Search results for 'scientific practice' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Moti Mizrahi (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44 (2):375-390.score: 240.0
    Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way (...)
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  2. Xiaofei Tian & Tong Wu (2009). The Philosophy of Scientific Practice in Naturalist Thought: Its Approaches and Problems. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):589-603.score: 240.0
    It is the continuity between epistemology and empirical science that the naturalism in contemporary philosophy of science emphasizes. After its individual and social dimensions, the philosophy of scientific practice takes a stand on naturalism in order to observe complex scientific activities through practice. However, regarding the naturalism’s problem of normativity, the philosophy of scientific practice today has deconstructed more than it has constructed.
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  3. Peter J. Taylor, Michael Hoyler & David M. Evans (2008). A Geohistorical Study of 'The Rise of Modern Science': Mapping Scientific Practice Through Urban Networks, 1500–1900. [REVIEW] Minerva 46 (4):391-410.score: 240.0
    Using data on the ‘career’ paths of one thousand ‘leading scientists’ from 1450 to 1900, what is conventionally called the ‘rise of modern science’ is mapped as a changing geography of scientific practice in urban networks. Four distinctive networks of scientific practice are identified. A primate network centred on Padua and central and northern Italy in the sixteenth century expands across the Alps to become a polycentric network in the seventeenth century, which in turn dissipates into (...)
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  4. Susann Wagenknecht (2014). Collaboration in Scientific Practice—-A Social Epistemology of Research Groups. Dissertation, Aarhus Universityscore: 240.0
    This monograph investigates the collaborative creation of scientific knowledge in research groups. To do so, I combine philosophical analysis with a first-hand comparative case study of two research groups in experimental science. Qualitative data are gained through observation and interviews, and I combine empirical insights with existing approaches to knowledge creation in philosophy of science and social epistemology. -/- On the basis of my empirically-grounded analysis I make several conceptual contributions. I study scientific collaboration as the interaction of (...)
     
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  5. Michael D. Kirk‐Smith & David D. Stretch (2003). The Influence of Medical Professionalism on Scientific Practice. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 9 (4):417-422.score: 216.0
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  6. Susann Wagenknecht (2014). Facing the Incompleteness of Epistemic Trust: Managing Dependence in Scientific Practice. Social Epistemology:1-25.score: 212.0
    Based on an empirical study of a research team in natural science, the author argues that collaborating scientists do not trust each other completely. Due to the inherent incompleteness of trust, epistemic trust among scientists is not sufficient to manage epistemic dependency in research teams. To mitigate the limitations of epistemic trust, scientists resort to specific strategies of indirect assessment such as dialoguing practices and the probing of explanatory responsiveness. Furthermore, they rely upon impersonal trust and deploy practices of hierarchical (...)
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  7. David Ludwig & Cornelia Weber (2013). University Collections as Archives of Scientific Practice -. Revista Electrónica de Fuentes y Archivosmore 4.score: 210.0
    Elimination controversies are ubiquitous in philosophy and the human sciences. For example, it has been suggested that humanraces, hysteria, intelligence, mental disorder, propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, the self, and the super-ego should beeliminated from the list of respectable entities in the human sciences. I argue that eliminativist proposals are often presented in theframework of an oversimplified ‘‘phlogiston model’’ and suggest an alternative account that describes ontological elimination on a gradualscale between criticism of empirical assumptions and conceptual choices.
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  8. Brian S. Baigrie (1994). Social Epistemology, Scientific Practice and the Elusive Social. Argumentation 8 (2):125-144.score: 210.0
    Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to ‘brute facts’ about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though (...)
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  9. Tian Xiaofei (2009). The Philosophy of Scientific Practice in Naturalist Thought: Its Approaches and Problems. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):589-603.score: 210.0
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  10. Steffen Ducheyne (2010). Whewell's Tidal Researches: Scientific Practice and Philosophical Methodology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):26-40.score: 192.0
    Primarily between 1833 and 1840, Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. In the essay at hand, I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology (...)
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  11. Alan C. Love (2013). Erratum To: Theory is as Theory Does: Scientific Practice and Theory Structure in Biology. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (4):430 - 430.score: 192.0
    Using the context of controversies surrounding evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) and the possibility of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, I provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization). These two characteristics are salient because the goals that organize and regulate scientific practice, including the activity of using a theory, are heterogeneous. This means that the same theory can be structured differently, in (...)
