Peter Murphy (2005). Closure Failures for Safety. Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
    Ernest Sosa and others have proposed a safety condition on knowledge: If S knows p, then in the nearest (non-actual) worlds in which S believes p, p is true.1 Colloquially, this is the idea that knowing requires not being easily mistaken. Here, I will argue that like another condition requiring a counterfactual relation between a subject’s belief and the world, viz. Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition, safety leads, in certain cases, to the unacceptable result that knowledge is not (...)
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  25.  11
    R. W. Comrie (2012). An Analysis of Undergraduate and Graduate Student Nurses' Moral Sensitivity. Nursing Ethics 19 (1):116-127.
    This study describes the level of moral sensitivity among nursing students enrolled in a traditional baccalaureate nursing program and a master’s nursing program. Survey responses to the Modified Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire for Student Nurses from 250 junior, senior, and graduate students from one nursing school were analyzed. It was not possible to draw conclusions based on the tool. Moral category analysis showed students ranked the category structuring moral meaning highest and interpersonal orientation second. The moral issue ranking highest (...)
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  26.  19
    Vladimir Labay & Amber McKee Anderson (2006). Ethical Considerations and Proposed Guidelines for the Use of Radio Frequency Identification: Especially Concerning its Use for Promoting Public Safety and National Security. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 12 (2):265-272.
    Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is quickly growing in its applications. A variety of uses for the technology are beginning to be developed, including chips which can be used in identification cards, in individual items, and for human applications, allowing a chip to be embedded under the skin. Such chips could provide numerous benefits ranging from day-to-day convenience to the increased ability of the federal government to adequately ensure the safety of its citizens. However, there are also valid concerns about (...)
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  27.  22
    Mari Meel & Maksim Saat (2002). Ethical Life Cycle of an Innovation. Journal of Business Ethics 39 (1-2):21 - 27.
    Product safety has always been one of the main problems in engineering ethics. At times it has been discussed as primarily a problem of engineering ethics. However the right to safety is one of the four fundamental consumer rights and so it is an important theme also in business ethics. At the same time the problem of product safety is inseparably connected with business effectiveness: how much can we spend on product safety without making our production (...)
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  28.  2
    Michael Blome‐Tillmann (2015). Sensitivity Actually. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for (...)
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  29.  12
    Antoine Danchin (2009). Cells Need Safety Valves. Bioessays 31 (7):769-773.
    In Escherichia coli, the role of lacA, the third gene of the lactose operon, has remained an enigma. I suggest that its role is the consequence of the need for cells to have safety valves that protect them from the osmotic effect created by their permeases. Safety valves allow them to cope with the buildup of osmotic pressure under accidental transient conditions. Multidrug resistance (MDR) efflux, thus named because of our anthropocentrism, is ubiquitous. Yet, the formation of simple (...)
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  30.  26
    Scott Hill (forthcoming). From Isolation to Skepticism. Erkenntnis (3):1-20.
    If moral properties lacked causal powers, would moral skepticism be true? I argue that it would. Along the way I respond to various arguments that it would not.
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  31. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Debunking and Dispensability. In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press
    In his précis of a recent book, Richard Joyce writes, “My contention…is that…any epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended to moral beliefs…will be neutralized by the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere…presupposes their truth.” Such reasoning – falling under the heading “Genealogical Debunking Arguments” – is now commonplace. But how might “the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere… presupposes” the truth of our moral beliefs “neutralize” whatever “epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended (...)
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  32. Ben Bronner (2012). Problems with the Dispositional Tracking Theory of Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):505-507.
    Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan attempt to improve on Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge by providing a modified, dispositional tracking theory. The dispositional theory, however, faces more problems than those previously noted by John Turri. First, it is not simply that satisfaction of the theory’s conditions is unnecessary for knowledge – it is insufficient as well. Second, in one important respect, the dispositional theory is a step backwards relative to the original tracking theory: the original but not the dispositional theory (...)
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  33. Ernest Sosa (1999). How to Defeat Opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
    What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouement of our reflections, finally, will (...)
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  34. Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that (...)
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  35.  72
    Andrew Peet (2016). Testimony and the Epistemic Uncertainty of Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):395-416.
    In the epistemology of testimony it is often assumed that audiences are able to reliably recover asserted contents. In the philosophy of language this claim is contentious. This paper outlines one problem concerning the recovery of asserted contents, and argues that it prevents audiences from gaining testimonial knowledge in a range of cases. The recovery problem, in essence, is simply that due to the collective epistemic limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive to the (...)
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  36. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009). Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):383-394.
    The paper discusses approaches to Epistemic Contextualism that model the satisfaction of the predicate ‘know’ in a given context C in terms of the notion of belief/fact-matching throughout a contextually specified similarity sphere of worlds that is centred on actuality. The paper offers three counterexamples to approaches of this type and argues that they lead to insurmountable difficulties. I conclude that what contextualists (and Subject-Sensitive Invariantists) have traditionally called the ‘epistemic standards’ of a given context C cannot be explicated in (...)
