Search results for 'scepticism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Luca Moretti (2014). Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility. Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.score: 24.0
    I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I also suggest a reason to doubt (...)
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  2. Roger Wertheimer (1993). Socratic Scepticism. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-62.score: 24.0
    The Socratic Paradox (that only Socrates is wise, and only because only he recognizes our lack of wisdom) is explained, elaborated and defended. His philosophical scepticism is distinguished from others (Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, Humean, Kripkean Wittgenstein, etc.): the doubt concerns our understanding of our beliefs, not our justification for them; the doubt is a posteriori and inductive, not a priori. Post-Socratic philosophy confirms this scepticism: contra-Descartes, our ideas are not transparent to us; contra-Verificationism, no criterion distinguishes sense from nonsense. (...)
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  3. Jessica Brown (2009). Sosa on Scepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):397--405.score: 24.0
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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  4. Anne Newstead, Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.score: 24.0
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is (...)
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  5. David Macarthur (2003). McDowell, Scepticism, and the 'Veil of Perception'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):175-190.score: 24.0
    McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor.
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  6. B. J. C. Madison (2011). Peacocke’s A Priori Arguments Against Scepticism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83:1-8.score: 24.0
    In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief. In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively. If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing epistemological problems. (...)
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  7. Chantal Bax (2013). Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.score: 24.0
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
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  8. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2003). Logic in Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism and the Impotence of Scepticism. Philosophical Investigations 26 (2):125-148.score: 24.0
    So-called 'hinge propositions', Wittgenstein's version of our basic beliefs, are not propositions at all, but heuristic expressions of our bounds of sense which, as such, cannot meaningfully be said but only show themselves in what we say and do. Yet if our foundational certainty is necessarily an ineffable, enacted certainty, any challenge of it must also be enacted. Philosophical scepticism – being a mere mouthing of doubt – is impotent to unsettle a certainty whose salient conceptual feature is that (...)
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  9. David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism: II--David Owens, Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):119-142.score: 24.0
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS]The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of (...)
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  10. Patrice Philie (2009). Entitlement as a Response to I–Ii–III Scepticism. Synthese 171 (3):459 - 466.score: 24.0
    In this paper, Crispin Wright’s unified strategy against scepticism is put under pressure through an examination of the concept of entitlement. Wright’s characterisation of a generalised form of scepticism is first described, followed by an examination of the concept of entitlement and of the role played by presuppositions in his strategy. This will make manifest the transcendental structure of this response to scepticism. The paper ends with a discussion of the effectiveness of this transcendental strategy in providing (...)
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  11. Alan Millar (2012). Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 189 (2):353-372.score: 24.0
    Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more (...)
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  12. Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.score: 24.0
    This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and (...)
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  13. John J. Callanan (2011). Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson's Anti-Scepticism. Theoria 77 (3):261-278.score: 24.0
    Strawson's philosophical attitude towards scepticism is frequently thought to have undergone a significant shift from the “strong” or “robust” employment of transcendental arguments in Individuals to a more “modest” understanding of the efficacy of such arguments in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. I argue that this interpretation is based upon a misunderstanding of the function of transcendental arguments in Strawson's earlier works. Examining the continuity of Strawson's modest naturalistic approach to scepticism can offer some insight as to the (...)
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  14. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):3-25.score: 24.0
    Two of the main forms of anti-scepticism in the contemporary literature—namely, neo-Mooreanism and attributer contextualism—share a common claim, which is that we are, contra the sceptic, able to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses. This paper begins by surveying the relative merits of these views when it comes to dealing with the standard closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem that is focussed on the possession of knowledge. It is argued, however, that it is not enough to simply deal with (...)
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  15. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism. Synthese 171 (3):467 - 479.score: 24.0
    One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell's view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he may (...)
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  16. Alexander Kelly (2013). Ramseyan Humility, Scepticism and Grasp. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):705-726.score: 24.0
    In ‘Ramseyan Humility’ David Lewis argues that a particular view about fundamental properties, quidditism, leads to the position that we are irredeemably ignorant of the identities of fundamental properties. We are ignorant of the identities of fundamental properties since we can never know which properties play which causal roles, and we have no other way of identifying fundamental properties other than by the causal roles they play. It has been suggested in the philosophical literature that Lewis’ argument for Humility is (...)
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  17. Jonathan Birch (2013). On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism. Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.score: 24.0
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims (...)
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  18. Luciano Floridi (2010). Information, Possible Worlds and the Cooptation of Scepticism. Synthese 175 (1):63 - 88.score: 24.0
    The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an informationtheoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borei numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that (...)
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  19. Christophe Grellard (2007). Scepticism, Demonstration and the Infinite Regress Argument (Nicholas of Autrecourt and John Buridan). Vivarium 45 (s 2-3):328-342.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval posterity of the Aristotelian and Pyrrhonian treatments of the infinite regress argument. We show that there are some possible Pyrrhonian elements in Autrecourt's epistemology when he argues that the truth of our principles is merely hypothetical. By contrast, Buridan's criticisms of Autrecourt rely heavily on Aristotelian material. Both exemplify a use of scepticism.
