Search results for 'scientific practice' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  25
    Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (2016). Neuroscientific Kinds Through the Lens of Scientific Practice. In Catherine Kendig (ed.), Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Routledge 47-56.
    In this chapter, I argue that scientific practice in the neurosciences of cognition is not conducive to the discovery of natural kinds of cognitive capacities. The “neurosciences of cognition” include cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurobiology, two research areas that aim to understand how the brain gives rise to cognition and behavior. Some philosophers of neuroscience have claimed that explanatory progress in these research areas ultimately will result in the discovery of the underlying mechanisms of cognitive capacities. Once (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  3
    Catherine Kendig (2016). Activities of Kinding in Scientific Practice. In C. Kendig (ed.), Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Routledge
    Discussions over whether these natural kinds exist, what is the nature of their existence, and whether natural kinds are themselves natural kinds aim to not only characterize the kinds of things that exist in the world, but also what can knowledge of these categories provide. Although philosophically critical, much of the past discussions of natural kinds have often answered these questions in a way that is unresponsive to, or has actively avoided, discussions of the empirical use of natural kinds and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Moti Mizrahi (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
    Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  17
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Circles of Scientific Practice: Regressus, Mathēsis, Denkstil. In Dimitri Ginev (ed.), Critical Science Studies after Ludwik Fleck. St. Kliment Ohridski University Press 83-99.
    Hermeneutic studies of science locate a circle at the heart of scientific practice: scientists only gain knowledge of what they, in some sense, already know. This may seem to threaten the rational validity of science, but one can argue that this circle is a virtuous rather than a vicious one. A virtuous circle is one in which research conclusions are already present in the premises, but only in an indeterminate and underdeveloped way. In order to defend the validity (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  3
    Peter J. Taylor, Michael Hoyler & David M. Evans (2008). A Geohistorical Study of 'The Rise of Modern Science': Mapping Scientific Practice Through Urban Networks, 1500–1900. [REVIEW] Minerva 46 (4):391-410.
    Using data on the ‘career’ paths of one thousand ‘leading scientists’ from 1450 to 1900, what is conventionally called the ‘rise of modern science’ is mapped as a changing geography of scientific practice in urban networks. Four distinctive networks of scientific practice are identified. A primate network centred on Padua and central and northern Italy in the sixteenth century expands across the Alps to become a polycentric network in the seventeenth century, which in turn dissipates into (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  18
    Xiaofei Tian & Tong Wu (2009). The Philosophy of Scientific Practice in Naturalist Thought: Its Approaches and Problems. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):589-603.
    It is the continuity between epistemology and empirical science that the naturalism in contemporary philosophy of science emphasizes. After its individual and social dimensions, the philosophy of scientific practice takes a stand on naturalism in order to observe complex scientific activities through practice. However, regarding the naturalism’s problem of normativity, the philosophy of scientific practice today has deconstructed more than it has constructed.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Susann Wagenknecht (2014). Collaboration in Scientific Practice—-A Social Epistemology of Research Groups. Dissertation, Aarhus University
    This monograph investigates the collaborative creation of scientific knowledge in research groups. To do so, I combine philosophical analysis with a first-hand comparative case study of two research groups in experimental science. Qualitative data are gained through observation and interviews, and I combine empirical insights with existing approaches to knowledge creation in philosophy of science and social epistemology. -/- On the basis of my empirically-grounded analysis I make several conceptual contributions. I study scientific collaboration as the interaction of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  8
    Edward Slowik (2001). Rouse-Ing Out the Legitimation Project: Scientific Practice and the Problem of Demarcation. Ratio 14 (2):171–184.
    This essay critically examines Joseph Rouse's arguments against, what he dubs, the "legitimation project", which are the attempts to delimit and justify the scientific enterprise by means of global, "a priori" principles. Stipulating that a more adequate picture of science can be obtained by viewing it as a continuously transforming pattern of situated activities, Rouse believes that only by refocusing attention upon the actual practice of science can philosophers begin to detach themselves from the irresolvable epistemological problems that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Jeff Kochan (2015). Scientific Practice and Epistemic Modes of Existence. In Dimitri Ginev (ed.), Debating Cognitive Existentialism: Values and Orientations in Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science. Brill
    Proponents of practice-based accounts of science often reject theory-based accounts, and seek to explain scientific theory reductively in terms of practice. I consider two examples: Dimitri Ginev and Joseph Rouse. Both draw inspiration from Martin Heidegger’s existential conception of science. And both allege that Heidegger ultimately betrayed his insight that theory can be reduced to practice when he sought to explain modern science in terms of a theory-based “mathematical projection of nature.” I argue that Heidegger believed (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  2
    Michael D. Kirk‐Smith & David D. Stretch (2003). The Influence of Medical Professionalism on Scientific Practice. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 9 (4):417-422.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  15
    Susann Wagenknecht (2015). Facing the Incompleteness of Epistemic Trust: Managing Dependence in Scientific Practice. Social Epistemology 29 (2):160-184.
