Search results for 'self-deception' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1. Ryan Preston-Roedder, Kant's Ethics and the Problems of Self-Deception.
    Cases of self-deception are familiar, and often troubling. Although recent philosophical work on self-deception focuses mainly on issues in philosophy of mind and epistemology, self-deception also poses important moral problems, including serious challenges to Kant’s ethics. In this paper, I will discuss a range of cases of self-deception: cases where people’s self-deception disguises their prejudice or their self-interest, cases where it discourages them from resisting injustice or other evils, and cases where it prompts them to (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Kevin Lynch (2016). Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  36
    Eric Funkhouser & David Barrett (2016). Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception: Strategic and Flexible. Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):1-15.
    In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Neil Van Leeuwen (2009). Self-Deception Won't Make You Happy. Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):107-132.
    I argue here that self-deception is not conducive to happiness. There is a long train of thought in social psychology that seems to say that it is, but proper understanding of the data does not yield this conclusion. Illusion must be distinguished from mere imagining. Self-deception must be distinguished from self-inflation bias and from self-fulfilling belief. Once these distinctions are in place, the case for self-deception falls apart. Furthermore, by yielding false beliefs, self-deception undermines desire satisfaction. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Alfred R. Mele (2006). Self-Deception and Delusions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6.  31
    William Von Hippel & Robert Trivers (2011). The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):1.
    In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  7. Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Self-Deception. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    In this entry, I seek to show the interdependence of questions about self-deception in philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. I taxonomize solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception, present possible psychological mechanisms behind it, and highlight how different approaches to the philosophy of mind and psychology will affect how we answer important ethical questions. Is self-deception conducive to happiness? How does self-deception affect responsibility? Is there something intrinsically wrong with self-deception? The entry, on the one (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  53
    Marko Jurjako (2013). Self-Deception and the Selectivity Problem. Balkan Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):151-162.
    In this article I discuss and evaluate the selectivity problem as a problem put forward by Bermúdez (1997, 2000) against anti-intentionalist accounts of self-deception. I argue that the selectivity problem can be raised even against intentionalist accounts, which reveals the too demanding constraint that the problem puts on the adequacy of a psychological explanation of action. Finally I try to accommodate the intuitions that support the cogency of the selectivity problem using the resources from the framework provided by an (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Review of Robert Trivers' The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life. [REVIEW] Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 18 (1-2):146-151.
    Here I review Robert Trivers' 2011 book _The Folly of Fools_, in which he advocates the evolutionary theory of deceit and self-deception that he pioneered in his famous preface to Richard Dawkins' _Selfish Gene_. Although the book contains a wealth of interesting discussion on topics ranging from warfare to immunology, I find it lacking on two major fronts. First, it fails to give a proper argument for its central thesis--namely, that self-deception evolved to facilitate deception of others. Second, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Alfred R. Mele (1997). Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.
    Self-deception poses tantalizing conceptual conundrums and provides fertile ground for empirical research. Recent interdisciplinary volumes on the topic feature essays by biologists, philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists (Lockard & Paulhus 1988, Martin 1985). Self-deception's location at the intersection of these disciplines is explained by its significance for questions of abiding interdisciplinary interest. To what extent is our mental life present--or even accessible--to consciousness? How rational are we? How is motivated irrationality to be explained? To what extent are our beliefs (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   35 citations  
  11.  12
    Simone Neuber (forthcoming). Self-Awareness and Self-Deception: A Sartrean Perspective. Continental Philosophy Review:1-23.
    In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. William Hirstein (2000). Self-Deception and Confabulation. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.
    Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues about (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  90
    Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.
    In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14. Kevin Lynch (2013). Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1337-1345.
    Stubborn belief, like self-deception, is a species of motivated irrationality. The nature of stubborn belief, however, has not been investigated by philosophers, and it is something that poses a challenge to some prominent accounts of self-deception. In this paper, I argue that the case of stubborn belief constitutes a counterexample to Alfred Mele’s proposed set of sufficient conditions for self-deception, and I attempt to distinguish between the two. The recognition of this phenomenon should force an amendment in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Neil Van Leeuwen (2007). The Product of Self-Deception. Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
    I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  16.  88
    Kevin Lynch (2014). Self-Deception and Shifts of Attention. Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
    A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Self-Deception, Intentions and Contradictory Beliefs. Analysis 60 (4):309-319.
    Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  18.  34
    Lawrence Lengbeyer (1998). Keeping Self-Deception in Perspective. In Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. CSLI Publications
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Richard Holton (2001). What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
    The orthodox answer to my question is this: in a case of self-deception, the self acts to deceive itself. That is, the self is the author of its own deception. I want to explore an opposing idea here: that the self is rather the subject matter of the deception. That is, I want to explore the idea that self-deception is more concerned with the self’s deception about the self, than with the self’s deception by the self. The expression (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  20.  25
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.) (1988). Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
    00 Students of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literature will welcome this collection of original essays on self-deception and related phenomena such as ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  21.  74
    Annette Barnes (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterisation of other-deception and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  22.  83
    José Luis Bermúdez (2000). Self-Deception, Intentions, and Contradictory Beliefs. Analysis 60 (4):309 - 319.
    Self-deception, intentions, and contradictory beliefs -/- Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broadgroups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  23. Baljinder Sahdra & Paul R. Thagard (2003). Self-Deception and Emotional Coherence. Minds and Machines 13 (2):213-231.
    This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  24.  62
    Cam Caldwell (2009). Identity, Self-Awareness, and Self-Deception: Ethical Implications for Leaders and Organizations. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 90 (3):393 - 406.
    The ability of leaders to be perceived as trustworthy and to develop authentic and effective relationships is largely a function of their personal identities and their self-awareness in understanding and making accommodations for their weaknesses. The research about self-deception confirms that we often practice denial regarding our identities without being fully aware of the ethical duties that we owe to ourselves and to others. This article offers insights about the nature of identity and selfawareness, specifically examining how self-deception (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25.  90
    Jordi Fernández (2013). Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  53
    Kevin Lynch (2009). Prospects for an Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception. Abstracta 5 (2):126-138.
    A distinction can be made between those who think that self-deception is frequently intentional and those who don’t. I argue that the idea that self-deception has to be intentional can be partly traced to a particular invalid method for analyzing reflexive expressions of the form ‘Ving oneself’ (where V stands for a verb). However, I take the question of whether intentional self-deception is possible to be intrinsically interesting, and investigate the prospects for such an alleged possibility. Various (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  70
    Alfred R. Mele (1999). Twisted Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.
    In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  28. Neil Levy (2004). Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility. Ratio 17 (3):294-311.
    The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  29. Robert Lockie (2003). Depth Psychology and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  29
    José Eduardo Porcher (2014). Is Self-Deception Pretense? Manuscrito 37 (2):291-332.
    I assess Tamar Gendler's (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of self-deception, I introduce Gendler's account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  21
    Maureen Sie (2015). Moral Hypocrisy and Acting for Reasons: How Moralizing Can Invite Self-Deception. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):223-235.
    According to some, contemporary social psychology is aptly described as a study in moral hypocrisy. In this paper we argue that this is unfortunate when understood as establishing that we only care about appearing to act morally, not about true moral action. A philosophically more interesting interpretation of the “moral hypocrisy”-findings understands it to establish that we care so much about morality that it might lead to self-deception about the moral nature of our motives and/or misperceptions regarding what we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  60
    Dion Scott-Kakures (1996). Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):31-56.
    I characterize a notion of internal irrationality which is central to hard cases of self-deception. I argue that if we aim to locate such internal irrationality in the _process of self-deception, we must fail. The process of self-deception, I claim, is a wholly arational affair. If we are to make a place for internal irrationality we must turn our attention to the _state of self-deception. I go on to argue that we are able to offer an (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  33.  17
    Guy Elgat (2015). Slave Revolt, Deflated Self-Deception. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):524-544.
    The problem of self-deception lies at the heart of Nietzsche's account of the slave revolt in morality in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. The viability of Nietzsche's genealogy of morality is thus crucially dependent on a successful explanation of the self-deception the slaves of the first essay are caught in. But the phenomenon of self-deception is notoriously puzzling. In this paper, after critically examining existing interpretations of the slaves’ self-deception, I provide, by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  69
    Carla Bagnoli (2012). Self-Deception: A Constructivist Account. Humana.Mente 20:93-116.
    This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are high: it protects the agent’s self (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Alfred R. Mele (2003). Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 163-179.
    According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceivers intentionally deceive others into believing something, p , and there is a time at which the deceivers believe that p is false while their victims falsely believe that p is true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something, p , and there is a time at which they believe (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36.  31
    José Eduardo Porcher (2012). Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception. Humana.Mente 20:67-84.
    Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  98
    Steven D. Hales (1994). Self-Deception and Belief Attribution. Synthese 101 (2):273-289.
    One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  61
    Alfred R. Mele (1983). Self-Deception. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (October):366-377.