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  20. Jeff Malpas (1994). Self-Knowledge and Scepticism. Erkenntnis 40 (2):165-184.score: 24.0
    Donald Davidson has argued that 'most of our beliefs must be true' and that global scepticism is therefore false. Davidson's arguments to this conclusion often seem to depend on externalist considerations. Davidson's position has been criticised, however, on the grounds that he does not defeat the sceptic, but rather already assumes the falsity of scepticism through his appeal to externalism. Indeed, it has been claimed that far from defeating the sceptic Davidson introduces an even more extreme version of (...)
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  21. James Franklin (1991). Healthy Scepticism. Philosophy 66 (257):305 - 324.score: 24.0
    The classical arguments for scepticism about the external world are defended, especially the symmetry argument: that there is no reason to prefer the realist hypothesis to, say, the deceitful demon hypothesis. This argument is defended against the various standard objections, such as that the demon hypothesis is only a bare possibility, does not lead to pragmatic success, lacks coherence or simplicity, is ad hoc or parasitic, makes impossible demands for certainty, or contravenes some basic standards for a conceptual or (...)
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  22. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice. Philosophia 34 (3):303-310.score: 24.0
    It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice (...)
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  23. Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo. Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.score: 24.0
    We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with (...)
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  24. John Callanan (2013). Kant on Nativism, Scepticism and Necessity. Kantian Review 18 (1):1-27.score: 24.0
    Kant criticizes the so-called hypothesis at the end of the B-Deduction on the ground that it entails scepticism. I examine the historical context of Kant's criticism, and identify the targets as both Crusius and Leibniz. There are two claims argued for in this paper: first, that attending to the context of the opposition to certain forms of nativism affords a way of understanding Kant's commitment to the so-called , by contrasting the possession conditions for the categories with those for (...)
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  25. Jacqueline A. Laing (2006). A Certain Kind of Moral Scepticism and the Foundations of Human Rights. Law and Justice 157:39-53.score: 24.0
    Despite the prevalence of human rights talk in Western jurisprudence, there has never been less belief in or acceptance of, any genuine form of objective morality. Academics reject the reality of moral objectivity and proclaim, as an objective truth, that morality is a mere “socio-historical construct”, illusory because always outweighed by worse consequences, expressions of subjective preference or mere evidence of culturally relative predilections. If morality is not that, then it is thought to be evidence of the power of the (...)
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  26. David William Harker (2013). Discussion Note: McCain on Weak Predictivism and External World Scepticism. Philosophia 41 (1):195-202.score: 24.0
    In a recent paper McCain (2012) argues that weak predictivism creates an important challenge for external world scepticism. McCain regards weak predictivism as uncontroversial and assumes the thesis within his argument. There is a sense in which the predictivist literature supports his conviction that weak predictivism is uncontroversial. This absence of controversy, however, is a product of significant plasticity within the thesis, which renders McCain’s argument worryingly vague. For McCain’s argument to work he either needs a stronger version of (...)
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  27. Ruth Weintraub (1997). The Cartesian Circle and Two Forms of Scepticism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (4):365 - 377.score: 24.0
    Descartes’ circle has been extensively discussed, and I do not wish to add another paper to that literature. Rather, I use the circle to facilitate our understanding of two types of scepticism and the proper attitude to them. Descartes’ text is especially apt for this purpose, because a case can be made for attributing to him both types. Although I will touch on the interpretative question, that is not my main aim. My contention is that one brand - whether (...)
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  28. Han Thomas Adriaenssen (2011). An Early Critic of Locke: The Anti-Scepticism of Henry Lee. Locke Studies 11:17-47.score: 24.0
    Although Henry Lee is often recognized to be an important early critic of Locke's 'way of ideas', his Anti-Scepticism (1702) has hardly received the scholarly attention it deserves. This paper seeks to fill that lacuna. It argues that Lee's criticism of Locke's alleged representationalism was original, and that it was quite different from the more familiar kind of criticism that was launched against Locke's theory of ideas by such thinkers as John Sergeant and Thomas Reid. In addition, the paper (...)
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  29. Ian Frowe (2007). 'The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism': Michael Oakeshott, Education and Extremism. British Journal of Educational Studies 55 (3):264 - 285.score: 24.0
    This paper considers a distinction between two types of politics developed by Michael Oakeshott in his book The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (1996) and argues that the theoretical framework proposed supplies an illuminating and productive perspective for examining the notion of political extremism. These positions are linked to two other important aspects of his work, namely his account of 'enterprise' and 'civil' association and his differentiation between abstract philosophical entities and concrete political situations. There is (...)
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  30. Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.) (2014). Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Jusification. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    One of the hardest problems in the history of Western philosophy has been to explain whether and how experience can provide knowledge (or even justification for belief) about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind. A prominent brand of scepticism has precisely denied that experience can provide such knowledge. How, for instance (these sceptics ask) can I know that my experiences are not produced in me by a powerful demon (or, in a modern twist on that traditional Cartesian scenario, (...)
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  31. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and the 'Metaepistemological' Challenge. Principia 4 (2):187-214.score: 24.0
    It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. (...)
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  32. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (forthcoming). Disjunctivism and Scepticism. In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.score: 24.0
    An overview of the import of disjunctivism to the problem of radical scepticism is offered. In particular, the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience is set out, along with the manner in which it intersects with related positions such as naïve realism and intentionalism, and it is shown how this account can be used to a motivate an anti-sceptical proposal. In addition, a variety of disjunctivism known as epistemological disjunctivism is described, and it is explained how this proposal offers a (...)
     
