Search results for 'self-representationalism' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 186.0
    According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.score: 180.0
    To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Uriah Kriegel (2012). In Defense of Self-Representationalism: Reply to Critics. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):475-484.score: 180.0
    In defense of self-representationalism: reply to critics Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9764-8 Authors Uriah Kriegel, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Tom McClelland (2012). Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Dissertation, Sussexscore: 180.0
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2005). The Limits of Representationalism: A Phenomenological Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):355-371.score: 120.0
  6. Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.score: 90.0
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Tom McClelland (2013). The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):125 - 151.score: 90.0
    We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above certain physical properties. However, doubt is cast on this by the apparent epistemic gap that arises for attempts to account for phenomenal properties in physical terms. I argue that the epistemic gap should be divided into two more fundamental conceptual gaps. The first of these pertains to the distinctive subjectivity of phenomenal states, and the second pertains to the intrinsicality of phenomenal qualities. Stoljars ignorance hypothesis (IH) attempts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Précis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):443-445.score: 84.0
    This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Chad Kidd (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.score: 84.0
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2004). Representationalism and Beyond: A Phenomenological Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):88-108.score: 84.0
  11. Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.score: 60.0
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Neil Mehta (2013). Is There a Phenomenological Argument for Higher-Order Representationalism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.score: 60.0
    In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press.score: 60.0
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.score: 54.0
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Miguel Angel Sebastian (forthcoming). Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer It to Me? Philosophical Topics.score: 54.0
    In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. -/- Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Thomas McClelland (2014). Receptivity and Phenomenal Self‐Knowledge. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):293-302.score: 48.0
    In this article, I argue that an epistemic question about knowledge of our own phenomenal states encourages a certain metaphysical picture of consciousness according to which phenomenal states are reflexive mental representations. Section 1 describes and motivates the thesis that phenomenal self-knowledge is ‘receptive’: that is, the view that a subject has knowledge of their phenomenal states only insofar as they are inwardly affected by those states. In Sections 4 and 3, I argue that this model of phenomenal self-knowledge is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Frank Hofmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge of Experience and Evidence. Erkenntnis 71 (1):19 - 34.score: 42.0
    The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Keith A. Wilson (2013). Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience. Dissertation, University of Warwickscore: 42.0
    Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism — the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — that is set out in Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004) constitutes a powerful, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Frank Hofmann, The Epistemological Role of Consciousness for Introspective Self-Knowledge.score: 42.0
    Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.score: 36.0
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Holger Lyre (2008). Handedness, Self-Models and Embodied Cognitive Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):529–538.score: 36.0
    The paper presents and discusses the “which-is-which content of handedness,” the meaning of left as left and right as right, as a possible candidate for the idea of a genuine embodied cognitive content. After showing that the Ozma barrier, the non-transferability of the meaning of left and right, provides a kind of proof of the non-descriptive, indexical nature of the which-is-which content of handedness, arguments are presented which suggest that the classical representationalist account of cognition faces a perplexing problem of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Bo Dahlin (2012). Bildning Till Verklighet Och Icke-Representationell. Studier I Pædagogisk Filosofi 1 (1):55-71.score: 36.0
    This paper explores the educational significance of the critique of representationalism. As it includes the notion of non-representational knowledge, Rudolf Steiner’s epistemology is introduced and further linked to elements in Bergson and Deleuze. Humboldt’s idea of Menschenbildung as the central function of knowledge is brought in, since both Humboldt and Steiner emphasise knowledge as mediating the interplay between self and world, producing a deeper sense of reality. Such an education must respect the living nature of genuine concepts as well as (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Kenneth Williford (2006). Zahavi Versus Brentano: A Rejoinder. Psyche 12 (2).score: 30.0
    Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Italo Testa (2009). Recognition, Skepticism and Self-Consciousness in the Young Hegel. Fenomenologia E Società 32 (2):117-132.score: 30.0
    The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I will dwell (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Uriah Kriegel (2006). Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives. In Morris Moscovitch, Evan Thompson & P. Zelazo (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. 35--66.score: 30.0
    This chapter surveys current approaches to consciousness in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. It focuses on five approaches, to which I will refer as mysterianism, dualism, representationalism, higher-order monitoring theory, and self-representationalism. With each approach, I will present in order (i) the leading account of consciousness along its line, (ii) the case for the approach, and (iii) the case against the approach. I will not issue a final verdict on any approach, though by the end of the chapter it should be (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Introspection and Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.score: 24.0
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In , Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 285--306.score: 24.0
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Brie Gertler (2001). Introspecting Phenomenal States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.score: 24.0
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Are Minimal Representations Still Representations? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369.score: 24.0
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific pragmatism (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Dorothée Legrand (2005). Transparently Oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5).score: 24.0
    Different points of Metzinger's position makes it a peculiar form of representationalism: (1) his distinction between intentional and phenomenal content, in relation to the internalism/externalism divide; (2) the notion of transparency defined at a phenomenal and not epistemic level, together with (3) the felt inwardness of experience. The distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive phenomenal internality will allow me to reconsider Metzinger's theory of the self and to propose an alternative conception that I will describe both at an epistemic and a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Mark Johnston (2009). Saving God: Religion After Idolatry. Princeton University Press.score: 24.0
