Search results for 'said-content' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Edward Said (2008). Chapter Twelve Said, Derrida And the Undecidable Human: In the Name Of Inhabitancy Robert P. Marzec. In Mina Karavanta & Nina Morgan (eds.), Edward Said and Jacques Derrida: Reconstellating Humanism and the Global Hybrid. Cambridge Scholars Pub.. 304.score: 210.0
     
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  2. Edward W. Said (1989). [Toward a Dialogue with Edward Said]: Response. Critical Inquiry 15 (3):634.score: 120.0
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  3. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP.score: 66.0
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  4. Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.score: 66.0
    To what extent is the external world the way that it appears to us in perceptual experience? This perennial question in philosophy is no doubt ambiguous in many ways. For example, it might be taken as equivalent to the question of whether or not the external world is the way that it appears to be? This is a question about the epistemology of perception: Are our perceptual experiences by and large veridical representations of the external world? Alternatively, the question might (...)
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  5. David W. Hamlyn (1994). Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.score: 66.0
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which (...)
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  6. Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Is Content Holism Incoherent? Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:173-195.score: 66.0
    There is a great deal of terminological confusion in discussions of holism. While some well-known authors, such as Davidson and Quine, have used “holism” in various of their writings,2 it is not clear that they have held views attributed to them under that label, views that are said to have wildly counterintuitive results.3 In Davidson’s case, it is not clear that he is describing the same doctrine in each of his uses of “holism” or “holistic.” Critics of holism show a (...)
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  7. John Tienson (2013). Kasimir Twardowski on the Content of Presentations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):485-499.score: 66.0
    In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of “naturalizing” the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which a presentation of (...)
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  8. Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). Propositional Content. In Ernest LePore & B. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.score: 54.0
    To a first approximation, _propositional content_ is whatever _that-clauses_ contribute to what is ascribed in utterances of sentences such as Ralph believes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph said _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph hopes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph desires _that Tony Curtis is alive_.
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  9. Fernando Martinez-Manrique & Agustin Vicente (2013). What is Said by a Metaphor: The Role of Salience and Conventionality. Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (2):304-328.score: 54.0
    Contextualist theorists have recently defended the views (a) that metaphor-processing can be treated on a par with other meaning changes, such as narrowing or transfer, and (b) that metaphorical contents enter into “what is said” by an utterance. We do not dispute claim (a) but consider that claim (b) is problematic. Contextualist theorists seem to leave in the hands of context the explanation about why it is that some meaning changes are directly processed, and thus plausibly form part of “what (...)
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  10. Berit Brogaard (2010). Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception: Short Version. In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy).score: 54.0
    0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the (...)
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  11. Catherine Wearing (2006). Metaphor and What is Said. Mind and Language 21 (3):310–332.score: 54.0
    In this paper, I argue for an account of metaphorical content as what is said when a speaker utters a metaphor. First, I show that two other possibilities—the Gricean account of metaphor as implicature and the strictly semantic account developed by Josef Stern—face several serious problems. In their place, I propose an account that takes metaphorical content to cross-cut the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This requires re-thinking the notion of metaphorical content, as well as the relation between the metaphorical and the literal.
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  12. M. Bierwisch, Content, Context and Composition.score: 54.0
    In the recent debate on the semantic/pragmatic divide, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (2005) on the one hand, and Fran¸cois Recanati (2004) on the other, occupy almost diametrically opposed positions as regards the role of semantics for communication, while largely agreeing on important features of pragmatics. According to Cappelen and Lepore (CL), semantic context sensitivity of natural language sentences is restricted to what is determined by a particular minimal set of canonically context sensitive expressions. If you try to go beyond (...)
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  13. Isidora Stojanovic (2006). What is Said, Linguistic Meaning, and Directly Referential Expressions. Philosophy Compass 1 (4):373–397.score: 54.0
    Philosophers of language distinguish among the lexical or linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered, what is said by an utterance of the sentence, and speaker's meaning, or what is conveyed by the speaker to her audience. In most views, what is said is the semantic or truth-conditional content of the utterance, and is irreducible either to the linguistic meaning or to the speaker's meaning. I will show that those views account badly for people's intuitions on what is said. I will (...)