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  33. Tim Kraft (2012). Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):49-70.score: 24.0
    The relation of scepticism to infallibilism and fallibilism is a contested issue. In this paper I argue that Cartesian sceptical arguments, i.e. sceptical arguments resting on sceptical scenarios, are neither tied to infallibilism nor collapse into fallibilism. I interpret the distinction between scepticism and fallibilism as a scope distinction. According to fallibilism, each belief could be false, but according to scepticism all beliefs could be false at the same time. However, to put this distinction to work sceptical (...)
     
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  34. Howard Sankey (forthcoming). Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism. Social Epistemology.score: 24.0
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of (...)
     
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  35. Kenneth R. Westphal (2009). ‘Consciousness, Scepticism and the Critique of Categorial Concepts in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit’. In M. Bykova & M. Solopova (eds.), Сущность и Слово. Сборник научных статей к юбилею профессора Н.В.Мотрошиловой. Phenomenology & Hermeneutics Press.score: 24.0
    This paper (in English) highlights a hitherto neglected feature of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit: its critique of the content of our basic categorial concepts. It focusses on Hegel’s semantics of cognitive reference in ‘Sense Certainty’ and his use of this semantics also in ‘Perception’ and ‘Force and Understanding’. Explicating these points enables us to understand how Hegel criticizes Pyrrhonian Scepticism on internal grounds.
     
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  36. M. McGinn (1998). The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein on Scepticism About Other Minds. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):45-58.score: 21.0
  37. Benjamin T. H. Smart, Inductive Scepticism in a Humean World.score: 21.0
    In this paper I show that David Armstrong is wrong to claim that the regularity theorist must be an inductive sceptic by demonstrating that even those who support worldly ontologies devoid of metaphysical glue (or as Hume might say, necessary connections ‘in the objects’) can justifiably make many inductive inferences. As well as branding the regularity theorist an inductive sceptic, Armstrong also claims that regularity theory (RT) laws have no explanatory value whatsoever. I try to show that Armstrong is also (...)
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  38. Paul Russell (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. In Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.), “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. Felix Meiner Verlag.score: 21.0
    In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason (...)
     
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  39. Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.score: 21.0
    At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim.
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  40. Anthony Brueckner (2011). Idealism and Scepticism. Theoria 77 (4):368-371.score: 21.0
    It is argued that contrary to appearances, Berkeleyan Idealism lacks anti-sceptical force. The problem stems from the way in which the idealist draws the appearance/reality distinction.
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  41. Daniele Sgaravatti (2014). Scepticism, Defeasible Evidence and Entitlement. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.score: 21.0
    The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of (...)
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  42. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.score: 21.0
  43. Norman Malcolm (1957). Dreaming and Scepticism: A Rejoinder. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (December):207-211.score: 21.0
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  44. Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.score: 21.0
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  45. Gary Ebbs (2005). Why Scepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining. Analysis 65 (287):237-244.score: 21.0
    In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument is self-undermining, it can still (...)
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  46. A. Lewis (1988). Wittgenstein and Rule-Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (July):280-304.score: 21.0
  47. Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds. Philosophia 40 (2):403-409.score: 21.0
    I formulate and defend two sceptical theses on specific parts of our modal knowledge (unqualified and absolute modalities). My main point is that unqualified modal sentences are defective in that they fail to belong unambiguously to specific modal kinds and thus cannot be evaluated; hence, we must be sceptical of beliefs involving them.
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  48. T. Shogenji (1993). Modest Scepticism About Rule-Following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.score: 21.0
  49. Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.score: 21.0
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  50. Joseph J. Sartorelli (1991). McGinn on Content Scepticism and Kripke's Sceptical Argument. Analysis 51 (March):79-84.score: 21.0
    In Wittgenstein on Meaning, Colin McGinn argues that the skeptical argument that Kripke distills from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations generates at most what might be called meaning skepticism (the non-factuality view of meaning), and not concept skepticism (the non-factuality view of concepts). If correct, this would mean the skeptical reasoning is far less significant than Kripke thinks. Others have seemed to agree with McGinn. I argue that McGinn is wrong here--that, in fact, Kripke's skeptical reasoning has a straightforward extension to concepts. (...)
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