Search results for 'science of consciousness perception qualia' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Bourget, Regimentation and the Science of Consciousness.
    A chief aim of the science of consciousness is to discover general principles that determine exactly which states of phenomenal consciousness occur in exactly which conditions. In this paper I argue that making progress towards the discovery of such principles requires developing a new regimented language for describing phenomenal states. This language should allow us to describe phenomenal states in a way that is commensurable with our descriptions of physical states. I suggest one way of doing this. (...)
     
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  2.  81
    Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or Non Epistemic Perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's Representational Theories of Consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208.
  3.  41
    J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2007). The Role of Control in a Science of Consciousness: Causality, Regulation and Self-Sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.
    There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that (...)
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  4. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57.
    Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’ based on a loose analogy with Newton's three laws of classical (...)
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  5.  19
    Max Velmans (ed.) (1996). The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. Routledge.
    Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by consciousness. In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical psychology. Within cognitive psychology, special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination. Neuropsychology includes examination of (...)
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  6.  69
    Amy Ione (2000). An Inquiry Into Paul Cezanne: The Role of the Artist in Studies of Perception and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8):57-74.
    [opening paragraph]: An intriguing element of Paul Cezanne's legacy is that while he aligned his paintings with the classical Renaissance tradition of Western art, his innovative body of work ushered in a decisive break with the standards of that tradition in the twentieth century. The many ways in which Cezanne's representational system deviates from the pluralistic art of the twentieth century suggests that probing his allegiance to classicism offers a unique vantage point for studying visual art, perception, and (...). It is for this reason that this paper examines Cezanne's contributions from both the painterly and the cognitive science perspectives, asking what artists in fact contribute to our studies in these areas. [A response to this article from Semir Zeki is published in Trends in Cognitive Science.]. (shrink)
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  7. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
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  8. J. McFadden (2002). Synchronous Firing and its Influence on the Brain's Electromagnetic Field: Evidence for an Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4):23-50.
    The human brain consists of approximately 100 billion electrically active neurones that generate an endogenous electromagnetic field, whose role in neuronal computing has not been fully examined. The source, magnitude and likely influence of the brain's endogenous em field are here considered. An estimate of the strength and magnitude of the brain's em field is gained from theoretical considerations, brain scanning and microelectrode data. An estimate of the likely influence of the brain's em field is gained from theoretical principles and (...)
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  9. Max Velmans (2001). A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):39-59.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model (...)
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  10. Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (eds.) (2002). Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press.
  11.  14
    A. Olivier (2010). The Possibility of a Science of Consciousness Critical Reflections on Dennett and Merleau-Ponty. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (2).
    In his latest book, entitled “Sweet dreams”, Daniel Dennett confirms and expands on his argument for a natural science of human consciousness. He dubs his view heterophenomenology: a third-person, scientific form of phenomenological description that can account for the most private and ineffable subjective experiences. A central part of his book consists of a reinvention of Jackson's thought experiment about color blind scientist, Mary, who tries to figure out what color experience is like. I explore another variation of (...)
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  12. Roger Vergauwen (2010). Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia. Symmetry 2 (3):1250-1269.
    Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called ‘raw feels’ or the feel of ‘what it is like to be’) has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is possible; for them, there remains an explanatory gap. In this paper, functionalist, physicalist, epiphenomenalist, and biological (...)
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  13.  92
    Andrew R. Bailey (2007). Representation and a Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
    The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving through various choice-points that map out the main peaks in the landscape of philosophical debate about representation. The choice-points considered are: (1) whether representations are conceptual or non-conceptual; (2) given that mental representation is conceptual, whether conscious perceptual representations are analog or digital; (3) given that the content of a representation is the concept it expresses, whether that content is individuated extensionally or intensionally; (4) whether (...)
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  14.  1
    Daniel C. Dennett (2006). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. A Bradford Book.
    In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories -- "so rambunctious," Dennett observes, "that several people are writing books just about the tumult." With Sweet Dreams, Dennett returns to the subject for "revision and renewal" of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges.In Consciousness Explained, (...)
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  15. Gregg H. Rosenberg, Consciousness as a Physical Property and its Implications for a Science of Mind.
    As the view that the mind has a physical cause becomes increasingly more difficult to refute, both philosophy and science must face the fact that having experiences, qualia, consciousness in short, is simply not deducible from within our physical theories. Indeed, all the power physics shows for qualitative explanation is adduced from outside the actual formality of its theories. Our physical theories describe vibrations and stochastic correlates of motion, and there is no principled way to explain awareness (...)
     
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  16.  47
    Stanley A. Mulaik (1995). The Metaphoric Origins of Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Consciousness in the Direct Perception of Reality. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):283-303.