    Based on an empirical study of a research team in natural science, the author argues that collaborating scientists do not trust each other completely. Due to the inherent incompleteness of trust, epistemic trust among scientists is not sufficient to manage epistemic dependency in research teams. To mitigate the limitations of epistemic trust, scientists resort to specific strategies of indirect assessment such as dialoguing practices and the probing of explanatory responsiveness. Furthermore, they rely upon impersonal trust and deploy practices of hierarchical (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  19
    David Ludwig & Cornelia Weber (2013). University Collections as Archives of Scientific Practice -. Revista Electrónica de Fuentes y Archivosmore 4.
    Elimination controversies are ubiquitous in philosophy and the human sciences. For example, it has been suggested that humanraces, hysteria, intelligence, mental disorder, propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, the self, and the super-ego should beeliminated from the list of respectable entities in the human sciences. I argue that eliminativist proposals are often presented in theframework of an oversimplified ‘‘phlogiston model’’ and suggest an alternative account that describes ontological elimination on a gradualscale between criticism of empirical assumptions and conceptual choices.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  4
    Brian S. Baigrie (1994). Social Epistemology, Scientific Practice and the Elusive Social. Argumentation 8 (2):125-144.
    Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to ‘brute facts’ about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  5
    Tian Xiaofei (2009). The Philosophy of Scientific Practice in Naturalist Thought: Its Approaches and Problems. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):589-603.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  17
    Alan C. Love (2013). Erratum To: Theory is as Theory Does: Scientific Practice and Theory Structure in Biology. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (4):430 - 430.
    Using the context of controversies surrounding evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) and the possibility of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, I provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization). These two characteristics are salient because the goals that organize and regulate scientific practice, including the activity of using a theory, are heterogeneous. This means that the same theory can be structured differently, in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  16.  42
    Steffen Ducheyne (2010). Whewell's Tidal Researches: Scientific Practice and Philosophical Methodology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):26-40.
    Primarily between 1833 and 1840, Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. In the essay at hand, I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s (...) and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  17
    Karen Kovaka (2015). Biological Individuality and Scientific Practice. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):1092-1103.
    I consider the relationship between scientific practice and the philosophical debate surrounding biological individuality. I argue for the sensitivity account, on which biologists do not require a resolution to the individuality debate. This view puts me in disagreement with much of the literature on biological individuality, where it has become common to claim that there is a relationship of dependence between biologists’ conceptions of individuality and the quality of their empirical work.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  7
    Catherine Kendig (ed.) (2016). Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Routledge.
    This edited volume of 13 new essays aims to turn past discussions of natural kinds on their head. Instead of presenting a metaphysical view of kinds based largely on an unempirical vantage point, it pursues questions of kindedness which take the use of kinds and activities of kinding in practice as significant in the articulation of them as kinds. The book brings philosophical study of current and historical episodes and case studies from various scientific disciplines to bear on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  5
    Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.) (2012). Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. De Gruyter.
    Combining philosophical and historical scholarship, the articles in this volume focus on scientific concepts, rather than theories, as units of analysis. They thereby contribute to a growing literature about the role of concepts in scientific research. The authors are particularly interested in exploring the dynamics of research; they investigate the ways in which scientists form and use concepts, rather than in what the concepts themselves represent. The fields treated range from mathematics to virology and genetics, from nuclear physics (...)
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  92
    Hasok Chang (2011). The Philosophical Grammar of Scientific Practice. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):205 - 221.
    I seek to provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice?a philosophical grammar of scientific practice, ?grammar? as meant by the later Wittgenstein. I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of the physical, mental, and ?paper-and-pencil? varieties. When we set out to see what it is that one actually does in scientific work, the following set of questions naturally emerge: who (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21.  25
    H. M. Collins (1985/1992). Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. University of Chicago Press.
    This fascinating study in the sociology of science explores the way scientists conduct, and draw conclusions from, their experiments. The book is organized around three case studies: replication of the TEA-laser, detecting gravitational rotation, and some experiments in the paranormal. "In his superb book, Collins shows why the quest for certainty is disappointed. He shows that standards of replication are, of course, social, and that there is consequently no outside standard, no Archimedean point beyond society from which we can (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   162 citations  
  22.  5
    Lucas J. Matthews (2016). On Closing the Gap Between Philosophical Concepts and Their Usage in Scientific Practice: A Lesson From the Debate About Natural Selection as a Mechanism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 55:21-28.
