Search results for 'secondary qualities' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Eugen Fischer (2009). Philosophical Pictures and Secondary Qualities. Synthese 171 (1):77 - 110.score: 240.0
    The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless (...)
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  2. Michael Jacovides, Sources of the Apparent World: Locke, Secondary Qualities, and the Scientific Revolution.score: 240.0
    The book is an examination of Locke on primary and secondary qualities, both for its own sake and as a special case for examining the relation between science and philosophy. Topics of the chapters include the varieties and sources of inconceivability, the inseparability of primary qualities as a guide to the nature of corporeal substance, the fall of the medieval theory of perception as the cause of the mind-body problem, the sources of Locke’s belief that the eyes (...)
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  3. Secondary Qualities (1999). Frances Howard-Snyder. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3).score: 240.0
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  4. Robert A. Wilson (forthcoming). Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Matthew Stuart (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Locke. Blackwell.score: 240.0
    The first half of this review article on Locke on primary and secondary qualities leads up to a fairly straightforward reading of what Locke says about the distinction in Essay II.viii, one that, in its general outlines, represents a sympathetic understanding of Locke’s discussion. The second half of the paper turns to consider a few of the ways in which interpreting Locke on primary and secondary qualities has proven more complicated. Here we take up what is (...)
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  5. Robert B. Brandom, No Experience Necessary: Empiricism, Noninferential Knowledge, and Secondary Qualities.score: 210.0
  6. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In L. Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities. Oxford.score: 210.0
    The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties are secondary qualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors are secondary qualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind of secondary quality theory (...)
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  7. Alexander Miller (2009). Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities and the Truth About Intention. Synthese 171 (3):433 - 442.score: 210.0
    In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.
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  8. G. F. Stout (1903). Primary and Secondary Qualities. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 4:141-160.score: 210.0
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  9. Alessio Vaccari (2008). Colors and Values: Secondary Qualities Between Knowledge and Moral. Rivista di Filosofia 99 (2):198-228.score: 210.0
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  10. Samuel C. Rickless (1997). Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):297-319.score: 208.0
    In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are (...)
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  11. Steffen Borge (2007). Some Remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Acta Analytica 22 (1):74-84.score: 208.0
    John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A (...)
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  12. Colin McGinn (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities And Indexical Thoughts. Clarendon Press.score: 208.0
    This book investigates the subjective and objective representations of the world, developing analogies between secondary qualities and indexical thoughts and arguing that subjective representations are ineliminable. Throughout, McGinn brings together historical and contemporary discussions to illuminate old problems in a novel way.
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  13. Janet Levin (1987). Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):400-411.score: 208.0
    In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences (...)
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  14. David Novitz (1975). Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Return to Fundamentals. Philosophical Papers 4 (October):89-104.score: 208.0
    The aim of this article is to give an account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in a way which allows the distinction a useful place in an explanation of scientific enquiry. this is done by modifying certain of locke's criteria for primacy, and by showing that this procedure has certain advantages over keith campbell's account of the distinction. in particular, i argue that primary qualities cannot be specified in a theory-neutral way, and that this (...)
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  15. D. H. M. Brooks (1992). Secondary Qualities and Representation. Analysis 52 (3):174-179.score: 184.0
    Secondary qualities have peculiarities which are thought to threaten physicalism. It is argued that these peculiarities are only to be expected in a physicalist universe in virtue of the essential characteristics of a representing device. Any device representing the world such as a camera will have depictional qualities. Secondary qualities are a subset of these.
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  16. James Hill (2009). Primary Qualities, Secondary Qualities and Locke's Impulse Principle. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1):85 – 98.score: 180.0
    In this paper I shall focus attention on a principle which lies at the heart of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is to be found explicitly or implicitly stated at many places in the Essay , but its clearest expression is at E.II.viii.11, where Locke writes that ' Impulse [is] the only way which we can conceive Bodies operate in'. Let us call it 'the impulse principle'. The first task is to describe what exactly the (...)