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  14. Stephen Neale (1998). Grain and Content. Philosophical Issues 9:353-358.score: 54.0
    lt is widely held that entertaining a belief or forming a judgement involves the exercise of conceptual capacities; and to this extent the representational content of a belief or judgement is said to be "con— ceptual". According to Gareth Evans (1980), not all psychological states have conceptual content in this sense. In particular, perceptual states have non—conceptual content; it is not until one forms a judgement on the basis of a perceptual experience that one touches the realm of conceptual content.
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  15. Luca Baptista (2014). Say What? On Grice On What Is Said. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-19.score: 54.0
    : In this paper I argue that there is a very important, though often neglected, dissimilarity between the two Gricean conceptions of ‘what is said’: the one presented in his William James Lectures and the one sketched in the ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ to his book Studies in the Way of Words. The main problem lies with the idea of speakers' commitment to what they say and how this is to be related to the conventional, or standard, meaning of the sentences uttered (...)
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  16. T. Parent, Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference.score: 54.0
    This paper evaluates Boghossian’s inference argument against externalist introspective self-knowledge. Boghossian’s objection is that such knowledge does not preclude (what I call) “self-blind equivocation,” i.e., equivocation that is introspectively undetectable. Such equivocation remains possible, since externalism implies that the content of ‘water’ (and of the concept it expresses) might change from premise to premise, owing to “slow switches” between twin environments. Moreover, because the change owes to environmental differences, the resulting equivocation would not be introspectively discernible. In reply I argue (...)
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  17. Sara McClintock (2014). Kamalaśīla on the Nature of Phenomenal Content (Ākāra) in Cognition: A Close Reading of TSP Ad TS 3626 and Related Passages. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):327-337.score: 54.0
    Traditional as well as contemporary interpreters of Indian Yogācāra divide that tradition into a variety of doxographical camps depending on whether awareness is understood tobe endowed with phenomenal content (ākāra) and, if so, whether that content is understood to be real or true. Kamalaśīla’s extensive commentary on his teacher Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha contains passages that throw into question certain doxographical equivalencies, especially the equivalencies sometimes proposed betweenthe doctrine that awareness is endowed with phenomenal content (sākāravāda) and the doctrine that such content (...)
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  18. Mark Jago (2012). Constructing Worlds. Synthese 189 (1):59-74.score: 36.0
    You and I can differ in what we say, or believe, even though the things we say, or believe, are logically equivalent. Discussing what is said, or believed, requires notions of content which are finer-grained than sets of (metaphysically or logically) possible worlds. In this paper, I develop the approach to fine-grained content in terms of a space of possible and impossible worlds. I give a method for constructing ersatz worlds based on theory of substantial facts. I show how this (...)
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  19. Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the Externalist Can Know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.score: 36.0
    Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not (...)
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  20. Jonathan Ellis (2010). Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.score: 36.0
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
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  21. Daniel Whiting (2013). It's Not What You Said, It's the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):364-377.score: 36.0
    In this paper, I defend against a number of criticisms an account of slurs, according to which the same semantic content is expressed in the use of a slur (e.g. 'chink') as is expressed in the use of its neutral counterpart (e.g. 'Chinese'), while in addition the use of a slur conventionally implicates a negative, derogatory attitude. Along the way, I criticise competing accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of slurs, namely, Hom's 'combinatorial externalism' and Anderson and Lepore's 'prohibitionism'.
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  22. Keith A. Wilson (2013). Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience. Dissertation, University of Warwickscore: 36.0
    Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism — the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — that is set out in Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004) constitutes a powerful, (...)
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  23. J. J. C. Smart (1978). The Content of Physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (October):339-41.score: 36.0
    It has been said that physicalism is an empty doctrine, Because if new forces are needed to explain biological or psychological phenomena they will have to be incorporated into physics. In reply it is argued that we can tie physicalism to present day physics. There may be revolutionary changes in physics but these are likely to affect only the field of elementary particles and cosmology. Our understanding of such things as the nervous system or of protein molecules is unlikely to (...)
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  24. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2011). The Different Ways in Which Logic is (Said to Be) Formal. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):303 - 332.score: 36.0
    What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal (...)
