Search results for 'self-knowledge' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
     
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  2. Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
  3.  58
    Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; (...)
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  4. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction (...)
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  5. C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and (...)
     
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  6. U. Neisser (1988). Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):35-59.
    Self-knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different 'self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or 'self-concept' (...)
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  7.  99
    Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from (...)
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  8.  22
    Quassim Cassam (forthcoming). What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge. Synthese:1-19.
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ , and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent (...)
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  9.  50
    Peter Langland-Hassan (2015). Self-Knowledge and Imagination. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):226-245.
    How do we know when we have imagined something? How do we distinguish our imaginings from other kinds of mental states we might have? These questions present serious, if often overlooked, challenges for theories of introspection and self-knowledge. This paper looks specifically at the difficulties imagination creates for Neo-Expressivist, outward-looking, and inner sense theories of self-knowledge. A path forward is then charted, by considering the connection between the kinds of situations in which we can reliably say that another (...)
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  10.  56
    Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) (2003). New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  11. Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese (15):1-26.
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual (...)
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  12. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (2013). Authenticity and Self‐Knowledge. Dialectica 67 (2):157-181.
    We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (...)
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  13. Christopher Peacocke (1998). Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 83.
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...)
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  14. Conor McHugh (2010). Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle. Synthese 173 (3):231 - 257.
    I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you (...)
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  15.  93
    Akeel Bilgrami (2000). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.
    Once this integrated position is fully in place, the book closes with a postscript on how one might fruitfully view the kind of self-knowledge that is pursued ...
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  16. Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
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  17. Quassim Cassam (ed.) (1994). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability (...)
     