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  12. Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.) (2012). Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. de Gruyter.score: 186.0
    Combining philosophical and historical scholarship, the articles in this volume focus on scientific concepts, rather than theories, as units of analysis. They thereby contribute to a growing literature about the role of concepts in scientific research. The authors are particularly interested in exploring the dynamics of research; they investigate the ways in which scientists form and use concepts, rather than in what the concepts themselves represent. The fields treated range from mathematics to virology and genetics, from nuclear physics (...)
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  13. Seamus Bradley (2011). A Literary Approach to Scientific Practice. Metascience 20 (2):363--367.score: 180.0
    A literary approach to scientific practice: Essay Review of R.I.G. Hughes' _The Theoretical Practices of Physics_.
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  14. André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.score: 180.0
    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all (...) practices are compatible with both realism and instrumentalism. I also repudiate van Fraassen's argument to the effect that the instrumentalist account of scientific practice is logically weaker, hence better, than the realist account. In the end, there are no scientific practice arguments on the table that support either side of the debate. It is also noted that the deficiencies of van Fraassen's argument are recapitulated in Putnam's miracle argument for realism. My pessimistic assessment of the state of the debate is reminiscent of Arthur Fine's. However, Fine's argument for the ‘natural ontological attitude’ once again repeats the problems of van Fraassen's and Putnam's arguments. (shrink)
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  15. Hasok Chang (2011). The Philosophical Grammar of Scientific Practice. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):205 - 221.score: 180.0
    I seek to provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice?a philosophical grammar of scientific practice, ?grammar? as meant by the later Wittgenstein. I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of the physical, mental, and ?paper-and-pencil? varieties. When we set out to see what it is that one actually does in scientific work, the following set of questions naturally emerge: who (...)
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  16. Valeriano Iranzo (2002). Constructive Empiricism and Scientific Practice. A Case Study. Theoria 17 (2):335-357.score: 180.0
    According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism (CE) makes better sense of scientific activity than scientific realism (SR). I discuss a recent episode in biomedical research - investigations about Helicobacter Pylori and its relation to peptic ulcer. CE's expedient to cope with it is a sort of belief substitution. I argue that replacing realist beliefs by empiricist surrogates (as-if beliefs) could accommodate scientists' expectations and behavior. Nonetheless, theoretical agnosticism could hardly motivate scientists to focus just on the observational consequences (...)
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  17. Matthew Stanley (2011). The Uniformity of Natural Laws in Victorian Britain: Naturalism, Theism, and Scientific Practice. Zygon 46 (3):536-560.score: 180.0
    Abstract. A historical perspective allows for a different view on the compatibility of theistic views with a crucial foundation of modern scientific practice: the uniformity of nature, which states that the laws of nature are unbroken through time and space. Uniformity is generally understood to be part of a worldview called “scientific naturalism,” in which there is no room for divine forces or a spiritual realm. This association comes from the Victorian era, but a historical examination of (...)
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  18. Melinda B. Fagan (2010). Social Construction Revisited: Epistemology and Scientific Practice. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):92-116.score: 180.0
    Philosophy of scientific practice aims to critically evaluate as well as describe scientific inquiry. Epistemic norms are required for such evaluation. Social constructivism is widely thought to oppose this critical project. I argue, however, that one variety of social constructivism, focused on epistemic justification, can be a basis for critical epistemology of scientific practice, while normative accounts that reject this variety of social constructivism (SCj) cannot. (...) Abstract, idealized epistemic norms cannot ground effective critique of our practices. I propose a new approach, placing SCj within a general framework of social action theory. This framework can be used to explicate epistemic norms implicit in our scientific practices. *Received July 2009; revised July 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: MS 14, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251‐1892; e‐mail: mbf2@rice.edu. (shrink)
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  19. Andreas Hüttemann (1998). Scientific Practice and the Disunity of Physics. Philosophia Naturalis 35 (1):209-222.score: 180.0
    It is my aim in this paper to look at some of the arguments that are brought forward for or against certain claims to unity/disunity (in particular to examine those arguments from science and from scientific practice) in order to evaluate whether they really show what they claim to. This presupposes that the concept or rather the concepts of the unity of physics are reasonably clear. Three concepts of unity can be identified: (1) ontological unity, which refers to (...)
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  20. Melinda Fagan, Collaboration, Toward an Integrative Philosophy of Scientific Practice.score: 180.0
    Philosophical understanding of experimental scientific practice is impeded by disciplinary differences, notably that between philosophy and sociology of science. Severing the two limits the stock of philosophical case studies to narrowly circumscribed experimental episodes, centered on individual scientists or technologies. The complex relations between scientists and society that permeate experimental research are left unexamined. In consequence, experimental fields rich in social interactions (notably biomedicine) have received only patchy attention from philosophers of science. This paper sketches a remedy for (...)