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  25. Herman Cappelen & Ernest Lepore (2006). Shared Content. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 1020--1055.score: 36.0
    A general and fundamental tension surrounds our concept of what is said. On the one hand, what is said (asserted, claimed, stated, etc.) by utterances of a significant range of sentences is highly context sensitive. More specifically, (Observation 1 (O1)), what these sentences can be used to say depends on their contexts of utterance. On the other hand, speakers face no difficulty whatsoever in using many of these sentences to say (or make) the exact same claim, assertion, etc., across a (...)
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  26. Maciej Witek (2003). Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma. In W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 36.0
    It can be said that Wittgenstein"s Private Language Argument initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to Wittgenstein as their forerunner. I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not in the head, even though it undermines methodological solipsism. I also (...)
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  27. Reinaldo Elugardo & Robert J. Stainton (2004). Shorthand, Syntactic Ellipsis, and the Pragmatic Determinants of What is Said. Mind and Language 19 (4):442–471.score: 36.0
    Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's 'Context and Logical Form'. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a subsentential expression—where by 'subsentential expression' we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truthconditional content (...)
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  28. Gerhard Schurz & Paul Weingartner (2010). Zwart and Franssen's Impossibility Theorem Holds for Possible-World-Accounts but Not for Consequence-Accounts to Verisimilitude. Synthese 172 (3):415 - 436.score: 36.0
    Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but (...)
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  29. Mikael Pettersson (2012). Shot in the Dark: Notes on Photography, Causality, and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):759-776.score: 36.0
    Photography is often said to be an essentially causal medium. This paper addresses the role of causality in photography and argues for three main claims: (i) a causal theory of photography does not force us to say that images of backlit objects are photographs of the back surfaces of the said objects (as Roy Sorensen would have it); rather, (ii), such images, I suggest, are photographs of the objects and what Alva Noë would call their ‘looks’; (iii) the notion of (...)
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  30. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Teleosemantics Without Etiology. Philosophy of Science.score: 36.0
    The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientifically respectable, or ‘naturalistic’ theory of mental content. In the debates surrounding the scope and merits of teleosemantics a lot has been said about the concept of indication (or carrying information). The aim of this paper is to focus on the other key concept of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biological function one should use to flesh out teleosemantics is that of (...)
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  31. Ken Gemes, Logical Content and Empirical Significance.score: 36.0
    Logical Positivism, could not be said to be au courant as a philosophical movement.1 Indeed not only is the movement no longer in existence, it's projects are no longer central to philosophical investigations, even to the investigations of those who specialize in the philosophy of science. If Positivism has been making a comeback it is primarily as an object of historical inquiry, perhaps as a means to answering the question of how we got from there (our forefathers' primary philosophical interests (...)
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  32. David G. Stern, Gabriel Citron & Brian Rogers (forthcoming). Moore's Notes on Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933: Text, Context, and Content. Nordic Wittgenstein Review.score: 36.0
    Wittgenstein’s writings and lectures during the first half of the 1930s play a crucial role in any interpretation of the relationship between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations . G. E. Moore’s notes of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures, 1930-1933, offer us a remarkably careful and conscientious record of what Wittgenstein said at the time, and are much more detailed and reliable than previously published notes from those lectures. The co-authors are currently editing these notes of Wittgenstein’s lectures for a book to (...)
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  33. Julian Dodd (1997). Indirect Speech, Parataxis and the Nature of Things Said. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:211-227.score: 36.0
    This paper makes the following recommendation when it comes to the IogicaI form of sentences in indirect speech. Davidson’s paratactic account shouId stand, but with one emendation: the demonstrative ‘that’ should be taken to refer to the Fregean Thought expressed by the utterance of the content-sentence, rather than to that utterance itseIf. The argument for this emendation is that it is the onIy way of repIying to the objections to Davidson’s account raised by Schiffer, McFetridge and McDowell.Towards the end of (...)
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  34. Larry A. Herzberg (2012). To Blend or to Compose: A Debate About Emotion Structure. In Paul Wilson (ed.), Dynamicity in Emotion Concepts. Peter Lang.score: 36.0
    An ongoing debate in the philosophy of emotion concerns the relationship between two prima facie aspects of emotional states. The first is affective: felt and/or motivational. The second, which I call object-identifying, represents whatever the emotion is about or directed towards. “Componentialists” – such as R. S. Lazarus, Jesse Prinz, and Antonio Damasio – assume that an emotion’s object-identifying aspect can have the same representational content as a non-emotional state’s, and that it is psychologically separable or dissociable from the emotion’s (...)