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  18. Richard A. Moran (1997). Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61.
    remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will (...)
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  19. Neil Van Leeuwen (2012). Perry on Self-Knowledge. In Albert Newen Raphael van Riel (ed.), Identity, Language, and Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI Publications
    The self-notion is an essential constituent of any self-belief or self-knowledge. But what is the self-notion? In this paper, I tie together several themes from the philosophy of John Perry to explain how he answers this question. The self-notion is not just any notion that happens to be about the person in whose mind that notion appears, because it's possible to have ways of thinking about oneself that one doesn't realize are about oneself. Characterizing the self-notion properly (and hence (...)
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  20.  68
    Keith Hossack (2002). Self-Knowledge and Consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.
    The Identity Thesis, proposed by Reid for the case of sensations, and extended by Brentano to conscious states generally, says that a state is conscious iff it is identical with introspective knowledge of its own instantiation. The Thesis offers simple explanations of a number of puzzling features of introspective self-knowledge, and unites the problems of introspection, consciousness and knowledge in the single problem of the metaphysical nature of conscious states. It does nothing to solve the latter problem, but it (...)
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  21.  33
    Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.) (2008). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    The essays featured in this collection seek to deepen our understanding of self-knowledge, to solve some of the genuine (and to resolve some of the spurious) ...
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  22. David Manley (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-23.
    This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge the traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute 'strong privileged access', and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge.
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  23.  43
    Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability1. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. (...)
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  24.  29
    Shadi Bartsch (2006). The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire. University of Chicago Press.
    People in the ancient world thought of vision as both an ethical tool and a tactile sense, akin to touch. Gazing upon someone—or oneself—was treated as a path to philosophical self-knowledge, but the question of tactility introduced an erotic element as well. In The Mirror of the Self , Shadi Bartsch asserts that these links among vision, sexuality, and self-knowledge are key to the classical understanding of the self. Weaving together literary theory, philosophy, and social history, Bartsch traces (...)
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  25.  88
    Gary Ebbs (2005). Why Scepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining. Analysis 65 (287):237-244.
    In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument is self-undermining, it can (...)
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  26. Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2006). Deception in Psychology : Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge. Accountability in Research 13:259-275.
    Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play (...)
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  27.  51
    Gary Ebbs (2001). Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.
    In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences (...)
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  28.  64
    Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Kant and Nietzsche on Self-Knowledge. In João Constâncio (ed.), Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity.
    Kant recognizes two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of our sensations, and apperception, which is knowledge of our own activities. Both modes of self-knowledge can go astray, and are particularly prone to being distorted be selfish motives; thus, neither is guaranteed to provide us with comprehensive self-knowledge. Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that these two modes of self-knowledge (1) are not distinct and (2) are far more limited than Kant acknowledges. In (...)
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  29.  7
    Jan Bransen (2015). Self-Knowledge and Self-Love. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):309-321.
    In this paper I argue for the claim that self-love is a precondition for self-knowledge. This claim is relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate on self-knowledge, but mainly because it draws attention to the role of claims of self-knowledge in the larger context of our ordinary practice of rationalizing and appropriating our actions. In this practice it is crucial for persons to open-mindedly investigate the limits of their own responsible agency, an investigation that requires a warm and (...)
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  30. Ted Parent (2015). Self‐Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 55 (3):158-168.
    Several authors have argued that, assuming we have apriori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know apriori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know apriori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian's Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such apriori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth experiment, however, since it would (...)
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  31.  68
    Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.
    Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I (...)
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  32.  58
    Annalisa Coliva (2009). Self-Knowledge and Commitments. Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a (...)
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  33.  34
    Mavis Biss (2011). Aristotle on Friendship and Self-Knowledge: The Friend Beyond the Mirror. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):125.
    Aristotle's emphasis on sameness of character in his description of the virtuous friend as "another self" figures centrally in all his arguments for the necessity of friendship to self-knowledge. Although the attribution of the Magna Moralia to Aristotle is disputed, the comparison of the friend to a mirror in this work has encouraged many commentators to view the friend as a mirror that provides the clearest and most immediate image of one's own virtue. I will offer my own reading (...)
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  34. Matthew Boyle (2010). Bar-on on Self-Knowledge and Expression. Acta Analytica 25 (1):9-20.
    I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present (...)
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  35.  30
    Hamid Vahid (2003). Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):370-388.
    Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so-called 'slow switching argument') for the thesis that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. It will be claimed that the argument (...)
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  36. Mark McCullagh (2002). Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.
    Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self-knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts. no such person could fail to possess self-knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true (...)
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  37.  67
    Andrew F. Smith (2003). Semantic Externalism, Authoritative Self-Knowledge, and Adaptation to Slow Switching. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):71-87.
    I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence (...)
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  38.  74
    Mathieu Doucet (2012). Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this (...)
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  39.  2
    Franz Knappik (2015). Self-Knowledge About Attitudes: Rationalism Meets Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):183-198.
    Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist (...)
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  40.  45
    Rockney Jacobsen (1997). Self-Quotation and Self-Knowledge. Synthese 110 (3):419-445.
    I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (self-quotation) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting (...)
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  41.  73
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal (...)
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  42.  52
    R. Greene (2003). Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge and the Regress Problem. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):141-48.
    Abstract In the contemporary literature on self-knowledge discussion is framed by and large by two competing models of self-knowledge: the observational (or perceptual) model and the constitutive model. On the observational model self-knowledge is the result of ?cognitively viewing? one's mental states. Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, on the other hand, hold that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentional states. That is, self-ascription is a necessary condition for being in a particular mental state. Akeel Bilgrami is a (...)
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  43.  53
    Karsten R. Stueber (2002). The Problem of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):269-96.
    This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about (...)
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  44.  17
    Emer O'Hagan (2009). Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.
    Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart - the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound (...)
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  45.  89
    Ted A. Warfield (2005). Tyler Burge's Self-Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):169-178.
    The question of whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access is a question of ongoing concern within philosophy of mind. Some philosophers think that Tyler Burge's early work on what he calls "basic self-knowledge" shows that externalism and privileged access are compatible. I critically assess this claim, arguing that Burge's work does not establish the compatbility thesis.
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  46.  54
    Jordi Fernández (2013). Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self-deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein (...)
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  47.  85
    Steven Yalowitz (2000). A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):249-278.
    It is widely thought that dispositional accounts of content cannot adequately provide for two of its essential features: normativity and non-inferentially-based self-knowledge. This paper argues that these criticisms depend upon having wrongly bracketed the presumption of first-person authority. With that presumption in place, dispositional conceptions can account for normativity: conditions of correctness must then be presumed, ceteris paribus, to be successfully grasped in particular cases, and thus to result from semantic-constituting dispositions; error occurs when cetera are not paria. An (...)
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  48.  85
    Rachel Brown (2004). The Emplotted Self: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):279-300.
    Abstract The principal aim of this paper is to give a positive analysis of self-deception. I argue that self-deception is a species ?self-emplotment?. Through narrative self-emplotment one groups the events of one's life thematically in order to understand and monitor oneself. I argue that self-emplotment is an unextraordinary feature of mental life that is a precondition of agency. Self-emplotment, however, proceeds according to certain norms, some of which provide apparent justification for self-deceptive activity. A secondary aim of the paper is (...)
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  49.  46
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception. Minds and Machines 7 (4):515-529.
    Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some (...)
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  50.  36
    Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and Self-Knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.
    It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. (...)
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