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  21. James A. Marcum (2011). Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.score: 180.0
    In this article, I introduce the notion of horizon for scientific practice (HSP), representing limits or boundaries within which scientists ply their trade, to facilitate analysis of scientific discovery and progress. The notion includes not only constraints that delimit scientific practice, e.g. of bringing experimentation to a temporary conclusion, but also possibilities that open up scientific practice to additional scientific discovery and to further scientific progress. Importantly, it represents scientific (...) as a dynamic and developmental integration of activities to investigate and analyze the natural world. I use the discovery of the clotting factor, thrombin, and the experiments conducted by the Johns Hopkins physiologist, William Howell, on the enzymatic nature of thrombin to illustrate the notion of HSP. In a concluding section, I compare the notion of HSP to other notions for scientific practice proposed in the history and philosophy of science literature. (shrink)
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  22. Andreas Hüttemann (2014). Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections. Theoria 79:29-39.score: 180.0
    In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open.More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by openfuture- Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails (...)
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  23. Axel Gelfert (2011). Model-Based Representation in Scientific Practice: New Perspectives. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):251-252.score: 180.0
    Editorial introduction to special issue on 'Model-based representation in scientific practice'.
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  24. Ann Elizabeth Fowler La Berge (2004). Debate as Scientific Practice in Nineteenth-Century Paris: The Controversy Over the Microscope. Perspectives on Science 12 (4):424-453.score: 180.0
    : This article explores debate as a key scientific practice among the medical elite in nineteenth-century Paris, with an emphasis on academic debate and debate in the scientific/medical press. I use the debate over the microscope, which took place in the Paris Academy of Medicine in 1854-55 and concurrently in the medical press, to illustrate the role of debate as scientific practice. Focusing on the debate in the press, I show how medical journalists used the (...)
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  25. Dan Mcarthur (2006). The Anti-Philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice. Foundations of Science 11 (4):369-397.score: 180.0
    In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur (...)
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  26. John W. Carroll (2005). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):240–245.score: 180.0
    This is a review of Marc Lange's _Natural Laws in Scientific Practice.
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  27. Javier Gomez Ferri (1996). EI estudio social y sociológico de la ciencia, y la convergencia hacia el estudio de la práctica cientifica (The Social and Sociological Study of Science, and the Convergence Towards the Study of Scientific Practice). Theoria 11 (3):205-225.score: 180.0
    Dentro dei ámbito de estudio da la ciancia, recientemente ha surgido con fuerza un nuevo enfoque, la sociología dei conocimiento científico (SSK). Desde su aparición a mediados de la dacada de los setenta, la SSK ha tomado formas diversas. Entre éstas y la filosofía de la ciencia ha existido una continua disputa. Ultimamente, sin embargo, la SSK se ha ido transformando en una “sociologfa de la practica cientrfica”. A partir de este cambio, ambas disciplinas -la filosofía de la ciencia y (...)
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  28. Ann-Sophie Barwich (2013). A Pluralist Approach to Extension: The Role of Materiality in Scientific Practice for the Reference of Natural Kind Terms. Biological Theory 7 (2):100-108.score: 180.0
    This article argues for a different outlook on the concept of extension, especially for the reference of general terms in scientific practice. Scientific realist interpretations of the two predominant theories of meaning, namely Descriptivism and Causal Theory, contend that a stable cluster of descriptions or an initial baptism fixes the extension of a general term such as a natural kind term. This view in which the meaning of general terms is presented as monosemantic and the referents as (...)
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  29. Daan Schuurbiers, Patricia Osseweijer & Julian Kinderlerer (2009). Implementing the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice—a Case Study. Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (2):213-231.score: 180.0
    Widespread enthusiasm for establishing scientific codes of conduct notwithstanding, the utility of such codes in influencing scientific practice is not self-evident. It largely depends on the implementation phase following their establishment—a phase which often receives little attention. The aim of this paper is to provide recommendations for guiding effective implementation through an assessment of one particular code of conduct in one particular institute. Based on a series of interviews held with researchers at the Department of Biotechnology of (...)