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  35. Ioannis Evrigenis (2007). Easier Said Than Done: Socratic Courage and the Fear of Death. History of Political Thought 28 (3):379-401.score: 36.0
    Plato's Laches, the dialogue devoted to the discovery of courage, is generally considered a failure, as the interlocutors' various definitions ultimately prove insufficient. Laches, however, notes that a definition of this kind can only be assessed by considering whether the speaker's words and deeds are in harmony. In fact he goes one step further, and admits that deeds are far more persuasive than words. He therefore declares that he is willing to let Socrates, whose deeds on the battlefield speak volumes, (...)
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  36. Mohan Matthen (2014). Image Content. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. 265-290.score: 27.0
    The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer notion is presented, sensory images include located objects and features predicated of them. It is argued that our grasp of the meaning of these images implies that they have propositional content. Two problems concerning image content are explored. The first is that even on an enriched conception, image content has certain expressive (...)
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  37. Tim Crane (1992). The Nonconceptual Content of Experience. In , The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.score: 25.0
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  38. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.score: 24.0
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  39. Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and Content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.score: 24.0
    It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view (CV).
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  40. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper concern not (...)
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  41. Mark Jago (2012). The Content of Deduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.score: 24.0
    For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I (...)
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  42. Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 24.0
    The dissertation addresses a debate in the philosophy of perception between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. Its principal thesis is that the intentional content of a perceptual experience is the content of a thought that a reflective subject is in a position to think if she has the experience. I call this claim, endorsed by conceptualists, the thesis of content congruence. Two principal lines of argument are put forward for it. The first, ‘simple’ argument contends that a perceptual experience is a state (...)
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  43. Katalin Balog (2009). Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content. Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.score: 24.0
    Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...)
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  44. Amy Kind (2003). What's so Transparent About Transparency? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.score: 24.0
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...)
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  45. Paul B. de Laat (2012). NAVIGATING BETWEEN CHAOS AND BUREAUCRACY: BACKGROUNDING TRUST IN OPEN-CONTENT COMMUNITIES. In Karl Aberer, Andreas Flache, Wander Jager, Ling Liu, Jie Tang & Christophe Guéret (eds.), 4th International Conference, SocInfo 2012, Lausanne, Switzerland, December 5-7, 2012. Proceedings. Springer.score: 24.0
    Many virtual communities that rely on user-generated content (such as social news sites, citizen journals, and encyclopedias in particular) offer unrestricted and immediate ‘write access’ to every contributor. It is argued that these communities do not just assume that the trust granted by that policy is well-placed; they have developed extensive mechanisms that underpin the trust involved (‘backgrounding’). These target contributors (stipulating legal terms of use and developing etiquette, both underscored by sanctions) as well as the contents contributed by them (...)
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  46. David J. Chalmers (2003). The Nature of Narrow Content. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.score: 24.0
    A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
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  47. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.score: 24.0
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in (...)
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  48. Jeff Speaks (2005). Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content? Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.score: 24.0
    In the past twenty years, issues about the relationship between perception and thought have largely been framed in terms of the question of whether the contents of perception are nonconceptual. I argue that this debate has rested on an ambiguity in `nonconceptual content' and some false presuppositions about what is required for concept possession. Once these are cleared away, I argue that none of the arguments which have been advanced about nonconceptual content do much to threaten the natural view that (...)
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  49. Sergeiy Sandler, Is There Such a Thing as “Semantic Content”?score: 24.0
    The distinction between the semantic content of a sentence or utterance and its use is widely employed in formal semantics. Semantic minimalism in particular understands this distinction as a sharp dichotomy. I argue that if we accept such a dichotomy, there would be no reason to posit the existence of semantic contents at all. I examine and reject several arguments raised in the literature that might provide a rationale for assuming semantic contents, in this sense, exist, and conclude that Ockham’s (...)
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  50. Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.score: 24.0
    Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judge- ments to account for Gestalt (...)
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