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  17. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25:197-210.score: 180.0
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two interpretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about values would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does provide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  18. Robert Pasnau (2006). A Theory of Secondary Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):568–591.score: 180.0
    No philosophical intuition has a longer history than that which divides sensible qualities into two kinds, primary and secondary. Something like it appears in Democritus, nearly 2500 years ago, and has been continuously maintained in some form or another ever since then. Philosophers today largely continue to think that there is something right about the distinction, even while it remains notoriously difficult to find agreement on just where its ultimate basis lies. As Mark Johnston (1992) puts it, the (...)
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  19. Robert Pasnau (2007). Democritus and Secondary Qualities. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2):99-121.score: 180.0
    Democritus is generally understood to have anticipated the seventeenthcentury distinction between primary and secondary qualities. I argue that this is not the case, and that instead for Democritus all sensible qualities are conventional.
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  20. Antony Eagle, §5 Primary and Secondary Qualities.score: 180.0
    QUESTIONS Objects seem to have some properties in themselves (like shape), and some other properties that depend on other things around them (like being alone or accompanied). The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a special case of this more general contrast: what, according to Locke, is the basis for the distinction? Is there more than one way to understand Locke’s argument: what is the best reading of Locke? What wider significance does the distinction between primary and (...)
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  21. D. Goldstick (1987). Secondary Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):145-146.score: 180.0
    LOCKE WAS RIGHT TO SAY PRIMARY QUALITIES "RESEMBLE" OUR\nIDEAS OF THEM IN A WAY SECONDARY QUALITIES DO NOT, BECAUSE\nHAVING THE APPROPRIATE PRIMARY-QUALITY "IDEA" IS LOGICALLY\nSUFFICIENT IN EACH CASE FOR KNOWING HOW SOMETHING MUST BE\n(INTRINSICALLY) IN ORDER FOR THE "QUALITY" TO INHERE IN IT.\nCOMPARE THE WAY A PERSON IS SAID TO "RESEMBLE" A VERBAL\nDESCRIPTION IN THE EVENT OF "ANSWERING TO" IT.
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  22. Joshua Gert (2010). Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.score: 180.0
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive (...)
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  23. Alistair M. C. Isaac (2014). Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities. Erkenntnis 79 (3):481-510.score: 180.0
    This paper outlines and defends a novel position in the color realism debate, namely structural realism. This position is novel in that it dissociates the veridicality of color attributions from the claim that physical objects are themselves colored. Thus, it is realist about color in both the semantic and epistemic senses, but not the ontic sense. The generality of this position is demonstrated by applying it to other “secondary qualities,” including heat, musical pitch, and odor. The basic argument (...)
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  24. Christopher A. Shrock, Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities.score: 180.0
    Direct Realism is the view that human perception takes physical entities and their mind-independent properties as immediate objects. Although this thesis is supported by common sense, many argue that it can be dismissed on philosophical or quasi-scientific grounds. This essay attempts to defend Direct Realism against one such argument, which I call the “Problem of Secondary Qualities,” using the ideas of Scottish Common Sense philosopher Thomas Reid. The first chapter of this work offers a detailed introduction to the (...)
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  25. Paul Fitzgerald (1982). Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:293 - 303.score: 180.0
    Several philosophers have argued that "temporal becoming" is mind-dependent, a claim they see as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. They have tended to assume that the classical secondary qualities are mind-dependent, and also that the close analogue for time of directly experienced secondary qualities is an irreducibly indexical nowness. In an earlier article it was argued that we should reject the second assumption. Here it is shown why there (...)
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  26. James Hill (1998). Concepts of Secondary Qualities. Organon F 5 (Supplement):91-98.score: 180.0
    The properties of secondary qualities have recently become an object of interest again in analytic philosophy; it is generally assumed that secondary qualities - in the mind at least - tend to be irreducible to the physical: taste, smell, color perception, the aural, & the tactile all seem to be more subjectively perceived than most other qualities. This is shown to present such topics as realism vs anti-realism, description, & truth-value with a series of problems, (...)