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  30. Javier Gomez Ferri (1996). EI Estudio Social Y Sociológico de la Ciencia, Y la Convergencia Hacia El Estudio de la Práctica Cientifica (the Social and Sociological Study of Science, and the Convergence Towards the Study of Scientific Practice). Theoria 11 (3):205-225.score: 180.0
    Dentro dei ámbito de estudio da la ciancia, recientemente ha surgido con fuerza un nuevo enfoque, la sociología dei conocimiento científico (SSK). Desde su aparición a mediados de la dacada de los setenta, la SSK ha tomado formas diversas. Entre éstas y la filosofía de la ciencia ha existido una continua disputa. Ultimamente, sin embargo, la SSK se ha ido transformando en una “sociologfa de la practica cientrfica”. A partir de este cambio, ambas disciplinas -la filosofía de la ciencia y (...)
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  31. Ingo Brigandt, Scientific Practice, Conceptual Change, and the Nature of Concepts.score: 174.0
    The theory of concepts advanced in the present discussion aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. To this end, I suggest that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) the concept.
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  32. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1994). Representation in Scientific Practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (4):647-654.score: 174.0
    The essays in this book provide an excellent introduction to the means by which scientists convey their ideas. While diverse in their subject matter, the essays are unified in asserting that scientists compose and use particular representations in contextually organized and contextually sensitive ways, and that these representations - particularly visual displays such as graphs, diagrams, photographs, and drawings - depend for their meaning on the complex activities in which they are situated.The topics include sociological orientations to representational practice, (...)
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  33. Axel Gelfert (2011). Mathematical Formalisms in Scientific Practice: From Denotation to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):272-286.score: 168.0
    The present paper argues that ‘mature mathematical formalisms’ play a central role in achieving representation via scientific models. A close discussion of two contemporary accounts of how mathematical models apply—the DDI account (according to which representation depends on the successful interplay of denotation, demonstration and interpretation) and the ‘matching model’ account—reveals shortcomings of each, which, it is argued, suggests that scientific representation may be ineliminably heterogeneous in character. In order to achieve a degree of unification that is compatible (...)
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  34. Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.score: 168.0
    Abstract: Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any (...)
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  35. Christoph Schneider (2000). Safeguarding Good Scientific Practice: New Institutional Approaches in Germany. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (1):49-56.score: 168.0
    After summarising three recent case histories of alleged scientific misconduct in Germany, the efforts of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Council)a and the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (German Rectors’ Conference) to promote academic and procedural safeguards in favour of professional self-regulation in science and scholarship are described in outline.
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  36. Michael Lynch (1993). Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science. Cambridge University Press.score: 164.0
    Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have grown interested in the daily practices of scientists. Recent studies have drawn linkages between scientific innovations and more ordinary procedures, craft skills, and sources of sponsorship. These studies dispute the idea that science is the application of a unified method or the outgrowth of a progressive history of ideas. This book critically reviews arguments and empirical studies in two areas of sociology that have played a significant role in the 'sociological turn' in (...)
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  37. Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.) (2009). Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.score: 164.0
    This volume is a unique contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences, presenting the results of cutting-edge philosophers' research alongside critical discussions by practicing social scientists. The book is motivated by the view that the philosophy of the social sciences cannot ignore the specific scientific practices according to which social scientific work is being conducted, and that it will be valuable only if it evolves in constant interaction with theoretical developments in the social sciences. With its unique (...)
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  38. Andrew Peterson (2011). The Relevance of Scientific Practice to The Problem of Coordination. Spontaneous Generations 5 (1):44-57.score: 164.0
    In his early work on the problem of coordination, Hans Reichenbach introduced axioms of coordination to describe the relationship between theory and observation. His insistence that these axioms are determinable a priori, however, causes him to ignore the normative dimensions of scientific inquiry and, in turn, generates a misleading interpretation of the theory-observation relationship. In response, I propose an alternative approach that describes this relationship through the framework of scientific practices. My argument will draw on two examples that (...)
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  39. Rieko Sawyer (2003). Identity Formation Through Brokering in Scientific Practice. Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 5 (2):25-42.score: 162.0
    Inspired by recent theorization by Dreier and Lave concerning situated perspectives on learning, I illuminate learning of international graduate students in a science lab in Japan as trajectories of participation in multi-layered activities and various mutually constituted occasions, and as crossing of multiple communities of practice. By doing so, I describe trajectories of participation as unique and multiple ways characteristic of individual participants instead of as a linear process from newcomer to old-timer or from peripheral to full participation in (...)