    In addition to theorizing about the role and value of mechanisms in scientific explanation or the causal structure of the world, there is a fundamental task of getting straight what a ‘mechanism’ is in the first place. Broadly, this paper is about the challenge of application: the challenge of aligning one's philosophical account of a scientific concept with the manner in which that concept is actually used in scientific practice. This paper considers a case study of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
    Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all (...) practices are compatible with both realism and instrumentalism. I also repudiate van Fraassen's argument to the effect that the instrumentalist account of scientific practice is logically weaker, hence better, than the realist account. In the end, there are no scientific practice arguments on the table that support either side of the debate. It is also noted that the deficiencies of van Fraassen's argument are recapitulated in Putnam's miracle argument for realism. My pessimistic assessment of the state of the debate is reminiscent of Arthur Fine's. However, Fine's argument for the ‘natural ontological attitude’ once again repeats the problems of van Fraassen's and Putnam's arguments. (shrink)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  24.  85
    Andreas Hüttemann (2014). Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections. Theoria 79 (1):29-39.
    In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open.More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by openfuture- Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  88
    Matthew Stanley (2011). The Uniformity of Natural Laws in Victorian Britain: Naturalism, Theism, and Scientific Practice. Zygon 46 (3):536-560.
    Abstract. A historical perspective allows for a different view on the compatibility of theistic views with a crucial foundation of modern scientific practice: the uniformity of nature, which states that the laws of nature are unbroken through time and space. Uniformity is generally understood to be part of a worldview called “scientific naturalism,” in which there is no room for divine forces or a spiritual realm. This association comes from the Victorian era, but a historical examination of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. Valeriano Iranzo (2002). Constructive Empiricism and Scientific Practice. A Case Study. Theoria 17 (2):335-357.
    According to van Fraassen, constructive empiricism (CE) makes better sense of scientific activity than scientific realism (SR). I discuss a recent episode in biomedical research - investigations about Helicobacter Pylori and its relation to peptic ulcer. CE's expedient to cope with it is a sort of belief substitution. I argue that replacing realist beliefs by empiricist surrogates (as-if beliefs) could accommodate scientists' expectations and behavior. Nonetheless, theoretical agnosticism could hardly motivate scientists to focus just on the observational consequences (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  10
    Daan Schuurbiers, Patricia Osseweijer & Julian Kinderlerer (2009). Implementing the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice—a Case Study. Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (2):213-231.
    Widespread enthusiasm for establishing scientific codes of conduct notwithstanding, the utility of such codes in influencing scientific practice is not self-evident. It largely depends on the implementation phase following their establishment—a phase which often receives little attention. The aim of this paper is to provide recommendations for guiding effective implementation through an assessment of one particular code of conduct in one particular institute. Based on a series of interviews held with researchers at the Department of Biotechnology (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  28. Seamus Bradley (2011). A Literary Approach to Scientific Practice. Metascience 20 (2):363--367.
    A literary approach to scientific practice: Essay Review of R.I.G. Hughes' _The Theoretical Practices of Physics_.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  7
    Jutta Schickore (2005). 'Through Thousands of Errors We Reach the Truth'—but How? On the Epistemic Roles of Error in Scientific Practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (3):539-556.
    This essay is concerned with the epistemic roles of error in scientific practice. Usually, error is regarded as something negative, as an impediment or obstacle for the advancement of science. However, we also frequently say that we are learning from error. This common expression suggests that the role of error is not—at least not always—negative but that errors can make a fruitful contribution to the scientific enterprise. My paper explores the latter possibility. Can errors play an epistemically (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  30.  64
    Andreas Hüttemann (1998). Scientific Practice and the Disunity of Physics. Philosophia Naturalis 35 (1):209-222.
    It is my aim in this paper to look at some of the arguments that are brought forward for or against certain claims to unity/disunity (in particular to examine those arguments from science and from scientific practice) in order to evaluate whether they really show what they claim to. This presupposes that the concept or rather the concepts of the unity of physics are reasonably clear. Three concepts of unity can be identified: (1) ontological unity, which refers to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31.  67
    Melinda B. Fagan (2010). Social Construction Revisited: Epistemology and Scientific Practice. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):92-116.
