Search results for 'seeing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William E. S. McNeill (2012). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
    Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis. I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. (...)
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  2. Craig French (2013). Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P. Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus we (...)
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  3. Bradley Richards (2013). Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):9-19.
    Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity-crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object-seeing without object-attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity-crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non-perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity-crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity-crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate (...)
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  4.  13
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). Seeing-In as Aspect Perception. In Gary Kemp & Gabriele Mras (eds.), Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-in. Routledge
  5.  15
    Jussi Backman (2015). Towards a Genealogy of the Metaphysics of Sight: Seeing, Hearing, and Thinking in Heraclitus and Parmenides. In Antonio Cimino & Pavlos Kontos (eds.), Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight. Brill 11-34.
    The paper outlines a tentative genealogy of the Platonic metaphysics of sight by thematizing pre-Platonic thought, particularly Heraclitus and Parmenides. By “metaphysics of sight” it understands the features of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics expressed with the help of visual metaphors. It is argued that the Platonic metaphysics of sight can be regarded as the result of a synthesis of the Heraclitean and Parmenidean approaches. In pre-Platonic thought, the visual paradigm is still marginal. For Heraclitus, the basic structure of being is its discursive (...)
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  6. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). Reflecting on Language From “Sideways-On”: Preparatory and Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (6).
    Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception: -/- 1. Preparatory: allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it. -/- 2. Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of (...)
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  7.  13
    Ben Phillips (forthcoming). Contextualism About Object-Seeing. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I (...)
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  8.  72
    Robert Hopkins (2012). Seeing-in and Seeming to See. Analysis 72 (4):650-659.
    When we see something in a picture, do we enjoy visual experience as of the depicted object? Gombrichians say yes: when viewing ordinary pictures we simultaneously see the picture and seem to see its object. But why, then, isn’t seeing-in contradictory, and how are these two elements somehow integrated into a single experience? Gombrichians’ attempts to answer appeal either to our awareness of the picture’s design, or to the idea that picture and object are not given as in the (...)
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  9.  33
    Alberto Voltolini (2013). The Content of a Seeing-As Experience. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):215-237.
    In this paper I will claim that the different phenomenology of seeing-as experiences of ambiguous figures matches a difference in their intentional content. Such a content is non-conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is just an experience of organizational seeing-as. It is partially conceptual when the relevant seeing-as experience is an overall experience of seeing something as a picture that is identical with Wollheim’s seeing-in experience and is constituted by an experience of organizational (...)-as (its configurational fold) and by an experience of knowingly illusory seeing-as (its recognitional fold). To my mind, Wittgenstein’s reflections on seeing-as have anticipated these claims. (shrink)
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  10. John Hawthorne & Mark Scala (2000). Seeing and Demonstration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):199-206.
    We see things. We also perceptually demonstrate things. There seems to be some sort of link between these two phenomena. Indeed. in the standard case, the former is accompanied by a capacity for the latter. One sees a dog and can, on the basis of one’s perceptual capacities, think thoughts of the form ‘That is F’. But how strong is that link? Does seeing a thing inevitably bring with it the capacity for perceptually demonstrating it? In what follows, we (...)
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  11.  16
    Daniel Enrique Kalpokas (2015). Perceptual Experience and Seeing-As. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):123-144.
    According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the (...)
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  12.  35
    Annalisa Coliva (2012). Human Diagrammatic Reasoning and Seeing-As. Synthese 186 (1):121-148.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.
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  13.  72
    Berit Brogaard (2012). Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered (...)
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  14. Craig French (forthcoming). Object Seeing and Spatial Perception. In Fiona MacPherson, Martine Nida-Rümelin & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence.
    I consider the way in which spatial perception is necessary for object seeing. In section 1 I outline the operative conception of object seeing. I consider Cassam’s view that in order to see o, you must see it as spatially located (section 2). I argue that Cassam’s argument is unsound. Cassam’s argument relies on the claim that seeing o requires visual differentiation. But it is not the case that seeing o requires visual differentiation. This is because (...)
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  15.  45
    Kathleen Stock (2013). Some Reflections on Seeing-as, Metaphor-Grasping and Imagining. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):201-213.