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  40. Daniel Hicks (2012). Scientific Practices and Their Social Context. Dissertation, U. of Notre Damescore: 160.0
    My dissertation combines philosophy of science and political philosophy. Drawing directly on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and inspired by John Dewey, I develop two rival conceptions of scientific practice. I show that these rivals are closely linked to the two basic sides in the science and values debate -- the debate over the extent to which ethical and political values may legitimately influence scientific inquiry. Finally, I start to develop an account of justice that is sensitive (...)
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  41. Marc Lange (2000). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford University Press.score: 156.0
    It is often presumed that the laws of nature have special significance for scientific reasoning. But the laws' distinctive roles have proven notoriously difficult to identify--leading some philosophers to question if they hold such roles at all. This study offers original accounts of the roles that natural laws play in connection with counterfactual conditionals, inductive projections, and scientific explanations, and of what the laws must be in order for them to be capable of playing these roles. Particular attention (...)
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  42. Francesco Coniglione (2004). Between Abstraction and Idealization: Scientific Practice and Philosophical Awareness. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):59-110.score: 156.0
    The aim of this essay is to emphasize a number of important points that will provide a better understanding of the history of philosophical thought concerning scientific knowledge. The main points made are: (a) that the principal way of viewing abstraction which has dominated the history of thought and epistemology up to the present is influenced by the original Aristotelian position; (b) that with the birth of modern science a new way of conceiving abstraction came into being which is (...)
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  43. Greg Bamford (1993). Popper's Explications of Ad Hocness: Circularity, Empirical Content, and Scientific Practice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):335-355.score: 156.0
    Karl Popper defines an ad hoc hypothesis as one that is introduced to immunize a theory from some (or all) refutation but which cannot be tested independently. He has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain other allegedly undesirable properties of hypotheses or of the explanations they would provide, but his account is confused and mistaken. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which need not be. (...)
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  44. Jed Z. Buchwald (ed.) (1995). Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories of Doing Physics. The University of Chicago Press.score: 156.0
    Most recent work on the nature of experiment in physics has focused on "big science"--the large-scale research addressed in Andrew Pickering's Constructing Quarks and Peter Galison's How Experiments End. This book examines small-scale experiment in physics, in particular the relation between theory and practice. The contributors focus on interactions among the people, materials, and ideas involved in experiments--factors that have been relatively neglected in science studies. The first half of the book is primarily philosophical, with contributions from Andrew (...)
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  45. H. M. Collins (1985/1992). Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. University of Chicago Press.score: 156.0
    This fascinating study in the sociology of science explores the way scientists conduct, and draw conclusions from, their experiments. The book is organized around three case studies: replication of the TEA-laser, detecting gravitational rotation, and some experiments in the paranormal. "In his superb book, Collins shows why the quest for certainty is disappointed. He shows that standards of replication are, of course, social, and that there is consequently no (...)
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  46. Wendy S. Parker (2010). An Instrument for What? Digital Computers, Simulation and Scientific Practice. Spontaneous Generations 4 (1):39-44.score: 156.0
    As a device used by scientists in the course of performing research, the digital computer might be considered a scientific instrument. But if so, what is it an instrument for? This paper explores a number of answers to this question, focusing on the use of computers in a simulating mode.
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  47. Nancy J. Nersessian (ed.) (1987). The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.score: 156.0
    ' this volume will make a significant contribution to a more adequate understanding of the 'nature of scientific knowledge and inquiry' ' ISIS Vol.79,No.1,1988.
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  48. Nancy E. Shaffer (1996). Understanding Bias in Scientific Practice. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):97.score: 156.0
    Methodological objectivism is a conception of bias which obscures the contingent and limited nature of methodological principles behind the guise of fixed a priori standards. I suggest as an alternative a more flexible view of the operation of bias which I call the attribution model. The attribution model makes explicit the working principles of both parties to an actual charge of bias. It enables those involved to identify the issues in dispute between them, and is the basis for an approach (...)
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  49. Andrew Jones (2002). Archaeological Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.score: 156.0
    Is archaeology an art or a science? This question has been hotly debated over the last few decades with the rise of archaeological science. At the same time, archaeologists have seen a change in the intellectual character of their discipline, as many writers have adopted approaches influenced by social theory. The discipline now encompasses both archaeological scientists and archaeological theorists, and discussion regarding the status of archaeology remains polarised. Andrew Jones argues that we need to analyse the practice of (...)
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  50. Lewis S. Feuer (1947). Analysis and Scientific Practice. Analysis 8 (2):28 - 30.score: 156.0
    The author contends that analysis is dependent on the criteria of "the scientific world-View." otherwise, There would be "no basis for excluding analyses which were simply precise formulations of unverifiable realms of being." (staff).
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