    Philosophy of scientific practice aims to critically evaluate as well as describe scientific inquiry. Epistemic norms are required for such evaluation. Social constructivism is widely thought to oppose this critical project. I argue, however, that one variety of social constructivism, focused on epistemic justification, can be a basis for critical epistemology of scientific practice, while normative accounts that reject this variety of social constructivism cannot., idealized epistemic norms cannot ground effective critique of our practices. I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  16
    Cynthia Passmore, Julia Svoboda Gouvea & Ronald Giere (2014). Models in Science and in Learning Science: Focusing Scientific Practice on Sense-Making. In Michael R. Matthews (ed.), International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Springer 1171-1202.
    The central aim of science is to make sense of the world. To move forward as a community endeavor, sense-making must be systematic and focused. The question then is how do scientists actually experience the sense-making process? In this chapter we examine the “practice turn” in science studies and in particular how as a result of this turn scholars have come to realize that models are the “functional unit” of scientific thought and form the center of the reasoning/sense-making (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  40
    James A. Marcum (2011). Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.
    In this article, I introduce the notion of horizon for scientific practice (HSP), representing limits or boundaries within which scientists ply their trade, to facilitate analysis of scientific discovery and progress. The notion includes not only constraints that delimit scientific practice, e.g. of bringing experimentation to a temporary conclusion, but also possibilities that open up scientific practice to additional scientific discovery and to further scientific progress. Importantly, it represents scientific (...) as a dynamic and developmental integration of activities to investigate and analyze the natural world. I use the discovery of the clotting factor, thrombin, and the experiments conducted by the Johns Hopkins physiologist, William Howell, on the enzymatic nature of thrombin to illustrate the notion of HSP. In a concluding section, I compare the notion of HSP to other notions for scientific practice proposed in the history and philosophy of science literature. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  50
    Melinda Fagan, Collaboration, Toward an Integrative Philosophy of Scientific Practice.
    Philosophical understanding of experimental scientific practice is impeded by disciplinary differences, notably that between philosophy and sociology of science. Severing the two limits the stock of philosophical case studies to narrowly circumscribed experimental episodes, centered on individual scientists or technologies. The complex relations between scientists and society that permeate experimental research are left unexamined. In consequence, experimental fields rich in social interactions have received only patchy attention from philosophers of science. This paper sketches a remedy for both the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  4
    Moti Mizrahi, The Scientific Practice of Assessing Progress.
    In a recent debate about the nature of scientific progress, Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of progress. According to Bird, scientific progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Rowbottom, on the other hand, thinks that truth alone is necessary for progress. Both appeal to intuitions in support of their views, and it seems that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, I propose that we (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  24
    Ann Elizabeth Fowler La Berge (2004). Debate as Scientific Practice in Nineteenth-Century Paris: The Controversy Over the Microscope. Perspectives on Science 12 (4):424-453.
    : This article explores debate as a key scientific practice among the medical elite in nineteenth-century Paris, with an emphasis on academic debate and debate in the scientific/medical press. I use the debate over the microscope, which took place in the Paris Academy of Medicine in 1854-55 and concurrently in the medical press, to illustrate the role of debate as scientific practice. Focusing on the debate in the press, I show how medical journalists used the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  15
    Ann-Sophie Barwich (2013). A Pluralist Approach to Extension: The Role of Materiality in Scientific Practice for the Reference of Natural Kind Terms. Biological Theory 7 (2):100-108.
    This article argues for a different outlook on the concept of extension, especially for the reference of general terms in scientific practice. Scientific realist interpretations of the two predominant theories of meaning, namely Descriptivism and Causal Theory, contend that a stable cluster of descriptions or an initial baptism fixes the extension of a general term such as a natural kind term. This view in which the meaning of general terms is presented as monosemantic and the referents as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  24
    Axel Gelfert (2011). Model-Based Representation in Scientific Practice: New Perspectives. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):251-252.
    Editorial introduction to special issue on 'Model-based representation in scientific practice'.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  36
    Dan Mcarthur (2006). The Anti-Philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice. Foundations of Science 11 (4):369-397.
    In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  29
    John W. Carroll (2005). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):240–245.
    This is a review of Marc Lange's _Natural Laws in Scientific Practice<D>.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  11
    Javier Gomez Ferri (1996). EI estudio social y sociológico de la ciencia, y la convergencia hacia el estudio de la práctica cientifica (The Social and Sociological Study of Science, and the Convergence Towards the Study of Scientific Practice). Theoria 11 (3):205-225.