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  27. Mi-Kyoung Lee (2011). The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities in Ancient Greek Philosophy. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press. 15.score: 180.0
  28. Jake Quilty-Dunn (2013). Reid on Olfaction and Secondary Qualities. Frontiers in Psychology 4:974.score: 180.0
    Thomas Reid is one of the primary early expositors of the "dual-component" theory of perception, according to which conscious perception constitutively involves a non-intentional sensation accompanied by a noninferential perceptual belief. In this paper, I will explore Reid's account of olfactory perception, and of odor as a secondary quality. Reid is often taken to endorse a broadly Lockean picture of secondary qualities, according to which they are simply dispositions to cause sensations. This picture creates problems, however, for (...)
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  29. Paul Symington (2011). Thomas Aquinas, Perceptual Resemblance, Categories, and the Reality of Secondary Qualities. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:237-252.score: 180.0
    Arguably one of the most fundamental phase shifts that occurred in the intellectual history of Western culture involved the ontological reduction of secondary qualities to primary qualities. To say the least, this reduction worked to undermine the foundations undergirding Aristotelian thought in support of a scientific view of the world based strictly on an examination of the real—primary— qualities of things. In this essay, I identify the so-called “Causal Argument” for a reductive view of secondary (...)
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  30. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs. Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25 (1):197-210.score: 180.0
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two inter- pretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about val- ues would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does pro- vide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  31. Gary Hatfield (2011). And Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press. 304.score: 180.0
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  32. Tim De Mey & Markku Keinänen (2001). Secondary Qualities in Retrospect. Philosophica 68.score: 180.0
    Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh’s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different (...)
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  33. Filimon Peonidis (1996). Secondary Qualities and Moral Values: What Do We Really Compare? [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):209-211.score: 180.0
    The aim of this essay is to reconsider the very analogy between secondary qualities and moral values. It is argued that since the subject matter of moral evaluation are events and not objects, the function and the status of moral qualities should be understood only in terms of the olfactory and auditory qualities of events. This implies that the common comparison of moral values with colors is no longer possible.
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  34. Antonia LoLordo (2011). Century Atomists on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press. 62.score: 180.0
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  35. Michael Ayers (2011). Primary and Secondary Qualities in Locke's 'Essay'. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
  36. Martha Brandt Bolton (2011). Primary and Secondary Qualities in the Phenomenalist Theory of Leibniz. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
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  37. Alex Byme & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
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  38. Gary Hatfield (2011). Kant and Helmholtz on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
  39. Antonia LoLordo (2011). Gassendi and the Seventeenth-Century Atomists on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
     
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  40. A. D. Smith (1990). Of Primary and Secondary Qualities. Philosophical Review 99 (2):221-254.score: 178.0
  41. Gerald Vision (1982). Primary and Secondary Qualities: An Essay in Epistemology. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 17 (March):135-170.score: 178.0
    It seems almost a truism to say that colour is a sensation; and yet Young, by honestly recognizing this elementary truth, established the first consistent theory of colour. So far as I know, Thomas Young was the first who, starting from the well-known fact that there are three primary colours, sought for the explanation of this fact, not in the nature of light, but in the constitution of man. (James Clerk Maxwell, p. 267.)It is doubtless scientific to disregard certain aspects (...)
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  42. E. Valberg (1980). A Theory of Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 55 (October):437-453.score: 178.0
    'color is not "in" objects" makes sense only if 'color "is" in objects' does. But it does not, Because we cannot say what it "would be like" if it "were". 'being green' means 'that which looks green' understood "attributively", Not referentially, I.E., 'that which looks green ("whatever that is")', Not 'that which emits certain light-Waves'. "contra" kripke, Heat is 'that which feels hot ("whatever that is")', Though the only thing whose "existence" it requires is molecular motion. If we ask what (...)
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  43. David McNaughton (1984). McGinn on Experience of Primary and Secondary Qualities. Analysis 44 (2):78-80.score: 178.0
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  44. Maurice Charlesworth (1987). Hacker on Secondary Qualities. Mind 76 (July):386-391.score: 178.0
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  45. R. E. Tully (1976). Reduction and Secondary Qualities. Mind 85 (July):351-370.score: 178.0
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  46. Roderick Millar (1983). Valberg's Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 58 (January):107-109.score: 178.0
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  47. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell.score: 178.0
     
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  48. Robert B. Brandom (2002). Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism. In Reading McDowell: On Mind and World. New York: Routledge.score: 178.0
     
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