    Self-Deception, Properly understood, Is not paradoxical. Although self-Deception involves motivated false belief, It is not properly modeled after "intentional" interpersonal deception. Thus, The major source of paradox is dissolved. Moreover, Even intentional self-Deception need not be paradoxical and there is good reason to believe that a kind of self-Deception which "would" be paradoxical never occurs. Finally, In cases of self-Deception, As in instances of akratic action, There is scope for blame.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  39.  89
    Rachel Brown (2004). The Emplotted Self: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.
    Abstract The principal aim of this paper is to give a positive analysis of self-deception. I argue that self-deception is a species ?self-emplotment?. Through narrative self-emplotment one groups the events of one's life thematically in order to understand and monitor oneself. I argue that self-emplotment is an unextraordinary feature of mental life that is a precondition of agency. Self-emplotment, however, proceeds according to certain norms, some of which provide apparent justification for self-deceptive activity. A secondary aim of the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  27
    Steven DeLay (2016). The Toiling Lily: Narrative Life, Responsibility, and the Ontological Ground of Self-Deception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):103-116.
    In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  37
    Paul Noordhof (2003). Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42.  30
    Massimo Renzo (2014). Fairness, Self-Deception and Political Obligation. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):467-488.
    I offer a new account of fair-play obligations for non-excludable benefits received from the state. Firstly, I argue that non-acceptance of these benefits frees recipients of fairness obligations only when a counterfactual condition is met; i.e. when non-acceptance would hold up in the closest possible world in which recipients do not hold motivationally-biased beliefs triggered by a desire to free-ride. Secondly, I argue that because of common mechanisms of self-deception there will be recipients who reject these benefits without meeting (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  74
    Daniel Statman (1997). Hypocrisy and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):57-75.
    Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally-corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self-deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  34
    Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1972). Belief and Self-Deception. Inquiry 15 (1-4):387-410.
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  45.  23
    Sophie Archer (2013). Nondoxasticism About Self‐Deception. Dialectica 67 (3):265-282.
    The philosophical difficulties presented by self-deception are vexed and multifaceted. One such difficulty is what I call the ‘doxastic problem’ of self-deception. Solving the doxastic problem involves determining whether someone in a state of self-deception that ∼p both believes that p and believes that ∼p, simply holds one or the other belief, or, as I will argue, holds neither. This final option, which has been almost entirely overlooked to-date, is what I call ‘ nondoxasticism ’ about (...). In this article, I present a negative case for nondoxasticism according to which, in the paradigm case of self-deception, there is no explanatory need to attribute the self-deceived person either their undesired belief that p, or their desired belief that ∼p. Folk psychology is replete with concepts other than belief, and if we bear this in mind, it becomes clear that the explanatory roles for which the self-deceived person's purported beliefs have traditionally been enlisted can be comfortably filled without recourse to belief. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  48
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception. Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.
    Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  48
    Kevin Kinghorn (2007). Spiritual Blindness, Self-Deception and Morally Culpable Nonbelief. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):527–545.
    While we may not be able simply to choose what we believe, there is still scope for culpability for what we come to belief. I explore here the distinction between culpable and non-culpable theistic unbelief, investigating the process of self-deception to which we can voluntarily contribute in cases where we do become culpable for failing to believe something.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  22
    David Livingstone Smith (2014). Self-Deception: A Teleofunctional Approach. Philosophia 42 (1):181-199.
    This paper aims to offer an alternative to the existing philosophical theories of self-deception. It describes and motivates a teleofunctional theory that models self-deception on the subintentional deceptions perpetrated by non-human organisms. Existing theories of self-deception generate paradoxes, are empirically implausible, or fail to account for the distinction between self-deception and other kinds of motivated irrationality. Deception is not a uniquely human phenomenon: biologists have found that many non-human organisms deceive and are deceived. A close analysis (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  32
    Stanley Paluch (1967). Self-Deception. Inquiry 10 (1-4):268-278.
    Is it possible for me to believe what I know not to be the case? It certainly does not seem possible for me, at the same time, to be aware of the fact that a given proposition is true and yet believe that the proposition is false. Models of self?deception which have the implication that this is possible are usually described as ?paradoxical?. However, many philosophers believe that there are genuine cases of self?deception which non?paradoxical models of self?deception mirror and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50.  33
    Thomas Sturm (2007). Self-Deception, Rationality, and the Self. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):73-95.
    This essay is a plea for the view that philosophers should analyze the concept of self-deception more with the aim of having useful applications for empirical research. This is especially desirable because psychologists often use different, even incompat-ible conceptions of self-deception when investigating the factual conditions and con-sequences, as well as the very existence, of the phenomenon. At the same time, philosophers who exploit psychological research on human cognition and reasoning in order to better understand self-deception fail (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000