Search results for 'science of consciousness perception qualia' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Bourget, Regimentation and the Science of Consciousness.score: 271.2
    A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles that determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. (...)
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  2. Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or Non Epistemic Perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's Representational Theories of Consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208.score: 204.0
  3. J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2007). The Role of Control in a Science of Consciousness: Causality, Regulation and Self-Sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.score: 182.4
    There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that (...)
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  4. Christian Lotz (2007). Depiction and Plastic Perception. A Critique of Husserl's Theory of Picture Consciousness. Continental Philosophy Review 40 (2):171-185.score: 165.6
    In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, (...)
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  5. Ezio Di Nucci & Conor McHugh (eds.) (2006). Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press.score: 164.4
    What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time - belong to the natural world, - represent the world, - give rise to our subjective experience, - and ground human knowledge? Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, (...)
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  6. Max Velmans (ed.) (1996). The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. Routledge.score: 160.2
    Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by consciousness. In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical psychology. Within cognitive psychology, special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination. Neuropsychology includes examination of (...)
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  7. Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.score: 152.4
    The Latin conscius does not translate anything like mind or consciousness. Only in the mid-nineteenth century do we find the first attempts to study consciousness as its own discipline. Wundt, James, and Freud disagreed about how to approach the science of consciousness, although agreeing that psychology was a 'science of consciousness' that takes lived biological experience as its object. The behaviorists vetoed this idea. By the 1950s, for cognitive science, mind (conscious and unconscious) (...)
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  8. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57.score: 151.8
  9. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration: Conference Report.score: 151.2
    This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011: 1. What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration? 2. Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal? 3. How should we model the unity of consciousness? 4. Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal? 5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?
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  10. Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a Neural Correlate Can Function as an Explanation of Consciousness: Evidence From the History of Science Regarding the Likely Explanatory Value of the NCC Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):77-95.score: 150.0
    A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain (...)
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  11. Daniel C. Dennett (2009). The Part of Cognitive Science That Is Philosophy. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):231--236.score: 149.4
    There is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science, work toward testable hypotheses, and take on the task of clarifying the relationship between the scientific concepts and the everyday concepts with which we conduct our moral lives.
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  12. Jon Mallatt Todd E. Feinberg (2013). The Evolutionary and Genetic Origins of Consciousness in the Cambrian Period Over 500 Million Years Ago. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 145.2
    Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group’s origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived (...)
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  13. Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.score: 144.0
    This book is a major contribution to the interdisciplinary project of investigating the true nature of color vision. In recent times, research into color vision has been one of the main success stories of cognitive science. Each discipline in the field--neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy--has contributed significantly to our understanding of color. Evan Thompson provides an accessible review of current scientific and philosophical discussions of color vision. He steers a course between the subjective and objective positions (...)
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  14. Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.) (1996). Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press.score: 143.4
    Toward a Science of Consciousnessmarks the first major gathering -- a landmark event -- devoted entirely to unlocking the mysteries of consciousness.
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  15. Henry P. Stapp (1997). Science of Consciousness and the Hard Problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):171-93.score: 142.2
    Quantum theory can be regarded as a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally e cacious and necessary role in brain dynamics It therefore provides a natural basis created by scientists for the science of consciousness As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms as compared (...)
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  16. A. Olivier (2010). The Possibility of a Science of Consciousness Critical Reflections on Dennett and Merleau-Ponty. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (2).score: 139.2
    In his latest book, entitled “Sweet dreams”, Daniel Dennett confirms and expands on his argument for a natural science of human consciousness. He dubs his view heterophenomenology: a third-person, scientific form of phenomenological description that can account for the most private and ineffable subjective experiences. A central part of his book consists of a reinvention of Jackson's thought experiment about color blind scientist, Mary, who tries to figure out what color experience is like. I explore another variation of (...)
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  17. David Hodgson (2002). Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):65-88.score: 138.8
    DAVID HODGSON Abstract: This article supports the proposition that, if a judgment about the aesthetic merits of an artistic object can take into account and thereby be influenced by the particular quality of the object, through gestalt experiences evoked by the object, then we have free will. It argues that it is probable that such a judgment can indeed take into account and be influenced by the particular quality of the object through gestalt experiences evoked by it, so as to (...)