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  37. Reinaldo Elugardo (2007). Minimal Propositions, Cognitive Safety Mechanisms, and Psychological Reality. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press 278.
     
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  38.  14
    Harry Hummels (1999). Ethical Challenges in a Technological Environment: The Perspective of Engineers Versus Managers. Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (1):55-72.
    In his article ‘Better Communication Between Engineers and Managers: Some Ways to Prevent Many Ethically Hard Choices’1 Michael Davis analyzes the causes of the disaster in terms of a communications gap between management and engineers. When the communication between (representatives of) both groups breaks down, the organization is in (moral) trouble. Crucial information gets stuck somewhere in the organization prohibiting a careful discussion and weighing of all (moral) arguments. The resulting judgment has therefore little (moral) quality. In this paper I (...)
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  39.  24
    Jeffrey Sanford Russell (2015). Temporary Safety Hazards. Noûs 50 (3):n/a-n/a.
    The Epistemic Objection says that certain theories of time imply that it is impossible to know which time is absolutely present. Standard presentations of the Epistemic Objection are elliptical—and some of the most natural premises one might fill in to complete the argument end up leading to radical skepticism. But there is a way of filling in the details which avoids this problem, using epistemic safety. The new version has two interesting upshots. First, while Ross Cameron alleges that the (...)
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  40.  58
    Peter Baumann (2015). Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on Sosa. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (45):295-306.
    Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety (...)
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  41.  39
    Peter Brössel (2013). The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
    Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure (...)
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  42. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015). Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.
    Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the (...)
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  43. Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
    Introduction: externalism and modalism -- Externalism -- Modalism -- What should the theory do? -- What's missing? -- Process reliabilism -- Goldman's causal theory -- Goldman's discrimination requirement and relevant alternatives -- Process reliabilism and why it is not enough -- Implications for skepticism -- Sensitivity -- Nozick's subjunctive conditional theory of knowledge -- Methods : an important refinement -- Objections to nozicks theory -- Safety -- Motivating safety -- Weak and strong safety : luck and (...)
     
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  44.  19
    Can Simga-Mugan, Bonita A. Daly, Dilek Onkal & Lerzan Kavut (2005). The Influence of Nationality and Gender on Ethical Sensitivity: An Application of the Issue-Contingent Model. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 57 (2):139 - 159.
    When a member of an organization has to make a decision or act in a way that may benefit some stakeholders at the expense of others, ethical dilemmas may arise. This paper examines ethical sensitivity regarding the duties to clients and owners (principals), employees (agents), and responsibilities to society (third parties). Within this framework, ethical perceptions of male and female managers are compared between the U.S. and Turkey – two countries that differ on power distance as well as the (...)
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  45.  18
    Danilo Šuster (2015). Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)Connection. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):267-294.
    The gist of modal epistemology is expressed in the idea that you fail to know if you do believe truly but it is seriously possible for you to believe falsely. According to subjunctivism, this idea is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One formulation invokes a safety condition—“If S had believed P, then P would have been the case,” while the other invokes a sensitivity condition—“If P had been false, S would not have believed that P.” According to simple (...)
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  46. Roman Yampolskiy & Joshua Fox (2013). Safety Engineering for Artificial General Intelligence. Topoi 32 (2):217-226.
    Machine ethics and robot rights are quickly becoming hot topics in artificial intelligence and robotics communities. We will argue that attempts to attribute moral agency and assign rights to all intelligent machines are misguided, whether applied to infrahuman or superhuman AIs, as are proposals to limit the negative effects of AIs by constraining their behavior. As an alternative, we propose a new science of safety engineering for intelligent artificial agents based on maximizing for what humans value. In particular, we (...)
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  47. Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.
    Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge.
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  48.  45
    Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (2013). Is Safety In Danger? Philosophia 42 (1):1-19.
    In “Knowledge Under Threat” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2012), Tomas Bogardus proposes a counterexample to the safety condition for knowledge. Bogardus argues that the case demonstrates that unsafe knowledge is possible. I argue that the case just corroborates the well-known requirement that modal conditions like safety must be relativized to methods of belief formation. I explore several ways of relativizing safety to belief-forming methods and I argue that none is adequate: if methods were individuated in those ways, (...)
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  49. Kelly Becker (2009). Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
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  50.  65
    David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher (2012). Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.
    The law views with suspicion statistical evidence, even evidence that is probabilistically on a par with direct, individual evidence that the law is in no way suspicious of. But it has proved remarkably hard to either justify this suspicion, or to debunk it. In this paper, we connect the discussion of statistical evidence to broader epistemological discussions of similar phenomena. We highlight Sensitivity – the requirement that a belief be counterfactually sensitive to the truth in a specific way – (...)
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