    In this paper I examine the frequently made claim that grasping a metaphor is a kind of ‘seeing-as’. I describe several ways in which it might be thought that metaphor-grasping is importantly similar to seeing-as, such that an extension of the latter category is though justified to include the former. For some of these similarities, I suggest they are illusory; for others, I argue that they are shared in virtue of the membership of both seeing-as and metaphor-grasping (...)
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  16.  72
    Scott Campbell (2002). Causal Analyses of Seeing. Erkenntnis 56 (2):169-180.
    I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye. I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it does not rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in this respect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory -- which involves a robot that mimics another (...)
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  17.  24
    Alberto Voltolini (2014). Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such (...)
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  18.  8
    B. R. Tilghman (1988). Seeing and Seeing-AS. AI and Society 2 (4):303-313.
    This paper highlights the importance of inter-relationships between language, context, practice and interpretation. These inter-relationships should be of interest to AI researchers working in multi-disciplinary fields such as knowledge based systems, speech and vision. Attention is drawn to the importance of Part II, Section II of Wittgenstein'sPhilosophical Investigations for understanding the enormous complexity of the concept of seeing and how it is woven into an understanding of language and of human relations.
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  19.  42
    J. F. M. Hunter (1981). Wittgenstein on Seeing and Seeing As. Philosophical Investigations 4 (2):33-49.
    The article is an interpretation of about the first half of chapter xi of part ii of "philosophical investigations". Wittgenstein is treated as having the single aim of arguing down the massive temptation to suppose that the expression 'to see...As...', And such similar expressions as 'to recognize', Record the occurrence of an experience distinct from the experience of simply seeing the object seen as or recognized. Ways are suggested of making a kind of sense of most of the very (...)
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  20.  37
    Liliana Albertazzi (2011). On Seeing: Remarks on Metzger's Laws of Seeing. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 21 (4):581-595.
    Nowadays cognitive science often views sensorial presentations and mental presentations as mutually exclusive, and they are also given separate treatment by neurophysiologists and by cognitive scientists, and some phenomena (like anomalous surfaces or various types of imagery) are reduced to either the former or the latter. Since no adequate methods for its investigation have been developed, the level of perceptual experiences analysed by Gestaltists and magnificently illustrated by Metzger in his Laws of Seeing remains unexplored. Starting from Metzger’s analyses (...)
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  21.  37
    Robert Schroer (2008). The Woman in the Painting and the Image in the Penny: An Investigation of Phenomenological Doubleness, Seeing-in, and “Reversed Seeing-In”. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 139 (3):329 - 341.
    The experience of looking at a tilted penny involves a “phenomenological doubleness” in that it simultaneously seems to be of something circular and of something elliptical. In this paper, I investigate the phenomenological doubleness of this experience by comparing it to another case of phenomenological doubleness––the phenomenological doubleness of seeing an object in a painting. I begin by pointing out some striking similarities between the phenomenological characters of these two experiences. I then argue that these phenomenological characters have a (...)
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  22.  19
    Panos Theodorou (2004). Of the Same in the Different. What is Wrong with Kuhn's Use of ``Seeing'' and ``Seeing As''. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):175-200.
    Kuhn uses the distinction between `(simple) seeing', and `seeing as' in order to claim that among competing paradigms there cannot be found any middle (experiential) ground; nothing `same' can be located behind such radically different paradigm-worlds. He claims that scientists do not see a common something as this thing at one time and as that thing at another. Each time scientists simply see what they see. To claim the contrary is to claim that scientists arrive at their paradigmatic (...)
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  23.  21
    Stefan Ramaekers & Paul Smeyers (2008). Child Rearing: Passivity and Being Able to Go On. Wittgenstein on Shared Practices and Seeing Aspects. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):638-651.
    It is not uncommon to hear parents say in discussions they have with their children 'Look at it this way'. And called upon for their advice, counsellors too say something to adults with the significance of 'Try to see it like this'. The change of someone's perspective in the context of child rearing is the focus of this paper. Our interest in this lies not so much in giving an answer to the practical problems that are at stake, but at (...)
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  24.  3
    Thomas Natsoulas (1994). An Introduction to Reflective Seeing. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):351-74.