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  18. Talis Bachmann (2011). Attention as a Process of Selection, Perception as a Process of Representation, and Phenomenal Experience as the Resulting Process of Perception Being Modulated by a Dedicated Consciousness Mechanism. Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 138.0
    Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained controversial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially useful for moving forward. Specifically, we should differentiate between processes and the results of the processes, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention on the modality-specific and feature-specific perception to studying attentional (...)
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  19. Stephan Blatti (2009). Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Review). [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 463-464.score: 137.4
    This is a review of Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer 2007).
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  20. Roger Vergauwen (2010). Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia. Symmetry 2 (3):1250-1269.score: 136.8
    Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called ‘raw feels’ or the feel of ‘what it is like to be’) has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is possible; for them, there remains an explanatory gap. In this paper, functionalist, physicalist, epiphenomenalist, and biological (...)
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  21. Andrew R. Bailey (2007). Representation and a Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.score: 136.8
    The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving through various choice-points that map out the main peaks in the landscape of philosophical debate about representation. The choice-points considered are: (1) whether representations are conceptual or non-conceptual; (2) given that mental representation is conceptual, whether conscious perceptual representations are analog or digital; (3) given that the content of a representation is the concept it expresses, whether that content is individuated extensionally or intensionally; (4) whether (...)
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  22. Max Velmans (2001). A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Communication and Cognition 34 (1):39-59.score: 136.2
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model (...)
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  23. Patrick A. Heelan (1983). Space-Perception And The Philosophy Of Science. University Of California Press.score: 135.0
    00 Drawing on the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Patrick Heelan concludes that perception is a cognitive, ...
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  24. Sangeetha Menon (ed.) (2006). Consciousness, Experience, and Ways of Knowing: Perspectives From Science, Philosophy & the Arts. National Institute of Advances Studies.score: 135.0
     
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  25. Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (eds.) (2002). Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press.score: 134.4
  26. Gregg H. Rosenberg, Consciousness as a Physical Property and its Implications for a Science of Mind.score: 133.8
    As the view that the mind has a physical cause becomes increasingly more difficult to refute, both philosophy and science must face the fact that having experiences, qualia, consciousness in short, is simply not deducible from within our physical theories. Indeed, all the power physics shows for qualitative explanation is adduced from outside the actual formality of its theories. Our physical theories describe vibrations and stochastic correlates of motion, and there is no principled way to explain awareness (...)
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  27. K. Ramakrishna Rao (2005). Perception, Cognition, and Consciousness in Classical Hindu Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.score: 131.4
    Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness (...)
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  28. Hermann Burchard (2011). The Role of Conscious Attention in Perception. Foundations of Science 16 (1):67-99.score: 130.2
    Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...)
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  29. Lois Isenman (2009). Digestive Enzyme Secretion, Intuition, and the History of Science: Part II. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 14 (4):331-349.score: 129.0
    A companion paper explored the role of intuition in the genesis of an alternative theory for the secretion of pancreatic digestive enzymes, looking through the lens of three philosophers/historians of science. Gerald Holton, the last scholar, proposed that scientific imagination is shaped by a number of thematic presuppositions, which function largely below awareness. They come in pairs of opposites that alternately gain cultural preeminence. The current paper examines three thematic presuppositions inherent to both the generally accepted model for digestive (...)
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  30. Donelson Dulany (2008). How Well Are We Moving Toward a Most Productive Science of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):75-98.score: 128.4
    Commentary on the Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference, Tucson 2008.
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  31. J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2007). The Role of Control in a Science of Consciousness: Causality, Regulation and Self- Sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 1-2):177-197.score: 128.4
    There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that (...)
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  32. Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne (2010). The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459.score: 127.2
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested (...)
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  33. Stanley A. Mulaik (1995). The Metaphoric Origins of Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Consciousness in the Direct Perception of Reality. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):283-303.score: 127.2
    This paper utilizes the theories of metaphor of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and Julian Jaynes to extend Jaynes' metaphor theory of consciousness by treating consciousness as an operator that works with 'covert behavior' so that humans can integrate temporally discontinuous percepts with concepts based on metaphoric extensions of the embodied schemas of direct and immediate perception and thereby transcend the limitations of direct perception. A theory of first-person expressions and covert behavior to account for self-conscious awareness (...)
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  34. Joan Chiao & T. Harada (2008). Cultural Neuroscience of Consciousness: From Visual Perception to Self-Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):58-69.score: 126.0
    Philosophical inquiries into the nature of consciousness have long been intrinsically tied to questions regarding the nature of the self. Although philosophers of mind seldom make reference to the role of cultural context in shaping consciousness, since antiquity culture has played a notable role in philosophical conceptions of the self. Western philosophers, from Plato to Locke, have emphasized an individualistic view of the self that is autonomous and consistent across situations, while Eastern philosophers, such as Lao Tzu and (...)