    Dentro dei ámbito de estudio da la ciancia, recientemente ha surgido con fuerza un nuevo enfoque, la sociología dei conocimiento científico (SSK). Desde su aparición a mediados de la dacada de los setenta, la SSK ha tomado formas diversas. Entre éstas y la filosofía de la ciencia ha existido una continua disputa. Ultimamente, sin embargo, la SSK se ha ido transformando en una “sociologfa de la practica cientrfica”. A partir de este cambio, ambas disciplinas -la filosofía de la ciencia y (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  2
    Javier Gomez Ferri (1996). EI Estudio Social Y Sociológico de la Ciencia, Y la Convergencia Hacia El Estudio de la Práctica Cientifica (the Social and Sociological Study of Science, and the Convergence Towards the Study of Scientific Practice). Theoria 11 (3):205-225.
    Dentro dei ámbito de estudio da la ciancia, recientemente ha surgido con fuerza un nuevo enfoque, la sociología dei conocimiento científico (SSK). Desde su aparición a mediados de la dacada de los setenta, la SSK ha tomado formas diversas. Entre éstas y la filosofía de la ciencia ha existido una continua disputa. Ultimamente, sin embargo, la SSK se ha ido transformando en una “sociologfa de la practica cientrfica”. A partir de este cambio, ambas disciplinas -la filosofía de la ciencia y (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  3
    Ann F. La Berge (2004). Debate as Scientific Practice in Nineteenth-Century Paris: The Controversy Over the Microscope. Perspectives on Science 12 (4):424-453.
    This article explores debate as a key scientific practice among the medical elite in nineteenth-century Paris, with an emphasis on academic debate and debate in the scientific/medical press. I use the debate over the microscope, which took place in the Paris Academy of Medicine in 1854-55 and concurrently in the medical press, to illustrate the role of debate as scientific practice. Focusing on the debate in the press, I show how medical journalists used the debate (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  4
    Phyllis Illari & Federica Russo (2014). Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice. OUP Oxford.
    Scientific and philosophical literature on causality has become highly specialised. It is hard to find suitable access points for students, young researchers, or professionals outside this domain. This book provides a guide to the complex literature, explains the scientific problems of causality and the philosophical tools needed to address them.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  45. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Ryan Giordano, Michael D. Edge & Rasmus Nielsen (2015). The Mind, the Lab, and the Field: Three Kinds of Populations in Scientific Practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 52:12-21.
    Scientists use models to understand the natural world, and it is important not to conflate model and nature. As an illustration, we distinguish three different kinds of populations in studies of ecology and evolution: theoretical, laboratory, and natural populations, exemplified by the work of R.A. Fisher, Thomas Park, and David Lack, respectively. Biologists are rightly concerned with all three types of populations. We examine the interplay between these different kinds of populations, and their pertinent models, in three examples: the notion (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  46. Ingo Brigandt, Scientific Practice, Conceptual Change, and the Nature of Concepts.
    The theory of concepts advanced in the present discussion aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. To this end, I suggest that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) the concept.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  26
    Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (1994). Representation in Scientific Practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (4):647-654.
    The essays in this book provide an excellent introduction to the means by which scientists convey their ideas. While diverse in their subject matter, the essays are unified in asserting that scientists compose and use particular representations in contextually organized and contextually sensitive ways, and that these representations - particularly visual displays such as graphs, diagrams, photographs, and drawings - depend for their meaning on the complex activities in which they are situated.The topics include sociological orientations to representational practice, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  35
    Michael Lynch (1993). Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have grown interested in the daily practices of scientists. Recent studies have drawn linkages between scientific innovations and more ordinary procedures, craft skills, and sources of sponsorship. These studies dispute the idea that science is the application of a unified method or the outgrowth of a progressive history of ideas. This book critically reviews arguments and empirical studies in two areas of sociology that have played a significant role in the 'sociological turn' in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   75 citations  
  49.  71
    Marc Lange (2000). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford University Press.
    It is often presumed that the laws of nature have special significance for scientific reasoning. But the laws' distinctive roles have proven notoriously difficult to identify--leading some philosophers to question if they hold such roles at all. This study offers original accounts of the roles that natural laws play in connection with counterfactual conditionals, inductive projections, and scientific explanations, and of what the laws must be in order for them to be capable of playing these roles. Particular attention (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   50 citations  
  50.  65
    Axel Gelfert (2011). Mathematical Formalisms in Scientific Practice: From Denotation to Model-Based Representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):272-286.
    The present paper argues that ‘mature mathematical formalisms’ play a central role in achieving representation via scientific models. A close discussion of two contemporary accounts of how mathematical models apply—the DDI account (according to which representation depends on the successful interplay of denotation, demonstration and interpretation) and the ‘matching model’ account—reveals shortcomings of each, which, it is argued, suggests that scientific representation may be ineliminably heterogeneous in character. In order to achieve a degree of unification that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000