    This paper utilizes the theories of metaphor of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and Julian Jaynes to extend Jaynes' metaphor theory of consciousness by treating consciousness as an operator that works with 'covert behavior' so that humans can integrate temporally discontinuous percepts with concepts based on metaphoric extensions of the embodied schemas of direct and immediate perception and thereby transcend the limitations of direct perception. A theory of first-person expressions and covert behavior to account for self-conscious awareness (...)
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  17. Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration: Conference Report.
    This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011: 1. What is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and sensory integration? 2. Are some of the basic units of consciousness multimodal? 3. How should we model the unity of consciousness? 4. Is the mechanism of sensory integration spatio-temporal? 5. How Should We Study Experience, Given Unity Relations?
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  18. J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way (...)
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  19.  65
    Austen Clark (1985). Qualia and the Psychophysical Explanation of Color Perception. Synthese 65 (December):377-405.
    Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or " qualia " are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia.
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  20.  95
    Daniel C. Dennett (2009). The Part of Cognitive Science That Is Philosophy. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):231--236.
    There is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science, work toward testable hypotheses, and take on the task of clarifying the relationship between the scientific concepts and the everyday concepts with which we conduct our moral lives.
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  21.  41
    Gary Hatfield (1993). Book Review:Historical Roots of Cognitive Science: The Rise of a Cognitive Theory of Perception From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century Theo C. Meyering. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 60 (4):662-666.
    Review of THEO C. MEYERING, Historical Roots of Cognitive Science : The Rise of a Cognitive Theory of Perception from Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century. Boston: Kluwer, xix + 250 pp. $69.00. Examines the author's interpretation of Aristotelian theories of perceptual cognition, early modern theories, and Helmholtz's theory.
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  22.  40
    Christian Lotz (2007). Depiction and Plastic Perception. A Critique of Husserl's Theory of Picture Consciousness. Continental Philosophy Review 40 (2):171-185.
    In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, (...)
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  23.  82
    Leopold Stubenberg (1996). The Place of Qualia in the World of Science. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press 41--49.
  24.  92
    Ezio Di Nucci & Conor McHugh (eds.) (2006). Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time - belong to the natural world, - represent the world, - give rise to our subjective experience, - and ground human knowledge? Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, (...)
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  25.  5
    Estiva Reus & David Olivier (2007). Mind-Matter for Animals Matters: Science and the Denial of Animal Consciousness. Between the Species 13 (7):6.
    Animal people are usually confident that Cartesianism is something of the past and that modern science clearly establishes that animals are sentient beings. But actually the scientific status of sentience is anything but firmly established. Not only is the subjective point of view absent from current science; it is precluded by construction from our fundamental realms of knowledge. Physics — the mother-science once we reject Cartesian dualism — is currently unable to include sentience in its account of (...)
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  26.  1
    D. S. Kothari (1990). The Perception of Truth in Science and Philosophy. In Kishor Gandhi (ed.), The Odyssey of Science, Culture, and Consciousness. Abhinav Publications 46.
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  27. Benjamin Kozuch & Uriah Kriegel (2015). Correlation, Causation, Constitution: On the Interplay Between the Science and Philosophy of Consciousness. In S. M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. John Benjamins 400-417.
    Consciousness is a natural phenomenon, the object of a flourishing area of research in the natural sciences – research whose primary goal is to identify the neural correlates of consciousness. This raises the question: why is there need for a philosophy of consciousness? As we see things, the need for a philosophy of consciousness arises for two reasons. First, as a young and energetic science operating as yet under no guiding paradigm, the science of (...)
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  28.  24
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). Functionalism's Response to the Problem of Absent Qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):357-73.
    It seems that we could be physically the same as we are now, only we would lack conscious awareness. If so, then nothing about our physical world is necessary for qualitative experience. However, a proper analysis of psychological functionalism eliminates this problem concerning the possibility of zombies. ‘Friends of absent qualia’ rely on an overly simple view of what counts as a functional analysis and of the function/structure distinction. The level of thought is not the only level at which (...)
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  29.  36
    Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
    The Latin conscius does not translate anything like mind or consciousness. Only in the mid-nineteenth century do we find the first attempts to study consciousness as its own discipline. Wundt, James, and Freud disagreed about how to approach the science of consciousness, although agreeing that psychology was a 'science of consciousness' that takes lived biological experience as its object. The behaviorists vetoed this idea. By the 1950s, for cognitive science, mind (conscious and unconscious) (...)
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  30. K. Ramakrishna Rao (2005). Perception, Cognition, and Consciousness in Classical Hindu Psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.
    Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness (...)
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  31. Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson & Alva Noë (1998). Finding Out About Filling-In: A Guide to Perceptual Completion for Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (21):723–802.
    In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a (...)
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  32.  48
    Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a Neural Correlate Can Function as an Explanation of Consciousness: Evidence From the History of Science Regarding the Likely Explanatory Value of the NCC Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):77-95.
    A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain (...)