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  35. A. Demertzi, E. Racine, M.-A. Bruno, D. Ledoux, O. Gosseries, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, M. Thonnard, A. Soddu, G. Moonen & S. Laureys (2013). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 6 (1):37-50.score: 124.8
    Pain, suffering and positive emotions in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states (MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically, we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimulation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g., smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuroimaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain which might influence decisions about treatment limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., withdrawal of artificial nutrition (...)
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  36. Kunjumon Vadakkan (2010). Framework of Consciousness From Semblance of Activity at Functionally LINKed Postsynaptic Membranes. Frontiers in Consciousness Research 1 (1):1-12.score: 124.8
    Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem. Binding, a process where different sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process similar to associative learning. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing to consciousness. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. (...)
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  37. Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.score: 124.2
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the (...)
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  38. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.score: 122.4
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
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  39. Roderic A. Girle (1996). Shades of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 6 (2):143-57.score: 121.8
    It has been argued that consciousness might be what differentiates human from machine mentality. What then is consciousness? We discuss consciousness, particularly perception accounts of consciousness. It is argued that perception and consciousness are distinct. Armstrong's (1980) account of consciousness is rejected. It is proposed that perception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness, and that there is a distinction to be drawn between consciousness and self-consciousness. (...)
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  40. David J. Chalmers (2004). How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness? In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. Mit Press. 1111--1119.score: 121.2
    In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.
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  41. Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.score: 121.2
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? (...)
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  42. Andrzej Klawiter (2004). Why Did Husserl Not Become the Galileo of the Science of Consciousness? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):253-271.score: 121.2
    It is well known that Husserl clearly recognized the importance of the introduction of idealization in physics and its contribution to the further advancement in natural sciences. The history of the successful applications of idealization in natural sciences encouraged attempts to extend the use of this sophisticated instrument of theoretical investigation and theory construction to other domains of science. Since Husserl designed his phenomenology as the rigorous science of consciousness we have to find out why he did (...)
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  43. Eugene Taylor (2010). William James on a Phenomenological Psychology of Immediate Experience: The True Foundation for a Science of Consciousness? History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):119-130.score: 121.2
    Throughout his career, William James defended personal consciousness. In his Principles of Psychology (1890), he declared that psychology is the scientific study of states of consciousness as such and that he intended to presume from the outset that the thinker was the thought. But while writing it, he had been investigating a dynamic psychology of the subconscious, which found a major place in his Gifford Lectures, published as The Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902. This was the clearest (...)
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  44. Pereira A. Almada Lf (2013). What Affective Neuroscience Means for Science of Consciousness. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):253.score: 121.2
    The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious (...)
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  45. Leonardo Ferreira Almada, Alfredo Pereira Jr & Claudia Carrara-Augustenborg (2013). What Affective Neuroscience Means for Science of Consciousness. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):253.score: 121.2
    The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious (...)
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  46. Riccardo Manzotti (2006). A Process Oriented View of Conscious Perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):7-41.score: 120.8
    I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides (...)
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  47. Austen Clark (1985). Qualia and the Psychophysical Explanation of Color Perception. Synthese 65 (December):377-405.score: 120.6
    Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or "qualia" are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia.
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  48. Ralph D. Ellis (2013). Neuroscience as a Human Science: Integrating Phenomenology and Empiricism in the Study of Action and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Human Studies 36 (4):491-507.score: 120.6
    This paper considers where contemporary neuroscience leaves us in terms of how human consciousness fits into the material world, and whether consciousness is reducible to merely mechanical physical systems, or on the contrary whether consciousness is a self-organizing system that can in a sense use the brain for its own purposes. The paper discusses how phenomenology can be integrated with new findings about “neural plasticity” to yield new approaches to the mind–body problem and the place of (...) as a causal player in the physical world. By phenomenology, I mean simply any attempt to have introspective or reflective access to the meaning of our own conscious states, and to carefully take account of the notorious pitfalls of subjective introspection (often subsumed within the concept of “folk psychology” in the empirically oriented cognitive theory literature). (shrink)
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  49. J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.score: 120.4
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way (...)
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  50. Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich (2010). Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.score: 119.4
    We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem, and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant did never use the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; (...)
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