    After two sections of background discussion regarding some views of inner some recent deployments of James J. Gibson's ecological approach to visual perception relevant to our understanding of reflective seeing, I present my own view of reflective seeing for the remainder of the present article. Although I include detailed references to Edmund Husserl's conception of straightforward perceptual consciousness and reflective perceptual consciousness, the present article is not about Husserl. Rather, I use quotations from and about Husserl to add (...)
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  25.  2
    Thomas Natsoulas (1994). An Introduction to Reflective Seeing: Part II. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (4):351-374.
    After two sections of background discussion regarding some views of inner some recent deployments of James J. Gibson's ecological approach to visual perception relevant to our understanding of reflective seeing, I present my own view of reflective seeing for the remainder of the present article. Although I include detailed references to Edmund Husserl's conception of straightforward perceptual consciousness and reflective perceptual consciousness, the present article is not about Husserl. Rather, I use quotations from and about Husserl to add (...)
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  26.  2
    Thomas Natsoulas (1993). An Introduction to Reflective Seeing. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):235-56.
    The human visual system allows a number of molar activities, among them straightforward seeing and reflective seeing. Both of these activities include, as product and part of them, a stream of first-order, visual perceptual consciousness of the ecological environment and of the perceiver himself or herself as inhabiting the environment and acting or moving within it. The two respective component streams of first-order consciousness both proceed at certain brain centers and, in Gibson's sense, they are resonatings to the (...)
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  27. Angela Curran (2016). Fictional Indeterminacy, Imagined Seeing, and Cinematic Narration. In Katherine Thomson-Jones (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Film. Routledge 99-114.
    This paper focuses on the debate over two central claims regarding cinematic narration: the claim that there are implicit cinematic narrators and the thesis that when we watch movies, we imagine seeing the events and characters in the film fiction. I examine what a consideration of the indeterminate nature of fictional narration, that is, what is specified by the fiction about how we come to imagine the story events, can contribute to the debate on these issues. It is argued (...)
     
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  28. Ned Block (2014). Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
  29.  70
    Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  30.  73
    Craig French (2012). Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
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  31. Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. (...)
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  32.  56
    Jean-Rémy Martin & Jérôme Dokic (2013). Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):117-125.
    Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and (...)
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  33. Donald Davidson (1997). Seeing Through Language. In John M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press 15-.
  34. István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.
  35. David C. Blumenfeld (1959). On Not Seeing Double. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (July):264-266.
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  36.  96
    Lynne Tirrell (1991). Seeing Metaphor as Seeing-As: Remarks on Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor. Philosophical Investigations 14 (2):143-154.
  37. Frank N. Sibley (1955). Seeking, Scrutinizing and Seeing. Mind 64 (October):455-478.
  38.  24
    Edmond L. Wright (1981). Yet More on Non-Epistemic Seeing. Mind 90 (October):586-591.
  39. Alan R. White (1987). Visualizing and Imagining Seeing. Analysis 47 (October):221-224.
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  40.  93
    Daryl Close (1976). What is Non-Epistemic Seeing? Mind 85 (April):161-170.
  41.  85
    Malcolm Budd (1987). Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects. Mind 96 (January):1-17.
  42.  50
    Natika Newton (1989). Visualizing is Imagining Seeing: A Reply to White. Analysis 49 (March):77-81.
  43.  32
    G. J. Warnock (1955). Seeing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:201-218.
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  44.  77
    Lorin Browning (1973). On Seeing 'Everything' Upside Down. Analysis 34 (December):48-49.
  45.  66
    Moreland Perkins (1966). Seeing and Hearing Emotions. Analysis 26 (June):193-197.
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  46.  25
    Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1956). Seeing and Seeing As. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:109-124.
  47.  53
    Daryl Close (1980). More on Non-Epistemic Seeing. Mind 89 (January):99-105.
  48.  41
    B. M. Arthadeva (1961). Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.
  49.  40
    Ingrid H. Stadler (1958). On Seeing As. Philosophical Review 67 (January):91-94.
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  50.  17
    John Morreall (1978). Size, Shape, Seeing, and Sense-Data. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):101-112.
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