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  33.  19
    Lois Isenman (2009). Digestive Enzyme Secretion, Intuition, and the History of Science: Part II. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 14 (4):331-349.
    A companion paper explored the role of intuition in the genesis of an alternative theory for the secretion of pancreatic digestive enzymes, looking through the lens of three philosophers/historians of science. Gerald Holton, the last scholar, proposed that scientific imagination is shaped by a number of thematic presuppositions, which function largely below awareness. They come in pairs of opposites that alternately gain cultural preeminence. The current paper examines three thematic presuppositions inherent to both the generally accepted model for digestive (...)
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  34.  17
    Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.) (1996). Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press.
    Toward a Science of Consciousnessmarks the first major gathering -- a landmark event -- devoted entirely to unlocking the mysteries of consciousness.
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  35.  7
    S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.) (1996). Towards a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    Toward a Science of Consciousness marks the first major gathering—a landmark event—devoted entirely to unlocking the mysteries of consciousness.
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  36. John O'Dea (2007). A Higher-Order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):29-41.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness and phenomenal character, or qualia. The higher-order states posited by these theories are intended only as explanations of consciousness, and not of qualia. In this paper I argue that the positing of higher-order perceptions may help to explain qualia. If we are realists about qualia, conceived as those intrinsic properties of our experience of which we are (...)
     
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  37.  61
    Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the (...)
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  38.  92
    Henry P. Stapp (1997). Science of Consciousness and the Hard Problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):171-93.
    Quantum theory can be regarded as a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally e cacious and necessary role in brain dynamics It therefore provides a natural basis created by scientists for the science of consciousness As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms as compared (...)
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  39.  59
    Bernard J. Baars (1997). In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The study of conscious experience has seen remarkable strides in the last ten years, reflecting important technological breakthroughs and the enormous efforts of researchers in disciplines as varied as neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. Although still embroiled in debate, scientists are now beginning to find common ground in their understanding of consciousness, which may pave the way for a unified explanation of how and why we experience and understand the world around us. Written by eminent psychologist Bernard J. (...)
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  40. T. de Villiers-Botha (2011). Peculiarities in Mind; Or, on the Absence of Darwin. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):282-302.
    A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often described as philosophy of cognitive science rather than philosophy of mind. Even then, whereas possible implications of the evolution of human cognition are taken more seriously within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of cognitive science, its relevance for cognitive science (...)
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  41.  20
    Michael Tye (1993). Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness. In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 19-40.
    One standard objection to the view that phenomenal experience is functionally determined is based upon what has come to be called ‘The Absent Qualia Hypothesis’, the idea that there could be a person or a machine that was functionally exactly like us but that felt or consciously experienced nothing at all . Advocates of this hypothesis typically maintain that we can easily imagine possible systems that meet the appropriate functional specifications but that intuitively lack any phenomenal consciousness. Ned (...)
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  42.  21
    Roderic A. Girle (1996). Shades of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 6 (2):143-57.
    It has been argued that consciousness might be what differentiates human from machine mentality. What then is consciousness? We discuss consciousness, particularly perception accounts of consciousness. It is argued that perception and consciousness are distinct. Armstrong's account of consciousness is rejected. It is proposed that perception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness, and that there is a distinction to be drawn between consciousness and self-consciousness. (...) is tightly linked to attention and to certain sorts of knowledge. Implications for machine consciousness and machine attention are discussed. (shrink)
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  43.  5
    De Villiers-Botha (2011). Peculiarities in Mind; or, on the Absence of Darwin. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):282-302.
    A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often described as philosophy of cognitive science rather than philosophy of mind. Even then, whereas possible implications of the evolution of human cognition are taken more seriously within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of cognitive science, its relevance for cognitive science (...)
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  44.  42
    Patrick A. Heelan (1983). Space-Perception And The Philosophy Of Science. University Of California Press.
    00 Drawing on the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Patrick Heelan concludes that perception is a cognitive, ...
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  45.  29
    Morten Overgaard, Julian Rote, Kim Mouridsen & Thomas Zoega Ramsoy (2006). Is Conscious Perception Gradual or Dichotomous? A Comparison of Report Methodologies During a Visual Task. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):700-708.
    In a recent article, [Sergent, C. & Dehaene, S. . Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15, 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. . Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory (...)
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  46.  1
    Evan Thompson (1999). Filling-In: Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer 145--161.
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  47.  53
    Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich (2010). Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.
    We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem, and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant did never use the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; (...)
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  48. Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne (2010). The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459.
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested (...)
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  49.  23
    Bill Faw (2006). 'Are We Studying Consciousness Yet?': Toward a Science of Consciousness--Tucson Conference, April 4-8, 2006. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):94-112.
    Conference Report for Toward a Science of Consciousness Tucson Conference, April 4- 8, 2006.
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  50.  47
    Stephan Blatti (2009). Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Review). [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 463-464.
    This is a review of Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer 2007).
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