    Is your God really God? -- Believing in God -- On the "names" of God -- The meaning of "God" and the common conception of God -- What is salvation? -- Salvation versus spiritual materialism -- The idolatrous religions -- The ban on idolatry -- Idolatry as perverse worship -- Graven images and the highest one -- Idolatry as servility -- The rhetoric of idolatrousness -- The same God -- The Pharisees' problem with Jesus -- Could we be idolaters? -- (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Vittorio Gallese & Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365 – 388.score: 24.0
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Greg Janzen (2008). The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins.score: 24.0
    Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, implicit awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or what-it-is-like, dimension of conscious experience, defending (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. M. Bitbol & C. Petitmengin (2013). A Defense of Introspection From Within. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):269-279.score: 24.0
    Context: We are presently witnessing a revival of introspective methods, which implicitly challenges an impressive list of in-principle objections that were addressed to introspection by various philosophers and by behaviorists. Problem: How can one overcome those objections and provide introspection with a secure basis? Results: A renewed definition of introspection as “enlargement of the field of attention and contact with re-enacted experience,” rather than “looking-within,” is formulated. This entails (i) an alternative status of introspective phenomena, which are no longer taken (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Sacha Loeve (2011). Sensible Atoms: A Techno-Aesthetic Approach to Representation. [REVIEW] Nanoethics 5 (2):203-222.score: 24.0
    This essay argues that nano-images would be best understood with an aesthetical approach rather than with an epistemological critique. For this aim, I propose a ‘techno-aesthetical’ approach: an enquiry into the way instruments and machines transform the logic of the sensible itself and not just the way by which it represents something else. Unlike critical epistemology, which remains self-evidently grounded on a representationalist philosophy, the approach developed here presents the advantage of providing a clear-cut distinction between image-as-representation and other modes (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Zoltan Veres (2008). Hiding Within Representation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9):131-135.score: 24.0
    The 'playful affirmation', as Uziel Awret calls it, turns into a joyful affirmation of a theoretical challenge in a philosophical space set up by the many questions concerning the nature of consciousness. This is especially because the 'Las Meninas and the search for self-representation' (Awret, this volume) has been written in the spirit of an interplay between different modes and approaches, and also the different philosophical traditions, for dealing with the 'enigma' it presents. Bringing Velasquez's Las Meninas into the bigger (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Peter Reynaert (2007). Phenomenology Encounters Cognitive Science. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:105-110.score: 24.0
    The paper argues for the relevance of phenomenology for the contemporary debate about a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Phenomenology's analysis of intentionality in terms of the conscious act, its representational content and the intentional object sustains an interpretation of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of the conscious mental acts themselves and not of their content. On the basis of this anti-representationalist clarification of the nature of qualia, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Thomas K. Metzinger (1999). Subjekt Und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität Phänomenalen Bewußtseins Vor Dem Hintergrund Einer Naturalistischen Theorie Mentaler Repräsentation. In [Book Chapter].score: 24.0
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Paul Bernier (2014). Diversité du représentationnalisme de la conscience. Philosophiques 41 (1):37-56.score: 24.0
    This article discusses various versions of Consciousness Representationalism. Its main purpose is to defend an interpretation of the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness (SRTC) according to which the content of a conscious state is a de re proposition which is constituted, in part, by the very conscious state itself. I first undescore some important problems for the Representational Theory of Consciousness (RTC), which is one of the most influential approach in the literature. I argue that the main rival theory, the Higher-Order (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Sven Bernecker (2008). Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and Consciousness. In , Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 55--74.score: 21.0
    In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. The second type of self-awareness he (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Bill Brewer (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, Mass: Mit Press. 291-€“303.score: 21.0
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. J. Campbell (1995). The Body Image and Self-Consciousness. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 29--42.score: 21.0
    in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez (eds.), The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995), 29-42.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Shaun Gallagher & Anthony J. Marcel (2002). The Self in Contextualized Action. In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 273.score: 21.0
    This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the self. First, we (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Tomis Kapitan (2006). Indexicality and Self-Awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 379--408.score: 21.0
    Self-awareness is commonly expressed by means of indexical expressions, primarily, first- person pronouns like.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. John Barresi (2001). Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. 141-161.score: 21.0
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.) (1992). Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 21.0
    This volume contains an array of essays that reflect, and reflect upon, the recent revival of scholarly interest in the self and consciousness. Various relevant issues are addressed in conceptually challenging ways, such as how consciousness and different forms of self-relevant experience develop in infancy and childhood and are related to the acquisition of skill; the role of the self in social development; the phenomenology of being conscious and its metapsychological implications; and the cultural foundations of conceptualizations of consciousness. Written (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Diana T. Meyers (ed.) (1997). Feminists Rethink the Self. Westview Press.score: 21.0
    How is women’s conception of self affected by the caregiving responsibilities traditionally assigned to them and by the personal vulnerabilities imposed on them? If institutions of male dominance profoundly influence women’s lives and minds, how can women form judgments about their own best interests and overcome oppression? Can feminist politics survive in face of the diversity of women’s experience, which is shaped by race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, as well as by gender? Exploring such questions, leading feminist thinkers have (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. 209-235.score: 18.0
    This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Paul Silva (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.score: 18.0
    An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000